Viennese Culture and Politics, 1861 to 1938
Everyday Expressions of 'German' Identity

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FOREWORD

Acknowledgements

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This work was undertaken on a part-time basis, but funding came through my continuing to work full-time elsewhere. After many years as a consultant in the Information Systems business, a return to the study of History proved too much to resist. I quit consultancy and joined the City of London Corporation in 2005, in a role that was less demanding than

consultancy, but still full-time. My employers at the City have shown considerable understanding. Without flexible working arrangements, and a lengthy unpaid leave of absence so that I could carry out research in Vienna in 2009, this work would not have been completed. I am grateful to all my colleagues at the City who have helped this to happen

Finally, none of this would have happened without the constant and loving encouragement of my partner Christine. She encouraged me to make the leap back into the study of History, knowing how much History in general, and this study of Vienna in particular, meant to me. This work has taken a number of years, and Christine has never lost faith that it would be completed and be worthwhile. For this, and for all the other things, I am so much more than grateful to her.

Some General Notes

Translations

All translations from the original languages, unless taken from a work already translated into English, are mine. Any mistakes or misunderstandings are therefore mine.

Place Names

In the multilingual Habsburg Empire, the language used for place names formed a source of much conflict. In this work, where a commonly accepted English version of a place name is available, it is used. Since the vast majority of references to place names that came from the archives were in German, the German name is generally used in these instances. Where necessary, an indication is given of the name of a place as it would appear in current English usage.

The Districts of Vienna

The Viennese often refer to their City's districts not by their name, but by the number allocated to them at the time of incorporation into the city. So, Ottakring is commonly referred to as 'the sixteenth'. In this work, the full name is usually given, except occasionally in the footnotes. As many reorganisations of the city have taken place in the last 160 years or so, a map of modern day Vienna is provided in Appendix C. Vienna's districts are customarily indicated by Roman numerals, and that is the practice here.

ABBREVIATIONS

ABPD	Archiv der Bundespolizeidirektion	
ABPD St	Archiv der Bundespolizeidirektion Strafpolizeiliche Agenden	Where neither St or V stated, files are not separated in certain years.
ABPD V	Archiv der Bundespolizeidirektion Verwaltungspolizeiliche Agenden	
AEDW	Archiv der Erzdiözese Wien	
AEDW AOCk	Alt-Ottakring Parish *Chronik*	
AEDW AOCor	Alt-Ottakring Parish Correspondence	
AEDW GrCk	Grinzing Parish *Chronik*	
AEDW NOCk	Neu-Ottakring Parish *Chronik*	
AEDW NOCor	Neu-Ottakring Parish Correspondence	
AEDW SRCk	St. Rochus Parish *Chronik*	
AEDW SRCor	St. Rochus Parish Correspondence	
AEDW WäCk	Währing Parish *Chronik*	
AEDW WäCor	Währing Parish Correspondence	
AEDW WeCk	Weinhaus Parish *Chronik*	
AEDW WeCor	Weinhaus Parish Correspondence	
AHYB	Austrian History Yearbook	
AO Pfarrblatt	*Alt-Ottakringer Pfarrblatt*	
AV Pfarrblatt	*Katholische Aktion in der Alservorstadt*, changed to *Pfarrblatt der Alservorstadt* in October 1938, after Catholic Action was suppressed.	
AZ	*Arbeiter-Zeitung*	
Br Pfarrblatt	*Breitenfelder Pfarrblatt*	
dkB	*Das kleine Blatt*	
Gr Pfarrblatt	*Grinzinger Pfarrnachrichten*	
HG Pfarrblatt	*Heiliger Geistbote*	

Abbreviations (Continued)

Hs Pfarrblatt	*Hernalser Pfarrblatt*
MT Pfarrblatt	*Maria-Treu, Piaristenkirche Monatsblatt*
NFP	*Neue Freie Presse*
NL Pfarrblatt	*Neulerchenfelder Pfarr-Blatt*
NO Pfarrblatt	*Mitteilungen der Pfarre Neu-Ottakring*
ÖBL	*Österreichisches Biographisches Lexikon 1815–1950*
ÖNB	Österreichische Nationalbibliothek
ÖNB Musik	Österreichische Nationalbibliothek Musiksammlung
ÖNB Zeitung	Österreichische Nationalbibliothek Zeitungssammlung
RP	*Reichspost*
SLG Pfarrblatt	*St. Laurenz-Gertrudsblatt*
SR Pfarrblatt	*St. Rochus Pfarrblatt*
WbiR	Wienbibliothek im Rathaus
WBiR Handschrift	Wienbibliothek im Rathaus Handschriftsammlung
WbiR MkS	Wienbibliothek im Rathaus Musiksammlung
We Pfarrblatt	*Weinhauser Pfarrblatt*
WZ	*Wiener Zeitung*
WVLW	Wiener Volksliedwerkstatt

INTRODUCTION: THE AIMS, DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURE OF THIS WORK

The Aims Of This Work

This is a work about identity and belonging in Vienna between 1861 and 1938. It engages with one of the great debates in Austrian history, concerning the nature, aims, depth and extent of radical German nationalist feeling that existed in the city in the period down to 1938. In particular, it addresses the level of support that existed among radical groups on the Right in favour of the joining of Austria and Germany into one country. This aim was known in German as *Anschluss*, which translates as union, and many, often small, political parties put it at the top of their priorities.[1] This aim of joining all Germans together was also known as the Pan-German policy, as it was theoretically based on bringing together all Germans in one country, regardless of the state in which they then lived. The main focal points for early Pan-German efforts, however, were the lands which were to be brought together as the German Empire in 1871 and the German-speaking parts of the Habsburg Empire. After the First World War, Germany and Austria were the main, if not only, points of attention. Switzerland and its German-speaking population received little Pan-German attention, perhaps because of the long independence of Switzerland outside of the Holy Roman Empire.[2]

In examining radical German nationalism in Vienna over this period, much of the historiography has rested on an assumption that German nationalist sentiment was expressed in support for such an *Anschluss*.[3] In this view, the outburst of pro-*Anschluss* enthusiasm in 1938 in Vienna – and elsewhere in Austria – was therefore a genuine and long-held expression of support for a German nationalist position. Yet throughout the period there was much disagreement about how, or even whether, *Anschluss* should be achieved, what kind of German state it would be desirable to join and what role Austrians – and Austria – should play within this state. There was also much disagreement over many decades about what it meant to be German, and who should belong as a German. In terms of this debate, the essence of the Germany that was on offer in 1938 presented a radical solution that can be expressed in three brief sentences. All Germans should be brought together in one state. A German was ethnically defined. A Jew was not a German.

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[1] See, for instance, Alfred D. Low, *The Anschluss Movement 1931-1938,* (New York: East European Monographs, 1984).

[2] Henry Cord Meyer, 'Mitteleuropa in Pan-German Political Geography', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 36, No. 3, 1946, pp.178-194.

[3] Barbara Jelavich on Low, *Anschluss 1931-1938*, in an untitled review in *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 91, No.5, 1986, p.1241.

If they are taken at face value, the crowds that gathered in Vienna to greet the arrival of Hitler shortly after the *Anschluss* suggest that the Viennese did support these three elements of the radical vision being put forward in 1938. The size of the crowds suggests the extent of German nationalist feeling. The passion on display suggests that these people were willing supporters of the *Anschluss,* gladly surrendering the independence of Austria. More than this, however, these people must have understood the essence of the German state to which Austria was being joined. The anti-Jewish violence that swept the country as these crowds gathered suggests that, for these participants at least, this was an enthusiastic endorsement of a racial, antisemitic, exclusionary vision of what it meant to be German.[4] Again, taken at face value, the members of these crowds seem confident that they belonged, that they were not excluded, and that they were part of the new order.[5]

Yet, as there had been so much debate in Vienna over these very ideas over many years, whether the support that these crowds appeared to show for *Anschluss* was widespread among the population in general, even on the Right, must be questioned. The purpose of this work is therefore to address two key questions. First, by 1938, had support for a radical, exclusionary German nationalism become deeply embedded in the political and social life of Vienna? Second, was *Anschluss* the fulfilment of the visions that those with radical, exclusionary, definitions of being German had been supporting in the lead-up to 1938? In order to understand whether these scenes were a momentary outburst, or the expression of a whole-hearted endorsement of this particular realisation of *Anschluss*, the work therefore focuses on competing, and yet at times overlapping, visions that evolved in Vienna of what it should mean to be German. In particular, this work focuses on those defined here as the radical Right, who promoted visions of being German which were predominantly based on the idea that an attributed ethnic origin could exclude someone from being German. The work aims to show how deeply these visions had penetrated Viennese thinking, who was promoting them and what they meant.

The Foundations Of This Work: Theories Of Nationalism And The Historiography On Vienna

To present the events of March 1938 as simply the outcome of a struggle between different radical German nationalist visions would be misleading at many levels, however, and a substantial body of work has been developed which has examined nationalism in Vienna over different periods leading to 1938. Historians have shown that many individuals and

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[4] See G.E.R. Gedye, *Fallen Bastions: the Central European Tragedy*, (London: Gollancz, 1942), pp.294-298, for a description of events on the night of the *Anschluss.*

[5] For a brief discussion of the meaning of crowds for power and belonging, see Ralph H. Turner, untitled review of 'Crowds And Power' by Elias Canetti, *Contemporary Society*, (1980), Vol.9, No.1, pp.142-144.

groups in the city, and in the wider Empire and the First Republic, rejected not just *Anschluss* nationalism, but nationalism of any kind, and that nationalism, German or otherwise, was just one position that people might support, especially in the pre-1918 period.[6] The present work is a contribution to the debate on the importance and nature of nationalism over the period, in examining the way it played a part in people's daily lives.

Recent works have shown how social, cultural and economic matters interacted with the political, whether during the Empire or the First Republic. This has been shown to apply in many locations, beyond Austria's borders, where daily life, not just the efforts of state-builders, affects the strength of national feeling.[7] There has been excellent work on Viennese, Austrian and Habsburg history, but there remains much to do, particularly in identifying the mechanisms by which local concerns were linked to wider events in a long-lasting way, not just as a spontaneous reaction to happenings elsewhere. The field of nationalism studies has contributed many models which can be considered as starting points for analysis.[8] This work takes existing concepts from this field, and extends and categorises them, so that distinctions can be drawn between different kinds of nationalist behaviour and the objectives of different nationalists. This enhances understanding of how nationalistic behaviour by different groups could take on very different characters and have very different aims. The concept of 'banal nationalism' – developed by Michael Billig, and covered in more detail later – is extended and applied as a way of identifying how far nationalism entered the conscious and subconscious attitudes of the people of Vienna.[9] Banal nationalism helps to establish the profundity of nationalist sentiment against ephemeral or opportunistic expressions. It also helps to understand how identity was being shaped and perceived.

Study of the historiography on Vienna on the one hand, and an analysis of the literature on nationalism as a phenomenon on the other, leads to a clear conclusion: a successful attempt to understand the nature and scope of nationalist behaviour in Vienna must extend to a study of the meaning, evolution and use of a wide range of day-to-day expressions of identity, such as social life and popular entertainments, street names and business advertising, 'high' culture and sport, posters and meeting places. Such a study builds a picture of the experiences of daily life in Vienna and how interpretations of German identity were promoted and absorbed. This work therefore looks beyond the traditionally identified efforts

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[6] This includes works such as Eagle Glasheim, *Noble Nationalists*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005).

[7] See, for instance, Tim Baycroft, *Culture, Identity And Nationalism: French Flanders In The Nineteenth And Twentieth Centuries*, (London: Boydell, 2004).

[8] See pages 39 to 45 of this work for a survey of some of the main theories to emerge from the field of Nationalism studies.

[9] Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London: Sage, 1995).

and aims of nationalists. It shows that while the pamphlets, newspapers and rallies of nationalists were important in the development of ideas of Germanness, the overall experience of daily culture also contributed over time to the struggle between different visions of the nation.

From this examination, one conclusion is that no single model of the nation, or of the workings of nationalism, is sufficient to contribute to an understanding of events in Vienna. The nation was defined and promoted in many ways even by those who saw it as a primary source of, and symbol for, identity. While orators and politicians often gave the impression that the nation had its own force, and spoke in terms that created a form of reification of the nation, what emerges from the contrasting and sometimes conflicting definitions and uses of the nation is the nation as a construct. Definitions of the nation were used flexibly, and different aspects of the nation were stressed at different times. This was the case not just in terms of different people using different definitions. One person or group could stress different aspects at different times, stressing different elements, such as religion or culture, that were said to define the nation, in order to emphasize the unity of people who claimed to be German. The same person or group could use the same elements to highlight divisions between competing visions of German identity. The one core aspect of nationalism upon which Nationalists agreed was that there is an 'us', however defined, and that there is an 'other', which does not belong. This was a powerful motivating force for those who believed in the nation. The intentions and consequences and of this belief were, however, extremely varied. They ranged from a nationalist-inspired pride in German culture to the desire to inflict harm on those who did not belong.

An Introduction To The Archival Sources And Their Results

The approach of this work is to examine the links between everyday culture, identity formation, power and influence. The principal archives that have been used were therefore selected because they were from organisations which kept a close eye on the daily life of Vienna in the period under consideration. Other archives that have been used recorded popular culture and informal influences on the shaping of opinion. Individuals and groups who stood out in their contribution to daily culture, and whose positions at least inclined to being supportive of the opinions and views of those on the radical Right, were identified for analysis. As the radical Right covered, at times, a relatively broad spectrum of views, a broad range of individuals and groups was uncovered.

The archives contributed to the approach of this work, which is similar to, but different from, the formal approach of an *Alltagsgeschichte.* While an *Alltagsgeschichte* looks at the experiences of the masses and attempts to extract direct causal links with wider events, this

work does not take the approach that the 'history of everyday life draws explicit causal connections – in all their contradictory tensions – between the processes of the microhistorical context and the metanarratives of macrohistory'.[10] This work does look at the connection between major events and local interpretations, but its focus is mainly on the local level, at how groups and individuals influenced, and attempted to influence, each other through their contacts, in many ways.

This work therefore focuses to some extent on influence, rather than power, and it is recognised here that there are limits to the exercise of influence. One person or group does not usually have a monopoly on trying to exercise influence on other individuals or groups. Nevertheless, the people who came to be examined here – the priests, the local politicians, members of the intellectual classes – were influences on the everyday experience of those that they encountered because of the near daily contact they had with them and, among other factors, because of their social and economic status. The people examined contributed to defining how wider events and significant ideas were experienced by many of those around them. They mediated events and attempted to shape perceptions of identity and belonging.

Two particularly rich sources of material – the Police archives and the archives of the Archdiocese of Vienna – are highlighted here, for the findings they provided and the way they influenced the development of this work. These archives were expected to provide evidence that would build up a series of pictures of the less overtly political activities of radical German nationalists: that is, activities such as charitable work or social events which could be turned to political advantage. The aim with the Police archive was to gather examples of life across the city, and the material here did provide much information on political rallies, reports of known activists, fund-raising events and societies that were nominally social, but which had political intent. These materials sat alongside others which showed the monitoring of socialists and anarchists, suspected foreign spies, and members of the aristocracy who might bring the Habsburg system into disrepute. These were materials which drew a picture of nationalist activity, in its wider context. This ranged from reports of the wearing of banned symbols of German nationalism in the 1850s and 1860s, through early Pan-German political successes in local elections in the 1880s and political street disturbances in the 1890s, to the monitoring of Nazi activity in the 1920s and 1930s.

The aim with the Archdiocesan archives was to concentrate on two districts of the city, and to choose two parishes in each, in order to gain a starting point for more detailed insight into activities of which the priests were aware. These would be set in the context of the general

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[10] Paul Steege, Andrew Bergerson, Maureen Healy and Pamela Swett, 'The History Of Everyday Life: A Second Chapter', *Journal Of Modern History*, 2008, Vol. 80, pp.358-378.

experience of the city, as found in the Police archives and in the secondary literature. It was expected that some participation by priests in politics – in the broadest sense – would be found, but this archive was mainly expected to provide observations of society, helping to build a rich picture of life in the districts. The correspondence files of these parishes, as well as the parish *Chronik*, also known as the *Gedenkbuch* – that is, the annual record of activities and events for the parish – were chosen for investigation.

The districts of Ottakring, in the West of Vienna, and Währing, in the North West, were chosen, because they offer comparisons and contrasts, both in their social composition and in the ways in which they are sometimes perceived. Ottakring, for instance, has been described as 'exclusively proletarian'.[11] In the period under investigation, however, the district had a number of areas of prosperity and a strong bourgeois presence, as it still has. Small businesses have always been prominent and Ottakring retains a core of support for parties promoting a bourgeois agenda. Under the restricted suffrage of the last years of the Empire, Ottakring's district council was dominated by an antisemitic Christian Social Party that was loyal to the Habsburgs, although it did return the first Socialist MP to the Austrian Parliament, the *Reichsrat*. Ottakring went on to become known as a significant centre of support for the Socialist movement.

Währing, by contrast, could be perceived as a bourgeois district. Its streets, its buildings, shops and public spaces, offer much more visible signs of affluence than Ottakring. Like Ottakring, it had a Christian Social controlled council in the last years of the Empire. However, the coming of democratic elections in the First Republic saw a Socialist majority and Socialist mayor in the district council. Währing also sent more Socialist representatives than bourgeois members to other elected bodies.[12] Again, though, it had a solid bourgeois core which participated, as the period progressed, in societies associated with bourgeois interests and in Christian Social activities. Währing was, however, unlike Ottakring, one of the strongest areas of support in Vienna for parties with a pro-*Anschluss* agenda. Most, if not all, of the Pan-German voters of Währing seem to have switched to the Nazis in elections to the Vienna City Council in 1932.[13] In this same election, the Nazis overtook the Christian Socials as the party with the largest share of the vote on the Right in the district. This suggests that at least these residents of Währing might have been among the crowds greeting the *Anschluss*.

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[11] Monika Glettler, *Die Wiener Tschechen um 1900: Strukturanalyse Einer Nationalen Minderheit in der Grossstadt*, (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1972), p.53.

[12] *Reichspost* (hereafter *RP*), 22nd October 1923, 25th April 1927 or 25th April 1932 contain detailed results for district, local, regional and national elections.

[13] Chapter 9 and Appendix E have more detail on this election.

The Archdiocesan archives did yield much material on political life in the parishes and, by extension, the districts in which they were based. Often, this might be the recording of local electoral campaigns and their results, or the records of disputes between priest and local council over the funding of religious teaching in schools. More surprisingly, the material showed how some priests – by no means all, but a significant number – took a considerable part, if indirectly, in political life. Even in the relatively early part of the period under consideration, priests were quick to organise parishioners into anti-liberal coalitions when they felt this necessary. This evidence emerged from an in-depth analysis of four parishes, but to check whether such evidence was typical of wider patterns or anomalous, other parishes were then also examined, in different ways.

Leads from the diocesan archive pointed the need to investigate the *Chronik* and correspondence for the parish of St. Rochus in the Landstrasse. The *Chronik* of the parish of Grinzing, on the very outskirts of the city, was examined, to see if the relative distance from the city centre lent itself to different patterns of activity or opinions, compared with more central parishes. A number of other parishes were examined, at least in the later stages of the period to 1938, through a reading of parish newsletters found in the archives. Twelve parishes were examined from these primary sources. In addition, in order to broaden the range of analysis, a published survey of twenty five parish newsletters from the 1920s and 1930s, some of which were included in the examination of primary sources, was consulted.[14] From Chapter 3 onwards, this work shows that a number of priests, with or without a parish, were openly active politically, but that their most profound impact may have come through their use of apparently non-political spaces, such as the pulpit, parish newsletters, and pilgrimages.

In addition to the priests, another set of people emerged repeatedly from the archives, whether police, diocesan archives, National Library or places such as the archive of popular culture. These, broadly defined, were the social, business and voluntary associations, based on middle class memberships of small businessmen, self-employed members of the intellectual classes, such as lawyers and doctors, or the white collar employees who grew in number from the end of the nineteenth century, whether in some form of state employment or in the private sector. These groups played a highly visible part in the daily lives of their communities. Some of these, such as the singing associations and, later in the period, drama groups were extremely active.

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[14] Nina Scholz and Heine Heinisch, *'... alles werden sich die Christen nicht verfallen lassen'. Wiener Pfarren und die Juden in der Zwischenkriegszeit*, (Vienna: Czernin, 2001).

These groups were ostensibly non-political, but they are included in this work because the evidence uncovered in the course of this thesis and the findings of other commentators indicate that many were, in fact, highly political and were often a source of exclusionary visions of identity and belonging. Other commentators, as will be seen, have found that these groups also fulfilled political functions, acting as pathways to political participation. For instance, singing and gymnastics groups belonged to broader organisations that represented specific political viewpoints.[15] The members of these associations would have known this, and would have joined them at least in part because of this. They were joining organisation where they could meet like minded people.

In this work, associations are found defending a 'true German' spirit at the turn of the century. They turn out in large numbers for celebrations of the birthday of leading Christian Social figures. Later, reports tell of numerous associations turning out *en masse* to celebrate the survival from an assassination attempt of right-wing dictator Engelbert Dollfuss. One association even adopts an openly antisemitic name, thereby publicly declaring that its purpose is to attack Jews, Jewishness and other attributes by which it characterises Jews. These individual pieces provide clues as to the nature and activities of the associations. Their main significance for this work, however, is how they provided not just individual meeting places for people of like minds – since people join associations in order to meet similar people – but that they were parts of extensive social networks, places and points of intersection, where political opinions could be represented as part of a broader world picture. Associations of different kinds overlapped one another, and priests were often at their centre, the glue that bound them together. One striking instance of this will be seen in the coming together of associational life, antisemitic priest and apparently non-political activity in a pilgrimage that took on antisemitic political purpose. These examples scratch the surface of an apparently antisemitic culture, which has already been exposed in other associations not studied in depth here, such as the athletics and sporting associations.[16] This area would reward further research.

Power And Influence: The Archival Results And The Historiography On Vienna Taken Together

In the course of the research for this work, the first signs of the strengthening of this exclusionary vision came from the material to emerge from the diocesan archives. At the start of the period, the *Chroniken* and other writings of priests made few, if any, references

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[15] See page 20 of this work.

[16] See, for instance, Peter Pulzer, *The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria,* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), p.218.

to antisemitism. Without there being a simple linear progression, the findings from the priests were that, as the period progressed, antisemitic references became more commonplace, not for all priests, but for many. Significantly, priests also fell back on nationalist-inspired rhetoric of 'true' German or Aryan values. The same was true of many associations, which moved form describing themselves as being *'bürgerlich'* to being Christian and then, in some cases, to being 'Aryan'. Businesses followed similar paths.[17] While priests and others at times expressed doubts and fears as to how their world was developing, they were also capable of displays of considerable self-confidence in the rightness of their beliefs and in their ability to turn them into concrete expression in the everyday world.

In undertaking the research presented here, however, it was important to be mindful that if it was one thing to promote exclusion, it was quite another to have people accept this vision. This work has therefore considered whether, and how far, the promoters of exclusionary visions were successful, based on a study of a number of elements. These include material found in the archives and from published works on the historiography of Vienna, but the conclusions have also been reached through an understanding of the generic workings of influence. They have also been reached through the examination and application of other work which has been carried out on the influence of the clergy and of bourgeois associations on definitions of identity and belonging elsewhere in Europe through the nineteenth century and into the first half of the twentieth century. In the development of this work, following the priests, in particular, aided this work's attempts to study and understand the impact of banal processes. In this respect, this work's narrow geographical-cum-social focus over a relatively long period has had a similar effect to that of recent work which has gone beyond traditional boundaries, geographically, over a relatively short period, to take a trans-regional approach.[18] It has also allowed the groups studied here to be examined without losing sight of their place and significance as part of their wider bourgeois world and Viennese society in general.

Influence is not to be confused with power. Power may give the ability, among other things, to coerce people into behaving in certain ways, but it does not influence what people believe, or what they intrinsically want to support. One definition of influence is 'the capacity to have an effect on the character, development, or behaviour of someone', or 'the power to shape policy or ensure favourable treatment from someone, especially through status,

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[17] See page 174 of this work.

[18] Laurence Cole, ed., *Different Paths To The Nation*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), Introduction, p.2.

contacts, or wealth'.[19] In other words, influence, whether social, economic or moral, is not about forcing people into line, rather it has to do with persuading others to come round to a particular point of view, or to act in a particular way.

Influence can also be defined indirectly, where people attempt to find views that match their own, in order to justify them. This is known as 'confirmation bias'. This is the 'tendency to test one's beliefs or conjectures by seeking evidence that might confirm or verify them and to ignore evidence that might disconfirm or refute them'. This confirmation is important to the person looking for it, as it provides a 'rationale' for beliefs which are known, deep down, to be irrational. It is a bias 'which helps to maintain prejudices and stereotypes'.[20] This is expanded below, to explore how those expressing a radical and exclusionary vision of belonging might reach their audience, and who that audience might be. This is an important limit on influence, as not everyone will be influenced by a speaker, a pamphlet or an electoral campaign, and the propagators of such material know this. They know and accept the limits of their influence, but want to maximise this.

In analysing the effects of those attempting to exert influence, questions must be asked about why they made their efforts, how they went about their work, and whether evidence exists that they succeeded. Many of the associations that are studied here clearly possessed the attributes necessary to hold influence. They had memberships that were made up of men *(sic)* who had status and contacts. Even those who did not have wealth in absolute terms had relative wealth compared with wider society. Some owned businesses. Others were state employees, in relatively senior positions. Few priests possessed personal wealth. More, as will be seen, had contacts within the Church and beyond, where they would have been able to plan events, seek a favour, express an opinion, share views. Many will be seen enhancing their status through other factors: leading by example, demonstrating persistence and holding enormous amounts of self-belief. They were also highly visible in their local communities, and used every opportunity to promote their message.

Priests, for instance, used sermons with such overtly political messages that it was difficult to distinguish between their purposes for 'worship and political motivation'.[21] This does not mean that they were always successful in their mission but, as Bruce Pauley points out, regularly repeated propaganda does have an influence, at least on the susceptible:

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[19] "influence *noun*" *Oxford Dictionary of English*. Edited by Angus Stevenson. Oxford University Press, 2010. *Oxford Reference Online*. Oxford University Press. King's College London. 28 April 2012 http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t140.e0410270

[20] "confirmation bias *n.*" *A Dictionary of Psychology*. Edited by Andrew M. Colman. Oxford University Press 2009. *Oxford Reference Online*. Oxford University Press. King's College London. 29 April 2012 http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t87.e1772

[21] John Boyer, *Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna: Origins of the Christian Social Movement, 1848-1897,* (Chicago: University Of Chicago, 1981), p.119.

> 'Even though it is impossible to prove in any empirical way, it is also highly probable that six decades of anti-Semitic propaganda had left Austrian Jews so isolated socially, that few Christians were willing to help them in their hour of mortal danger. To argue otherwise is to suggest that propaganda has absolutely no influence on the public no matter how often it is repeated over no matter for how long a time.'[22]

This work presents not just the statements of the propagandists themselves, but the people they worked with, the people they influenced, and their opponents. Time and again, witnesses attest to the effect they had. This work looks at the aims of these activists, and the constituencies they expected to be able to reach and to influence. It considers how they needed luck, and how they needed to be prepared and able to take advantage of it when it came. In this case, as will be seen, these activists seized on the electoral change of the 1880s, to make their breakthrough.

Comments On The Principal Groups Examined

Some associations which participated in the development of an exclusionary vision of German identity in Vienna have been examined elsewhere. John Boyer has looked at the trade guilds. The student associations, the *Bürschenschaften*, have been examined by Peter Pulzer.[23] They have been examined in the wider contexts of Austria and the whole German-speaking world. The societies studied here, such as the singing groups, were part of a particular bourgeois world, with roots dating much earlier than the period studied here and across the wider German-speaking world. In Prussia, in the early nineteenth century, composer Carl Friedrich Zelter created rules to formalise the structure and conduct of singing societies, which he thought would lead through education to self-improvement. He created a 'singing group for patriotic German men, a *Liedertafel*, which became the model for countless other such groups in Germany.'[24] In this context, Germany should be taken to include Austria. As will also be seen, German patriotism, as experienced in these societies and others, took varying forms and had many intentions, and presents a lesson that we should not see 'German nationalism or national identity… as an undifferentiated whole, lurching its monolithic way through the nineteenth century into the disastrous twentieth'.[25]

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[22] Pauley, p.322

[23] See Pulzer, *Political Anti-Semitism*, pp.244-247.

[24] Celia Applegate, 'How German Is It? Nationalism and the Idea of Serious Music in the Early Nineteenth Century', 19th-Century Music, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Spring, 1998), pp. 274-296, here p.293.

[25] Applegate, p.277.

Men's singing groups may appear not to have a political intent at face value, but as early as the 1890s they divided between liberal, German nationalist, Christian Social and Social Democratic groups.[26] By the 1920s, the groups had rationalised into broadly bourgeois groups on the one hand, under the umbrella of the *Österreichischer Sängerbund* and, on the other, the Social Democratic *Österreichischer Arbeitersängerbund*. Theoretically, nothing prevented the members of these singing groups crossing over, but the ideological and party political boundaries between bourgeois and Marxist were too strong to be overcome on a permanent basis.[27]

Within Austria, however this is defined, and beyond Vienna, singing societies confirm the shifts that took place in debates about 'German' identity. Helmut Brenner has shown how singing societies in early 1860s Styria had mottos and performed programmes that 'left no doubt of their German convictions'.[28] Brenner goes on to indicate how, after 1866, these societies had difficulties in reconciling notions of German identity with the promotion of a separate Austrian Germanness.[29]

The evidence to emerge from this research also confirms that the boundaries within the bourgeois camp, between Vienna's Christian Socials and German nationalists, were often broken. The two groups may not have had the same vision for the nature of German identity, but they did, in different ways, attach importance to a shared German heritage. Many associations carried the words 'German' and 'Christian' in their names, but it should not be assumed that this implied support for a Pan-German vision that placed the nation as the primary source of identity, over and beyond other factors such as religion. Some of these associations were outside of the formal control of the Catholic Church, but others were Catholic and sat within one of a number of Church umbrella organisations such as *Katholische Aktion*. Their events were listed in Catholic parish newsletters of the 1920s and 1930s, or advertised in Christian Social publications.[30] They used 'German' in their names in the way they used Christian as a synonym for Catholic, with all that implied for a specific vision of German identity. Few, if any, would have rejected the idea that they had a German element to their identity. Many would have supported the Austrian German path, a separate path from that of the country that was called Germany, but they still possessed a kind of

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[26] Rudolf Flotzinger, 'Zum Topos von der Völker und Stände verbindenden Wirkung der Musik', *International Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Dec.,1981), pp. 91-101.

[27] Flotzinger, p.99.

[28] Helmut Brenner, 'Lechts und rinks nicht velwechsern! Zur Frage der Identitäten im steirischen Sängerwesen', Lied und populäre Kultur, 47. Jahrg. (2002), pp. 77-102, here p.82.

[29] Brenner, p.82.

[30] See page 174 of this thesis.

Pan-Germanism, perhaps one that was culturally or religiously defined, rather than politically.

The strength of this religious attachment should not be downplayed, and can be gauged from many quarters. Franz Eichert, an antisemitic journalist and convert to Catholicism, spoke of the fervour that attended many Catholic voluntary associations in the later 1880s.[31] Societies that had specifically Catholic names and intent were not alone in this, however, and there was also a favourable sentiment – '*kirchliche Gesinnung*' – towards the Church in numerous associations.[32] Conviction – *Gesinnung* – is the key word here. The societies were a world where the teachings of the Church were given considerable respect. This phenomenon was not peculiar to Vienna and, throughout the period examined here, the ordained representatives of the Catholic Church were adept at becoming part of social and political life across Europe in general.[33]

It had been expected, as mentioned, that the archives would show priests as participants in the social and cultural life of their parishes. Priests do emerge from the archives as frequent attendees at society events, as honoured guests, particularly on special occasions, who could bless these events, physically and metaphorically. However, the extent of their participation in attempting to shape politics and to define identities was a surprise. This discovery called for an examination of the extent and success of their influence in shaping and diffusing such exclusionary visions. The first prompt for this investigation came from the priests themselves, a number of whom boasted of their involvement, formally or informally, in politics. In the same manner as any investigation into the associations, questions would therefore have to be asked as to why priests became involved, how, and also as to the evidence for any success they might have achieved in their objectives.

John Boyer has rightly concluded that many factors contributed to the emergence from the 1870s onwards of what he terms the 'radical clergy'.[34] One factor he cites is that many were incapable of reconciliation with the modern world. This was not just a case of despairing at the new, capitalist economic conditions, but also rejection of the politically dominant liberal mindset of the mid-nineteenth century. Some desired a return to an imagined pre-capitalist past, as embodied by a Romantic Catholic corporatism, where parliamentary institutions and

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[31] Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, p.119

[32] Peter Leisching, 'Die römisch-katholische Kirche in Cisleithanien' in Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch, eds., *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918, Vol. IV: Die Konfessionen*, (Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1985), pp.1-247, here p.131.

[33] For examples from later in the period see James Bjork, 'Nations in the Parish: Catholicism and National Conflict in the Silesian Borderland, 1890-1922', in Michael Geyer and Hartmut Lehmann, eds., *Religion und Nation: Nation and Religion*, (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2004).

[34] Boyer, *Political Radicalism* See chapter 3, 'Catholic Politics in Vienna: The Radical Clergy and the Restoration of *Mittelstand* Society', pp.122-183.

representative politics would be replaced by a world of fixed hierarchies. Others were said to be angered by their exclusion from public life, and their marginalisation from a State for which they no longer had any formal use, a liberal denial to the clergy of meaningful social activity which had damaged their *bürgerlich* social respectability.[35] It may have been the case that some clergy saw politics as the only way to overcome their social isolation, as they sought new roles to replace those they had occupied under the pre-liberal social system.[36] Others were said to have frustrations over the decline in the value of their personal salaries and status, while others became radicalised out of the desire for social reform, and the need to improve the lot of their parishioners, living in the dreadful conditions of late nineteenth century Vienna. In these circumstances, the lower clergy needed to become radicalised to demonstrate to those they attempted to win round to their views that they were different from the upper hierarchy of the Viennese Catholic Church, which was close to the elites of society. They needed to legitimate their claims to moral leadership, by being seen to be of the people and for the people.

However, while Boyer and other commentators suggest no single cause for radicalisation, they do identify one cause above all others, in the desire of the clergy to respond to what they felt were liberal assaults on the Church. In particular, the clergy feared that liberal efforts to separate Church and State permanently would destroy not just the power and influence of the Church, but perhaps even the Church itself.[37] From tentative beginnings, they grew louder in their political and personal attacks on liberals and liberalism. Priests, and others, then labelled liberals as Jews. Anti-liberalism became antisemitism, and the two terms soon became mutually interchangeable in many hands.

To understand the impact of antisemitic activists requires, to some extent, a move beyond an analysis of formal politics. Politics should not be extrapolated into, say, the wider social development of antisemitism in Vienna. John Boyer, for instance, recognises that the priests were extremely active in the growth in Vienna of the Christian Social Party, but sees them, however, as playing 'a series of non-dominant agitatorial roles' in the rise of the Christian Socials, used for their ability to distort 'the religious values of the Church to serve the political purposes of the party machine'.[38] In this view, professional politicians exercised the real power in the party. This analysis may be correct from the viewpoint of the internal workings of the Christian Social Party, but this study is concerned with the general

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[35] Leisching, p.97.

[36] See Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, pp.122-183, on the clergy at the time.

[37] See, for instance, Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, p.137, on falls in the number of priests entering training.

[38] Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, p.115.

development of exclusionary visions of belonging, and it demonstrates that the wider role that the clergy played in the development of antisemitism was much more significant than that of low-level agitators. Their activism fostered the growth of the Party by helping, among other things, to change attitudes or to encourage the expression of antisemitic attitudes that had been secretly held.

Antisemitic priests played a significant part in Christian Social plans, and set about achieving their objectives through a combination of individual and collective effort. As individuals, they preached, wrote parish newsletters and used other ways to spread an exclusionary message. Priests, in order to be recognised as men of the people, threw themselves into the struggles over nationalism, antisemitism and anticlericalism.[39] They used their status as spiritual pastors and teachers of religion, they took part in activities involving economic, cultural and educational improvement. They were frequently engaged on official business, as a result of which they were in contact with the district authorities. By virtue of this, and simply from his role as parish priest, the 'priest had, in his commune – especially in Church matters – a special and influential position'.[40]

In order to judge whether these priests, and the associations that are studied here, were successful in their efforts to create a world where, paradoxically, belonging was defined by exclusion, a set of criteria needs to be identified that allows an objective assessment to be made. The first of these criteria is to recognise that none of these people would have believed that they could convert the whole of Vienna, not even all of Vienna's non-Jews, to their world view. They would have recognised that there were limits to their influence. They would have recognised, for instance, that they could not win over the liberal who believed in distinguishing Jews – and others – only by individual behaviour, not by alleged, attributed characteristics. They would have realised they could not reach Catholics who felt antisemitism was an irrational and un-Catholic stance.

Antisemitic activists were still, however, trying to reach a significant number of people in Vienna who might be influenced to support public antisemitism. They were looking to appeal to those who were antisemitic, but who kept their antisemitism quiet, to encourage them to take a stronger stance in the expression of their antisemitism. They were looking to encourage others, those looking for a justification for their antisemitism, to join an antisemitic group or political organisation, so that they could become part of an organised movement, or become more active. They were looking to provide a welcoming environment to those who were reticent about expressing their antisemitism in public. They wanted to

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[39] Leisching, p.99.

[40] Leisching, p.96

convert those who were susceptible, or weak, or afraid, or who were looking for simple explanations for the difficulties they faced, from people whom they trusted, who could be believed. We see this in, for example, the stories of those who fell under antisemitic influence when they were children, and who moved away when exposed to other views.

Potential antisemites may eventually have become open antisemites anyway, but organised antisemitism gave these potential antisemites somewhere to go, a place where antisemitism seemed like the natural order of the world. This was a place where, by extension, nationalism, German values, and alleged racial hierarchies, with the Aryans at their peak, could become normal, in the eyes of some people. It was not, however, just the actions of individual priests that counted. It was not even just the actions of priests collectively that made a difference in creating conditions for the flourishing of antisemitism where it was possible that this ideology might prosper. The collective actions of large parts of Viennese society produced an effect that was greater than the sum of the parts could have managed. The collective and overlapping impact of all of those studied here acted in the same way as banal nationalism, creating an atmosphere of antisemitism and exclusion that was welcomed by those who were receptive, and which was in turn built on by them.

As will be seen, many of the priests encountered here were confident that their influence could be used to convert antisemitic activities into concrete results, but this is a finding on their thoughts, and is not evidence to demonstrate that they really did have influence. The writings left behind by others support the views of these priests that they were men of influence but, again, in themselves individual statements are opinions. These writings become evidence of the influence wielded when they are viewed together, in terms of a cumulative witnessing that these men did have significance. For instance, *Reichspost* journalist Friedrich Funder, who attended open air rallies addressed by priests, expresses his admiration for the leadership they showed in building the movement. One priest who was active in Vienna in the 1920s and 1930s states that he took holy orders because he was inspired as a boy by the preaching of one of the most extreme of his antisemitic predecessors, Father Joseph Deckert. Evidence also comes in more tangible form from the significant sales of a parish newsletter published by the same Father Deckert. Opponents of those priests who spread an antisemitic message also attested to the influence of the priests. As will be seen, leading Social Democrats, liberal journalists and even, in later times, Austria's National Socialists commented on, and complained about, the role that these men took in political activity. In this sense at least, influence was demonstrated by the belief that these men were having an impact.

These priests were highly visible players on the antisemitic front, but the key in assessing the impact of these priests is not just to consider them individually, nor even as a group. It

is, instead, important to analyse them as part of the totality of antisemitic activities of all kinds, and from all sources, activities which were mutually reinforcing. This returns the focus of analysis of the activities and societies back to the level of Billig's banal processes. Priests and members of the intellectual classes may not have had contact every day with their intended constituencies – those that have been identified here – but they did impact on the everyday, normal experience of what was acceptable and appropriate, in terms of thinking, saying and doing. Visions of exclusion became an accepted part of the fabric of public life. Again, this has to be qualified with the phrase 'for certain constituencies'.

This was not just a Viennese or Austrian phenomenon, and much work has investigated the influence that clergy of different denominations could bring to bear on matters that were important to them. Research on Germany has shown how Protestant pastors supported pro-German Nationalist stances by being 'robed in authority and surrounded with the symbols of Christian tradition'.[41] Even as late as the 1930s, pastors were making resistance to Nazi ideas difficult to achieve. As Geyer remarks, what was to be resisted when 'publications one had been taught to respect, and one's own church leaders, from the pulpit…proclaimed the beauty and righteousness of the cause.'[42] The influence of the antisemitic Catholic priests in general should also not be downplayed:

> 'From the popular religious revivalism of the 1840s/1850s to the involvement of the Catholic hierarchy and parish clergy in the development of mass democratic politics during the last third of the century, religious language, practices, and institutions were, arguably, playing a greater role in European society at the beginning of the twentieth century than at the beginning of the nineteenth century'.[43]

There has been much debate about the relative role that different groups played in the development of antisemitism in Vienna. Bruce Pauley agrees with Boyer when he attributes the main responsibility for the rise of antisemitism to antisemitic politicians. Pauley, however, goes on to say that, behind these politicians, the Catholic clergy of Vienna was 'only slightly less responsible'.[44] This work agrees that, seen as part of a wider network of activists on the one hand, and also given their highly visible roles, individually and collectively the priests of Vienna had a major influence in the development of antisemitism and visions of exclusion in the city.

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[41] Geyer, pp.87-88.

[42] Geyer, p.87

[43] Bjork in Geyer, pp.207-208.

[44] Pauley, p.328.

This is not to propose a simplistic model that overplays the role and impact of those priests who undertook antisemitic activities. As Boyer has shown in his work on the Christian Social movement, it is necessary to examine the rise and consolidation of an exclusionary mindset from several angles.[45] It is also necessary to recognise that the importance that was attached to antisemitism as a definer of belonging or exclusion also varied over time. Similarly, proponents of exclusionary visions did not operate in isolation. The work of others would have helped reinforce their impact on the public imagination, while that of others would have worked against them.

The political activities of these priests were not intended to help pro-*Anschluss* nationalists. They did, however, help to create a world where antisemitism, and alongside it nationalism, with its similar ordering of people into groups and hierarchies based on attributed characteristics, came to be seen by many not just as a potential way of ordering the world, but as the most logical way of ordering it. They were not alone in this. Pan-Germans frequently used antisemitic language, for many purposes. This work shows that while antisemitism and nationalism are not the same thing, the antisemitic language used by these priests as the period progressed became more and more intertwined with the language of nationalism. Many of them spread the message that a good German was also a determined antisemite. Just as it has been demonstrated how, in Bohemia, the process of 'nationalising' all events, not just politics, acquired a momentum that became difficult to stop once it had started, a similar process appears to have been at work in Vienna.[46] Catholic priests were clearly contributing to an atmosphere which shaped perceptions of what it meant to be German, but they were also spreading a message of a separate path of Austrian German development. Catholic priests, and others, spread a message that German national spirit was linked to antisemitism, an idea whose diffusion became difficult to stop.

While priests appear in most of the chapters of this work, two relatively short chapters have been set aside to look closely at their activities at key points in this study. These show how patterns in their activities were developing over time. While this moves the efforts of these priests to the heart of this work, two contexts within which they exist must be examined. The first context is that of the activities of the pro-*Anschluss* nationalists. The second, and perhaps even more important context, is exposed by a number of sources which show how the expression of extreme German identity was aided by a world view where arbitrary divisions of people into 'us' and 'them' came to be considered as normal. This was a world of constant differentiation at many levels, including socially, ethnically, religiously. The

[45] In *Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna,* Boyer examines, among others, artisans, clergy and white collar employees.

[46] See Pieter Judson, *Guardians of the Nation*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006).

concept and act of differentiation based on nationalist principles became for many an important part of this world.

The Structure Of This Work

1861 is the starting point for this work, because this was the year that representative government, however limited, was properly implemented in the Habsburg Monarchy, after false starts in the previous year.[47] Local civil institutions were revived, so from this point onwards people began to develop a voice in the shaping of the state. The structure of this work reflects how the original questions, and questions raised by material coming out of the archival findings, have had to be addressed. Chapter 1 sets out two themes. One theme is the chronological superstructure of the work, a high level analysis of events across the whole period, in order to explain the long line of events. This is far from suggesting that there was a single line of events that had to be followed and which could not be avoided. Rather, it shows the general development of events, to highlight where changes in direction occurred, and where new starting points for developments came about, before returning in detail to these events in individual chapters. The second theme of Chapter 1 is the intellectual framework for the work as a whole, the models on which it draws and which it develops, in order to grapple with underlying events, again before returning to these models in later chapters. This chapter also begins to develop the overlapping dialogues of German nationalism and antisemitism in Vienna.

Chapters 2 and 3 are paired chapters, giving different perspectives on the same period. Chapter 2 begins by briefly highlighting some developments in Vienna in the 1850s that are important for an understanding of later years, before turning its attention to nationalist politics and nationalist agitation in Vienna up to 1879. It does so in the context of wider events, and partly by revisiting some important secondary literature. Chapter 3 covers approximately the same period, but presents an introduction to some of the priests of Vienna who are important for this work. Chapters 4 and 5 move forward to 1896, the years of liberal decline and the rise of an antisemitic challenge. These chapters look at how this challenge split between two groups. On one side were Habsburg loyalists, who saw their future in the Empire. On the other side were the Pan-German nationalists, who believed all Germans should be in one, German state. Chapter 6 looks at the years of Christian Social rule on the Vienna City Council, the developing relationship between the two main branches of the antisemitic movement, and what this meant for definitions of being German. Chapter

[47] Stefan Malfer argues that Habsburg autocratic rule throughout the 1850s should be seen as an 'intermezzo' in the constitutional era. That is not the position taken in this work, as the outcome of 1861 was by no means pre-ordained. See Stefan Malfer, 'Der Konstitutionalismus in der Habsburger Monarchie. Siebzig Jahre Verfassungsdiskussionen in "Cisleithanien"', in Helmut Rumpler and Peter Urbanitsch, eds., *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918, Vol. VII: Verfassung und Parlamentarismus*, Part 1, (Vienna; Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2000), pp.11-67, here p.11.

7 considers the continuities and changes that existed between 1914 and 1920, alongside the search by the Right for scapegoats to blame for defeat in war and the end of Empire. Chapter 8 presents an analysis of how the First Republic was viewed by many as a provisional state form, if not as a provisional state, while Chapter 9 shows how the idea of *Anschluss* was resisted even by many who considered Austria to be a German state. Chapter 10 begins with the *Anschluss*, but continues beyond 1938 the stories of some of the people here. It considers how these stories, and some post-War reflections on events, contribute to an understanding of the period 1861 to 1938.

Vienna did not develop in isolation and familiar themes from wider debates in Habsburg and European history are encountered: for instance, the German nationalist activity in Vienna that is covered here must be set in the context of, say, Czech nationalism and wider political questions from the same period. Nor can the activities of the priests be properly understood without addressing the question of secularisation, to show that the nature and scope of the influence of priests changed throughout the period, but did not go away.[48] Other questions that have to be addressed come from the specialist historiography on Vienna. It is particularly important, for instance, to understand how the activities of these priests stand in relation to two seemingly opposing models for engaging with the history of Vienna. The first of these, that of 'Red Vienna', suggests a view that the city as a whole was Socialist. This in turn implies that a Socialist vision of inclusion was the dominant paradigm in Vienna and that a vision of exclusion would be exceptional. However, the extent of Socialist domination of the city, and the ability of the Social Democrats to influence bourgeois life and culture, has long since been challenged by some historians as a myth.[49]

Against this is the idea to be found in the works of historians such as Robert Wistrich, that antisemitism was widespread and an ordinary part of daily life, and that an exclusionary vision of belonging was generally accepted. Wistrich, and others, go so far as to claim that Socialist Democratic leaders were prone to indulge in antisemitic remarks, to whip up support.[50] This work engages with these views in later chapters, as appropriate. As will be seen, it concludes that the Red Vienna model is useful, but needs to be applied appropriately if the role and influence of the priests is to be understood. This work concludes that the Wistrich and Pauley models at the very least overstate the case of 'antisemitism

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[48] See David Martin, 'The Secularization Issue: Prospect and Retrospect', *The British Journal Of Sociology*, Vol.42, No.3, 1991, pp.465-474 and Frank J. Lechner, 'The Case against Secularization: A Rebuttal', *Social Forces*, Vol. 69, No. 4, 1991, pp.1103-1119.

[49] Jill Lewis, 'Red Vienna: Socialism In One City, Vienna 1918-1927', *European History Quarterly*, Vol.13, 1983, pp.335-355, here p.335.

[50] See Robert S. Wistrich, *Socialism and the Jews*, (Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson, 1982), pp.350-352. Also Bruce Pauley, *From Prejudice to Persecution: A History of Austrian Anti-Semitism,* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), p.136 or p.143.

everywhere', and as such are unhelpful in understanding the importance of the priests and their activities.

This examination of how the Viennese experienced the shaping of identity and belonging is a challenging and worthwhile subject in its own right. However, the importance of the subject goes beyond this, raising questions which continue to be asked now. These questions, of nations without states, of otherness, assimilation and tolerance of diversity, have a continuing relevance across a wide range of current political and social issues. The history of Vienna over these years, like most other lengthy periods, was a period of great change. It shows individuals reacting in different ways to the erosion of the world that is familiar to them. From these diverse reactions, a city of contradictions emerged, but by 1938, Vienna seemed to have abandoned a cosmopolitan past for a future of intense German nationalism. Chapter 1 begins to tell this story.

CHAPTER 1: VIENNA 1861-1938: CULTURE, POLITICS AND IDENTITY

Conflict, Cohesion And Change: A View Of 1861 To 1938

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, major economic and demographic changes affected the whole of Europe. Austria was no exception. Its capital, Vienna, was the product of a combination of its own people and culture as well as being a mirror of the wider trends that affected Europe. Studies of the 'Austrian' part of the Empire, known as Cisleithania, have shown how regional variations in *per capita* income acted as push factors to encourage people with skills to migrate to the cities. Vienna offered the prospect of a better life than most cities in the Empire, even if life there could be incredibly harsh, with accommodation being at a particular premium.[1] After 1857, the first serious attempts were made to remodel the city both within its old boundaries and beyond, in order to improve living conditions and to absorb new arrivals. Vienna's population grew quickly, from 476,000 in 1857, to 1,364,000 in 1891, and over two million in 1910.[2]

Over time, the administrative structure and even the physical extent of the city of Vienna changed with circumstances. By the late nineteenth century, as the population grew, Vienna comprised what is now known as the modern inner city, the *Innere Stadt,* as well as suburbs that were incorporated into the city in two batches, first in 1850 and then in the 1890s. For the purposes of this study, this is the geographical scope of Vienna. Vienna in the 1890s was not too dissimilar in extent to the Vienna of just before *Anschluss*, which in its turn is not too dissimilar to that of modern Vienna. Appendix C shows a map of modern Vienna.

In the period to the First World War, buildings of all kinds were erected, far out into the suburbs, from workers' tenements through department stores to sanatoria for rest cures. Construction brought disruption as well as benefits into people's lives, but the pace of change could be frustratingly slow at times. In Währing, in the 1890s, the old cemetery had long reached its capacity. Efforts to reach an agreement about how and where to replace it, however, dragged on into the 1920s.[3] Planned factory extensions threatened to intrude on land owned by the Church at Ottakring. This was less inconvenient for the Church than it

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[1] See, for example, the per capita figures for 1913, in David F. Good, *The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire 1750-1914,* (Berkeley: University Of California Press, 1984), p.150.

[2] The 1910 estimate is for the population after the expansion of the city's administrative boundaries in the 1890s but, even based on the earlier city limits, the population had grown to 827,000 in 1910. Jean-Paul Bled, *Histoire de Vienne,* (Paris: Fayard, 1998) pp.179-180.

[3] See multiple instances of correspondence: AEDW WäCor, 1893, 1895, 1896, also AEDW WäCk, 1923.

might seem since, if this land could be sold at a fair price, the Church would no longer have to pay local taxes on land that brought little benefit.[4]

Viennese author Stefan Zweig, writing in exile at the start of the 1940s, portrays pre-First World War Vienna, and the Habsburg Empire, as a 'golden age of security' and the home of a hitherto unknown material and psychological prosperity.[5] His memoirs show a longing for an age that could never have been, and Zweig has been criticised for an over-romanticised sense of the past.[6] However, the contradictions between the opinions he expresses and the story he tells expose a certain truth. Zweig writes from the perspective of someone from a privileged background, conservative in outlook, a Jewish, bourgeois Habsburg loyalist, who turned eighteen in 1899. Zweig considered even the mass antisemitic Christian Social movement that gathered around Mayor Karl Lueger as no real threat to his way of life. Referring to Lueger, Zweig says: '… his official antisemitism never prevented him from staying well-disposed and agreeable to his former Jewish friends'.[7] Protected as he was by money, and with opportunities for education and travel, perhaps for Zweig this really was a golden age.

Zweig's material shows, however, the threats to this world, from Socialist agitators on the one hand to Pan-Germans on the other, and he would have been familiar with the kinds of disturbances that these agitators caused. He would have known about the huge nationalist crowds that spilled onto the streets of Währing in 1892. Ostensibly there to welcome Herbert Bismarck for his wedding in Vienna, these crowds were really hoping for a glimpse of Herbert's father Otto, and they become involved in clashes with the police to do so.[8] Zweig considered these nationalists, who 'took their support almost exclusively from the Bohemian and Alpine districts', to be an alien import into Vienna, bringing with them as early as the 1880s something that was not native to the city.[9] Zweig therefore concedes that this 'golden age of security' was under threat, whether from outsiders or not, long before 1914. This contradiction between security, stability and the *status quo* on the one hand and agitation for change on the other, and the conflicts that came out of these opposing positions had effects far beyond Vienna's boundaries. These were Viennese-accented reflections of conflicts taking place elsewhere in the Empire and in other parts of Europe.

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[4] AEDW AOCk, entries for 1872, 1874 and 1875.

[5] Stefan Zweig, *Die Welt von Gestern: Erinnerungen eines Europäers,* (Stuttgart: Fischer, 1981), p.14.

[6] See for example H.C. Meyer, untitled review of Die Welt von Gestern, *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (1954), pp.293-294.

[7] Zweig, *Gestern*, p.82.

[8] ABPD 1892 St1, reports of 20th June 1892. Hereafter, unless otherwise stated, all ABPD are police reports.

[9] Zweig, *Gestern*, p.82.

As Vienna grew, large groups of people who did not necessarily have German as their first language arrived in the city, adding to its diversity. By 1869, over 40,000 Jews had come in large numbers from Bohemia, Moravia and Galicia.[10] Many had been brought up in the Jewish enlightenment tradition, the *haskalah*, and embraced German culture, converted to Christianity and assimilated as far as they could into Viennese society.[11] Later waves of poorer Galician Orthodox Jews were Yiddish-speaking, kaftan-wearing, and stood out on the streets. [12] All around them were signs of Vienna's Catholic culture, from the Churches and their public ceremonies through the clusters of priests and nuns on the streets to the plaster saints that decorated the exteriors of homes and shops across the city.[13] Christian Viennese society's acceptance even of assimilated Jews appears to have been skin-deep.[14] One view of the lack of true assimilation of Jews is that 'Austria never did accept them'.[15] Nevertheless, care should be taken not to assume that Christian means the whole of Vienna's non-Jewish population, nor should all Christians be suspected of rejecting Jewish assimilation. Nor should assimilation, if it means the loss of a culture, be taken as a necessarily worthwhile objective compared with, say, the acceptance of diversity within a society.

Other large immigrant groups also settled in the city. As many as 100,000 Czechs lived there by 1900. Settling in clusters – as much as twenty five per cent of the population of the Simmering district was Czech – they filled jobs across a range of industries from brick makers through coffee house waiters to tram drivers.[16] Some immigrants arrived with their families, but most were male and single. Married men hoped to be joined by their families later. The first call of these immigrants would be to earlier arrivals from their home town or province, to try to arrange jobs and accommodation. Some immigrants came from rural areas but many, especially among Jews, were from urban backgrounds in the Empire's provinces. Per head of population, Jews were more likely than the Austrian average to live in cities.[17] They had skills that would be useful for survival in Vienna but social advancement, while not impossible, was difficult to achieve.

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[10] Marsha Rozenblit, *The Jews of Vienna 1867-1914,* (Albany: State University Of New York Press, 1983), p.95.

[11] Rozenblit, p.17.

[12] Rozenblit, p.21.

[13] See Emmerich Siegris, *Alte Wiener Hauszeichen und Ladenschilder*, (St.Pölten: Burgverlag, 1924).

[14] See, for instance, Robert Wistrich, *The Jews of Vienna in the Age of Franz Joseph*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1988).

[15] Rozenblit, p.196.

[16] Alfred Payrleitner, *Oesterreicher und Tschechen*, (Vienna: Böhlau, 2003), p.120.

[17] Rozenblit, p.16.

Certain years stand out as being critical in the history of this period, with 1897 as a major watershed. This was the year of the so-called *furor teutonicus*, the 'German rage', when many Germans throughout Cisleithania took to the streets in violent reaction to Prime Minister von Badeni's language ordinances.[18] If implemented, these decrees would have led to more Czech speakers in the Bohemian civil service. As civil servants included employees of organisations ranging from postal services through customs stations to state-owned transport systems, the effects would be felt among a considerable number of German-speakers.[19] Adding to the general turmoil, 1897 also saw the elevation of the leader of the antisemitic Christian Social movement, Karl Lueger, to the post of Mayor of Vienna. The Christian Socials were now, and would be for some time to come, the most successful antisemitic movement in Europe.[20] The same year also witnessed the appointment of Gustav Mahler, a convert from Judaism, as Director of the Royal Opera, and the anti-Jewish reaction to this; the return to the Austrian Parliament of Georg Schönerer, a key figurehead for racial pan-Germanism in Austria, after a lengthy ban for violent antisemitic activities; and, at a different level, in the arts, the creation of the breakaway movement, the Secession. All of these events pointed in different ways to splits in Viennese society between the old order and competing visions of the new. Some of the causes behind these events – nationalist activity, the challenge to the artistic old order – were familiar across Europe. The sustained success of political antisemitism, however, was peculiar to Vienna.

The end of the war in 1918 was another clear watershed, with the destruction of the old Empire and the creation from it of several new states. Most, but by no means all, of the German speaking areas eventually formed a new Austrian Republic, where the political parties – Christian Socials, Social Democrats and the smaller Pan-German parties – now competed under a democratic system, but the Republic was built on shallow foundations. It struggled through the 1920s, at times seemingly ready to fall apart. After the onset of the Depression, the whole of the period 1930 to 1938 was for Vienna and Austria a period of political, social and economic crisis. While major upheavals took place in many countries, perhaps only in Spain's civil war was the intensity, extent and duration of violence in this period greater than in Austria.[21]

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[18] Andrew Whiteside, *The Socialism of Fools. Georg Ritter von Schönerer and Austrian Pan Germanism*, (Berkeley: University Of California, 1975), pp.160-187.

[19] T. Mills Kelly, *Without Remorse: Czech National Socialism In Late-Habsburg Austria,* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 2006), p.46.

[20] Wistrich, *Jews of Vienna*, pp.205-206.

[21] Paul Preston, *The Spanish Civil War*, (London: Harper Perennial, 2006), pp.1-16.

Despite significant ruptures, even after 1918 there were continuities on many levels. If in shrunken form, the intellectual elite still influenced, and was influenced by, events beyond the boundaries of city and state. The Republic may have swept away the Habsburgs, but the city retained its Catholic veneer. The city's population remained diverse after 1918, but the social composition of many of the city's districts was changing. In 1937, Father Leopold Lojka of the parish of St. Joseph, in the district of Währing, recorded a survey of life in his parish. Alongside a note on the existence of a poor quarter, as well as an area housing mainly public servants, he noted: 'Jewish quarter in the Cottage (area of Währing)... none before the war'.[22]

Against this backdrop of continuity and change, radical nationalism in Vienna must not be interpreted as having taken a single, unopposed, linear path from the 1860s to 1938. Habsburg loyalists had challenged Pan-German nationalism, and some people had held a genuine commitment to the Empire, whether expressed as dynastic loyalty or as a commitment to its supranational character. In the inter-war period, while a few Social Democrats occasionally formed tactical alliances with Nazis in street violence against common enemies, the Social Democratic Party, with its commitment to international socialism, stood up to Nazism. This is explored in later chapters.

The history of Vienna should also not be judged from high profile political events alone. Politics is important, because it is through effective control of political and state institutions that change can be implemented, but the daily culture of a place or time can be difficult to change, as it is based on long experience. Daily culture can be based on, and expressed through, deeply held beliefs, but it can also be governed by how people think they should behave and conform, and the ways in which they receive and interpret messages.[23] Hence, the scenes at the time of the *Anschluss* could be the representation of inner feelings that had been suppressed; it could be a temporary creation of circumstances; or it could be the result of fear of the consequences of not conforming. The history of Vienna to 1938 shows that people took different stands on the question of nationalism at different times. Yet, the wave of anti-Jewish violence and the huge pro-Nazi rallies that followed the *Anschluss* must have appeared to confirm that a particular kind of antisemitic, aggressive German nationalism had now succeeded in becoming a permanent and dominant feature.

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[22] AEDW WeCk, 1937.

[23] See for instance Michel De Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life,* (Berkeley: University Of California, 1984).

Geographical, Political And Other Contexts

The story that emerges from this study is set in, and influenced by, several contexts, beyond the context of the changing city of Vienna itself. The first of these is to be found in the wider geopolitical context for this study of Vienna, in which political change and the physical re-ordering of the frontiers of European states left a Europe in 1938 that was completely different from the Europe that existed in the mid-nineteenth century. At the start of the period, Vienna was the capital of an Empire that stretched from Italy to modern day Ukraine. Beyond its frontiers, this Empire exercised an informal leadership of the German states, with Prussia as its only serious rival for this position. This changed as a result of war, and the Habsburgs were forced, in turn, from Italy and Germany. Further war led to the Empire's dismantlement and the end of rule by the Habsburg dynasty, leaving Vienna as the capital of a much reduced Austria in the heart of Europe. By 1938, the threat was that Austria would disappear from the map altogether, to become part of Germany.

These events took place against a backdrop of political change that was happening across Europe. In 1861, most countries were governed by some form of dynastic system. Great Britain was a constitutional monarchy, but few could vote. The German states, by and large, were ruled by princes and their ministers. Russia was governed by an autocratic Tsar. Gradually, this changed. More people were allowed the vote, and dynastic rule in the constitutional monarchies became symbolic: parliaments expressed the will of the people. In other states, such as France, republican systems gained some degree of permanence. Activists promoted the nation state as the natural order, and advanced the idea that the nation was the bond that unified the people. Democracy was championed and, after the First World War, seemed to have won the day, when states that were said to be democratic and to conform with the ideal of the nation state replaced the Empires of Central and Eastern Europe. These states did not last long in this form. Dictatorship replaced democracy, and nationalism was invoked to legitimate the state against enemies abroad and minorities within.[24]

A further context for this study is that of the development of nationalism within the borders of the Empire. Many of the states that sprang into being from the ruins of the Habsburg Empire after the First World War were claimed to be the culmination of national liberation struggles by activists who were supported in their aims by the bulk of the people, freeing them from the Habsburg 'Prison of Nations'.[25] This however, would be an over-

[24] Lonnie Johnson, *Central Europe: Enemies, Neighbors, Friends,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.182-190..

[25] Johnson, *Central Europe*, pp172-182; Judson, *Guardians*, p.233.

simplification, and caution should be taken when considering the extent of, and support for, nationalism in the Empire in the period covered in this work. This caution should extend to the interpretation of allegedly nationalist activity, such as the gathering of crowds at times of 'national tensions'.

Newspapers of the time carried reports of 'nationalist' disturbances, stressing the size of the crowds and the level and duration of violence. These reports were at pains to emphasize the nationalist motivation behind these scenes, as part of a defence against the loss of what they came to term *Nationalbesitzstand*. *Nationalbesitzstand* can be translated as the territory and economic power of a nation, but it does also include the psychological, cultural and emotional wealth of a people. Nationalists claimed this heritage was under threat from encroachments by rival national groupings. Closer examination of events, via police reports and the reports of Imperial, rather than local, administrators contradicts many of these accounts. The level and extent of violence tended to be exaggerated, particularly with regard to the numbers participating. The cause of the violence was also often misreported, with a nationalist gloss given to a personal vendetta or violence resulting from the excessive consumption of alcohol. Once an event had been given a nationalist interpretation, however, it was difficult to remove this alleged aspect of it from the public's mind.[26] In this way, events which had not been at all nationalist added to the nationalist mythology of national warfare in certain parts of the Empire. Reporters, whether on the Czech or German side, were keen that this should happen. Their reports also ignored the many examples of cross-national co-operation in Bohemia, or presented them as acts of national betrayal.[27]

While nationalists argued for a vision of society based on national privilege and segregation, others were engaged in the struggle to win democratic rights for all people, regardless of nation. Nationalists were not unopposed in their belief that the struggle for the rights of the *ethnos* was more important than the struggle for the rights of the *demos*.[28] Nevertheless, nationalist activity certainly increased, particularly in Bohemia. Despite the distance of events from Vienna, it is clear from the timing of riots there that the effects of this increased activity were in some way felt and reflected in responses in the city. Nationalist politicians in Vienna became skilled at linking events in Bohemia, the so-called threat to Germanness, with the changing social and economic scene in the city.

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[26] Judson, *Guardians*, pp.206-213, for evidence of misreporting.

[27] Glasheim, pp.11-12.

[28] I am indebted to Professor Gerald Stourzh for his summation of this struggle during the inaugural LSE Austrian History Lecture at the London School Of Economics in 2007.

As political rights and the vote spread, radical politicians used street rallies, pamphlets and bribery to egg on their supporters.[29] However, even within the German camp there were competing visions. Christian Socials used German identity to preach antisemitism, but they dared not display too extreme an anti-Slav position, as they wanted Slav support, first against the liberals, later against the Social Democrats. Schönerer-type Pan-Germans lost support by attacking the Church and even the Emperor.[30] After a brief peak in the late 1890s, support for radical Pan-German nationalism in Vienna fell back, although it experienced occasional brief revivals. Pan-Germans also faced indifference to nationalism in a city where economic survival was a daily concern for large segments of the population. While daily concerns should not be taken as automatically overriding longer term concerns or desires, it is unlikely that large numbers of the population of the city were making what French scholar Ernest Renan described as a 'daily plebiscite', a positive identification with the nation.[31]

A third context for this study is that of the development of nationalism outside the borders of the Empire. This relates in particular to how organised and large-scale nationalist activity swept across Europe, taking different forms at different times and in different places. The Italian states came together as a Kingdom in 1860. While British governments faced the political thorn of the Irish question in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Norway claimed a peaceful separation from Sweden in 1905.[32] Nationalists justified their cause on the grounds of both tradition and modernity, claiming that nationalism could both bring back the past and modernise for the future.[33] Proponents of nationalism acted at a political, economic and social level. This wave of nationalist sentiment took many forms. It occupied the fields of high and popular culture. Folk song was described as the root of the genius of the people. A movement for the independence of Finland from Russia found a voice in the music of Sibelius, such as his *Finlandia* overture of 1899.[34]

While Nationalist movements within the Habsburg Empire were said to be a threat to the Empire's unity, nationalism outside the Empire – in different forms – also posed a threat. Outside of the Empire, irredentist movements – so-called from the Italian for 'unredeemed', in the sense of incomplete – looked to absorb into recently formed national states, such as

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[29] Judson, *Guardians*, p.42.

[30] Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, p.229.

[31] Aviel Roshwald, *The Endurance Of Nationalism,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp.58-59 and pp.212-213.

[32] Michael Rapport, *Nineteenth Century Europe*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), p.298.

[33] John Hutchinson, 'Myth Against Myth: The Nation as Ethnic Overlay' in Montserrat Guibernau and John Hutchinson, eds., *History And National Destiny*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), pp.109-119.

[34] Michael Kennedy, ed., *The Oxford Dictionary Of Music*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.299.

Rumania or Serbia, citizens of the Empire with whom they shared their language or culture. An extension of nationalism, Pan-Slavism, called on all Slavs to be proud of, but to transcend, national identity, and to look to their common roots against common enemies. As this movement was heavily promoted by Russia, some saw Pan-Slavism as a front for Russian interests.[35] Such movements were seen as powerful forces which could ultimately destroy the Habsburg Empire and the culture which Germans, not just nationalist Germans, felt it represented. Perhaps this was correct. In 1913, the Serbian Prime Minister was quite open with the French ambassador that Pan-Slavism should act 'to ensure [Slav] cohesion in the struggle against Vienna'.[36] Russian foreign policy may not seem to have been directly relevant for the 'man in the street', especially before the days of universal suffrage and responsible governments. However, if Russian foreign policy seemed to encourage the so-called disloyal enemy within, perhaps the Czech who competed for jobs and wages, it translated a distant matter into a local concern.

All of these contexts had an influence on how people saw the world. They were not, however, the only contexts. Supporters of political movements which rejected nationalism, for instance, attempted to win people to their views. The contexts of political change in Vienna, and Europe in general, are also high-level influences on expressions of German identity, and a more immediate, and final, context for this section is that of the everyday experience. Even more so than the city of today, the Vienna of 1861 to 1938 was a world of street culture, communal places, and shared living quarters.[37] Admittedly, events were mediated by the press, political parties, the Church and other organisations. However, the informal contact, the neighbour, the work comrade, the co-drinker at the local bar and other social networks all had a significant and wide-reaching influence, as did the drip effect of popular newspapers, songs and entertainments. In this way, covert propaganda, reinforced by a supportive local culture, linking wider events to local concerns, would be successful in creating for some the sense of a threat to a way of life or their very identity. It would also succeed in defining, for some, who was said to belong and who was not. Everyday culture would prove to be a significant influence on ideas of who belonged and who did not belong.

Identity, The Nation And Nationalism

Any examination of nationalism and national identity raises questions concerning the nature of identity and how it is constructed. It is now generally agreed that identity is a complex,

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[35] Hugo Hantsch, 'Pan-Slavism, Austro-Slavism, Neo-Slavism: The All Slav Congresses and the Nationality Problems of Austria-Hungary', *AHYB*, 1965, Vol. I, pp.23-27.

[36] Hantsch, p.35.

[37] J. Robert Wegs, *Growing up working class: continuity and change among Viennese youth, 1880-1938*, (University Park: Pennsylvania State University,1989), pp.55-74.

shifting phenomenon, not a given, fixed characteristic of a person, and that 'Identities are considered and bound to change. What one identifies with at any given moment may depend upon the situation and the threat or challenge one is facing'.[38] It is also recognised that socialization and social roles play a major part in the development of identity, and that some individuals 'accept' roles given to them, while others are more active in creating identities from social surroundings.[39] Identity changes over time according to various influences, and the components of identity take on different levels of significance for the individuals concerned. National identity is one such component of an individual's overall identity, but little consensus exists on what it is, nor even what goes to create it. Socialization is a key component of the definition of identity that is used here. Without social groups, and the interactions they provide, definitions of identity would be based only on the self, without reference to any other person. The social group provides opportunities to demonstrate one's own identity and to experience and share in that of others.

Models have been developed to assist in understanding the nation and nationalism, but none is universally accepted as definitive. These models can be grouped in many ways, but they usually vary in their approach to two competing ideas for defining the nation, civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism. The first idea, civic nationalism, proposes that citizenship is the key and, while nationality comes in essence from place of birth, immigrants may acquire citizenship by demonstrating acceptance of deeply held local values. Civic nationalism is often seen as essentially individualistic.[40] The second idea, ethnic nationalism, proposes that one cannot gain or lose a national identity, which is inherited through kinship.[41] Ethnic nationalism is often considered to be essentially collectivist.[42]

Appendix A shows how some of the major theories regarding nationalism fit into a spectrum of views as to whether the civic or the ethnic definition of nationalism is key. For the purposes of this study these models are placed into five broad groups, from which their commonalities as well as their differences emerge.[43] First, there are two groups which are based on the view that, to varying degrees, nationalism is a modern phenomenon, part of

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[38] Holger Briel, ed., *German Culture And Society,* (London: Arnold, 2002), p.70.

[39] John Scott and Gordon Marshall, eds., *A Dictionary of Sociology*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). *Oxford Reference Online*. Oxford University Press. King's College London. 11 August 2007 http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t88.e1061.

[40] Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads To Modernity,* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992).

[41] See T.H. Eriksen, *Place, Kinship And The Case For Non-Ethnic Nations*, in Montserrat Guibernau and John Hutchinson, eds., *History And National Destiny: Ethnosymbolism and its Critics,* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004)

[42] Greenfeld, *Nationalism,* p.21.

[43] The categories which have been used as the starting point for this analysis are derived from John Hutchinson, *Modern Nationalism,* (London: Fontana, 1994).

urban, industrial society. The first of these groups – the modernists – broadly argue that modern industrial conditions require societies to be more homogeneous than they had previously been. Societies are political communities, where participation is through mass movements. Industrially organised print media are the primary mechanism for the creation of these new national societies.[44] Here, nationalism is an invented phenomenon. Differences do exist within this group of modernists, for instance between Gellner and Hobsbawm, but they see modernity as central to an understanding of nationalism.[45]

Another modernist school of thought is that of political nationalism. Here, nationalism derives from an ideology invented by a political class. This political class seizes advantages from states being organised along national principles, as it forms the elites of those states.[46] This would be especially so for those who go on to make up the elites of newly formed states, perhaps after a breakaway from a multinational state. Political nationalists usually recognise other nations' rights, although not always. A further group that embraces elements of modernist thinking is that of cultural nationalism, which is said to emerge where a people fears that its way of life is under threat. Cultural nationalists aim to preserve or revive national languages and traditions, and they stress kinship and common past experiences, such as war or resistance. Cultural nationalists are tolerant of diversity within the nation, and accept that the nation can be made up of many sub-cultures.

Against this stands a group labelled historicists, who view nationalism as a natural phenomenon, with roots deep in the past and in shared kinship. Here, nationalism affects modernisation; it is not caused by it. Nationalism is the natural divider of the world into states based on nations.[47] A final group is the ethno-symbolists or ethnicists.[48] Ethnicists view nations as being rooted in shared intrinsic values and the search for security at times of crisis. They also view the nation as being rooted in a common kindred past, the *ethnie*, the predecessor of the yet-to-be-formed nation. Generally, ethnicists agree that symbols help to legitimise changes to social organisation. They share historicists' belief in the intrinsic nature of the nation. In this work, no single model is taken to be able to provide an explanation of nationalism. Both the nation, nationalism and the forms that nationalism takes are considered to be contingent, dependent on a particular set of circumstances. This

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[44] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, (London: Verso, 1991).

[45] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism,* (Oxford: Blackwell,1980) and Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

[46] Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism,* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).

[47] The historicist case is argued by, among others, Hastings and Roshwald. See Adrian Hastings, *The Construction Of Nationhood,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) and Roshwald, *Endurance*.

[48] For a volume dedicated to the work of a leading proponent of Ethnicist views, Anthony D. Smith, his critics and his response, see Guibernau and Hutchinson, *History And National Destiny*.

work shows that nationalists were quite prepared to use whichever definition of the nation suited their purposes at a given time, as long as it furthered their aims.

Appendix A represents each group of theories regarding nationalism as sitting on several dimensions, and these are the typology's most important feature. The dimensions show approximately where particular views of the nation and nationalism are positioned in the debate over whether nationality can be acquired or is innate. The radical German groups studied in this work are generally positioned towards the Ethnic end of the Ethnic-Civic dimension, but in interpreting this model care should be taken not to confuse complex, often shifting positions regarding nationalism for what may appear on paper as a static, two-dimensional relationship. While the diagram represents these positions as being at different points on these dimensions, it represents ideal types, not every possible variant of nationalism, and different viewpoints do exist within these groupings.

Most importantly for this study, the dimensions show how the concept of 'banal nationalism' crosses all categorisations. It is the common thread, the everyday experience which provides the foundation for deeply felt expressions of nationalism. It sits alongside Renan's concept of the 'daily plebiscite', the unconscious and conscious coming together of the act of giving oneself to the nation.[49] An examination of daily activities, of spoken and unspoken commitment to the nation, exposes the depth of absorption of national sentiment. That is why the level of examination chosen for this study is this everyday experience of daily culture and why, in this work, the concept of banal nationalism is critical. The concept of banal nationalism offers a means of examining how an environment that was conducive to the development of both antisemitic and extreme nationalist attitudes was created.

Michael Billig defined banal nationalism as:

> 'the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced. It is argued that these habits are not removed from everyday life, as some observers have supposed. Daily, the nation is indicated, or 'flagged', in the lives of its citizenry. Nationalism, far from being an intermittent mood in established nations, is the endemic condition'.[50]

In this original definition, within established nation-states diverse factors create a 'rhetoric' which reinforces the nation-state as the natural unit of allegiance. Publicly displayed flags act as daily reminders of the nation without appearing as a forced message. Reports of international sports competitions may not seem nationalist in tone, but allusions to the nation

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[49] Roshwald, *Endurance*, pp.212-213.

[50] Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, p.6.

support a national 'rhetoric'. This definition has elsewhere been extended to include proto-states, where autonomous regions promote a national vision via such banal mechanisms.[51] In this work, the definition of banal nationalism is extended further, to include any daily activity which supports the creation of a nationalist vision for the organisation of society.

Where a state is not founded on national principles, nationalist organisations replace Billig's institutional propagator of nationalism. These organisations find support for their efforts not just by overt political activity, but from popular songs, nursery rhymes, humour and folk tales which reinforce national stereotypes. They find support in the subconscious codes that are triggered by street names and public buildings. This daily activity creates or reinforces individuals' views of themselves and their relationship with the national 'other'. Nationalism has to compete with other ideologies at this 'banal' level, as it is not the only phenomenon that can be shaped by 'banal' processes. The same could be true of religious or social ideas and other mindsets. This daily identification has been picked up recently by Rogers Brubaker, who has made models of nationalism even more dynamic. In Brubaker's work, the sense of national identity is a process, formed by social relationships, where the nation is defined and redefined on a regular basis.[52] Still more recent models look at aspects of social relationships and nationalism in the context of social networks and social mobility.[53]

While no single definition of the nation can be created that is sufficient to represent all the differences in the views outlined above, it can be said that nationalism 'turns devotion to the nation into principles or programmes. It thus contains a different dimension from mere patriotism, which can be a devotion to one's country or nation devoid of any project for political action'.[54] Nationalism is therefore a political activity and can be a doctrine for which its more extreme advocates are prepared to kill or die, although it is not unique in this. Other forms of nationalism may still allow for competing loyalties, such as religious or political ties, but for extreme nationalists the nation is everything. For the purposes of this work, nationalism is defined as the doctrine which puts the nation above all else as the primary source of identity and group loyalty at a given time. Such a definition includes

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[51] Kathryn Crameri, 'Banal Catalanism?' *National Identities,* Vol. 2, No. 2, 2000, pp.144-158.

[52] Zsuzsa Csergo, 'Review Essay: Do we need a language shift in the study of nationalism and ethnicity? Reflections on Rogers Brubaker's critical scholarly agenda', *Nations and Nationalism* Vol. 14, No.2 (2008), pp.393-398. See also a response by Brubaker to other reviews of his work, in Rogers Brubaker, 'Reply', *East Central Europe*, Vol. 36, No. 2, (2009), pp.155-157.

[53] See a review of Peter Haslinger, *Nation und Territorium im tschechischen politischen Diskurs 1880-1938,* (Munich: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag 2010) by Pieter Judson, <http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/rezensionen/2011-2-191>. This research was uncovered late in the preparation of this work, so is not considered here

[54] The definition of 'Nationalism' in Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan, eds., *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). *Oxford Reference Online*. Oxford University Press. King's College London. 11 August 2007 http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t86.e866.

those who wish to bring the whole nation into one political unit, as well as those who accept a multi-national state, but who want to see, at the very least, that their nation's culture and rights within it are protected. Nationalist activity, however, can also be carried out by those who do not place the nation above all else, but for whom the nation is a significant factor in self-identification. The key element in this is that, as identity is complex and shifting, the national element of identity can become the principal element to be fostered or protected at times of a perceived national crisis.

In its analysis of nationalists and nationalism, and in order to identify features that nationalists put forward as common to the nation, this work draws on several models of the nation and nationalism that have been developed by specialists in the field of nationalism studies, such as Anthony D. Smith.[55] Smith has been recognised as one of the leading experts in a field which is the subject of much debate. Smith's work has evolved over the years, and he has changed his opinions over such matters as the elements that make up the nation.[56] For the purposes of this work, one interpretation of the work of Smith, and others, that has proved useful is a model synthesised by Jan Penrose.[57]

The Penrose model builds on the idea that, for nationalists, the nation is a distinctive group of people, different from others; it occupies a distinct territory; and the nation has a powerful, perhaps even mystical, link with its territory. In the Penrose model, the nation as a distinctive group is marked out by three potential cultural bases: a common language; a common religion; and common traditions, identified not just by current rituals, but a shared history and shared symbols. These cultural bases are the outward symbols of the unity of the nation and the means by which its members are kept together. The regular reiteration by Nationalists of the elements and cultural bases in this model serves to make these seem natural and intrinsic properties of groups and individuals. Nationalists may ignore or vary the relative importance of these cultural bases if they are in reality something which may divide the nation.

It will be seen in this work that while nationalists consistently use language and territory, for instance, as national unifiers, religion can be used by nationalists as something which may either unite or divide a nation. Pan-Germans will be shown to emphasize religion when attempting to highlight alleged differences between Christian Germans and Jewish Germans. They will be shown to play down religious differences when attempting to minimise

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[55] Anthony D. Smith, T*he Ethnic Origin Of Nations*, (Oxford: Blackwell,1986).

[56] For Smith's work see Guibernau and Hutchinson, eds, as above.

[57] Jan Penrose, 'Nations, States and Homelands: Territory and Territoriality in Nationalist Thought', *Nations and Nationalism* Vol. 8, No. 3, 2002, pp.277-98 and Jan Penrose, 'Essential constructions? The 'cultural bases' of nationalist movements'. *Nations and Nationalism* Vol. 1, No. 3, 1995, pp.391-417.

conflicts between Catholic Germans and Protestant Germans. Evidence will be shown as to how several approaches to religion were used to give concrete form to thoughts on what bound Germans together, and what separated them.

By the start of the period examined here, advocates of nationally-based political and cultural theories were arguing that, through the free expression of national sentiment, whole communities linked as a nation could throw off the old dynastic order and move into a modern world, where liberty and authority derived from popular legitimacy. Writers such as Herder and Fichte were among the most prominent nationalist theoreticians. Both thought that all human progress, not just that of one nation, depended on the free association of nations.[58] This world would be one founded on a community of nations, based on equality and the particular characteristics of each people. As the century progressed, however, more aggressive views of national distinctiveness gained weight. Here, nations assumed their place in a hierarchy based on the alleged qualities and abilities attributed to them. New questions were raised about who made up the nation and who was not part of it. This was no academic debate: between 1861 and 1938 more radical nationalist activists used tools ranging from the widening franchise to street violence to demand the realisation of their principles in concrete form.

For this work, radical German nationalists are defined as covering a broad spectrum. They define the nation in an ethnic, exclusionary way. This includes those Christian Socials who, at times of crisis, placed the defence of the German nation above all other priorities. It also includes the Pan-Germans, those who felt the future of German Austrians lay within a Greater Germany. While in the early part of the period Pan-Germans included Jews, Jews became the most significant group which would later be excluded from nationalist societies. Radical German nationalists are also taken to include those who could be termed antisemitic cultural nationalists, who saw no contradiction between Germanness and the Habsburg Empire or the Austrian First Republic, but who wanted these states to have a predominantly 'German' character. These radical groups overlapped in different ways with groups which favoured a unified German state, but which had very different motivations for this ambition, such as those who considered such an aspiration as nothing more than a logical cultural objective. This included the likes of the Social Democratic Mayor of Vienna, Karl Seitz, who talked of the need to preserve Austria until Anschluss was possible. For Seitz, the goal was intellectual and cultural unity.[59]

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[58] See Herder on human rights. Johann Gottfried Herder, 'Wort und Begriff der Humanität' in Ehrhard Bahr, ed., *Was ist Aufklärung?,* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2004), pp.36-42.

[59] Low, *Anschluss 1931-1938*, p.20.

The focus of this work, however, is on those who usually followed an antisemitic line and came from the Right of the political spectrum. This covers both Pan-Germans, such as Schönerer, and many Christian Socials, whether they were in the party or supported its objectives. Like the many positions that could be taken with regard to the national question, antisemites were not always agreed on their position towards Jews, nor on what should be done with regard to the so-called 'Jewish Question'. Positions even changed over time. The starting point for an antisemitic line was that Jews were outsiders not just in the German-speaking world but in the whole of the Christian world. Religious antisemitism could allow that if a Jew converted then that was the end of the need for antisemitism. However, other forms of antisemitism were invented, in order to argue that a Jew was always a Jew, under any circumstances. Categories such as racial antisemitism were developed, based on what would now be considered pseudo-science at the most, in order to produce 'proof' of such arguments. These categories are shown in more detail in Appendix B.

Antisemitism is here defined as a range of prejudicial attitudes towards Jews simply for being Jews. This could be anything from social or economic discrimination against Jews for not being Christian, through to a hatred of Jews simply for being Jews. Antisemitism is not the same as a casual comment that may be hurtful to someone who is Jewish, if this is not based on prejudice against Jews in general. Individuals make comments based on the way they perceive the world, and based on how the world is portrayed to them. This especially applies to those who have had little education, or who are educated and influenced by those who have antisemitic views. For this reason, not everything that may now look or read like antisemitism really is antisemitism, defined as prejudice against Jews because they are Jews. In this way, a piece of propaganda that targets Jewish Capitalists is not antisemitic if its aim is to target Capitalists who happen to be Jewish, rather than being based on targeting Jewish Capitalists as a sub-set of all Jews. It may be ill-judged and in bad taste, but it is not antisemitic. This point will be developed throughout this work.

Antisemitism is a relative of radical nationalism, in that it takes attributed characteristics and places people into groups alleging who can and can not belong to a particular nation. In a hierarchy of nations, it places Jews at or near the bottom of the pile. The *Anschluss,* and the Viennese reaction to it, appeared to demonstrate that this belief in nation as a component of race, and not as the coming together of people with shared values, had become the dominant view in Vienna. This work examines whether this was the case, by studying not just the immediate post-*Anschluss* reaction, nor just the views of the political classes, but by scrutinising how deeply such views had penetrated into the daily culture of the city. In so doing, it examines whether the ethnic vision of nationalism that was being promoted by certain nationalists in Vienna had become dominant by 1938. This work is concerned with

the processes through which radical German nationalist sentiment was created, and the social relations which contributed to such feelings. It is particularly concerned with how processes such as the conscious propagandising efforts of radical German activists worked alongside changes in the underlying culture of the city, in the form of people's assumptions about and perception of the nature of society.

Being German

Nationalists promoted visions of a single, unified German people, but questions were also asked as to whether it was possible to be a 'good German' at the same time as being a 'good Austrian', or if there was even an opposition in these ideas. In the nineteenth century, similar questions were being asked in Bavaria, Saxony and Hanover, and the other German states. Many reconciled what could now, perhaps anachronistically, be viewed as conflicts between particularist local loyalties and broader German visions.[60]

While local activities, dialects and loyalties were the primary focus for everyday life, the Holy Roman Empire, and then the German Confederation, had provided some framework for the formulation of matters that affected all lands considered to be German. High German was the repository of a culture that produced a living and growing body of world renowned literature. The Confederation, and institutions such as the *Zollverein*, a customs union, allowed local Heimat loyalties to parallel wider allegiances. [61] In the sense proposed by Benedict Anderson, a much larger German community could be imagined.[62]

Yet, some things could divide Germans from each other. People were loyal to their local dynasty and local traditions. They followed their own religion and, even leaving aside Jews, the main Christian groups had very different histories. Evangelical Germans pointed to Lutheranism as a German faith that bound them together. This tradition divided Evangelical Germans from their Catholic counterparts. Catholicism offered a different bond, to a universal Church, and the Habsburgs promoted Catholicism as a means of unifying all of their subjects.

An understanding of this complexity is important for analysing one term that will be encountered frequently in this work: Pan-Germanism. Pan-Germanism can be defined as a political philosophy that aims to bring all Germans together in one state, and which requires

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[60] Cole, ed., p.2.

[61] See, for instance, Abigail Green, 'Representing Germany? The Zollverein at the World Exhibitions, 1851–1862', *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 75, No. 4 (December 2003), pp. 836-863.

[62] See Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

this outcome for Germans to be fulfilled.[63] In another, looser sense, Pan-Germanism indicates a sense of common feeling, a shared cultural heritage among all Germans, and a sense of shared national identity which stretches into the past and which, it is imagined, will also reach into the future. It is 'the universal sense of all Germans belonging in a larger community united by culture and ethnicity'.[64] Such a definition requires no political outcome resulting in the unification of all Germans in a single state. It does not require Germans to live in a state where they are the only group, defined ethnically, linguistically or culturally.

Pan-Germanism as identified by Gerald Stourzh develops the ideas of the *Sprachnation* or the *Kulturnation*.[65] Here, the bonds between Germans do not necessarily even have to be ethnic, or based on kinship, but can be a shared linguistic or cultural legacy. This allows that, those who identify with German language and culture, but whose ancestors are not linked by recognised kinship as having a German heritage, or whose ancestors have no association with a generally recognised German territory, may belong to the German nation. This allows for assimilation of non-Germans who have become thoroughly Germanised in language and culture. These ideas do not so much divorce a cultural stance, on the one hand, from a political stance that may exist in a policy of Pan-Germanism on the other, but show that a cultural stance can be part of a political stance or it can be independent of it.[66]

A second effect of viewing Pan-Germanism not as an ethnic, but as a cultural phenomenon, is to allow for different, competing notions of belonging, as a German, without removing the nation as a potential place for identification. The *Kulturnation* allows competing cultural spaces to exist alongside each other.[67] A German could identify with a transnational Catholic community, creating links with non-Germans in the process, since the ethnic nation is just one element of identity. Nevertheless, however Pan-Germanism is defined, caution is required. It is a term that has become associated with the likes of extreme Right-wing nineteenth century politician Georg von Schönerer, but it has also been associated with those of Austria's Social Democrats who, in the 1920s, wished to unite Austria with the Weimar Republic.[68] Each expressed a Pan-Germanism that was very different from the other.

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[63] Pulzer, *Political Antisemitism*, pp.221-228, explores Pan-Germanism. See also Julie Thorpe, *Pan-Germanism And The Austro-Fascist State, 1933-38*, (Manchester: University Of Manchester, 2011), passim, for a detailed analysis of the term.

[64] Thorpe, p.7.

[65] Gerald Stourzh, *Vom Reich zur Republik: Studien zum österreichisem Bewusstsein im 20. Jahrhundert*, (Vienna: Atelier, 1990), pp.19-20.

[66] Stourzh, p.20.

[67] Stourzh, p.73.

[68] Thorpe, p.28.

Culture, Politics And Daily Life

A culture is made up of sub-cultures and counter currents, and is 'an assemblage of forces and people(s) interacting in certain ways under certain conditions'.[69] However, the visible behaviours of people making up a culture may suggest one thing when competing or contradictory values are also displayed by the people undertaking them. Attendance at a pro-Nazi rally in 1930s' Vienna implies German nationalism of a particular kind, but the people attending may also be members of another Rightist group the *Vaterländische Front,* set up in the mid-1930s to promote Austrian independence. This suggests a competing loyalty to a different vision, or even simple self-interest in being associated with the governing group. Attendance alone cannot be said to prove where someone's inner beliefs lie.

Political cultures may not reflect the outward forms of political life – political structures – that they are meant to support. For example, after the First World War, the new First Republic adopted the political structures of a democratic state: free elections, democratic institutions and free political parties. Alongside these structures, however, was an unreformed political culture, and the Republic inherited little of substance from the Empire, if political culture is taken to be 'The norms, values, and symbols that define and help to legitimate the political power system of a society'.[70] The Republic lacked legitimacy and unifying symbols. It inherited a culture of violence that had emerged in the 1880s as an apparently legitimate instrument for the achievement of goals in politics.

In analysing the interaction of culture, politics and identity from the perspective of nationalism, propaganda is a good marker of nationalist activity, in that it is visible and it is intended to be noticed, whether consciously or not. As mentioned when explaining why this work has, to a large extent, followed the paper trail left by priests, an important distinction must be drawn between 'agitation propaganda', which aims to change attitudes, and 'integration propaganda', which aims at reinforcing attitudes.[71] Both types of propaganda are found in Vienna over the period studied, and are used by a wide range of activists. From the perspective of those spreading an antisemitic message, activists generally used agitation propaganda more heavily in the earlier part of the period studied here, as they attempted to win people round to their views. Later in the period, integration propaganda was used,

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[69] Briel, p.vii.

[70] John Scott and Gordon Marshall. King's College London. 11th August 2007: http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t88.e1061.

[71] Simon Blackburn, *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). *Oxford Reference Online*. Oxford University Press. King's College London. 11 August 2007 http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t98.e3140.

almost as a way of reassuring audiences that the views they held were widespread. The mechanisms for spreading propaganda also developed over the period, adding new weapons to the propagandists' armoury. For instance, newspapers remained a favourite tool as they became cheaper and more readily available, and public gatherings in halls continued to take place, but larger scale gatherings were made possible following the introduction of electric loudspeakers. New mass media, in the form of cinema and radio, made it possible for wider audiences to be reached, and for more propaganda than ever before to be distributed.

Modern propaganda is a mass activity: 'a set of methods employed by an organized group that wants to bring about the active or passive participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, psychologically unified through psychological manipulations and incorporated in an organization'.[72] However, it must not be assumed that a causal link exists between nationalist propaganda and the spread of nationalism. Other factors come into play, such as the ways in which propaganda and banal nationalism support each other. As will also be seen, the dividing line between overt and covert propaganda is blurred. Messages coming from the church pulpit, for instance, may not have had primarily nationalist objectives, but did often add to layers of nationalist propaganda being laid elsewhere.

Activists on the radical Right worked to create a culture that was supportive to their message. They used formal propaganda distribution, but they also used social networks, which were of considerable importance as a distribution mechanism.[73] Within these social networks, radical activists devoted considerable energy to promoting specific visions of the nation. They generated definitions of who should belong and who should be excluded. In so doing, different nationalist groups emphasized different combinations of the elements of the nation and its cultural bases, outlined in the Penrose model above, according to their objectives and circumstances. For instance, Pan-Germanism of the Schönerer variety, which was ethnic, exclusive in terms of kinship, partly mystically defined and secessionist has a close fit with this model. Germans, to this group, are ethnically distinct. They occupy the so-called historic lands of the Holy Roman Empire and they have a strong link with this territory. They speak a common language. Their religion is said to be the Protestant faith and they imagine a shared past, back to Roman times. Schönererians also fit the model in terms of how it defines nationalist goals: in this case, secession from the Habsburg lands into a perceived homeland, the German Empire. The variety of nationalism being promoted is

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[72] Jacques Ellul, quoted in Monroe E. Price, 'The Market for Loyalties: Electronic Media and the Global Competition for Allegiances' *The Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 104, No. 3. (Dec., 1994), pp.667-705, at p.676. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0044-0094%28199412%29104%3A3%3C667%3ATMFLEM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-O.

[73] Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, p.26.

aggressive ethnic-territorial: Schönerer's views on Jews and Slavs were based on a sharply hierarchical world, founded on national principles.

The model also holds good for other groups of nationalists who had different aims from Schönerer. For example, many who are here defined as German nationalists in Vienna in the period to 1918 were pro-Habsburg and devout Catholics. Their aim was to maintain German cultural and political hegemony in the Empire. They promoted a German Austrian particularist vision, not a Protestant Pan-Germanism. So, they stressed language and a shared past, and usually put less emphasis on religion, except where this concerned Jews. Lueger's political movement was Christian, not Catholic, and did not explicitly exclude Protestants. At key times, however, it did stress the importance of Catholicism as an essential component of German Austrian identity and opposed Pan-Germans.

While models are useful analytical tools, they must nevertheless be applied critically and appropriately. For instance, models help to depict social networks, but they do not recreate the networks as they existed at the time. Models also tend to give too clean a picture of events so, when applying them, it is important to look at the detail within the picture. Models look for conscious decisions based on principles and the subconscious decisions affected by ideological fits between an individual's beliefs and a propagandist's ideology. Models do not expose decisions which are based on compromise. These compromises are important historical evidence, a recognition of the reality of politics, since an individual may choose an unlikely ally, if that ally can help to achieve the individual's goals. Alliances may be formed against a common enemy. Finally, not all outcomes should be attributed to their initiators' stated intentions. Caution should be exercised not to attribute all nationalist success to nationalist activity.

There must also be caution against seeing nationalism or antisemitism everywhere. In a work on business behaviour, Supreme Court President Emil Steinbach included a children's rhyme to demonstrate what he considered the natural order of the world:

> 'The Emperor wants your loyalty and duty,
> The preacher wants to owe no money,
> The nobleman boasts 'I am free',
> The Jew drives his usury'[74]

Steinbach's perception of this 'natural order' could suggest that he held an antisemitic position, but Steinbach was presenting no more than a set of stereotypes, however distasteful

[74] Emil Steinbach, *Treu und Glauben im Verkehr*, (Vienna: Manz, 1900) pp.78-79.

they are now: Steinbach was the son of a convert from Judaism.[75] It must also be remembered that, whatever Steinbach's intention and no matter how many readers he reached, such statements were common and would have contributed to views of the world held by Viennese of many origins, but these views need to be interpreted in their wider context.[76]

Summary

This chapter has outlined the chronological and theoretical underpinnings of this work. It has done so by pointing to some of the major events in Vienna, from the perspective of a study of nationalism in the city in the period 1861 to 1938, and it has indicated that such events cannot be treated in isolation from their wider European setting. The long-term economic and social changes of growth and immigration; the impact of events such as war and the subsequent exclusion from the new Italy and Germany, or the Badeni language ordinances; reaction to events on the so-called language frontiers in Bohemia and Slovenia; reaction to events in Europe after the First World War; all reflected European conditions. Other cities experienced antisemitism, but the rise and sustained success of antisemitic parties in Vienna is an exception in major European capitals before the rise of the Nazis in Germany.[77] In Vienna, this points to a specially aggressive form of ethnic nationalism. This chapter has shown where this variety of nationalism exists in the context of studies of identity, particularly national identity, culture and politics. It has begun to show how it came to be spread via the propagandistic use of perceived elements of the nation and its cultural bases, coupled with the effects of banal nationalism, to promote dissatisfaction at an alleged threat to or worsening of the position of Germans – as defined by radical nationalists – in Vienna. Chapter 2 begins to look in more detail at how this came about, from 1861 onwards.

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[75] *ÖBL*, Vol.13, p.159.

[76] This is covered in more detail in later chapters.

[77] Pulzer, *Political Anti-Semitism*, throughout, for comparisons and contrasts between Vienna and Berlin.

CHAPTER 2: LIBERAL AND NATIONAL CHOICES: VIENNA TO 1879

The focal point of this chapter is formed substantially by the years 1861 to 1879. This was a period when, on the level of domestic politics, a constitutional settlement granted a voice in the shaping of the state to people other than those from a narrow elite that served the Emperor. It extended this elite in the most limited of ways, but it was the first step towards later extensions of the franchise that would be significant for defining identity and belonging in Vienna. This was a period when politicians classed as liberals enjoyed great electoral success. They formed the national government first of Austria and then, after 1867, of Cisleithania. Liberal administrations ran the Vienna City Council. They promoted liberal principles, such as an inclusive vision of the equality of all citizens before the law.

At the level of international politics, the first half of this period was overshadowed by the possibilities for settling the 'German Question', how and whether to achieve the unification or reform of Germany. These possibilities had implications for the internal politics of the Habsburg state. Many would have assumed in 1861 that the Habsburgs would continue to play a leading role in 'Germany', whatever that role might be. The Austro-Prussian war of 1866, and the creation in 1871 of a German *Reich* centred on Prussia, changed this. Within this context, the chapter shows how debates concerning the nation and identity were by no means confined to formal political activity, and how apparently non-political daily activities could be turned to political effect.

This period is important for this thesis for debates that took place about aspects of identity and belonging at the time. Its importance also lies, however, in how later critics – the broad grouping here defined as the radical Right – interpreted the period and used it to promote their own visions of citizenship and society. Some attacked it for its anticlericalism, some for its economic policies. Others attempted to associate the period with the imposition of 'alien values' on Austria in general, and on Vienna in particular. They condemned a period when alleged liberal 'dominance' threatened a 'natural' German and Christian basis of society.[1] They would claim that liberals were a powerful, unified block, a claim which has been highlighted by Lothar Höbelt as 'a fiction'.[2]

The 'liberal era' was the result of what preceded it, and this chapter begins by examining briefly those events and the conflict of ideas that took place between liberals and their opponents who then ruled Austria. Later activists on the radical Right would attempt to

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[1] See also Karl Tauchmann, *Geschichte der Pfarre SS Rochus und Sebastian auf der Landstrasse in Wien III*, (Vienna: Pfarramt Verlag, 1933), p.43.

[2] Lothar Höbelt, *Kornblume und Kaiseradler: die deutschfreiheitlichen Parteien Altösterreichs 1882-1918*, (Munich: Oldenburg, 1993), p.25.

portray the pre-liberal period as one which they were trying to re-create, to justify their efforts at excluding those they believed should not belong.

Liberal Ideals And Practice

The pre-liberal world was, in essence, built on the institutions of monarchy and religion, coupled with custom and practice. The rulers of pre-1848 Austria justified Habsburg reign as being based on a 'divine right of kings'.[3] Many supported this view, such that, except at times of tension, the dynasty did not have to assert its authority solely through repressive measures. Groups and individuals were assigned places not in conflicting classes, but in a hierarchy of estates that was meant to bring harmony to the State. Regional institutions functioned as intermediaries to the State, often via the aristocracy. Local institutions provided pressure valves for social disputes. Privileges were granted to cities and trade guilds and to and a narrow range of citizens. Education, for most, aimed not at developing individuals, but at producing loyal subjects. An imperial bureaucracy supported the Emperor. The Church preached loyalty to the Emperor, and the Emperor confirmed that this was a Christian society. Jews occupied a place within the state, but were in many ways outside of its society. They were only occasionally allowed to enter it, usually after conversion. Before 1848, Jews had no rights to own property. They were banned from becoming, among other things, teachers, judges or army officers. They could not employ Christian servants or apprentices. Apart from the few who had residency rights in Vienna, Jews could stay for a maximum of three days in the City, and were not allowed to be active in trade or business there. They paid a special tax, for 'toleration'. This discriminatory age would later be evoked by antisemites who wished to turn back the clock.[4]

Liberal ideals had their roots in Enlightenment, and were based on notions of progress and rationality rather than custom and practice. Liberals aimed to create a situation where political participation was based on 'rational' rules, although only the most radical liberals demanded democracy. Liberals did not want to see a repetition of the events that took place after the revolutions of 1789. Instead, they saw liberalism as a liberating ideology, whose principles would transform society. Among the key policies they put forward to achieve this was the reduction of the power of the Church and the freeing of the economy from guild restrictions. The Church and the guilds were considered to be key factors holding back economic and social development. A further target for liberals was the education system of

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[3] This section on the pre-1848 period draws on R.J.W. Evans, '1848-1849 in the Habsburg Monarchy', in R.J.W. Evans and Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, eds., *The Revolutions In Europe 1848-1849*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), James J. Sheehan, *German History 1770-1866*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp.589-601 and R.John Rath, *The Viennese Revolution 1848-1849*, (New York: Greenwood, 1957), pp.3-16.

[4] On pre-1848 Jewish laws, see Rath, pp.15-16 and p.103.

the old order, which was to be reformed in the name of progress. Liberals also sought to find new ways to bind people into a common purpose, and to legitimise the State. For this, they looked to the nation, as the source of sovereignty, rather than the dynastic principle. Such ideas were viewed with deep suspicion by the dynasty, and liberals and liberal ideas were heavily suppressed in Austria before 1848.

These were the broad principles that encouraged liberal thought when, in 1848, across Europe, as in Vienna, liberals rose against the old order. More immediate concerns were also spurring on liberals in Vienna. The central authority of the State had been under challenge since the mid-1840s, as harvests failed and an industrial slump set in. The factory system was entering Austria, destroying the handicrafts sector of the economy. Towns and cities, especially Vienna, were becoming increasingly overcrowded and filled with the unemployed, as migrants from rural areas sought work. The Habsburgs convened an 'assembly of notables' to address state finances and plans for a resolution to economic problems. They also called the assembly as a result of liberal attacks on the incompetence of the state administration, and liberal pressure to open political participation to more people, whose contribution might assist the State. [5]

In March 1848, liberals in Vienna rose against the Habsburgs, supported by elements of the working class, and with a number of Jews prominent among their leaders. Similar revolts broke out in other Habsburg cities, and the revolutionaries forced the dynasty into promises of concessions. This led to nearly two years of fighting across the Empire between rebels and dynasty, as the balance of power swung between them. Eventually, the Habsburgs crushed the rebels and regained control of their lands. These events, which have been detailed elsewhere, are important, but some key battles of ideas and what they came to represent are more significant for this study.[6]

The first point to make clear is that Vienna's liberals were not a single, unified block, gathered around an agreed set of policies and aims. Liberals were a loose coalition of men from the bourgeoisie, but also from progressive elements within various ranks of the aristocracy.[7] They included the representatives of students from the university, such as journalist Ignaz Kuranda, of relatively poor Bohmenian origins, who had moved to Vienna in his twenties.[8] Broadly, they agreed on an ideologically liberal approach to matters already

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[5] See Evans, p.184, for developments in the 1840s.

[6] For the events of 1848-1849, see Sheehan, pp.656-729.

[7] The liberals who sat in the *Rathaus* from 1861 included a baron, a count and owners of small businesses. Member details are given in Moritz Bermann and Franz Evenbach, *Die neuen Väter der Großkommune Wien*, (Vienna: Beck & Co, 1861).

[8] Bermann and Eevenbach, p.11. See also Kuranda's entry in *Österreichisches Biographisches Lexikon 1815–1950*, hereafter *ÖBL*, Vol 4, p.63. This is available via the on-line edition, http://www.biographien.ac.at.

discussed, such as secularisation, education and the liberalisation of the economy. They also agreed in broad terms that the nation should be the source of sovereignty, even if this meant in reality support for a constitutional monarchy, rather than a republic. The problem for the liberals of 1848 was that agreements on theoretical approaches did not correspond to messy reality, whether within the Habsburg lands or with regard to 'Germany'.

In 1849, a constitution for the non-Hungarian parts of the Empire was drawn up by delegates to an assembly that was meeting in the Moravian city of Kremsier.[9] This constitution promised the achievement of the liberal objectives outlined above. It promised the emancipation of peasants and Jews. It also recognised the diversity of the Empire, and promised equality of all nationalities and freedom to use local languages. It was, based on the idea of a central authority based in Vienna, although it attempted to add elements of federalism to take account of regional representations. It was a liberal ideal of the rational state, run efficiently, in a way that paralleled Josephinism. The constitution was never implemented, as the Habsburg army closed the assembly.

The constitution also ignored events that were taking place elsewhere. When revolution had broken out in 1848, Austria's German liberals seized their chance to address the German Question, by joining a parliament called in Frankfurt, for delegates from all the 'German' lands. Political and economic reforms were discussed, and delegates called for all Germans to be brought together in one state, but a solution could not be found as to how the Habsburg Empire could be integrated into such a state. The position of the dynasty, with its ties to its non-German lands, was one problem. The linguistic and national composition of the Empire was another. In this respect, areas of the Empire that could be defined as homogeneously German presented few problems, but this was not the case everywhere in the multinational Empire, with its overlapping populations. In a foretaste or what was to come, German liberals fell out with Czech liberals. The Czechs boycotted Frankfurt, as an assembly that had nothing to do with them.[10]

Attempts to implement a *kleindeutsch* solution, bringing together all of the German states except for Austria's German-speaking lands, fell apart when Friedrich Wilhelm IV of Prussia rejected the offer of the crown of such a new Germany.[11] The offer of this crown showed that, in return for most Germans being brought together, some liberals were prepared to leave other Germans outside a new German state. In the aftermath of 1848,

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[9] Hungary was in revolt and sent no delegates to Kremsier, but allowance was made that the constitution might be applied there later. See Sheehan, pp.690-701 and Evans, pp.195-196 on Kremsier.

[10] Evans, p.189.

[11] Sheehan, p.691.

liberals had shown that they were not a single, cohesive movement, and that some would compromise in order to achieve some of their aims.

Liberals may have failed in 1848-1849, but the familiar battlegrounds of sovereignty, secularisation and education would flare up again, but now the national question for Germany, with the idea of identity coming from belonging to a national community was prominent in a way it had not been before. In many ways, the Habsburgs and the liberals were competing narrow elites, with different value systems. For a period, the Habsburgs would be able to hold down the liberals and their ideas but, when they eventually found they needed them, they reached common ground.

Neoabsolutism

After the crushing of the revolution, the Habsburgs revoked the rights won after 1848 and set about consolidating their rule throughout the Empire, through a policy known as neoabsolutism, achieved initially by brutal suppression of any attempt at rebellion. The long-term objective was the revival of an Empire that was felt to have fallen behind its international competitors. This would be achieved by the establishment of a centralist, authoritarian government, based in Vienna, which would govern with firmness and suppress dissent.[12]

The Habsburgs rewarded their old supporters for their loyalty. In 1855, a Concordat was reached between Church and State which effectively made the Church the arbiter of morality in the Empire.[13] The Concordat gave the Church authority over marital matters and control over the education of all young Catholics in any school, public or private. In any subject to be taught there should be no contradiction with Catholic teachings on morality. In return, the bishops were required to take an oath of allegiance to the Emperor before they could take up an appointment on imperial soil.

German was to be the dominant culture and language, but this did not mean that the state was a German state. This was not a simple statement about the supremacy of German culture, even if German was regarded as having a high value. This was evidence of the continuation of Josephinist policies, which aimed to provide a strong and centralised state. For instance, in 1850 German became the de facto language for the internal functioning of the state administration in the Voivodina, despite this being an area of mostly Romanian

[12] Sheehan, p.725. See also Josef Redlich, *Austrian War Government*, (New Haven: Yale, 1927), p.1.

[13] Leisching, pp. 25-34, gives details on the Concordat.

speakers. The German language was a means to an end, at least in this respect, although it did tend to favour native German speakers.[14]

The Habsburgs used the standard repressive methods of autocratic states. Press censorship was heavy.[15] Yet, as one avenue of protest was closed down, another opened, and even everyday items became a means of resistance. In 1853, the authorities tried to ban items of clothing, including the so-called Kossuth hat, named in honour of a style favoured by the Hungarian revolutionary.[16] Correspondence shows that even the police enforcing the ban were unsure of what they could do. One local police officer wrote to Vienna that he was having trouble preventing them from being worn, because he was unsure of their design, so he requested a sketch. On receiving this, he asked for sketches of other hats that were banned, to make sure he was not letting anything slip. Fourteen further sketches were then sent to him. The impression given by the correspondence is that either the officer was genuinely confused or he was poking fun at his superiors.[17] Such tales were common. The police seized hats that might be used by students as revolutionary symbols from a shop in Vienna's fashionable *Kohlmarkt*, run by the widow of Herr J. B. Hardtmuth.[18] They were aware of many instances of students showing their support for German nationalism through the wearing of nationalist symbols on their clothing.[19] Reports of the manufacture of items in the 'forbidden three colours', the gold, black and red of the 'German' flag, also circulated.[20]

Not all of the labours of the Habsburgs' administrators were aimed at repression. Administrators drew up plans for political and physical renewals of Vienna, to give Austria a capital that would rival the appearance of any other major European city, and which would be a centre for the efficient administration of the Empire.[21] Deregulation of economic activity was carried out. In 1854, the railways were freed to competition and a bidding system for railway franchises was introduced. In 1859, trade Guilds, which controlled much

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[14] Ágnes Deák, *From Habsburg Neo-Absolutism to the Compromise, 1849-1867*, (Boulder: Atlantic Research and Publications, 2008), p.251.

[15] Norbert Bachleitner, 'The Habsburg Empire' in Robert J. Goldstein, ed., *The Frightful Stage: Political Censorship Of The Theater In Nineteenth-Century Europe*, (New York: Berghahn, 2009), pp.228-264.

[16] ABPD 1851-1860, among others, 22nd April 1853 and 28th November 1853.

[17] ABPD 1851-1860, among others, 22nd April 1853 and 28th November 1853.

[18] ABPD 1851-1860, 30th April 1853.

[19] ABPD 1851-1860, 10th March 1854.

[20] ABPD 1851-1860, 17th April 1853.

[21] Bled, p.178.

economic activity through restrictive practices, lost many of their powers, and sectors of the economy were opened to free competition.[22]

Efforts at repression did not always achieve their intended consequences, nor were all sustained completely throughout the period. Hungary, despite the best efforts of the Habsburgs, was never completely held down and, according to recent research, even underwent something of a cultural and economic revival.[23]

In 1851, the Habsburgs suspended the *Gemeindegesetz* of 1849, a law that allowed local communities to elect their own representatives and to run their own affairs. Theoretically, the suspension restricted local freedom of action. Nevertheless, local cadres, even if under neoabsolutism they often proved to be Habsburg placemen, were learning about the realities of administration, and how to influence local developments.[24] As the 1850s progressed, the Habsburgs also began to make accommodations with some of the elements that had stood in opposition to the dynasty, or which had at least been suspected of potential disloyalty. The state bureaucracy began building bridges with the upper bourgeoisie in the late 1850s in Vienna.[25] Such allies would soon be needed. In 1859, Austria was lured into war with Piedmont and France, and lost. Austria ceded large portions of its Italian territories to the nascent Kingdom of Italy that emerged from the war. Defeat on the international stage had consequences at home. The Habsburgs now looked to build domestic alliances, rather than simply imposing themselves on the State. Neoabsolutism was over.

A German And Liberal Empire?

Once again, the Habsburgs needed to strengthen their state. Externally, the Habsburgs needed to improve the diplomatic and military position of the Empire. Internally, they needed political stability and economic growth. A lid had to be kept on national aspirations, especially as far as Hungary was concerned. Politically, the state's dealings with its citizens were now to be based on liberal principles. The 1861 February Patent, confirmed at the time of the *Ausgleich*, therefore decreed all citizens of the Empire to be equal before the law, if not equal in terms of political rights. It was a partial reinstatement, at least, of the principles of the Kremsier constitution, and Liberals hoped it would be the start of further reform.[26] This constitution was an invitation to a tiny percentage of the population, the predominantly

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[22] Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, p.56.

[23] Deák, p.81 and p.422.

[24] Laurence Cole and Hans Heiss,, 'Unity versus Difference: The Politics Of Region-building and National Identities in Tyrol, 1830-1867', in Cole, ed., p.46.

[25] Redlich, p.9

[26] See Wilhelm Brauneder, 'Die Verfassungsentwicklungen in Österreich 1848-1918', in Rumpler and Urbanitsch, eds., *Habsburgermonarchie, Vol. VII,* Part 1, pp.69-237, here p.151. Also Evans, p.204.

German upper bourgeoisie, to participate in the government of a centralised state.[27] After 1861, and despite temporary suspensions of the constitution at times of national emergency, decades of legally defined, rather than arbitrary, rule followed. The liberals of the 1860s went on to win the battles for the constitutional state that they had set out to win in 1848, at least in part because of the external failures of the Habsburgs in Italy.[28] This intertwining of internal and external politics would continue throughout the Empire.

The early 1860s were not just a political clean break. Several key pillars of pre-1860s' Austria remained in place. The monarchy demonstrated that this society was based on hierarchy. Citizens had their place. Liberals and Habsburgs would have agreed that this was still a German Empire, and they would have had considerable agreement on the status of German culture as the leading culture, if perhaps for different reasons. They would have believed that Austria was a leading player in 'Germany', however that was defined. Any liberal government would have been expected to reach out to the state's allies throughout Germany, and to support 'Habsburg efforts to make good the loss of Lombardy by re-asserting their position in Germany'.[29]

Others were asking basic questions about the purpose of the Habsburg state, its intentions, and how it served and bound together the people. Debates on these matters emerged in public soon after the constitutional settlement of the early 1860s. For instance, one issue of Viennese satirical magazine *Figaro* shows a sketch for a suggested frieze for the new, elected lower chamber of parliament.[30] The frieze shows a history of the previous ten years, from the suppression of attempts to create a state based on liberal principles, via the Kremsier Constitution of 1849, through a period of attempted centralisation and Germanisation. Through censorship and bribery, neo-absolutist Austria was kept in place, until it was pushed over by Napoleon III, then rescued by a constitution. The magazine questions what the 1861 constitution means.

In another cartoon, *Figaro* shows various ways in which state and people can be aligned. The nations of Great Britain – England, Scotland and Ireland, but with no reference to Wales – are shown to be united under law. France is bound together under the leadership of Napoleon III, Hungary under Andrassy. Austria is shown as united only under the state's national debt. The constitutional settlement of 1860 to 1861 was here explicitly recognised

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[27] 'Federal', in the context of Austrian history, did not necessarily mean devolved. It could mean a system of using local institutions to strengthen central control. See Höglinger, pp.62-63 for an outline of debates on the matter.

[28] Höbelt, p.16

[29] Cole and Heiss, p.49

[30] *Figaro, Humoristisches Wochenblatt*, Vienna, 30th March 1861. Hereafter, *Figaro*.

as a compromise between the dynasty and the liberals. It was something that would not have come about without war, and which had at its heart not the resolution of political principles but the elimination of state debt. Such newspapers and periodicals, however limited their readerships, show what was being debated, at least among the political class of the time.[31]

Figaro also sheds light on the local political life of Vienna. After 1860, members of the Vienna City Council, and of the districts, were no longer Habsburg placemen, but were elected, if on a very limited franchise. Figaro refers to the members of the City Council as the 'new fathers of the Commune'.[32] A booklet with the title 'The New Fathers Of The Commune Of Great Vienna' repeats this phrase, and lists in some detail the backgrounds of these representatives.[33] The booklet goes to some lengths to establish the members' liberal credentials, in keeping with the spirit of the new age. Many members of the City Council were indeed veterans of 1848, yet *Figaro* is more sceptical about the nature of some of these representatives. It asks what kinds of liberals sat in the Council Chamber. It asks what has really changed since the days of neo-absolutism, when some members who had previously supported clerical opinions, or some who had been resolutely conservative, now claimed to be liberal.[34] This contradicts the later viewpoint of many on the radical Right that Vienna City Council was now a solid bastion of liberal principles. Liberals were divided into many factions and sub-factions, and liberal principles meant many things to many different people.

Illustrating this, the elections of 1860 returned liberals of various shades. 'Centre liberals' made up a little more than half of the members of the Council, 'right liberals' almost sixteen per cent, and 'left liberals' eighteen per cent.[35] But, in 1861, some inside the council chamber had either come late to these views or proclaimed their support for liberal principles only from political expediency. *Figaro's* assertion that nearly everyone was claiming to be liberal emphasizes the point that only the proclamation of a liberal message would win political influence at this time. Whether this message was sincere is open to question, given that the veterans of 1848 sat alongside those who had previously held very different views. At the very start of the new era, then, there were questions over the commitment to liberal ideals of some of those who held power and influence.

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[31] For a survey of the press in Austria, see Kurt Paupié, *Handbuch der österreichischen Pressegeschichte 1848-1959 Vol. 1: Wien,* (Vienna: Braumüller, 1960).

[32] *Figaro*, 13th July 1861.

[33] See Bermann and Evenbach.

[34] *Figaro*, 22nd March 1861 and 22nd June 1861.

[35] Seliger and Ucakar, Vol. 1, p.600.

Apart from domestic politics, the German Question was an important consideration for Austria's liberals in the 1860s. A broad agreement may have existed between liberals and Habsburgs when it came to asserting Austria's position in Germany, but the devil lay in the detail. In 1863, in an attempt to gain the upper hand in Germany, the Habsburgs attempted, but failed, to reform the German Confederation, to give themselves more of a say in its running than their Prussian rivals.[36] This avoided a conflict between Austria's liberals and the Habsburgs, as the liberals would only support the reforms if they led to an elected representative body for the Confederation, which they did not.[37]

This did not mean that Habsburgs and liberals were always at odds. In 1863, for instance, celebrations were being planned for the five hundredth anniversary of Rudolf of Habsburg becoming Count of Tyrol. Flags were hung in the Habsburg black and yellow, alongside others in Tyrolese green. Unlike the earlier reports of bans on the 'forbidden three colours', flags also hung in the German national colours of black-red-gold. Franz Joseph was invoked as 'leader' of Germany, and 'liberals praised Franz Joseph as the monarch who had given Austria a constitution, whilst hailing him too as the renewer of Germany. Praise was fulsome:

> 'We call for God's blessing on all the steps by which your Majesty tries to renew and strengthen the Confederation of German lands'.[38]

Liberal hopes in Franz Joseph may have had their origins in the then political situation in Austria's great rival in Germany, Prussia where, in 1862, Bismarck attacked Prussian liberals who had refused his military budget. At this time, Austria, with its liberal constitution and liberals in Parliament, must have seemed a better bet for their vision of the future.[39] Taking a German national position and simultaneously remaining *Habsburgtreu* were at this time highly possible. A reconciliation of the German Question with the Habsburgs' aims in Germany – whether these were anything ranging from Habsburg leadership to a strengthening of the smaller German states against Prussia – was still possible. Liberal ideals and national unity, perhaps in some federal form, still seemed to be feasible goals.[40]

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[36] Jiří Kořalka, "Deutschland und die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918", in Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch, eds., *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918, Vol. VI: Die Habsburgermonarchie im System der internationalen Beziehungen*, Part 2, (Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1993), p.35.

[37] Cole and Heiss, p.50.

[38] Cole and Heiss, p.50.

[39] Kořalka, p.35.

[40] Sheehan, p.600 and p.907.

Nevertheless, a real threat to the Empire from nationalism was emerging in the form of the complex question of the Schleswig-Holstein succession.[41] In the inns and drinking houses of Vienna, the issue lifted nationalist passions. There were calls for Austria to take action, along with other German states, against Denmark. Gatherings called for volunteers to support any military efforts. Fund raising events took place. Alarmingly for the authorities, those becoming involved in these events were not just hot-headed and youthful students. Clerks and lower officials were said to be playing a leading part.[42] The Schleswig-Holstein question was being discussed right across the city, in many settings, including singing groups. These groups were a popular form of male association at the time, and a way for respectable men with like-minded opinions to meet, converse and explore business and career opportunities. One such group, the *Ottakringer Liedertafel* was formed in 1864, and the *Ottakringer* gathered for their first meeting, on 2nd March 1864, at the Ottakring Brewery Hall. The song sheets for the occasion include patriotic songs about Austria, but also about the German nation. All proceeds were to go to a fund for Austrian volunteers fighting in Schleswig-Holstein. The programme began with the 'German folk song', The Schleswig-Holstein Song:

> 'Schleswig-Holstein bound by the sea
> German tradition, high alert,
> Give true loyalty, hard earned,
> Until a finer morning dawns!
> Schleswig-Holstein brother tribe,
> Do not weaken, my fatherland!'[43]

The second meeting of the *Ottakringer*, on 11th May, included a mixed bag of music including Mendelssohn, and ended with the national anthem, *Österreich mein Vaterland*. By 29th June, the *Ottakringer* were still meeting at the brewery hall in Ottakring, but this time along with sixteen other singing groups, including those of the *Erster Wiener Turnverein* and *Hermann*.[44] The *Ottakringer* included in their programme a Festival Motto, composed by Ferdinand Merrenz, a member of the *Liedertafel*:

> 'German men, German strength,
> German women, virtuous,

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[41] See Sheehan, pp.890-896.

[42] ABPD 1861-1872. 8th January 1864 on the *Wiener Männergesangverein*.

[43] Songsheets for 1864 to 1866 are available as *Programm und Liedertext zur Fest-Liedertafel*, dated 2nd March 1864 to 20th December 1866, WbiR. Hereafter *Programm und Liedertext.*

[44] *Programm und Liedertext*.

German customs, German loyalty,
German songs, German and free!'[45]

Such songs formed part of a longer programme that included the singing group from the nearby district of Hietzing singing *Österreich, mein Vaterland*. It seems that these groups saw no contradiction between this expression of the group's Germanness and its ability to be loyal to the Habsburgs as German princes. As has been stated, German nationalists at this point may have envisaged the Habsburgs as leaders of a unified Germany.

As the conflict to the North intensified, further charitable concerts to raise funds took place.[46] The programmes and the venues became more ambitious. This was a flurry of what can be described as expansive nationalism, the desire to defend lands that were seen as part of Germany, but which were under threat from a foreign power. While these calls were being made, however, in 1864 Austria was outmanoeuvred by Prussia over the Schleswig-Holstein question. It was now challenged in its role as nominal leader of the German Confederation, that had been established after the defeat of Napoleon. This challenge eventually led to war, and Austria's defeat by the Prussians at Sadowa on 3rd July 1866. As a result, the German Confederation was dissolved, and the North German Confederation, under Prussian leadership, came into being.[47] In August 1866, the Peace of Prague effectively excluded Austria from a role in those German lands it did not directly control. Habsburg possessions in Italy were also greatly reduced, with the loss of the Veneto. Some perceived this as the end to an era.

Franz Joseph had his own view on the situation in Germany. Even after Sadowa, he still believed that Germany could be won back. After all, the political set-up in Germany had changed many times in the past century. He appointed the anti-Prussian Count Friedrich von Beust, former prime minister of Saxony, as his Foreign Minister. Beust was instructed to bring to a successful conclusion long negotiations which had been taking place between representatives of the Emperor and the Hungarians, who had been among the most powerful opponents of the centralised state favoured by the German liberals. It had also been feared they might yet again rebel.

In February 1867, the Hungarian Constitution was reinstated and on 15th March 1867 the Hungarians swore an oath to a new political compromise, the *Ausgleich*. The Empire was now Austria-Hungary, with Hungary beyond the reach of the German liberals. The

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[45] *Programm und Liedertext*.

[46] *Programm und Liedertext*.

[47] On Austro-Prussian relations within the Confederation, see Kořalka.

relationship between the state and the German liberals, on which the 1861 settlement had been based, had been changed at will by the dynasty. Crucially, however, the constitutional idea remained intact.[48]

Liberal Consolidation At Home, Austrian Ejection From Germany Confirmed

The *Ausgleich* was a major development in the history of the Empire. It would later poison relationships and influence many stances on how the Hungarians had damaged the state's strength.[49] Yet German liberals, despite anger at the break-up of the unitary state, accepted the *fait accompli* and went about building a liberal and German state in the non-Hungarian part of the Empire, Cisleithania.[50] In Cisleithania, the 1867 December Constitution regulated matters. This constitution guaranteed individual rights, and declared equality before the law. National rights were also guaranteed, at least on paper, even if a system known disparagingly as 'electoral geometry' tilted voting strength towards the German bourgeoisie. The gerrymandered franchise gave Germans, by virtue of their above average tax contributions or educational status, more seats in assemblies at the regional or Cisleithanian level, even when they were in a minority.

This constitution was later held up as a model of how the liberals had brought an alien philosophy into Christian Austria, and tried to drive Germans from the Church. The 1867 Constitution superseded the Concordat of 1855, and confirmed the secularising stance of the state. It did so indirectly, through guarantees of freedom of belief and conscience, for individuals and groups. Directly, it reduced the role of the Church in schools, and the Church lost to the state its previous jurisdiction over marriage.[51] Liberals who also happened to be sincere Catholics were in a difficult position. Even the Emperor was put at a disadvantage. His ministers had attempted to negotiate with the Church, but Franz Joseph accepted that compromise was impossible with the reactionary Pius IX.[52] Franz Joseph may in fact have been relieved that a new start was possible. He had taken offence at the Papal Declaration of Infallibility of 1870. He was equally resentful that Pius IX had 'flirted with Italian nationalism'.[53] Beyond constitutional matters, the liberals continued to extend

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[48] Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, p.35.

[49] See, for instance, Boyer, *In Power*, pp.111-112, on Franz Ferdinand, an ardent opponent of the Hungarians.

[50] Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, p.22.

[51] These constitutional provisions were confirmed in the 1868 May Laws. Leisching, pp.41-42

[52] Leisching, p.56

[53] Jenks, 'Statecraft', *AHYB*, 1966, p.96.

laissez-faire policies and, economically, the period 1866 to 1873 was one of expansion in Cisleithania.[54]

The constitution had attempted to resolve one potential area of nationally-inspired tension, by making Galicia, in effect, an autonomous region within Cisleithania. The Germans of Cisleithania accepted this compromise without opposition.[55] Galicia had never been part of their homeland, so nothing would be lost by Galician autonomy. Liberals considered most of the rest of Cisleithania to be a German cultural and political sphere, although challenges to German privileges were rising. In Bohemia, where Germans enjoyed better political representation than Czechs, and German was a privileged language in its use in state employment, Germans were outnumbered by Czechs. After 1867, the Czech political class demanded the raising of Czech status, some calling for the dualist settlement with Hungary to be replaced by a tripartite settlement involving the Czechs.[56] Behind the scenes negotiations began.

In February 1871, the Hohenwart ministry took office and continued these negotiations, with a view to producing a formal Czech *Ausgleich,* known as the Fundamental Articles. This would give Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia a significant degree of autonomy and, if enacted, would allow greater use of the Czech language and open more public jobs to Czech speakers.[57] It would thereby diminish the relative importance of the German language, potentially altering the lives of German speakers in Bohemia. The German reaction was predictable. German deputies walked out of the Bohemian Diet. In Vienna, there were reports of tension, and fears that students at the University would riot.[58] The Hungarians, fearing that Slavs in their part of the Empire would demand concessions, made their opposition clear.[59] On 20th October 1871, a month after his own Prime Minister had put them forward, Franz Joseph rejected the Fundamental Articles. There would be no compromise for the Czechs.[60]

The reactions of politically active and nationally minded Germans to change in Bohemia could not have been more different to their reactions to the changes brought about by the

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[54] Cole and Heiss, p.51.

[55] See page 148 of this thesis for the persistence of this approach to Galicia in German nationalist programmes.

[56] Glasheim, pp.23-24; Kelly, pp.25-28.

[57] Eric Fischer, 'New Light on German-Czech Relations in 1871' *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 14, No. 2. (Jun., 1942): 177-194.

[58] Fischer, p.191.

[59] Kelly, p.27.

[60] The substance of the Fundamental Articles, and whether they would given Czechs a greater role Bohemia, have been well documented elsewhere. See Christian Scharf, *Ausgleichspolitik und Pressekampf in der Ära Hohenwart*, (Munich: Oldenbourg,1996).

Hungarian *Ausgleich*. These Germans dug in against the Czech *Ausgleich*, in contrast to 1867 when, despite what amounted to token protests, they gave up hope of a role in Hungary. Their attitude seems to have been that they had never really had much influence in Hungary, so they were abandoning little. Their reactions in 1867 and 1871 were also governed by the realities of politics. Germans who agitated against a Czech compromise thought that they could achieve their goals. They believed they could ultimately rely on the State using force if Czech demands went too far. German actions in 1871 were therefore driven in part by political realities, and in part by principle.

Czechs had previously made claims for rights in Bohemia but, after 1871, Germans now began to feel that such claims might succeed. The Empire's German liberals had watched as the Habsburgs had at least contemplated an attempt to strengthen their state, by negotiating a settlement that would have changed the relative position of Czechs and Germans in Bohemia. The doors to constitutional reform had opened in 1861, and other groups now wanted to come through them. German liberals now saw that the Empire could continue to change, and not necessarily in their favour.

Events outside of the Empire also continued to shape the Habsburg state and its development. On 18th January 1871, after victory for Prussia and its allies over France, the German Empire was declared. Now, Franz Joseph had to recognise that Austria's exclusion from the new Germany was a long-term settlement, and that his ambitions in Germany were at an end. By way of acknowledgement, he dismissed Beust.

Liberalism Under Attack

Fears of Czech intrusions into German privileges persisted. The German Association, which had been founded in Vienna in 1869, promoted liberal opposition to a Czech *Ausgleich*. In March 1871, the Association organised the second German Austrian Party Conference in Vienna. Ignaz Plener, a leading liberal, wrote that he and his allies prevented German Bohemian deputies from attending, as they wanted to discuss the 'protection of German nationality in Austria (which is really not in the least threatened, despite the Hohenwart cabinet)'.[61] Plener's comments show that splits existed within the liberal movement, between liberals based in Vienna and those from Bohemia.

Splits also emerged between generations. Conflicts between established politicians, the *Alten*, such as Plener, and a new generation, the *Jungen*, show the latter inclining to

[61] Judson, *Revolutionaries*, p.170.

Germany, but still with the primary aim of winning support for German interests and influence in Austria-Hungary, not for union with the *Reich*. It was also partly a conflict of approach as much as a conflict of goals, since both factions defined German identity in progressive terms, and were open to the idea of assimilation for others. The *Jungen* did believe in 'a rising tide of Slav political gains in Austria', but older liberals appreciated the efforts of their younger colleagues to rejuvenate their movement. Any definitive split that would harden existing divisions on the nationality question was at a very early stage in 1871.[62]

These disputes over the nationalities question are obvious points in tracing the evolution of notions of German identity, but other areas of liberal philosophy would also come under scrutiny in this respect. The first of these, *laissez-faire* economic policies, would later be used to complain about allegedly 'Jewish' unfair practices, which hit hard at 'honest German' tradesmen. This was especially the case after a stock market crash in 1873 led to widespread business closures and unemployment. Free market theory demanded that the economy be left to run its course until the markets found new equilibrium points. As the government followed this orthodoxy, business after business collapsed. The effects were worsened by an underlying restructuring of the economy, as new modes of production threatened traditional artisanal ways.[63]

The resultant unemployment and misery was attributed firmly – and probably justly – to the economic line taken by the liberals. Economic difficulties after 1873 did not, however, prevent the liberals from pressing on with their plans in other areas, such as attempts to secularise society. In 1874, after years of delay, the 1855 Concordat was finally repudiated.[64] The state had regulated its relations with the Catholic Church, but the wealth and influence of the Church was such that it remained a 'privileged public corporation' in the Empire.[65] Secularisation was a further liberal philosophy that would later come under attack as un-Christian and un-German, but in the 1870s, a widespread 'embittered reaction' that would come from some quarters against 'Manchester liberalism' had not yet set in.[66]

At the time of negotiations over the Fundamental Articles, liberals had expected a coup, led by conservatives, that would reverse constitutional gains, but this fear went away.[67] After

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[62] Judson, *Revolutionaries*, pp.168-170.

[63] Pulzer, *Political Antisemitism*, p.138; Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, pp.44-49.

[64] Leisching, pp.51-57.

[65] Ernst Hanisch, *Der lange Schatten des Staates: österreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert*, (Vienna: Ueberreuter, 1994), p.215.

[66] Höbelt, p.21.

[67] Höbelt, p.22.

the crash of 1873, however, a new anti-liberal movement, based on antisemitism, began to coalesce. Its geographical heartland was Vienna, and it was in Vienna that it would find its earliest successes. Antisemites had been active in the city even in the 1860s, but they had been limited in their influence. In the 1870s, this emerging movement became bolder and more insistent, coupling liberal economic and educational proposals as Jewish assaults on Christian values.[68] This movement's roots lay in resentment at liberal economic policies, alongside religious and racial prejudice, but some leading figures in the antisemitic movement would even emerge from the liberal ranks. Antisemites targeted liberalism as a front for alleged Jewish plots to dominate Christians.

These antisemites were often from guilds or other groups, such as the lower clergy, which claimed to have been disadvantaged by the constitutional state. Liberals had indeed implemented some policies which deregulated guild control of economic activities, and in so doing had caused an unintended outcome: guild members, master craftsmen and others who had been protected by former regulations began to see themselves threatened by liberal reforms.[69] This ignored the reality of the changing nature of economic activity across Europe. Factories and international trade were making guild-based products uncompetitive. However, antisemites stuck to their line that it was 'Jewish' liberalism that was the root cause of their problems. Jews were said to be stealing business from the traditional guilds and their members, and impoverishing working Christian people through usury although, in reality, Jews were to be found in many occupations and at many social levels.[70]

Antisemites were also attempting to take advantage of mass Jewish immigration into Vienna, which brought the presence of Jews in Vienna in large numbers for the first time. The number of Jews in Vienna soared from less than 16,000 in 1854, to over 40,000 in 1869, then on to almost 75,000, ten per cent of the total population of the city, in 1880.[71] Lothar Höbelt has described Viennese antisemitism as a 'challenge' and 'response' to the speed and scale of such immigration, which took place after the 1860s.[72]

This overlooks two points, however. The first is that antisemitic outbursts were part of a longer tradition. As William Bowman has shown, antisemitism was rooted in the Catholic colleges for priests.[73] The second point is that those who turned to antisemitism seem to

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[68] As will be seen in more detail in Chapter 3.

[69] Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, pp.99-105.

[70] Pulzer, *Political Antisemitism*, p.139. Rozenblit, pp.66-69 analyses occupational status.

[71] Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, p.79.

[72] Höbelt, p.25.

[73] William Bowman, *Priest And Parish In Vienna, 1780-1880*, (Boston: Humanities Press, 1999), p.117 and p.130.

have done so in order to achieve certain ends. Members of the guilds were attempting to remove the competition of house-to-house hawkers of goods, who were often Jewish, so removing Jews would somehow alleviate economic difficulties.[74] Some members of the clergy thought Jews encouraged a non-Christian outlook. This ties in with the idea presented by Julie Thorpe that understanding the purpose of antisemitism is more important than understanding its nature.[75] This is true, but a qualifier needs to be added that some active antisemites had a prejudice towards Jews that had no end other than prejudice. In this case, the root causes of their prejudice, perhaps a deep exposure to antisemitism from their education or their daily experience, would be at least as important in understanding their views as would be the aims of their antisemitism.

The source of the attacks on liberals is a reminder that liberals did not make up all of bourgeois Vienna. The bourgeoisie of the liberal world was, in general, relatively affluent, as measured by their tax contributions, which entitled them to vote from the 1860s. Another bourgeoisie existed, lower down the social scale, without major reserves of capital, which found little comfort in *laissez-faire* economic policies when times were hard. Another bourgeoisie also existed for whom Catholicism was genuinely important.[76] The anticlerical laws, and their outcomes prevented them from being allies for the liberals. The stance that liberals took towards religion and economics would come to haunt them, especially when the franchise was extended in the 1880s. This stance would be repeatedly portrayed as incompatible with a Viennese identity based on Christian-German values.

The liberals could also at times be their own worst enemies, and the long years in power were taking a toll. Liberals were accused of taking bribes for the awarding of contracts. Scandals rocked the Vienna City Council, eating away at the liberals' authority.[77] Ironically, their fall from government came over a matter of principle, in the form of a protest against Imperial military intervention, ostensibly as a peace-keeping mission, in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Liberals were replaced by a coalition of conservatives, and clericals, the so-called Iron Ring, under Count Eduard von Taaffe.[78] After nearly twenty years in national government, the liberals were out of power. Faced with this reversal of fortunes, liberals would attempt to re-group, to take on their conservative opponents. The next two chapters will explore where and how new opponents other than the conservatives would emerge, who

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[74] Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, p.62.

[75] Thorpe, p.153.

[76] Höbelt, pp. 22-23.

[77] Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, pp.197-198.

[78] Höbelt, p.106.

would try to keep the liberals, in the form they had existed to 1879, from making a return to power.

Summary

This chapter has focused on Austria's German liberals up to 1879. One reason it has done so is because, to this point, liberals were key players in trying to shape a German identity for the state, as well as trying to infuse the state with liberal values. The chapter has therefore outlined the broad base of liberal principles, which rested on constitutionalism, personal responsibility, secularisation of the state, and free market economics. It has shown that the Habsburgs attempted to suppress the application of some of these principles in the early years of neoabsolutism, while simultaneously starting to compromise over others. Habsburg defeat abroad allowed the liberals to take over government in the 1860s, where they attempted to build the state they wanted.

Two defeats for liberal aims came as the Habsburgs were driven out of Germany and a separate Hungarian sphere was carved within the Empire. The liberals had little control over these events. Their aim of a centralised Empire, based on liberal principles and German culture, was lost. An end to Habsburg involvement in the lands covered by the new 'Germany' also put an end to any visions Austria's German liberals may have had for a larger German state that would have involved them. Liberals were more successful in cementing foundations for constitutionalism, secularism and *laissez-faire* economic policies. Their vision of citizenship as inclusive was flawed by modern standards, in demanding assimilation, but at least it was not exclusive, and possibilities of coming to belong did exist.

Debates were taking place that would later shape critical matters of who could and could not belong, especially from a nationalist and antisemitic perspective. These debates were beginning to show that the 'process of 'becoming national' derives from the social and cultural creation of new group identities, which involves the 'invention' or re-discovery of national myths and traditions.[79] Some were going about developing the process of 'becoming national' by meeting regularly in a singing society, where they could boast about the position of German strengths and virtues above those of others. Even daily dress could reinforce such views, with items of clothing being used to express an otherwise banned point of view, from Hungarian peasants to Viennese students.

Liberal factionalism meant that single issues came to dominate, political jockeying became the standard and normalised the politics of interest groups. The roots of liberalism were

[79] Cole, in Cole, ed., Introduction, p.1.

shallow.[80] The conflicts within the liberal movement meant that different histories of the people, events and nature of this period could later be presented. In some hands, these histories became deliberate distortions of the 1860s and 1870s, and the period that preceded it, for the benefit of those who claimed to want to destroy the liberal inheritance, and thereby aimed to re-invent the 'better' world that preceded it.

[80] Höbelt, p.24

CHAPTER 3: THE LOWER CLERGY AND VIENNA, 1860-1879

A Church Persecuted?

Chapter 2 has shown aspects of political developments, as conventionally defined, in Vienna and Austria in the years from 1861 to 1879. Chapter 3 concentrates on one important sector of Viennese society, some of the lower clergy in this period. The chapter considers the early stages of antisemitic activities among some of these priests, and also outlines some of their daily routines, in order to explain the context of these activities. In so doing, it identifies a general chronological division. First, from 1861 to around the mid 1870s, where antisemitism was found among priests it was generally a compartmentalised activity. It was a subject that was specifically raised and debated. Often, the message was proclaimed through niche newspapers, with their limited reach, and antisemitic attacks took the form of denunciations of the State's alleged assaults on the Church.

Then, about the mid-1870s, some priests went on the offensive, often from positions within parishes. It was at this time that a number of factors came together as an impetus to action. Liberal secularising policies were being implemented, an economic crash had occurred and large scale Jewish immigration was taking place. The *Kulturkampf* was in progress in Germany. Priests were also lamenting a decline in their personal status, as their engagement with politics became more direct, and they began to gain prominence. They used antisemitism in politically slanted sermons, speeches and supposedly religious publications in order to attack Jews or the liberal state and its relationship with the Church, aiming at political change.[1] Their comments were peppered with explanations of what they were attacking and why. In so doing, they were changing not just the language of politics, but helping to change the way people viewed the world on a daily basis. They promoted an exclusionary, ethnic view which they would have considered not to be nationalist, but which indirectly played its part in the reinforcement of exclusionary, ethnically based nationalism.

Chapter 2 described how Church-State relations fluctuated. Under neoabsolutism, the Church was a highly privileged corporation, a cornerstone of the State. In the 'liberal era', Church privileges were curtailed, but it retained considerable influence at many levels in society. The chapter shows that, despite clerical complaints, priests were not completely frozen out of politics in the 1860s. Priests continued to play a significant social role, and local politicians tried at times not to confront them, but to work with them. In these cases, politicians seemed to be seeking the legitimising authority of the Church.

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[1] Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, p.119.

Within the Church at this time, priests of a new generation were either in training or in their first parishes, learning skills which would see them later make headway in attacking the liberal state in the 1880s and 1890s. Something of a myth was built up about the relationship between Church and State which, essentially, depicted the Church as having been persecuted relentlessly over a long period by a liberal state that tried to destroy it. This myth became a repeated commonplace among many of the lower clergy and the Catholic press. This view is found in many places, such as the *Chroniken* of the parishes, or official parish histories. For instance, writing of the early liberal era in Vienna, the *Chronik* from the parish of Grinzing talks of the 'most uncomfortable period in the history of the parish' and of the Communal administration being run by liberals 'under the influence of the Freemasons'.[2] This was nothing less than a life and death battle, part of the wider war unleashed by alien, Jewish liberalism, for the soul of German, Catholic Vienna.

Some Suburban Parishes

By the mid-nineteenth century, the Church had done little to help parishes to cope with the increases in population that had taken place in Vienna and its suburbs. Change, when it came, was *ad hoc* and no systematic attempt was made at reorganising the parishes until 1940.[3] The burden of care on priests had therefore been increasing. Priests led physically and emotionally demanding lives. Several masses were held each day.[4] Each year also brought hundreds of weddings, baptisms and funerals to a parish.[5] Fortunately for these priests, they were not alone in carrying out their work. Parishes were often staffed with curates, junior priests who were fully ordained but unable as yet to take up a parish of their own. This may have been because of a lack of available parishes, or because the curates lacked sufficient experience at that time, and curates might spend years working at a parish on a temporary basis until their position was confirmed.[6] The life of a curate could be precarious. While the salary for a parish priest was guaranteed through the *Ordinariat,* the office of the Archbishop at St. Stephen's Cathedral in Vienna, a curate's salary had to be requested from the *Ordinariat*, often in arrears. While curates might wait years for their own parish, this system gave them exposure to the full range of parish activities.

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[2] AEDW GrCk. The date in the *Chronik* is 1883, but this may have been a later entry referring back to that year.

[3] Anonymous, *Festschrift: 'Die Wiener Pfarren von 1932-1952'*, (Vienna: Katholisches soziologisches Institut, Abteilung Österreich, 1952), pp.1-2.

[4] See for instance AEDW AOCor, several items from September 1897 for times of church services.

[5] The figures are for later in the period, but Father Pax at Alt-Ottakring recorded, for the years 1893 to 1898, an average of 180 weddings, 400 funerals of adults and 660 funerals of children per year. AEDW AOCor, Nachweisung, 28th May 1899.

[6] AEDW AOCor, 10th July 1906 or AEDW WeCk 1912.

In addition to looking after their curates, priests had to deal with a considerable amount of daily administration, including the care of church buildings that were often in disrepair. In Ottakring, for instance, Father Emmanuel Paletz, priest since 1848, spent much of his time in correspondence with the *Ordinariat*. He wrote often about the need for assistants to help him in his work. He sent reminders about the need to pay them.[7] Much of this correspondence was dashed off, in barely legible handwriting, and was simply a record of daily routines. Occasionally, when Paletz wrote about matters he considered to be important, his handwriting became more measured and he used better paper. In 1861, Paletz made no mention in the parish *Chronik* of the political changes happening either in the capital or nationally. He wrote, however, in great detail about a thunder storm that had hit Ottakring, the damage it caused to church buildings, and the danger to his parishioners that the damaged buildings represented.[8] The *Chroniken* and correspondence of the parishes of Währing and Weinhaus contain similar records of the need for funds for building work.[9] The same applies to requests for funding for teachers.[10] Priests across the city had to cope with increasing congregations, squeezed into crumbling buildings. They had to learn the skills to manage their curates.

One potential form of support from outside the Church was that of a patron, and any support obtained from a patron would have been welcome, but a patron could also present problems; the provision of cash could be taken as a licence to interfere with the running of a parish. In the nineteenth century, the Czartorysky family funded the church at Weinhaus. In return, the family, and not the Archdiocese, appointed the parish priest there.[11] The family also expected to be involved in the running of the local school. A long-running dispute over who should control the school – priest or patron – came to a head in the 1860s, and was finally resolved only with the intervention of the local Imperial administration, the *Statthalterei*.[12] This was much to the relief of the incumbent priest, Father Adam Schwandner, whom the *Statthalterei* supported. Displaying no gratitude for his patron's financial support, and with total belief in the justice of his stance, Schwandner recorded the end of the dispute with an emphatic '*Victoria!*' in the parish *Chronik*.[13]

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[7] AEDW AOCor, 27th August 1851.

[8] AEDW AOCor, 26th April1861.

[9] AEDW WäCk, 1873.

[10] AEDW WeCk, 1860.

[11] AEDW WeCor, letter from Prince Czartorysky dated June 1901.

[12] AEDW WeCk. The year is unclear from the *Chronik*, which is marked 1860s, but it is between 1862 and 1865.

[13] AEDW WeCk. The year of this entry is also unclear from the *Chronik*, but it too is between 1862 and 1865.

Priest Versus Politician?

Despite the rigours of their work, many priests stayed at the same parish for long spells. Schwandner was at Weinhaus for sixteen years.[14] Paletz was at Ottakring from 1848 to 1873.[15] Their longevity in office would have helped parish priests to exercise authority over their parishioners. Many enhanced that authority by hard work in their community, even if the constitutional settlements of the 1860s presented a challenge to this authority. The nature of this challenge lay not so much in the detail of the settlements as in the liberal principles that underpinned them. The 1860s removed the privileges the Church had held in areas such as marriage and education. Despite retaining influence over religious teaching in schools, and while it retained its position at the centre of many social networks, the Church was now, legally at least, one corporate body among many. It retained a voice in the shaping of public policy, but other voices now had the right to be heard too. Among these voices were the legal political parties that were being formed, as well as the various societies that were emerging after the constitutions guaranteed at least some freedom of association. In 1861, Vienna City Council represented the views of the electorate in districts I to IX. Beyond the *Gurtel*, the local communes had their own elected representatives. In many cases in the 1860s and 1870s, the pattern of liberal pre-eminence within the *Gurtel* was repeated in these communes. These patterns show the solid bourgeois credentials of the representatives, as home-owners, master builders and above all as bourgeois.[16]

The picture that has been painted – often by people from within the Church – was that this was an age where the Church was immediately under attack from secularising liberal administrations. This picture has often been summarised by later commentators, such as the author of a history of the parish of St. Rochus, in the Landstrasse district, who in the 1930s described liberals as attempting to deprive the Church of all influence, aided by Jews and Marxists.[17] Friedrich Funder, later editor of the *Reichspost*, looked back on the 1860s and 1870s as a time when liberals dominated Parliament, the University, the bureaucracy, the literary world, but 'not satisfied with ruling over the political stage and public opinion, they tried to make the religious thinking of the people subject to their views'.[18]

In some parishes, this was said to have led to the almost complete destruction of religious activity. At St. Rochus, for instance, it was claimed that religious life only revived after

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[14] AEDW WeCk, 1874.

[15] AEDW AOCK, 1873.

[16] For instance, AEDW AOCk, 1871, 1872 and 1873, for lists of those elected.

[17] Tauchmann, p.43.

[18] Friedrich Funder, *Vom gestern ins heute. Aus dem Kaiserreich in die Republik*, (Vienna: Herold, 1952), p.89-90.

1892, with the appointment of an energetic champion of the Church, Father Karl Gold.[19] The *Chroniken* and correspondence of the parishes give a rather different picture. Certainly, the liberal period did see new laws which required the building of schools that fell under the control of local authorities. These schools were not, however, beyond the influence of the Church. Father Paletz of Ottakring, for instance, remained as a member of the Ottakring commune council until 1869, on a co-opted basis.[20] He was eventually removed from the council after a dispute with other members over religious education.[21]

While this was no doubt a blow to Paletz, he had grasped how politics worked in the liberal era, and took up the fight using the new political weapons available to him. On 31st August 1869, Paletz protested that the 'worthy' members of the commune of Ottakring had decided to build an elementary school.[22] Yet within a month Paletz was writing to the *Ordinariat* about the need, and the right, to appoint a teacher of religion to this school.[23] A similar route had been followed by Father Magnollo in the parish of Währing. In 1867, he had requested that the *Ordinariat*'s office provide a curate to run religious education for the new commune-built school in his parish. Magnollo did at least seem to recognise the need for this school, to cope with the growing population in the area.[24]

Priests had no intention of letting education slip from their influence, even if, as in the case of Grinzing, the *Chronik* records the 'separation of the elementary school from the Church' as early as 1861.[25] Details concerning schooling are carefully noted in the *Chroniken*. In 1861, Father Schwandner listed how many children were in the elementary and more advanced schools, even down to the level of those who repeated a year.[26] In 1862, Father Magnollo recorded changes in the personnel on the school committee in Währing.[27] In 1871, Father Paletz was still unhappy with how the commune of Ottakring was handling the question of religious education in the elementary school. Perhaps suspecting that the liberals were attempting to avoid their responsibilities in this regard, he formed an alliance with Pastor Wilkens from the Evangelical Church in Vienna and Herr Huffner, for the

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[19] Tauchmann, p.62.

[20] Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Heimatkunde in Ottakring, ed., *Ottakring: ein Heimatbuch des 16. Wiener Gemeindebezirkes*, (Vienna: Österreichischer Schulbücherverlag, 1924), p.160.

[21] Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Heimatkunde in Ottakring, p.165.

[22] AEDW AOCor, 31st August 1869. Paletz to *Ordinariat*.

[23] AEDW AOCor, 3rd September 1869. Correspondence between Paletz and the Archbishop's office.

[24] AEDW WäCor, 31st July1867, Magnollo to Ordinariat.

[25] AEDW GrCk, 1861.

[26] AEDW WäCk, 1862.

[27] AEDW WäCk, 1862.

'Israelites'.[28] Together, they invoked the law and forced the commune to provide sufficient funds for teachers of religion at the school.[29] Paletz also recorded that this was the year he was named as 'defender of religion' by Filipp, Freiherr von Weber. The juxtaposition in his *Chronik* of his actions and the award he received suggest the two are likely to have been linked.

Across Vienna, a general pattern emerged of priests, as was their right, defending the role of the Church in education. This occasionally brought them into conflict with liberal politicians but, in the 1860s and even in the early 1870s, the picture is more complicated than this. Sometimes the parties involved were at daggers drawn. For instance, it is hard to imagine a good relationship existing between the priests of the parish of St. Rochus on the one hand and the liberals of the city on the other, after the 1863 appointment of Josef Pia as a curate to the parish. The *Chronik* of the parish records delight that Pia's services have been obtained. It records that Pia had been editor-in-chief of the *Österreichischer Volksfreund*, although it fails to mention that this was an anti-liberal and viciously antisemitic newspaper.[30] On his appointment, Pia made donations of several gold objects for mass and general decorative purposes, so his arrival at the parish would have been noticed by parishioners. His track record at the *Volksfreund* would have made his appointment equally visible to liberal politicians.

Nevertheless, priests and politicians were not all at war with each other all of the time, and forms of accommodation emerged which allowed them to appear together in public. They gave each other mutual seals of secular and spiritual approval at significant events in the life of the city. The 1871 *Corpus Christi* procession in Ottakring, one of the major Church events of the year, was led by Father Paletz, but also attended by a swathe of civic dignitaries, including a Member of Parliament, Dr. von Stremayr and *Bürgermeister* Ignaz Kuffner, chairman of the commune's managing committee, the *Bezirksausschuss*. This should not be surprising. Many politicians, even those with a secularising agenda, would have been raised as Catholics and may have been practising Catholics. Ignaz Kuffner was Jewish.[31] Such events provided a point of contact between priest and politician. Father

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[28] Not to be confused with the mayor of Ottakring from 1869 to 1882, Ignaz Kuffner. Alfred Schiemer, *Auf Ottakrings Spüren*, (Vienna: Edition Volkshochschule, 1999), p.104.

[29] AEDW AOCor, 3rd September 1869. Correspondence between Paletz and the Archbishop's office.

[30] Paupié, pp.94-97.

[31] *Neue deutsche Biographie*, on-line edition: http://www.deutsche-biographie.de/sfz46850.html.

Magnollo ensured the Church had some say in the appointment of teachers at the new school in Währing, while liberal politicians trumpeted the school's achievements.[32]

Priests could become involved in politics, but they had to balance their workloads, and the world around them was not standing still. In 1871, for instance, Father Paletz was involved in raising money for a middle school and for a hospital in Ottakring. In September 1872, in an effort to ward off a cholera outbreak, a pilgrimage was held, at which there was 'great participation'.[33] In 1873, Paletz records the coming of the trams to Ottakring and the financial catastrophe of the great crash. By contrast, he hardly pays attention to the elections of that year to the local council, simply recording a list of those who were successful. As might be expected, the list comprises local bourgeois: builders, inn-keepers of the more respectable kind and property owners. [34]

Other Concerns

Politics were important for priests, but formed only one concern among many, and their daily lives reflected the harsh nature of existence at the time. The Grinzing *Chronik* of 1862 records the hardships still caused by the failed harvest of the previous year.[35] The priests, protected by an income from the Archdiocese, may not have experienced the physical effects of this failure, but the psychological effects of their parishioners' suffering must have been difficult to bear. At times, the dangers of life came even closer to home. In Ottakring, both the priests' home and the parish offices were a source of much correspondence with the *Ordinariat* over the years. Complaints were particularly common about overcrowding in the home, with priest and all curates lodged there. On the night of 18th February 1876, fire broke out at the home as the priests slept.[36] Only swift action by one of the curates made escape possible, but the damage caused by the fire was such that the accommodation was rendered uninhabitable. As a result, some of the priests moved into the parish offices, while others found temporary lodgings in private homes in the area.[37]

This kind of experience must have served to embed the priests even further into the life of their parishes. Their spiritual leadership, and also their sharing in the daily experience of their parishioners can only have reinforced their authority. The same effect came from their

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[32] Andreas Wimmer, *Zweiter Jahresbericht der sechsklassigen Volksschule in Währing*, (Vienna: Publisher Name Not Printed, 1871).

[33] AEDW AOCk, 1872.

[34] AEDW AOCk, 1873.

[35] AEDW GrCk, 1862.

[36] AEDW AOCor, 18th and 20th February 1876.

[37] AEDW AOCor, 16th June 1876.

relatively high level of education.[38] The priests' authority would prove to be important for the ways in which they would later shape political developments in their parishes, although some priests seem to have kept some distance from the practicalities of politics. For Father Magnollo, and others like him, this meant simply recording events and remaining loyal to the Habsburgs and the idea of Austria. Magnollo recorded that the war year 1866 'was an unhappy one for Austria', and he reserves a page each for events in France, Italy and Bohemia.[39] Other priests, though, were emerging for whom politics was taking on a more practical dimension. Two appointments made in this period highlight this change. The first was that of Father Carl Dittrich, who at the age of 52 took over from Father Paletz at Ottakring in 1874, and who is covered in more detail in Chapter 5.[40] The second is Father Joseph Deckert, who took over the church of St. Joseph in Weinhaus in October of the same year.[41]

Father Deckert was thirty-one when he arrived at Weinhaus. He had been educated at the *Piaristengymnasium* in Vienna's Josefstadt, then at the *Knabenseminar*. Deckert was a braggart and all the indications are that he was a swindler.[42] He was, however, full of organisational ability, charisma, dynamism and seemingly unlimited self-belief. Deckert inherited some long-running problems at Weinhaus and immediately took steps to remedy them. These steps included founding a charity for poor schoolchildren and the launching of a fund-raising campaign for church restoration work. The restoration campaign took off, initially with support from sixty members, who made donations by subscription.[43] In 1875, this campaign was formalised as the Church Renovation Association, and by the end of the year it had 4,071 members.[44] The statutes of the Association list the members of the committee. There were priests, curates and local notables, but no sign that Deckert had any resonance beyond his own parish.[45] Deckert then changed this, by founding a newsletter, the *Sendbote des heiligen Joseph*, the stated purpose of which was to boost the renovation fund. Such confidence in the commercial prospects of a newsletter from the priest of a small parish in North West Vienna may have seemed misplaced, yet issue two, from February 1876, carried mail from satisfied readers as far away as Austrian Galicia and Switzerland.

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[38] Bowman, *Parish Priests*, p.107.

[39] AEDW WeCk, 1866.

[40] AEDW AOCor, 12th February 1874, for Dittrich's application.

[41] AEDW WeCk, 1874.

[42] Klusacek and Stimmer, pp.161-162.

[43] AEDW WeCk, 1865.

[44] Joseph Deckert, *Der Sendbote des heiligen Joseph*, (Vienna: Verlag des Sendboten), February 1876, p. 7.

[45] The statutes for the *Kirchenbau-Verein* are dated 31st October 1880, but are in the AEDW WeCor, box for 1900-1910.

After only four issues Deckert could report that the newsletter was selling 10,000 copies a month.[46] The *Sendbote*, and other activities by Deckert, made his name widely known across the Empire and beyond.

The declared purpose of the newsletter may have been fund raising, but political content featured from the start. The second issue contained an appeal to pray 'for the endangered Catholic Church, for the Holy Father... who for their true faith suffer persecution, and for all Christian communities which, through the persecution of their priests, find themselves in great spiritual need'.[47] The date makes this a likely reference to the *Kulturkampf* and Bismarck's attacks on the Church in Germany. At the start of the second year of publication, Deckert then turned his sights very firmly against Austria's liberal government.[48]

Deckert quoted extensively from a speech that had been given in Vienna in the previous year by a Baron Raimund von Stillfried. Stillfried had warned his listeners that while the opponents of the Church in Austria were leading a less violent campaign than those in Germany, those in Austria were shrewder. These opponents were trying to divide the bishops from the rank and file clergy. They were trying to reduce the pool of potential priests, by removing exemption from conscription for those who were studying theology. They were trying in particular to reduce the authority of the Church, by establishing state authority over marriage and, in so doing, they were dividing the people from the Church. Stillfried ended with an appeal to multiply the Catholic societies, and to revive Catholic values, so that a Catholic Austria might be revived.[49] This was an attempt to use the form of the institutions of liberal civic society, the association, against the liberal state. This forming of Catholic associations had been common since 1848, but most of them were charitable in nature. Catholic associations with overtly political ends were new and had been frowned on by the upper reaches of the Church, at least until the 1860s.[50]

In using this speech, Deckert was showing his belief in the ability of Catholics to fight back against the liberal state. He also intended to show that support for an anti-liberal stance could be found among those who seemed to be part of the establishment. Stillfried was at least reasonably well-connected. In 1876, at the age of thirty seven, he had already left

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[46] AEDW WeCk, 1876.

[47] Deckert, *Sendbote*, February 1876, p.3.

[48] Deckert, *Sendbote*, January 1877, supplement, p.v.

[49] Deckert, *Sendbote*, January 1877, supplement, p.v.

[50] William Bowman, 'Religious Associations And The Formation Of Political Catholicism In Vienna, 1848 to the 1870s', *AHYB*, 1996, Vol. XXVII, 65-76, here pp.70-72.

behind a career in the army. He was of sufficient wealth to have managed trips to the United States and the Far East.[51] He was not untypical of the kind of aristocrat whose support priests would later find valuable.

In the 1870s and subsequent decades, Deckert continued his line of combining anti-liberalism and antisemitism with loyalty to the Habsburg state. He attacked the Pan-Germans in the Empire relentlessly. Other priests equally took pride in being singled out as enemies of the Pan-German movement. For instance, in 1878 the then incumbent priest at Währing, Father Adolf Khu, took care to record that he had been attacked by the German nationalist newspaper, the *Deutsche Zeitung*.[52]

It has been argued that one of the primary motivations for priests like Deckert to begin their agitation was their declining social status, as the relatively low salaries of priests reduced their ability to engage in bourgeois activities, or to make substantial charitable donations.[53] This may well be true but, given the wider context, it can be no coincidence that Deckert and Dittrich began their most directly political engagement, in the parishes, at the time the Concordat was being revoked by a liberal administration. One other factor may have influenced the decisions by Deckert and Dittrich to become politically active. As Höbelt indicates, this was a time when mass immigration of Jews to Vienna was taking place, and Jews as liberals were an easy target.[54] This was at a time when the effects of the crash of 1873 were either being felt or feared by Deckert's parishioners. Links were certainly being made between Jews and Capitalism and its effects, not just in Vienna, and not just by 'Germans'.[55]

Nevertheless, while the signs are here of the beginnings of organised political activity, the extent of that activity should not be overestimated, especially as Deckert was a singularly energetic activist in the incipient antisemitic movement. Not all priests displayed his vigour or his desire to develop an antisemitic challenge. In this early part of the period, the material that was uncovered in the *Chroniken* and the correspondence rarely covered more than the daily routine. The correspondence usually covered requests for the payment of salaries for curates, for more curates to cope with the workload generated by the city's growing population, or applications for funding for building repairs. Inventories and rather anodyne

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[51] http://www.aeiou.at/aeiou.encyclop.s/s865006.htm

[52] *Deutsche Zeitung* (hereafter *DZ*), 26th October 1878, p.47, quoted in AEDW WäCk, 1878.

[53] John Boyer, 'Catholic Priests in Lower Austria: Anti-liberalism, Occupational Anxiety, and Radical Political Action in Late Nineteenth-Century Vienna', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Vol. 188, No. 4, 1974, 337-369.

[54] Höbelt, p.26.

[55] Whiteside, *Socialism*, p.37.

histories of the parishes are found. Only occasionally did something out of the ordinary intrude, such as one mention of Austria's defeat against Prussia in 1866.[56] At this stage there was no evidence of antisemitism in the *Chroniken,* nor in the correspondence that was examined. Some priests in the 1860s were engaging in antisemitic attacks, however, using publications such as the privately published *Wiener Kirchenzeitung.*[57] Their attacks were denunciations of the State's alleged assaults on the Church. In this sense, they were defensive of the Church's position.

Summary

Priests responded to the secularising agenda of the liberal administrations in a variety of ways. Father Paletz and Father Schwandner engaged with the new rules of the liberal age to lobby for teachers. They do not seem to unduly concerned that they will be able to extract concessions from politicians, even if they were certainly determined to protect the religious life of their communities. Father Paletz even learned that a coalition with Evangelical and Jewish interests could yield results. Sometimes, younger priests, like Father Deckert, engaged with the liberal State in a confrontational way. At this stage, they tried to convince people of their cause. This reaction has been described as 'occupational anxiety', an element of concern by priests that they were losing social status, and therefore influence over their parishioners.[58] This was, though, more than a reaction to a loss of personal status. Whatever the intentions, when the State made civil marriage available, and cross-denominational education compulsory, priests felt such moves to be attacks on the mission of the Church.

Nothing emerges from the records studied from this period that explicitly describes the German aspects of Austrian identity as being under threat. Defeats in war are mentioned as simple recording of events. Some priests do emerge who have in their sights a different threat, to Austria's Christian identity. Unlike Fathers Paletz and Schwandner, they attack, rather than engage with the state. Circles that gathered around the *Volksfreund* or the *Kirchenzeitung* were beginning to single out liberals and Jews as threats to the Christian aspects of Austria's identity. They were starting on a road that would lead some to suggest that Jews did not, and should not, belong. In this respect, these were some of the first implicit claims that German aspects of Austrian identity could come under threat from a 'foreign' element.

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[56] AEDW WeCk, 1866.

[57] Scholz and Heinisch, pp.12-13.

[58] Boyer, *Catholic Priests*, pp.337-369.

John Boyer has appropriately described Deckert as 'probably the most vulgar antisemite' among the clergy. As Boyer also states, it was Deckert's repeated use of the Jew as outsider, corrupter and scourge of society that was intended to spread an antisemitic message.[59] Deckert alone, however, was not enough to change the atmosphere of a city, perhaps not even the atmosphere of his parish and district. It required priests, the associations of which they were members, or which they influenced, and similar groups with antisemitic foundations, to change the culture of parts of the city, through a daily propaganda that, for some, became perceived as common sense. Deckert, and priests like him, helped lay the foundations for the long-term development of antisemitism in Vienna, as will be seen in subsequent chapters.

[59] Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, p.156.

CHAPTER 4: THE TRANSFORMATION OF VIENNESE POLITICS: 1879-1896

The Antisemitic Challenge

In 1879, as the liberals fell from government at the national level, Karl Lueger was a relatively unknown, 35 year-old councillor in the Vienna *Rathaus*. A lawyer, he represented Vienna's Landstrasse district as a reforming liberal, having stood against the alleged corruption of some of the more established Council members. In order to further his cause, the Catholic Lueger allied with a fellow liberal, the Jewish Julius Mandl, in their so-called 'Progress and Economy Party', which functioned as a faction within the liberal ranks. The two men ran a small club, *Unity*, and Mandl published a journal, *Progress*, but their influence was limited. Neither man was in the inner circle of the liberal party.

Lueger was in many ways the liberal model of a good citizen. As the son of a servant at the Vienna Polytechnic, and therefore lacking the social contacts that might have eased his progress, Lueger had earned his position in life, not inherited it, and he was a long way down the party hierarchy.[1] Yet, by 1895, he was in effective control of the most powerful elected office in the country, that of Mayor of Vienna and, two years later, Lueger himself became Mayor. He did so now as leader of a new, anti-liberal, anti-Jewish Christian Social movement, a movement he did not create, but which he shaped and led to power in Vienna. In 1879, Lueger had allied with Mandl. Long before 1895, Lueger had changed on many fronts and he had long left his liberal, tolerant past behind him.

In the period to 1896, Lueger, the Christian Social movement and its allies transformed Viennese politics. Since the story of Lueger's rise has been well documented, this chapter is not focused on the detail of this rise.[2] Instead, this chapter uses the emergence of Lueger and the Christian Socials as a framework on which other developments with long-term significance for Vienna can be traced. It looks at changes in political culture, such as the routine recourse to violence on the streets, and changes in the use of the language of antisemitism. It outlines some of the developments within an Austro-German vision of the world. The analysis of these changes is then complemented in Chapter 5 by a return to the parishes of Vienna.

This chapter emphasizes two points. First, this new movement was not without roots in Vienna's recent past. Lueger may have left his tolerant past, but he had not left behind all of his liberal values. The Christian Social movement that he came to lead shared the liberals' belief in self-reliance. It was proud of, and prepared to defend, 'German' culture and

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[1] Pulzer, *Political Antisemitism,* p.158.

[2] See Richard Geehr, *Karl Lueger: Mayor of Fin-de-Siècle Vienna*, (Detroit: Wayne State University, 1990).

privileges. It may have been Christian but, in its early days at least, it was not necessarily clerical. As such, it was attractive to those who had only ever held a shallow allegiance to true liberal values, especially once it started to be successful. This meant that Lueger was not the only Viennese who passed from one movement to the other. Second, developments in Vienna were not typical of events elsewhere in Austria. Outside Vienna, liberal parties became more focused on local issues, which often involved nationality and language disputes, especially in places such as Bohemia and Styria.[3] As a result, liberal parties evolved from being 'liberal' to becoming first 'German liberal' then 'German nationalist'.

Lothar Höbelt has charted these developments in considerable detail in terms of the two main strands that existed within the liberal movement before 1879, the ideological (*freisinnig*) and the nationalist. As Höbelt points out, outside of Vienna antisemitism succeeded briefly in creating cleavages within the ranks of each of these groups, but it did not create new groupings out of them, based on positions that either supported or opposed a new, post-confessional, antisemitism. Rather, outside Vienna, splits remained focused on the classic liberal dilemmas, of clerical versus anticlerical, of whether the state should intervene and, if so, how far. The situation was different, however, within Vienna, where a movement focused on antisemitism came together for the long term.[4]

Antisemitism may have united the new movement but, as Höbelt also points out, Christian Socials in particular succeeded because their leaders were also more astute politicians than their liberal counterparts. They recognised that, in the 1880s, a 'paradigm change' had occurred in Austrian politics. Old liberal battles for a political settlement that respected constitutional arrangements had been won, but liberal politicians did not move on. They failed to take account of electoral changes that brought new people the vote, and for whom politics was not just about high-level political principle.[5] In Vienna, these new electors, lower down the social and economic scale than traditional liberal supporters, would be lured away by antisemitic politicians who combined populist antisemitism with the offer of a better deal for white collar workers. This deal would come either directly from the municipality, for its workers, or from pressure on the national government to improve civil service conditions.[6] Opportunism, as well as principle, motivated at least some of the politicians and some of the voters.

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[3] Höbelt, pp.43-52,

[4] Höbelt, pp.25-26, p.43. Also Peter Pulzer, 'Third Thoughts On German And Austrian Antisemitism', *Journal Of Modern Jewish Studies*, 4:2, 137-178, here p.17.

[5] Höbelt, p.22.

[6] Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, pp.351-354.

New Liberal Challenges

In 1879, a Conservative-Clerical-Slav coalition came together to form the national government, with Count Taaffe at its head.[7] This coalition brought together conservative Germans, Poles and Czechs. While liberal administrations had promoted the view that a strong, centralised state was vital for future prosperity and security, Taaffe's new government, in a spirit of 'reconciliation and understanding' was committed to giving some measure of autonomy to provincial institutions.[8] He did not, however, actively privilege one nation over another, except in as much as he maintained a *status quo* that favoured the so-called 'historic nations'. Changes that gradually affected the balance of national interest were carefully introduced. The Stremayr language ordinances of 1881, for instance, introduced a limited reform, permission for the Czech language to be used in certain areas of the outer civil service in Bohemia.[9]

Taaffe's government attempted to temper the excesses of *laissez-faire* economics with measures such as workers' health and accident insurance.[10] These policies may have seemed far-reaching at the time, but they were in reality limited in scope. Nevertheless, they were a reversal of some liberal approaches. One liberal difficulty in how to react to these moves was what has been described as their symbiosis, as 'Germans', with the state. Their position as a *Staatsvolk*, tied to the future of the Empire, made outright opposition impossible.[11] As such, the liberals, who hoped to return to office, were in danger of being left behind, on the one hand by parties which proposed state intervention as a remedy to the difficulties of modern Capitalism, and on the other by those who might take up a more nationalist position, or both.

After 1882, when the franchise was extended, mass parties which promoted the rights of the nation, as opposed to say, the rights of class, did emerge. A good number of these parties, though, were not completely new creations. Many were radicalised versions of liberal parties, which added the word 'German', for instance, to emphasize that they were both liberal and national in outlook. This might initially be a means to express a defence of German interests but, in later years, the use of the word 'German' might add a more aggressive tone to a party's programme.

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[7] Helmut Rumpler, 'Parlament und Regierung Cisleithaniens 1867 bis 1914' in Rumpler and Urbanitsch, eds., *Habsburgermonarchie, Vol. VII,* Part 1, pp.667-894, here p.743.

[8] Rumpler, 'Parlament', p.753.

[9] Whiteside, *Socialism*, p.23.

[10] See Rumpler, 'Parlament', pp.760-774, on Taaffe's social policies.

[11] Höbelt, p.31.

Within groups where the national interest was thought to be the priority, however, rivals attempted to be the sole representatives for each nation. Splits arose between Young Czechs and Old Czechs. In Vienna between 1879 and 1896, those who promoted radical, exclusionary visions of the rights of the German nation broadly described themselves as antisemites. They divided between two seemingly irreconcilable, at times mutually antagonistic groups, although it must be stressed that the reality was much more complex. Both across these groups and within them, there was considerable fluidity. At one extreme of the positions taken by the Pan-Germans, or German nationalists, for instance, one prominent figure, Georg von Schönerer, called for all Germans to become part of the new German *Reich*. Antisemitism was a major element in the programme of Schönerer's Pan-Germans, but union with Germany was its priority. Other German nationalists, such as Otto Steinwender, were more pragmatic and he, and others like him, placed more emphasis on searching for ways to protect German interests within the Habsburg Empire.[12] German nationalists usually, however, shared a strong anticlericalism.

A second group, which eventually came under Lueger's influence and evolved into the Christian Social movement, also believed in German national solidarity, but its approach to the future of German Austria was different. Up to the fall of the Empire in 1918, it would call for the 'protection' of the German *Volk* within the boundaries of the existing Habsburg state. Its core values consisted of a fierce loyalty to the state, antisemitism, Catholicism and calls for the protection of bourgeois sectors of society. Christian Socials believed that the Germans and Slavs were an Aryan family. Within that family, disputes might arise, in which case the Christian Socials were staunch defenders against any threat to German identity, but Christian Socials promoted a vision of the peoples of the Empire as being able to live within one state. To this vision it made one exception: Jews, who were labelled as an alien intrusion.[13]

By the 1890s, the Christian Socials were defining their relationship with German nationalism. A distinctively Austro-German vision of the state was being established as the dominant strand within the party, one that favoured an Austria separate from predominantly Protestant Germany. This vision, however, was one that supported close ties with other Germans from outside Austria, especially if those Germans were Catholic. This vision was flexible enough never to exclude from the Party those who supported other key elements of the Party's programme, but who would have welcomed union with Germany. The Christian Social vision aimed to protect the German character of Vienna, but it was predominantly

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[12] Höbelt, p.27.

[13] See, for instance, Ludwig Psenner, *Das Papsttum und die soziale Frage*, (Vienna: Publisher Name Not Printed, 1893).

tolerant, culturally, in its approach to most non-German Christians in the Empire. Lueger could appeal to all Catholics in the Empire as 'Brothers in Austria, brothers in Christ'.[14] This did not stop Christian Socials from being brutally racist towards their fellow Jewish citizens.

In 1879, however, the antisemitic movement as a whole was in its infancy in terms of political organisation, and factions that called themselves liberal still controlled nine out of every ten seats in the Vienna council chamber. Estimates give almost fifty per cent to those labelled Centre liberals and thirty-eight percent to the Left.[15] A highly restricted franchise meant that political action through the voting system was, at this time, unlikely to be effective against the liberals. Those who opposed liberal policies took to using other routes. On the 11th November 1880, a meeting was organised with the slogan 'Craftsmen against the pedlars' trade'.[16] Craftsmen, bound by guild rules and practices, complained that travelling pedlars, bringing with them cheap, often mass-produced goods, were a threat to their livelihoods. At the meeting, there were calls for the restoration of compulsory guilds. The speeches made it clear that the threat to the mainly Christian craftsmen was from Jewish pedlars. Significantly for later events, this meeting was attended by Lueger.

By late 1881, anti-liberal organisations rooted in Vienna were growing and merging. These included the recently founded *Österreichischer Reformverein*, an umbrella organisation for trade and guild based organisations, which drew its membership from a wide range of people with differing views on how to face up to the problems of modern Austria. The *Reformverein*, like other groupings, was fluid and contained people whose later views would draw them into conflict with each other. Its members overlapped with those of other organisations. Robert Pattai, first Vice President of the *Reformverein*, worked with Schönerer on the preliminaries to the political manifesto known as the Linz Programme.[17] Schönerer, in his turn, worked on the manifesto with Jews. This Programme was ambiguous enough to be seen by some as a statement calling for union with the German *Reich* and by others as a call for the protection of German interests in the Habsburg Empire.[18] What the Linz Programme did not define was the meaning of being German.

Pattai now moved into open calls for antisemitic action. He declared in February 1882 that the Jews of Vienna were a symptom of liberalism's 'Manchester theories', which he

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[14] Funder, *Vom Gestern*, p.100.

[15] Seliger and Ucakar, Vol. 1, p.600.

[16] Pulzer, *Political Antisemitism*, p.139.

[17] Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, p.90.

[18] Pulzer, *Political Antisemitism,* pp.145-146.

despised. He called for economic reform which would impact on these Jews, and which he believed was a necessity for Austria.[19] The *Neue Freie Presse* reported in March 1882 that a row over antisemitism had turned into a brawl at a Vienna *Reformverein* meeting. In April 1882 Schönerer chaired a meeting of the *Verein der Deutschen Volkspartei*, which was forcibly dissolved by the authorities because of antisemitic speeches. Violence occurred elsewhere and was becoming a feature of Viennese politics. The people behind these organisations were persistent. The *Verein der Deutschen Volkspartei* was banned by the authorities for its antisemitism, but by June 1882 Schönerer helped to replace it with the *Deutschnationaler Verein*.[20]

As far back as 1848, and the original emancipation of Jews, support for an antisemitic stance had been coming from small business owners, guild masters and their apprentices.[21] It should not be concluded, however, that the members of these groups were all heading down the same road. In 1882, for instance, the trial took place of Josef Engel and 28 others, accused of being anarchist bank robbers. Of the 29, ten were apprentice carpenters, two were shop assistants, one was an office worker, several were apprentices in various trades, and one was a master carpenter. They came from all over the Empire and beyond, even from Prussia. Twenty declared themselves to be Catholics, one refused to answer, one was Jewish and seven were registered as without religion. No single interpretation can be placed on the mixture of religious affiliations found among this group of anarchists, especially as that of being without religion – *konfessionslos* – was an officially recorded status, not an opinion on religion.[22]

While the members of this anarchist group were not rich, they were not on the lowest rungs of society, and came from the social sectors where antisemites were busily recruiting.[23] So antisemitic groups were not alone in recruiting from these strata. If anything, it is known that the incipient Socialist trade unions were successfully mobilising apprentices in the struggle for better conditions. In 1883, strikes by apprentice ironsmiths, and in particular by the bakers' apprentices, caused the police considerable anxiety, and there were many more strikes by apprentices in the early 1880s.[24] The extent of antisemitic activity and organisation by 1883 should not therefore be overestimated, as the relative attention given

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[19] Pulzer, *Political Antisemitism,* p.140.

[20] Whiteside*, Socialism,* p.90.

[21] Pulzer, *Political Antisemitism,* p.139.

[22] Those who wished to leave a religion had to register their intention with the authorities and pay a fee for the service. *RP*, 1st January 1908, p.6 has an explanation of the law.

[23] ABPD 1880-1882 V1. Charge sheet for trial of Josef Engel and fellow accused.

[24] Numerous reports from 1883 in ABPD 1881-1883 St1.

by the police at the time to the various strands of the growing Socialist movement shows the extent to which the latter were considered a threat to public order, and therefore to the political *status quo*. The police seem to have spent more time monitoring a group of Italians in Vienna who were suspected of being anarcho-syndicalists than in watching antisemites.[25]

The police were forced to pay more attention to the antisemites, however, when a scandal broke out that gave the antisemitic movement considerable impetus. The *Nordbahn*, the Northern Railway out of Vienna into Bohemia, was a concession that had been sold in 1836 to Salomon Rothschild, and the company remained in the hands of his family after his death in 1859.[26] The terms of the concession had been condemned by significant elements of the press, and by a number of politicians, as too easy on the concession holders. Uproar followed when the *Nordbahn* concession was renewed in 1884, with the same company, on terms which were at least as favourable as the earlier concession. In April 1884, Schönerer and Lueger addressed a public meeting in Vienna, calling for the nationalisation of the *Nordbahn*. The issue became a touchstone for the anti-liberals.[27] The *Nordbahn* scandal was a national issue and, in May 1884, Schönerer presented the Austrian parliament with a petition of more than 33,000 signatures calling for nationalisation.

As the 1880s progressed, antisemitic agitation and Pan-German activity, especially by Schönerer, whether actual, planned or rumoured, was monitored closely.[28] A high point of this activity came with celebrations for Bismarck's seventieth birthday. Newspapers such as the *Deutsche Zeitung* set the tone with articles that began:

> 'Far beyond the borders of the German Empire, as far afield as German hearts are beating, all gather to celebrate the day'.

According to the paper, Germans in Austria had a duty to send good wishes to their brothers in the new *Reich*, to forget old quarrels and to unite the princes and the peoples of the two imperial German states.[29] To this end, Vienna's Pan-Germans, led by Schönerer, arranged a festival, a 'Celebratory Greeting Of The German Nationalists in Austria'.[30]

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[25] ABPD 1881-1883 St1, 14th February 1883.

[26] Pulzer, *Political Antisemitism,* p.147.

[27] Pulzer, *Political Antisemitism,* p.147.

[28] The reports relate to 1884, but were found in the box ABPD 1885 St3. See reports from Brünn, 27th June 1885 and from Vienna 22nd and 28th June 1885.

[29] *DZ*, 30th March 1885, evening edition, p.1, to be found in ABPD 1885 St3.

[30] ABPD 1885 V8, reports between 31st March 1885 and 8th April 1885.

The event took place on 1st April 1885, at the *Sofiensaal* in the city's Landstrasse district.[31] By 8 a.m. it was in full swing. As Schönerer arrived with his wife in their coach, large crowds were already inside and outside the hall. The outside of the *Sofiensaal* was covered in garlands. The speakers' platform was decked in flowers, with the Pan-German symbol, the cornflower, heavily used. Schönerer opened the event by reading aloud a telegram he had sent to Bismarck, in which he remarked that all in Vienna who possessed a German national spirit would join in this celebration. Schönerer proclaimed: 'Hail and blessings to the creator of the German Empire'. Bismarck's response was also read out. The event consisted mainly of speeches, including some from members of the *Reichsrat*, the reading of letter after letter and telegram after telegram signed by the 'German Nationalists of Vienna', much cheering and proposing of birthday greetings.[32] According to the police, the messages were kept within the bounds of legality but, at any rate, letters and telegrams for the event had already been intercepted. Only two telegrams had contained 'questionable content'.[33]

Although the meeting was meant to be non-political, calls came from the floor for universal suffrage. Calls also attacked what was known as the 'curial system', which privileged certain voters. Under this, voters were allocated to a curia, a kind of electoral college, according to qualifications such as tax paid or education. The higher curiae had fewer members, so fewer votes needed to be gained by successful candidates. Shouts also rang out about the *Nordbahn* scandal. The only note of originality on the day seems to have been provided by an 87-line poem by Adolf Hagen in honour of Bismarck's birthday, which began:

> 'All of Germany celebrates here the feast of feasts,
> It gladly greets the day on which was born
> The German hero...'[34]

This was not the kind of paean likely to induce a passionate reaction, but excitement broke out when someone in the crowd began taking notes, causing many to suspect he was a journalist. Shoving and pushing followed so, fearing that the man might be assaulted, the police pulled him from the hall.[35]

The police may not have found the speeches and correspondence alarming, but they were surprised by the size and nature of the crowd on a Wednesday morning. It was estimated

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[31] Christoph Römer, *Die Sofiensäle: Eine Wiener Institution*, (Erfurt: Sutton, 2004).

[32] ABPD 1885 V8, 31st March 1885. On telegrams and letters.

[33] ABPD 1885 V8, 1st April 1885.

[34] ABPD 1885 V8, 1st April 1885.

[35] ABPD 1885 V8, 1st April 1885, on events in the hall.

that 3,000 people attended the meeting, from all social classes, including approximately 300 women, despite women being barred from political activity.[36] This mixing of class and gender was a potentially ominous sign of the success of Schönerer's appeal. Nevertheless, as a result of information coming from the meeting, the police were able to trace a number of anonymous political pamphlets with Pan-German and antisemitic messages to the student group *Silesia*, in the Josefstadt district. The members of this group belonged to several university faculties.[37]

The Bismarck birthday event was at least confined to one location. Little more than a month later came a bigger challenge to public order. Elections to the City Council were due, and police were stretched to cover all the planned political gatherings. Newspapers carried long lists of venues where these would take place, across the city and out into the suburbs.[38] The labels used to describe political gatherings, even in newspapers which carried notices of meetings for all political persuasions, show that the terms anti-liberal and antisemitic had become synonymous. These meetings also show that politics as a mass phenomenon was beginning to emerge on both the Right and the Left, and in turbulent form. On the 29th May 1885, police needed reinforcements to deal with simultaneous Socialist and antisemitic demonstrations in Vienna's *Neubau* district.[39] On the same day, the Mayor of the district of Mariahilf informed police that Robert Pattai was planning secret antisemitic agitation.[40] How secret this planned agitation was, however, must be called into question. One Viennese newspaper had just reported Pattai and his fellow antisemites meeting in an inn to draw up 'battle plans' for the elections.[41]

After the elections, the police continued to monitor any reported antisemitic agitation, such as the activities of a businessman from Germany, Josef Hoffmann, in September 1885. An anonymous tip-off had alerted the police to a meeting of antisemites at a private address in the Währing district. After an extensive investigation, police raided and searched Hoffmann's lodgings in Ottakring, where a large quantity of antisemitic material was confiscated. Hoffmann was later fined for possessing this material.[42] Under questioning, Hoffmann explained that he had inherited a great deal of wealth from the family businesses.

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[36] Birgitta Bader-Zaar, 'Women in Austrian Politics, 1890-1934. Goals and Visions', in Good & Grandner & Maynes, eds., p.61.

[37] ABPD 1885 V8, 8th April 1885.

[38] *Konstitutionelle-Vorstadt-Zeitung* (hereafter *KVZ*), 28th May 1885, to be found in ABPD Gemeinde-, Landtags-, Bezirks- und Reichstagswahlen 1850/1865/1885/1886/1889, (hereafter ABPD *GLBRWahlen*).

[39] *KVZ*, 28th May 1885, to be found in ABPD *GLBRWahlen.*

[40] ABPD *GLBRWahlen*, 29th May 1885.

[41] *KVZ*, 28th May 1885, to be found in ABPD *GLBRWahlen.*

[42] ABPD 1885 St4, 18th and 19th September 1885.

He said that he could have used this wealth to live like a *rentier*, but that was the way of the Jew, not a true German, so he had turned over the running of the businesses to trusted staff and taken to the road to spread the antisemitic message.

In Berlin, he had been given the names of antisemites that he should contact in Vienna and other cities on his travels, and this was what he had been doing. These included Pattai and Ernst Schneider, an engineer and businessman from Währing. It is not known how many people were spreading the antisemitic message in this way, but it is clear that antisemitic networks were already established in Germany and Austria by this period. The 'antisemite' Schneider had recently been spotted in Brünn as an agitator during strikes that had taken place there, but he had made little if any impression on the workers. As a factory owner himself, Schneider was presumably trying to convince the workers that the Jew, not the 'German' factory owner was the enemy.[43] Schönerer was recorded in several locations, and he also sent representatives on his behalf to numerous towns.[44] The Berlin police reported to their colleagues in Vienna that copies of the *Korrespondenzblatt,* the newspaper published by Schönerer's *Deutscher Schul-Verein,* were in circulation there, despite being banned.[45]

Despite much activity within these networks, with Schönerer, Pattai and Schneider featuring prominently, it was not all necessarily co-ordinated nor to the same ends. Josef Hoffmann's description of Pattai and Schneider as antisemites, and not as German nationalists, indicates what they were against, not what they were for. Schönerer was certainly both a Pan-German and an antisemite. Pattai, at least in the 1880s, stood close by the Pan-Germans, but gradually became more ambiguous as to whether Germans were best served in the Habsburg Empire or the German Reich. At this point, with political parties in their formative stages, the label antisemite, or anti-liberal, served to bring such people together.

In the City Council elections of 1886, one candidate who was previously unknown to the police, a man called Wiedenhofer, stood in the Neubau district. He and others were suspected of making Pan-German and antisemitic shouts at public meetings but, because of the general commotion, the police could prove nothing.[46] Official electoral announcements record that Wiedenhofer won election to the district council.[47] Although this provides evidence that political gatherings were becoming relatively large scale affairs, these City elections offer important insights into the functioning of the electoral system. They show

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[43] ABPD 1885 St3, 22nd June 1885.

[44] ABPD 1885 St3, 22nd June 1885.

[45] ABPD 1885 St3, 4th December 1885.

[46] ABPD *GLBRWahlen*, June 1886.

[47] ABPD *GLBRWahlen*. Copy of official election results poster of 6th May 1886.

the small numbers needed to win seats in elections at that time. Wiedenhofer was elected with only 108 votes, and others were elected with still fewer votes. The election of Wiedenhofer should also caution against drawing too many general conclusions about where the antisemites were beginning to make breakthroughs. It is true that the most fruitful recruiting ground was the third curia, that of the lower bourgeoisie, the artisans and the shop keepers.[48] Wiedenhofer, however, was elected to the first curia, that of the upper bourgeoisie and the intellectuals, the layer of society that was said to be most loyal to the Habsburg idea of the state.

At about the same time as these individual antisemitic triumphs, liberal factions were beginning to split, first over the nationalities question, then over antisemitism, and it was often local issues that sparked divisions in their ranks. These factions were also failing to understand the realities of the new politics. The electorate they had previously faced was based on a *Großbürgertum* that formed an extremely shallow layer of society.[49] In 1885, the liberals suffered electoral setbacks in Vienna when candidates from beyond traditional liberal circles made promises to alleviate the economic hardships being faced by City employees, whose salaries were not keeping up with the cost of living, and small business owners, who faced new competition.

The 1885 elections were the first to be held under a new franchise that extended the vote to the lower middle classes. The third curia, the lowest, was the destination for these new voters.[50] They were, among other things, artisans, clerks, municipal officials and teachers.[51] The United Christians learned to combine programmes that contained demands for the restriction of state employment for Jews with calls for controls on occupations where Jews were considered to be making undue progress, whether this be pawn broking or medicine.[52] The newly enfranchised now voted for candidates who understood their particular concerns, not those of the upper bourgeoisie.[53] Lothar Höbelt asks whether the splits in the liberal movement, caused by trying to satisfy the new electorate, emerged because of antisemitism or divisions between social reformers and traditional free market liberals.[54] The answer is that antisemitic politicians combined an appeal to economic self-interest with an easily identifiable scapegoat for local conditions.

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[48] Pulzer, *Political Antisemitism,* p.168.

[49] Ernst Hanisch, *Lange Schatten*, p.73.

[50] Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, pp.15-17, on the establishment of a curial system.

[51] See Pulzer, *Political Antisemitism*, p.168, for further examples. Also, Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, p.213.

[52] Pulzer, *Political Antisemitism*, p.167, for the 1889 United Christian programme.

[53] Höbelt, p.30. For electoral campaiging in Vienna under the new franchise, see Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, pp.210-214.

[54] Höbelt, p.43.

In the same way, local conditions took on major importance at other levels of politics. In Bohemia, some Germans felt that Czechs had been making gains at the expense of Germans since the installation of the Taaffe government in 1879. In response, elements within the *Vereinigte Linke* created a breakaway grouping, the *Deutscher Klub*.[55] This was more a parliamentary faction than a political party, but it had an auspicious birth, with fifty MPs joining, mainly from Bohemia and Styria. Other members of the *Vereinigte Linke* joined a newly established rival, the *Deutsch-Österreichischer Klub*. Its members came mainly from Vienna and those areas which were distant from the capital, such as the Bukovina.[56] The *Deutsch-Österreichischer Klub* was still inclined to defend German privileges, but less stridently than the *Deutscher Klub*.

The newly established groupings struggled to stay unified. Members of the *Deutscher Klub* argued, among other things, about the position of Jewish author and politician Heinrich Friedjung as editor of the *Klub'*s party journal, and Schönerer's April 1887 proposals in Parliament to ban certain kinds of Jewish immigration.[57] The proposal was rejected, but it split the *Klub*.[58] By 1888, members of the *Deutscher Klub* and the *Deutsch-Österreichischer Klub* joined together again, this time in the *Vereinigte Deutsche Linke*. Their numbers were reduced in the wake of 1888 elections under the new franchise, and they were moving in a more nationally-inclined direction.[59] Parts of the liberal movement mutated into 'German liberals', then 'Germans'.

The United Christians

By 1887 a new, anti-liberal opposition, that would come most strongly from the suburbs of Vienna, was emerging. Antisemitic activists criss-crossed each other in spreading their message. In this year, Schönerer and his associates continued to be involved in Pan-German agitation, in Troppau, across Lower Austria, and in Währing.[60] These activities were beginning to have results, as evidenced in the inns of the Prater, where enthusiastic pro-Schönerer cries were frequently heard, and violence sometimes accompanied this enthusiasm.[61]

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[55] Höbelt, p.31.

[56] Höbelt, p.31.

[57] Pauley, p.330.

[58] Whiteside, *Socialism,* pp.121-123.

[59] Höbelt, p.50.

[60] ABPD 1887 St2, 6th October 1887; ABPD 1887 St2, 25th May 1887.

[61] ABPD 1887 St2, 3rd September 1887.

Whether this was driven by deep-seated nationalist fervour or it was drink fuelled is open to question. Two men who were arrested for violent behaviour and shouting antisemitic slogans turned out to be members of the Catholic Political Union. Their defence was that they were students and that their behaviour was a youthful aberration. Nevertheless, the students were from the Währing and Hernals districts, a long way from the Margareten and Mariahilf districts where the incidents took place, and it was noted that they had behaved in this way while taking the time to cross two of the city's districts. The result of their appeal for clemency is unknown.[62]

Alongside the physical violence came a drip feed of antisemitic language. Newspapers such as the *Österreichischer Reformer* were filled with stories of Jewish plots and corruption.[63] The *Reformer* promoted the work of German antisemite Paul de Lagarde, including his fight against the 'privileged position' of the Jews and for a 'true' national spirit. Lagarde's German background was used as evidence that antisemitism was 'natural' and crossed borders. It was also noted that Lagarde based some of his ideas on those of the Austrian antisemite, Robert Pattai.[64] Other pieces proclaimed pride in the performance of anti-liberals in recent elections in Vienna. The *Reformer* also carried advertisements for antisemitic books and pamphlets, which could be obtained at the bookshop of the newspaper's editor, Cornelius Vetter, in central Vienna. The advertisements, like the articles, would have been seen by the relatively small number of people who bought the *Reformer*, but it is a reasonable speculation that the advertisements, with their casual antisemitism, were at least as influential in shaping opinion among readers as the heavily political articles.

At this time, Schönerian Pan-Germans, as well as those from other Pan-German groups, rubbed shoulders with antisemitic Habsburg loyalists against the common Jewish 'enemy'. 'Respectable' antisemites like Lueger confined their violence to their rhetoric, and turned a blind eye when street scuffles broke out between rank and file antisemites and their opponents. In 1888, however, Schönerer went too far, and effectively shut himself off from future co-operation with all but the most extreme German nationalists. Schönerer and his supporters had been indulging in minor street attacks on political opponents, but they had somehow managed to avoid punishment. He then made a mistake. After a violent attack on the staff and equipment at the offices of the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt*, on 8th March 1888,

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[62] ABPD 1887 St2, 27th May 1887.

[63] *Österreichischer Reformer*, 10th April 1887, in ABPD 1887 St4.

[64] *Reformer,* 10th April 1887, ABPD 1887 St4.

Schönerer was sentenced to four months in prison, the removal of his political rights for five years, and the stripping of his patent of nobility.[65]

In Vienna, as sentence was passed on Schönerer, violence was expected to break out as a show of support for him. The police called in reinforcements across the city, strengthening the number of men at police stations, official buildings and sites where public gatherings might take place. Cavalry was at hand, but stayed out of sight in case its presence sparked trouble. Demonstrations did take place, and those taking part came from right across the city, yet the police managed to restore order quickly where trouble did break out.[66]

Schönerer probably expected that the punishments would lead to his becoming a political martyr, and certainly the initial reaction suggested that this might happen. Once the moment had passed, however, Schönerer's isolation began to set in. Others continued their work without him. Ernst Vergani, editor of the Vienna-based *Deutsches Volksblatt*, organised a summer *Germanenfest*.[67] Posters to promote it talked of the 2,000 year old kinship of the German people. They stressed the idyllic nature of the venue, Wachau, among the oldest settlements of the German 'tribe'. This tribe was said to live in the *Ost-Mark*, an allusion to the old region of the Eastern Holy Roman Empire, the frontier against the non-Christian tribes of the time before the East was converted. The posters show Wachau next to the Danube, symbol of the never resting, powerful spirit of the German people.[68] Vergani used these symbols of territory and kinship as evocations of factors which he claimed unified the German people. The wholesome images are in stark contrast to how Vergani had promoted himself as 'tribune' of the 'nationalist' wing of the Christian Social Party, a man who mixed 'filthy racism' with Pan-Germanic sentiments.[69]

Later in 1888, crowds gathered in Vienna for a musical commemoration, the reburial of Franz Schubert.[70] Schubert had been buried in the cemetery at Währing, but his body was now to be transferred to the Central Cemetery in the South East of the city. On a September Sunday, at least thirty five singing groups from across the city gathered at 7:30 a.m. outside the Votivkirche, in central Vienna. These groups were regulars on Vienna's social networks. Groups which had confirmed their attendance before the day included the *Ottakringer Liedertafel*, the *Käufmännischer Gesangverein*, the *Simmeringer Liedertafel*.

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[65] Pulzer, *Political Antisemitism,* p.153.

[66] For police deployments see, for instance, a report from the police at Währing on events at Pötzleinsdorf, 7th March 1888, or witness statements taken later, 21st March 1888, both in ABPD 1888 St1.

[67] Source is a poster for the event, 23rd September 1888, to be found in ABPD 1888 St2.

[68] Poster in ABPD 1888 St2.

[69] Bled, pp.325-326.

[70] Poster in ABPD 1888 St2.

and the *Sängerbund der Bäcker*. Responses were still to be received from nearly twenty more groups, including the *Wiener Männerchor*, the *Eisenbahnbeamten-Gesangverein* and the *Wiener Liedertafel*, and the women's group, *Syrènes*, based in Weinhaus, which had close connections with Father Deckert's parish church. The event was organised by the *Wiener Männergesangverein*. Participants gathered in formal dress, to accompany a procession to the Central Cemetery. The *Währinger Liedertafel* began the procession from Währing. By the time the Votivkirche was reached, 1,200 singers had gathered. One hundred and fifty carriages joined the procession. Among the participants was a, by now aged, brother of Schubert, aided by the priest from Währing, Father Aumann.[71]

The significance of this event is the presence of a large number of groups that were already associated with, or which would become associated with, radical German views. As has been noted elsewhere in this work, singing groups split roughly along political lines, according to the political climate. This shows that the networks on which the Christian Social Party, in particular, would rely were already well established before the Party was founded. Specifically Catholic societies were developing which, William Bowman has demonstrated, would be important in helping to lay the base for a Christian Social movement that was in essence Catholic.[72] Other societies also existed that did not have a specifically Catholic purpose, but where Catholic priests exercised much influence.[73]

This was also a time when associations and societies, like political parties and factions, were being dragged into arguments over the nation and its importance as an organising principle. For instance, The Academic Association of German Historians, a seminar group based at the University of Vienna, whose members often also belonged to the university geography seminar, was founded in 1889, as a breakaway from the official history seminar, which was open for membership to all who were interested and qualified, 'without distinction of nation or religion'. In 1914, the authors of a celebratory pamphlet on twenty fifth anniversary of the association proclaimed as a proud achievement that the breakaway group restricted membership to 'Germans' only, in response to 'threats' from 'enemy nations'. They stated that their 'leading stars', in this order, were 'Nation and knowledge'. The authors lamented that the geography seminar, to the best of their knowledge, had not followed this route.[74]

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[71] *Vaterland*, 24th September 1888.

[72] Bowman, *Associations*, pp.70-72.

[73] From Chapter 3 onwards.

[74] Akademischer Verein deutscher Historiker in Wien, *Festschrift des akademischen Vereines deutscher Historiker in Wien: herausgegeben anläßlich der Feier des 25jährigen Bestandes*, (Vienna, Self Published: 1914), pp.3-6.

This association may have been small in number, but the range of its contacts and influence should not be underestimated. Members included senior civil servants, academics and journalists. They included future Chancellor or the First Republic, Michael Mayr.[75] The pamphlet does not explicitly state that prohibitions on any religious groups, such as Jews, were in place, but the phrase that the group had previously welcomed members 'without distinction of nation or religion' suggests that this had changed.

The importance of the Academic Association of German Historians for this thesis is that it is yet another example of an association, whose membership came from the bourgeois, intellectual classes, that was part of a movement away from inclusive approaches to belonging, where interest in a particular subject was no longer enough to qualify for membership. Even experts in a given field would be shunned if they failed to meet criteria of nationality or, apparently, religion. Exclusion was being spread by members of associations like this. Care must be taken, however, not to attribute such plans to all associations that used the word 'German' in their names. The main membership of the *Deutsch-österreichische Schriftsteller-Genossenschaft* was open only to 'German' writers, but it did offer membership as observers to all who were interested in German culture. 'German' associations such as this, which did not talk of the need to 'protect' German interests, or which were positively open other than to Germans, emerged very rarely in this research.[76]

It was at this time, too, that one newly formed group, the United Christians, held its first Vienna meeting, at the '*beim Goldenen Luchsen*' inn, in Neulerchenfelder Strasse, now in modern day Ottakring.[77] The group was an informal, and shifting, set of alliances among non-liberal factions. It had first come to notice as an *ad hoc* coalition which unexpectedly won elections for the *Reichsrat* and the Upper Austrian *Landtag*.[78] At this time of fluid political alliances, Friedrich Funder describes the United Christians as having in their ranks former liberals, Catholics, antisemites, German nationalists, and even those who had not been inside a church in years.[79] The group was also said to embrace conservatives and Democrats.[80]

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[75] Akademischer Verein deutscher Historiker in Wien, p.4.

[76] Anonymous, *Satzungen der deutsch-österreichischen Schriftsteller-Genossenschaft*, (Vienna: Self-Published, 1901).

[77] Johannes Hawlik, *Der Bürgerkaiser: Karl Lueger und seine Zeit*, (Vienna: Herold, 1985), p.67.

[78] Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, pp.218-226.

[79] Funder, *Vom Gestern*, p.94.

[80] See Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, pp.219-222.

The group aimed to act as an umbrella for different antisemitic groups which existed in the districts. Whereas antisemites had often stood against each other in elections, they now began to organise and to spread propaganda in common. One antisemitic pamphlet, prepared for the 1889 elections, was elaborate and well-produced, and carried a subtitle which claimed it made a contribution to 'the characterisation of our opponents'. The pamphlet was confident enough to describe as famous the leaders of the anti-liberal movement, which it recognised was also known as the antisemitic movement, as well as the United Christians.[81] At a second curia election gathering of 1889 in the Alsergrund district, antisemitic cries rang out. Candidates standing in the second curia described themselves as 'antisemites' or members of the 'United Christians'.[82] By 1889, about thirty 'anti-liberal' members were sitting on the Vienna City Council.[83] 1889 was also the year that Karl Lueger formally broke from the liberals, after he addressed an antisemitic gathering, in the presence of Karl von Vogelsang, editor of the antisemitic newspaper, *Vaterland*. Vogelsang recognised Lueger as the leader the Christian Social movement needed to bring its disparate groups together.[84]

Friedrich Funder later described the appeal of the Christian Social movement as being initially that of a broad movement of those forced down by the new conditions which 'liberalism had created in the capital'. Craftsmen of all kinds could now barely make a living. They had poor homes and workplaces. This was why, he believed:

> 'A people tormented by the bitterest need raised itself and directed its gaze with hope towards men who had put themselves at the head of a struggle against the 'arch enemy', the economic and social oppressor, liberalism'.[85]

This was also a people who may have been bourgeois, but who had previously been outside of politics, and who now found nothing for them in liberal values. They looked back to a 'corporate and feudal view of the world', where Guilds and regulations had protected them and their families. The great disappointment for these people, as loyal Catholics, was that the Church did not engage with these issues to help them. The Christian Social movement rose in Vienna, therefore, in opposition to the official line of the Church, creating a conflict between older Catholic Conservatives and younger Christian Socials.[86]

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[81] 'Die Wiener Gemeinderatswahlen und die Antisemiten', ABPD GLBRWahlen, p.7.

[82] ABPD *GLBRWahlen*, 9th May 1889.

[83] Figures for the number of antisemitic members of the council in 1889 comes from *NFP*, 4th July 1905, p.10

[84] Pulzer, *Political Antisemitism,* pp.161-162.

[85] Funder, *Vom Gestern*, pp.93-94.

[86] Funder, *Vom Gestern*, pp.82-83.

Antisemitism and anti-liberalism were aspects which helped to create a bond between the disparate groups and individuals that came to it, but they were not the only factors. Whether they were Pan-German or Christian Social, those on the Right could point to shared traditional bourgeois values of civic responsibility, self-reliance, and aid for the deserving. They were involved, as will be seen, in charitable and voluntary groups, where these values could be put into practice. This was why the antisemites could line up, in the 1890s, as the *Bürgerklub*. They were as bourgeois as their liberal opponents, but in different ways. From his estate in Lower Austria, Schönerer could display patriarchal values that were not all that different from the power of patronage that Lueger would later exercise as Mayor of Vienna.[87] Whether Catholic or Protestant, those under the banner of the *Bürgerklub* could unite for the promotion of a Christian Vienna, underpinned by German values.

What 'German values' meant could not always be agreed. As a young man, on resigning from a reading society that had turned from Austria to Prussia for its leadership, Lueger had claimed: 'If you cut me, you'll find black and yellow'.[88] This was used against him, when Schönerer and his allies taunted Lueger that he could not sleep without the Habsburg black and yellow colours over his bed.[89] Behind the taunting was a serious point. Contemporary observers noted that when Lueger was in control of Vienna City Council he 'made loyalty to the Emperor part of the City's municipal administration'.[90] Pan-Germans who disagreed with this loyalty might find themselves disadvantaged so, although certain values brought the various strands of the United Christians or the *Bürgerklub* together, others drove them apart. Apart from the many positions that might be adopted on the future of the Germans in terms of the state or states to which they might belong, anticlericalism was another area of dispute. Antisemitism was a way to bring these factions together, as a lowest common denominator. Antisemitism might be genuinely felt by many within these groupings, but others might see in it the opportunity for practical politics against a common enemy. Whether Karl Lueger, for instance, was an opportunistic antisemite or one out of conviction has been much debated.[91]

By 1890, Schönerer had served his sentence and was free, but his chances of leading a unified antisemitic movement had gone. After his release from prison, it seemed as if he had resumed 'business as usual'. He was seen visiting addresses in the Vienna suburbs, or

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[87] See Whiteside, pp.64-68, for a description of Schönerer's upbringing and wealth.

[88] Geehr, *Lueger*, p.34.

[89] Pulzer, *Political Antisemitism*, p.172.

[90] Brigitte Hamann, *Hitler's Vienna: A Dictator's Apprenticeship*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.283.

[91] See, for instance, Pulzer, *Political Antisemitism*, pp.160-162.

dining at the Hotel Sacher.[92] His followers drew up petitions, calling for support for the return of his political rights and his title. Labels with the words '*Hoch Schönerer*' were produced to add to envelopes, to raise the visibility of this campaign. Pre-printed postcards invited people to pro-Schönerer meetings, but this was all surface activity and Schönerer's chance, if had ever had one, had passed.[93] Schönerer was treated as a loose cannon in those parts of antisemitic circles where at least the appearance of respectability was important.[94]

Antisemitic activities continued throughout the year. In October 1890, more than one hundred antisemites were reported to be gathering in the Hernals district, although the purpose of the gathering is not recorded.[95] Rumours circulated of an antisemitic conference being planned for later in 1890, although police intelligence initially turned up nothing concrete.[96] The scarcity of information reaching the police may have been because of a lack of detailed preparation by those meant to be organising the conference. This was delayed several times, until it was eventually planned for 15th November but, because of disruption to travel caused by bad weather, the conference was held back for two more days. At this point, the Hungarian antisemite Baron von Onody, who was billed as a guest speaker, turned up but did not wait the two days before returning to Budapest.[97]

The organisers of the event struggled on. Several large gatherings that had been planned to take place throughout the city were turned into one central gathering, but even then attendance was sparse. Reports talk of 'Christian MPs' like Ernst Vergani being there, alongside representatives of the Christian Social Party, three years before the generally accepted date of the party's foundation.[98] The agenda included discussion of plans for a further extension of the City, by joining the suburbs to Vienna. This seems not to have been sufficient to attract people to the meeting.[99] Again, in terms of relative attention, the police were more concerned with a Socialist gathering of the same month.[100]

In October 1890, the *Deutsches Volksblatt* made appeals not to split the 'Christian and German' antisemitic vote in elections to the *Reichsrat*, calling for a united front against the

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[92] ABPD 1890 St3, 17th August 1890.

[93] See examples in ABPD 1887 St2.

[94] ABPD 1890 St1, 2nd April 1890. ABPD 1890 St3, 10th July 1890.

[95] ABPD 1890 St3, 3rd October 1890.

[96] ABPD 1890 St3, several reports between July and August 1890.

[97] ABPD 1890 V1,15th November 1890.

[98] ABPD 1890 V1, 15th November 1890.

[99] ABPD 1890 V1, 15th November 1890.

[100] ABPD 1890 V1, 13th November 1890.

liberals.[101] Even at this early stage, however, antisemites who were gaining seats were mainly of the Christian Social, pro-Habsburg kind, and Lueger was increasingly secure as leader of the majority of antisemites. For instance, Vergani's brand of Pan-German antisemitism still had supporters in Vienna, but Vergani's status was increasingly secondary to that of Lueger in the Christian Social movement.[102]

Yet the antisemites as a whole were challenging the liberals and, by 1891, the liberals were losing their hold on Vienna city council. Some of their core voters, employees of the City, were crossing over to the antisemites, after broken liberal promises on raising salaries. The antisemites now made this offer.[103] The 1891 Spring elections to the city council gave the liberals 69.6% of seats to 30.4% for the *Bürgerklub*.[104] Yet the liberals won only because the electoral system favoured the higher curia, and the number of seats did not reflect the number of votes.[105] This was the last time the liberals enjoyed this advantage from the curial system. The City Council was undergoing a major expansion, this time beyond the *Gurtel*. In 1892, the suburbs beyond this limit were brought into the city, giving Vienna twenty-one districts and, by and large, the electorates of these districts were weighted towards the lower curiae where, in general, the antisemites were finding their greatest support.[106] The imbalances of the curial system had shifted in favour of the antisemites.

The 1890s were a decade when violence at times hit Vienna hard. In 1890, workers had taken to the streets to riot against high food prices.[107] In June 1892, Pan-German sympathisers also caused near riots.[108] The occasion was the wedding in Vienna of Otto von Bismarck's son, Herbert. When Herbert and his father arrived by rail, for his marriage to the Countess of Hoyos, huge crowds had gathered, making up an informal wedding procession, but in reality mostly having come to cheer his father.[109] Shouts expressing German solidarity went up from the crowds. Prominent among those cheering the Bismarcks were students from the University. Some of their number were arrested when fighting broke out, and mounted police used batons to keep the crowd under control.

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[101] *Deutsches Volksblatt*, 4th October 1890, available in ABPD 1890 St3.

[102] Pulzer, *Political Antisemitism,* pp.171-172.

[103] Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, pp.350-354.

[104] Seliger and Ucakar, Vol. 1, p.600.

[105] Pulzer, *Political Antisemitism,* pp.168-169.

[106] Pulzer, *Political Antisemitism,* p.172.

[107] Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, pp.231-232.

[108] ABPD 1892 St1, 22nd June 1892.

[109] ABPD Studenten 1. Numerous reports around 20th June 1892.

Violence was not just the preserve of youth, however.[110] Hermann Roys, a 42-year old painter from the Währing district, claimed that he had set off from home with a friend, in the hope of 'catching a glimpse of Prince Bismarck on his arrival in Vienna'. After Bismarck's arrival, Roys had tried to navigate his way home through the heart of the city, but he had become caught up in the crowds that formed from a series of police blockades. Turning from one street to the next, Roys found these crowds rowdier and denser, and the police precautions sterner. Carried along in the general confusion, Roys eventually found himself at the front of a crowd that was blocked by contingents of police from the front and from the rear. One police contingent had drawn sabres. It is unclear what sparked trouble, but when Roys dropped his hat and attempted to retrieve it he was struck by several blows to the head. It was only with the help of a number of strangers that Roys was able to receive treatment at a nearby pharmacy and then make his way to a police station to register a complaint.[111] Roys would not have been alone in receiving this manhandling from the police. Despite this, Bismarck's visit must have raised Pan-German spirits. In a clear endorsement of those with Pan-German sympathies, Herbert Bismarck visited the Pan-German MP, Karl Wolf.[112]

Wolf later challenged the Cisleithanian Prime Minister, Badeni, to a duel, which made headlines, but it won neither power nor influence.[113] Winning power and influence was something which, instead, Christian Socials were steadily doing. They built up their organisation and used, for instance, the institutions and patronage of the Viennese suburban district councils, some of which they now controlled as part of the broad antisemitic movement, to enhance their position.[114] Christian Social leaders distanced themselves from the more radical aspects of their Pan-German allies, but they also kept an eye on people in their own ranks.

Ernst Schneider earned no rebukes from leading Christian Social figures for suggesting that author and cleric August Rohling, who had accused Jews of the ritual murder of Christian children, should be invited to stand as MP in Lower Austria.[115] Some, however, were ready to ditch Schneider, because of his association with the 'revolutionary' wing of the party.[116] Ludwig Psenner, who had helped persuade Karl Lueger into the movement, gave ferociously

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[110] ABPD Studenten 1, 20th June 1892.

[111] ABPD Studenten 1, witness statement by Roys 20th June 1892, and a statement by the doctor who treated Roys in Währing on the same day, also in ABPD Studenten 1.

[112] ABPD Studenten 1, 20th June 1892.

[113] Whiteside, *Socialism,* p.180.

[114] ABPD1893 St1, 19th January 1893.

[115] ABPD1893 St1, 11th January 1893. Also Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, p.89 and p.92.

[116] ABPD1893 St1, 19th January 1893.

antisemitic speeches. He talked of the Jew as a plague bacillus that infected Europe, multiplying itself in the cities of Germany and the Habsburg lands, despite the best efforts of the 'indigenous' people to eradicate it.[117] He, too, was gradually marginalised within the Christian Social Party, not because of this language, but because his approach did not match the 'respectability' the Party wanted to project.

The Christian Socials repeatedly stated that they wanted to work within the system, and were different from Schönerer, who wanted to overthrow it, an approach that was paying off. Some who might earlier have willingly been seen with Schönerer were turning away from him. The gymnastics association *Ottakringer Turnverein* was investigated in late 1893 after reports that Schönerer had met members of the group in an Ottakring inn. Members of the committee vigorously denied this, saying that no such meeting had occurred and, besides, the committee members had been away from Vienna on business at the time. The gist of the matter seems to have been that Schönerer and members of the group had been in the inn at the reported time, but there had been no formal meeting.[118]

Regardless of what had really happened, that the committee members distanced themselves from Schönerer is striking. Members of gymnastics associations such as the *Ottakringer Turnverein* were often prominent supporters of radical German ideas. Rooted in politics, some gymnastics associations were now declaring that Jews were no longer welcome as members. Some associations were going so far as to declare themselves to be German, not German-Austrian. In this, associations mirrored the split between Habsburg loyalist and German Nationalist branches of the antisemitic political movement.[119]

Christian Social Victory In Vienna

Political change had been coming for some time, both locally and nationality and, in 1893, after fourteen years as Prime Minister of Cisleithania, Count Taaffe resigned, to be replaced by a coalition of clericals, Poles, and German liberals, who finally returned to government. The government was troubled, and limped on only as far as 1895.[120] In Vienna, elections to the City Council were held in Spring 1895. The result gave 53 seats to the liberals and 46 to the antisemites.[121] Further elections took place in September 1895, from which the antisemites, predominantly the Christian Socials, secured a narrow majority. Nevertheless, the victory of the antisemites in 1895 was incomplete. The delight of Father Ignaz Aumann

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[117] Psenner, *Papsttum*.

[118] ABPD1893 St1, 31st January 1894.

[119] Whiteside, *Socialism*, p.131.

[120] See Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, pp.327-333.

[121] Seliger and Ucakar, Vol. 1, p.600.

of St. Laurenz-Gertrud, that the liberals had been 'shot through' in these communal elections, thanks to the 'efforts and magnificent agitation' of Lueger, was tempered by a major disappointment.[122] The Emperor, appalled by the antisemitism of the Christian Socials, had not given his approval of Lueger as Mayor. Instead of Lueger, his deputy, Josef Strobach, was appointed as Mayor. Lueger would have to wait two more years, and go through much political manoeuvring, before he finally took up office.[123] However, Vienna's antisemites had few grounds for complaint as to how they were treated. The Hungarian government at this time clamped down heavily on antisemitic activities and antisemites found little success. Perhaps significantly, too, the Hungarian franchise was even more highly restricted than that in Austria, and the electoral system was heavily bent to favour the liberal, Magyar establishment. The kind of constituency that nursed the economic grievances and which formed the bedrock of antisemitic support in Vienna was unavailable to antisemites in Budapest.[124]

The Christian Socials would not relinquish control of the city until after the First World War.[125] This lengthy hold on power could suggest that the Christian Socials commanded a popular mandate in the city. The reality is that the combination of the highly restricted franchise and the curial system gave the Christian Socials an unfair advantage. The Christian Social Party never held the support of anything like a majority of the adult population. In 1900, for instance, the population of Vienna was a little over 1.6 million, but there were fewer than a quarter of a million eligible voters.[126] The franchise had been extended far enough for the Christian Socials to reach out to the lower middle classes, allowing them to overcome the liberals among the bourgeoisie, but it had not yet been extended to the working classes, where the Social Democrats found their support.

Summary

This chapter has shown that the rise of the antisemitic movement at the local level in Vienna was made possible by a combination of circumstances in which they found themselves and conditions they helped to create. The liberals, who had run the city since the 1860s, lacked a central organisation. They were a collection of factions, rather than a party. They were also,

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[122] AEDW WäCk, 1895.

[123] See Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, pp.403-410, for details on the appointment of Lueger.

[124] Alice Freifeld, *Nationalism and the crowd in liberal Hungary, 1848-1914*, (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000), p.229 and p.249. See also Norman Stone, 'Crises in Hungary, 1903-1906', *Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 45, No. 104 (Jan., 1967), pp. 163-182.

[125] Maren Seliger and Karl Ucakar, *Wien: Politische Geschichte 1740-1934*, *Vol. 2 1896-1934,* (Vienna: Jugend und Volk, 1985), p.926.

[126] Seliger and Ucakar, Vol. 2, p.919.

at the national level, beginning to move apart from each other over questions such as economic intervention by the state and the importance of the nationalities question. Unable to mount a challenge to the Conservative Taaffe government, they failed to adapt to new political realities, including a new electorate. Some liberals followed a path of increasing the nationalist content of their programmes.

In Vienna, a bourgeois, but decidedly anti-liberal movement grew up. This included former liberals and bourgeois who were pursuing their own interests, such as city employees, looking for a party that would give them what they considered their fair rewards. This movement was, initially, based around groups such as German nationalists and Catholic Habsburg loyalists, who had previously been opponents, who came together under the umbrella of associations such as the United Christians, on an antisemitic and anti-liberal ticket. They came together under a banner of antisemitism, as a lowest common denominator. They shared some values, but were divided by others. They combined economic interest and antisemitism to gain support among those who could vote under the franchise of the 1880s and 1890s. Tensions between various streams of this antisemitic movement never completely eased and, even as they took power, splits emerged. The Christian Socials, better organised, were in place to take advantage of these splits. Yet, the two groups did not really form separate camps, except in as much as the restricted franchise kept out the Social Democrats and allowed feuds between German nationalists and Christian Socials to be feuds within a family. Once the Social Democrats were able to compete freely, in the First Republic, German nationalists and Christian Socials would come back together against the common enemy.

The antisemitic movement had succeeded in making antisemitism a source of debate about how policies should be constructed, and for whose benefit. The liberal era of tolerance and equality, even if assimilation was understood to be how to achieve it, was being rejected. In terms that ranged from religious to racial antisemitism, it was becoming, perhaps had become, acceptable to discuss in some circles the reasons for excluding fellow citizens. This was a significant first step towards a path that might lead to forcible exclusion, or worse. Chapter 5 now shows how some people on the ground were spreading messages of exclusion.

CHAPTER 5: POLITICS IN THE PARISHES

This chapter continues to analyse developments in the last decades of the nineteenth century, by considering certain priests who were involved in shaping politics in Vienna. It examines their very practical role in building the Christian Social movement, in order to provide a deeper understanding of how the antisemitic message was spread so successfully. The antisemitic message would have hit a chord with those looking for scapegoats for their circumstances or their fears, but without the priests as a capable and experienced cadre of propagandists, it would have been more difficult for the antisemitic movement to succeed.

These priests provide prime examples of how organisation and persistence, from a dedicated set of activists, can further an ideology. This is not to say that priests were alone in this work, but they helped to lay the foundations for the exclusionary ways in which many people would come to see the world. This chapter looks in particular at three priests who, in different ways, were connected with the Christian Social movement from its early days. The chapter goes a little beyond 1896, to complete part of the story of one of these priests, Father Adam Latschka. Another of these priests, Father Deckert of Weinhaus has already been encountered, but the chapter begins with Father Carl Dittrich of Ottakring.

Father Dittrich At Ottakring

In the same year, 1874, that Deckert was appointed to Weinhaus, Father Carl Dittrich, something of a high flyer in the Church, took over the parish of Ottakring. In March 1882, as rector of the *Knabenseminar* he had given a speech to the Joseph of Aramathea Society in Vienna, in the presence of the archbishop and other high ranking clergy.[1] Dittrich described the nineteenth century as an 'age of discoveries', but one characterised by social misery. According to Dittrich, governments no longer understood the rights and demands of the people. He condemned the secularising actions of the State against the Church, calling for a response from that other feature of the age, the public association. This was an age in which associations were 'shooting up like mushrooms', and he believed that Catholic associations should multiply and turn their power on the State.[2]

During the 1860s, Dittrich had been associated with the antisemitic *Kirchenzeitung*, but it is not known if he was actively involved at that time in electoral campaigning against the liberals. His Ottakring *Chronik* entries for the election years of 1879 and 1882 show no more than a list of successful candidates, but this may have been because Dittrich did not want to record the success of the liberals. The 1887 *Chronik* entry is not by Dittrich, but by

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[1] Carl Dittrich, *Rede gehalten in der 15. Generalversammlung des St. Josef von Aramathea-Vereins am 17. März 1882*, (Vienna: Self-Published, 1882).

[2] Dittrich, *Rede*.

one of his curates, Father Haberl. This entry shows that Dittrich was certainly involved directly in the elections of that year, as the local *Bürgermeister* had complained that the election had seen clerical involvement.[3] Haberl agreed that this involvement had been 'vigorous', and also noted that the campaign had seen the participation of the Christian Social Union, an umbrella group for Catholic organisations, but this had been 'unsuccessful'.[4] Two local businessmen, had stood for the Christian Socials but 'had fallen'. Haberl explained to the *Bürgermeister* that he personally had made no political efforts in the nine years he had been at the parish. He did, however, record that Dittrich had tried to rally opponents of the liberals, mainly by having the women of his parish organise social gatherings where they, along with Father Dittrich, could persuade male voters to oppose the liberals.[5]

Haberl's comments about his own involvement are perhaps disingenuous. He complains that one liberal candidate for the office of *Bürgermeister*, Herr Dick, was unworthy of the office, especially as Dick had tried to cajole *Gemeinde* officials and workers to vote for him. While Haberl may not have taken part in active anti-liberal campaigning, he would likely have made his views on politics known to his parishioners. Haberl's comments about the ability of the Christian Social Union to mount a presence in Ottakring suggest that it was already rooted in previous organisations in the area, as it was in March of that year that the organisation was founded, by Fathers Abel and Latschka.[6] As Haberl records, however, 'these efforts were in vain'. He notes: 'Who is not with me is against me. We could not prevent our opponents from succeeding in the elections to the communal council'.[7]

Despite this setback, the priests at Ottakring were prominent figures. In September 1888, for example, the priests led around 4,000 people in a pilgrimage to Mariabrunn. This was part of a wider pattern of pilgrimage activity. Adelheid Popp, who would later become a leading Social Democrat, related how she had fallen under the spell of antisemitic priests in her early teens, around 1880.[8] She describes how, on pilgrimages and at masses, priests described Jews as a threat to the 'normal' life of Vienna. At the urging of her priests, the young Popp distributed propaganda, and tried to dissuade friends from buying from Jewish shops. It was

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[3] AEDW AOCk, 1887.

[4] AEDW AOCk, 1887.

[5] AEDW AOCk, 1887.

[6] Funder, *Vom Gestern*, p.94.

[7] AEDW AOCk, 1887.

[8] Adelheid Popp, *Die Jugendgeschichte einer Arbeiterinnen, von ihr selbst erzählt*, (Munich: Reinhardt, 1909), pp.53-56 and pp.58-59.

only as she moved away from the influence of the Church, reached adulthood and became a member of the Social Democratic movement that Popp rejected antisemitism.[9]

In 1889, Father Dittrich was 'removed from office' at Ottakring, as the result of a scandal where his assistants had been overcharging for Church ceremonies, such as weddings and funerals.[10] Dittrich was not involved in the scandal, but he had failed to manage his staff. His successor, Father Wilhelm Pokorny, inherited a parish that was being subjected to long-term change from the wider world. In 1892, the commune of Ottakring, along with the commune and parish of Neulerchenfeld and other areas nearby, became part of the new district of Ottakring, absorbed into the City of Vienna. The population of this district had grown by 24,000 in the decade to 1891, to more than 61,000. Of this population, 58,324 were Catholics. 2,365 were Jews.[11]

By now, as Dittrich had hoped, the number of associations that looked to the Church as a sponsor or a source of authority, had grown. This had been a long-term process, but by the 1890s these associations had become a part of daily life. In 1893, Pokorny attended a dinner to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Ottakring Volunteer Fire Brigade.[12] In 1895, a shelter for the homeless was founded in Ottakring, with the Archduchess Valerie as its sponsor. In the same year, a charitable hospital also opened, sponsored by Princess Wilhelmine, and under the spiritual care of the church at Ottakring.[13] These organisations provided ways for people to meet and to express views with people who shared them. They gave opportunities for people to demonstrate their commitment to the community, and to be seen to be doing so. Pokorny did not, however, enjoy these associations for as long as he might. In 1897, he too was caught up in allegations of financial wrong-doing, and he resigned.[14] His replacement at Ottakring was Father Adam Latschka.

Father Latschka

Adam Latschka had been born in 1847 to a poor farming family in Lower Austria. His first permanent appointment was as curate at the parish of Perchtoldsdorf, not far outside Vienna. This was a parish in a state of spiritual disrepair when he arrived. Church attendance was mostly limited to the old, with many people attending only on major feast days or for baptisms, weddings or funerals. Latschka set about changing this, by bringing in Jesuits for

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[9] Popp, pp.58-59.

[10] AEDW AOCk, 1889.

[11] AEDW AOCk, 1891.

[12] AEDW AOCk, 1893.

[13] AEDW AOCk, 1895.

[14] AEDW AOCk, 1897.

missionary work. He undertook visits to parishioners who did not attend mass. He organised prayer meetings, and he arranged work for the unemployed. In so doing, Latschka achieved his major goal: he revived church attendance at Perchtoldsdorf, where he stayed for eight years, until 1880, when he took a junior post at the prestigious *Votivkirche* in Vienna.[15]

Latschka occupied this post for seventeen years. Although this role proved to be undemanding for a man of energy, it allowed Latschka to undertake social-cum-missionary work among the growing number of factory workers in the city.[16] He was heavily involved in a campaign to improve conditions for the largely female workers at the Rosenau tobacco factory, in the Alsergrund district. When the factory moved to new premises in Ottakring, Latschka was again involved, helping to ensure adequate facilities for personal hygiene and health. The factory was a substantial structure, built between 1893 and 1898, and spread over twenty thousand square metres. The factory hall was four to six metres high, giving good ventilation.[17] In his involvement in the building of the factory, Latschka was a priest who recognised the importance of practical considerations. The practical and the religious mixed together when he became one of the founders of a Catholic working women's association.[18]

By this time, Latschka had also become directly involved in politics, as had other priests.[19] He was co-founder of a group known as the Christian Social Union, successor to the by now defunct Reformverein.[20] Then, in 1889, Latschka was elected to the Vienna City Council for the Alsergrund district. He was by now something of a public figure, with the police recording his attendance at a public meeting of antisemites in Alsergrund in 1890.[21] Through the United Christians he rubbed shoulders with prominent politicians, including Lueger. He was busily involved in several associations and was a writer on religious matters.[22] So it is surprising that Latschka then decided to leave the *Votivkirche* and to take on a busy parish, as he did when he took over the parish of Ottakring, in 1897.

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[15] Franz Loidl, *Msgr Adam Latschka – Politisch-sozialer, vor allem Arbeiterinnen-Seelsorger und erster Pfarrer von Neu-Ottakring*, (Vienna: Publisher Name Not Printed, 1962).

[16] Loidl, *Latschka*, pp.6-7.

[17] G. Hajos, *Ottakringer Industriebauten*, (Vienna: Schober, Undated).

[18] Loidl, *Latschka*, p.23.

[19] Geehr, *Lueger*, p.72.

[20] Loidl, *Latschka*, p.9; Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, p.114.

[21] ABPD 1890 St3, 14th September 1890.

[22] Funder, *Vom Gestern*, p.118.

It has been suggested that Latschka and other antisemitic priests carried out their activities despite the disapproval of their superiors.[23] After all, the Austrian bishops had tried, but failed, to obtain '… a papal condemnation of the Christian Social movement from Pope Leo XIII'.[24] Latschka seems not to have been aware of any disapproval, nor does it seem he was part of a group of priests who disobeyed orders from a 'remote' hierarchy.[25] His letter of application for the post at Ottakring seems instead to reveal his confidence in his relations with at least some of this hierarchy.[26]

In this application, Latschka talks of his work with Catholic working women's organisations and of his literary achievements. He draws attention to his political involvement, and hopes that this will find favour from those making the appointment. His activities certainly had no negative effect, as Latschka beat fifteen other applicants for the post.[27] One of these applicants, Father Johannes Pax, who did eventually take the parish at Ottakring, wrote of how he had failed to win the job, despite his excellent references and testimonials, to a curate who was three years his junior. Pax, for one, did not see the upper hierarchy treating Latschka as a rogue antisemitic priest.[28]

By 1899, as a result of population growth, the parish of Ottakring had a huge number of parishioners. It was therefore split into two parishes. Ottakring was re-named Alt-Ottakring, and a parish was created based on a brand new church at Neu-Ottakring. Latschka applied for this new church. His application for this second parish is more humble than his application for the parish he now wanted to leave. He admitted that he should not be applying after such a short time in his present post, and he wrote that he would understand if he was rejected, but Latschka was fortunate. Some lay members exercised influence in the Church, so it was useful to him that the sponsor of the new church was Count Alois von Liechtenstein, an early and prominent supporter of the Christian Social movement. Liechtenstein, a member of the *Reichsrat* and *Landtag* for constituencies which covered Ottakring, would have known Latschka.[29]

A biography of Latschka draws heavily on his entries in the *Chronik* from Neu-Ottakring, his second parish in Ottakring.[30] His 1899 entry has little to do with church affairs. Instead,

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[23] Whiteside, *Socialism,* p.148.

[24] Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, p.348.

[25] Whiteside, *Socialism,* p.148.

[26] AEDW AOCor, 29th March 1897.

[27] AEDW AOCor 1897, list of applicants.

[28] The comments are in Pax's 1899 application for the post. AEDW AOCor 31st January1899.

[29] Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, pp.70-71.

[30] Loidl, *Latschka*, pp.6-12.

he wrote of the rise of the liberals and the emergence of the Christian Socials, as a response to the 'threat' from 'the Jews' towards 'his people'. Latschka conceded that the word 'Christian' in United Christians had been intended as a term of exclusion. Members were often only nominally Christian, but at least they were not Jewish. Latschka is quite certain that the liberals fell because 'the Jew' was their Achilles heel. He describes Jews as subjecting the 'indigenous' Christian people to *robot,* a term suggesting serfdom.[31] The Neu-Ottakring *Chronik* is a near copy of the entry Latschka made at his previous parish at Alt-Ottakring, in 1897 but, among changes in the second *Chronik*, the alleged threat to 'Christian society' is not from 'the Jews' but from 'the Jew', a much more personal threat. The word *robot* did not appear in the earlier *Chronik*. By adding the term, Latschka creates a world where *robot* defines relationships between Christians and Jews.[32]

Priests had many reasons for becoming involved in politics. A desire to relieve social and economic problems was significant, as can be seen from Latschka's involvement with charitable groups in Ottakring long before he was a priest there. Antisemitism was a major motivation for Latschka, but this was not religious antisemitism based on blaming Jews for the death of Christ. In a prayer book written by Latschka – and one that was widely used in education – in response to the question 'Who killed my Saviour?' Latschka was quite clear: 'Who else but I and my sins?'[33] He did, however, indiscriminately blame all Jews for the economic and social problems that confronted Vienna, and his antisemitism was linked with his political fears and rooted in his perceptions of the modern world.[34]

However, Latschka's main motivation for becoming involved in politics was religious, and redemption was at the root of all he did. He rejects the faith of earlier generations of clergy in the ability of the poor to redeem themselves. In his view, the Church had to reach out to the poor, or their souls would be lost to 'Godless Socialism'.[35] The root of Latschka's social and political involvement was therefore charitable endeavour with a bigger purpose. This was why he worked extremely hard at each of his parishes to build his congregations.

It has been said that, in Vienna, 'serious Catholic politics simply did not exist until the late 1880s and that at this point priests immediately became an appendage of Christian Social antisemitism'.[36] An alternative view is that organised and serious Catholic politics became

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[31] AEDW NOCk, 1899 and Loidl, *Latschka*, p.7.

[32] AEDW AOCk, 1897; AEDW NOCk, 1899.

[33] Latschka, p.76.

[34] AEDW NOCk, 1899.

[35] AEDW AOCk, 1897.

[36] Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, p.143.

viable from the late 1880s because it built on the earlier activities of priests and Catholic societies in the districts. Politics was not just concerned with the winning of votes, important as this may have been. Politics was also about contacts and influence, and priests were adept at building these, through one-off events like pilgrimages and through their regular participation in social networks. Groups like the Christian Social Union and the United Christians were important organisations that brought smaller groups together, but these groups pre-dated them. It must not be forgotten, however, that other factors played a significant part in antisemitic success. It is particularly the case that if the franchise had not been extended in the 1880s, antisemites would probably have been unable to find sufficient electoral support. Nevertheless, as can be seen through the *Chroniken* or the memoirs of Adelheid Popp, priests were playing a part in organising group activities and propaganda before 1887. These foundations provided a model for how the Christian Social movement could develop. Priests did not become an appendage of the Christian Social movement. They used the movement to spread their closely linked spiritual and political messages.

A powerful weapon to this end was the large-scale, public religious gathering. Latschka goaded the Socialists by inviting priests who were known for the vehemence of their preaching to give open air sermons at his parish.[37] These meetings were primarily religious in purpose, but must have had the flavour of a political rally. Latschka himself was described as having used the harshest of antisemitic language, at some of the stormiest meetings in the suburbs.[38] The transcripts of these particular sermons are not available, but the content of others given by these invited preachers is known. These include those of Father Heinrich Abel, one of Latschka's favourite guest speakers.

In 1892, regular participants in a pilgrimage asked Abel to become involved in its organisation.[39] He noted that the vast majority of pilgrims were women, 400 compared with 40 men, so he threw himself into the work of using these pilgrimages to re-integrate back into the Church men who had left it. He then turned to a tried an trusted method to gather recruits: the association. Abel invited the male members of the *Marianische Kaufmannskongregation*, which had been founded in 1890, to spread the word among its members that an all-male pilgrimage was being started.[40] Abel ordered that women were to 'stay at home' when he led pilgrimages.[41] He used a light touch, to avoid alienating

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[37] AEDW NOCk, 1899.

[38] *NFP*, 4th July 1905, p.10; Wiener Zeitung, hereafter *WZ*, 4th July 1905, p.4.

[39] Heinrich Abel, *Pater Abel, S.J. und die Wiener Männerfahrten nach Maria-Hell*, (Vienna: Marianische Kongregation der Kaufleute, 1907), Foreword.

[40] Abel, *Wiener Männerfahrten,* Foreword.

[41] Funder, *Vom Gestern*, p.111.

potential returnees to the Church. For his first year in charge, a three day pilgrimage in 1893, Abel arranged for rosaries and prayer books to be on sale for those who had none, but no one would be forced into praying or singing.[42] He demanded only the observance of Sunday mass, fasting on holy days, and the taking of the sacraments at Easter.[43] Abel records that eventually he was so successful that large male congregations joined evening gatherings at the *Augustinerkirche* in central Vienna, a few days before pilgrimages took place. Six thousand were said to be present in 1899, despite an antisemitic rally at the *Rathaus* at the same time also attracting large crowds.[44] Even allowing for exaggeration, the numbers must have been large. Printings of Abel's preaching ran to up to 20,000 copies.[45]

Before the 1895 pilgrimage, Abel preached that the Jew was the new Turk; the Star of David the new crescent moon; that a new crusade was needed against the Jew.[46] The language used was insistent. Newspaper editor Moritz Szeps was called 'Moses Szeps', the press was the 'Jewish press'. Abel preached loyalty to the Habsburg state. He claimed his pilgrimages were for the peace and unity of all Christians in Austria, and that he had no quarrel with many members of Protestant churches. This seems to have created fertile antisemitic ground. Within a couple of years, special trains were booked for pilgrimages, and discounts obtained on block bookings for accommodation.[47] Abel had used a combination of ploys to attract these men, from an appeal to those seeking all-male comradeship to an approach that would not embarrass those who had not been to church for some time. He had chosen a proven way to spread the word, the association.

For Abel, a clear hierarchy of nations existed. Good German values should inform the Empire, but the 'Aryans', despite their differences, came from the same line: Slavs and Germans were cousins. For him, the Jew was the problem, stirring up distrust between nations. Jews were destroying the healthy diversity that national cultural differences gave the Empire. The nations within the Empire would work together if it were not for the Jew. In a printed version of his speeches, Abel stated that people should approach their struggles in a 'true German way' rather than in the Jewish manner. In Nancy Wingfield's terms, Abel had set about 'creating the other', encouraging his audience to construct barriers between themselves, as those who belonged, and a Jewish other that was to be considered an alien

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[42] Abel, *Wiener Männerfahrten,* p.7.

[43] Funder, *Vom Gestern*, p.110.

[44] Heinrich Abel, *'Los von Gott?' Vier Conferenzreden des hochwürdigen Herrn P. Heinrich, S.J.*, (Vienna: Verlag der Reichspost, 1899), p.3. and p.19.

[45] Abel, *'Los von Gott?',* title page.

[46] Abel, *Wiener Männerfahrten,* p.28.

[47] Abel, *Wiener Männerfahrten,* p.17.

intrusion.[48] Abel published these thoughts 'with the approval of the Ordinariat of the Prince Archbishop of Vienna'.[49] Despite the views that Abel expressed about Jews, Friedrich Funder considered Abel a 'priestly renewer of religious life', who possessed a 'magnanimous gentleness'.[50]

Abel's speech before the 1895 pilgrimage took place in the same year as the liberals lost control of Vienna, but his brand of Catholic antisemitism, with fidelity to the Empire and toleration of its Slavs as 'fellow Aryans', was not yet fully in charge of the City Council. The coalition that had defeated the liberals, the *Bürgerklub*, still contained a significant number of Pan-Germans, when Lueger set about consolidating his position. Those with Pan-German views who stayed within, or moved into, the Party were sidelined but, from their point of view, they were still in power. Others found themselves up against the Christian Socials' now powerful party organisation, and they frequently lost. Christian Socials, for instance, made inroads into parts of Währing that had once been a nationalist stronghold.[51]

It had become clear that the antisemite who wanted success in Viennese politics would have to follow a line of Habsburg loyalty, and align with the newly dominant force. Former hard-line Pan-Germans like Ernst Vergani turned to the Christian Socials to fend off the challenge from Schönerer and his allies.[52] Robert Pattai had not long before barely disguised his anticlericalism, and he admitted he was no Christian Social, but he took Christian Social help.[53] Latschka must have been delighted when he recorded in his *Chronik* that Pattai was, after the Christian Social victory, 'speaking fluent Catholic like a bishop'.[54]

Father Deckert At Weinhaus

At Weinhaus, Father Joseph Deckert was a controversial figure. Whatever the truth of stories of financial wrong-doing, in 1888 Deckert had sufficient funds for a lengthy visit to Rome.[55] A decade later, he embarked on an even longer pilgrimage to the Holy Land.[56] Deckert's self-belief was high. In 1889, other priests alluded to the 'tragic events' at

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[48] Nancy M. Wingfield, 'Introduction', in Nancy M. Wingfield, ed., *Creating The Other: Ethnic Conflict And Nationalism In Habsburg Central Europe*, (New York: Berghahn, 2004), p1.

[49] From title page of Abel, '*Los von Gott?'*. The copy of Abel's *Wiener Mannerfahrten* used for this work had originated in Karl Lueger's personal library, now to be found in the WbiR.

[50] Funder, *Vom Gestern*, p.110.

[51] Höbelt, p.101.

[52] AEDW NOCk 1899.

[53] AEDW NOCk 1899.

[54] AEDW NOCk 1899.

[55] AEDW WeCk, 1888.

[56] AEDW WeCk, 1898.

Mayerling after the death of Crown Prince Rudolf.[57] Deckert was confident enough to describe Rudolf's death as 'suicide'.[58] He turned his skills in oratory and writing to propagandistic effect. Many speeches he gave in his parish were also published in booklet form. In 1893, Deckert published speeches that he had given at Weinhaus to raise funds for Catholic theologian August Rohling, who was on trial for having accused Jews of committing ritual murder of Christian children. In their titles and in the language they used, these speeches were violent, repetitive and built on stereotypes of Jews.[59] They were designed to whip up the audience and to inspire a reaction from their targets. Deckert records a series of talks, at an overflowing church, where he delighted at goading the 'Jewish Press'.[60]

It has been said that this should not be taken to indicate that large numbers of people were being reached, as the suburban churches of the time were relatively small.[61] This is true, but the numbers should not be underestimated. The speeches were often repeated over several evenings. They were only part of a network of activities that took place in which priests participated. Their audiences would have been from social classes that were relatively influential at the local level. Deckert boasted of links with the antisemitic members of the local council management committee.[62]

The metaphors in his pamphlets continued to hammer home messages about the 'Jewish threat', metaphors repeatedly used by other antisemites to put down layer upon layer of negative images of Jews. Deckert, like Heinrich Abel, compared Jews to earlier Turkish threats to Vienna.[63] He linked Jews with questions of work, wages and usury.[64] Deckert engaged with the question of racial antisemitism, in an 1895 pamphlet dedicated to Lueger.[65] This was a response to a pamphlet from earlier that year, which had condemned racial antisemitism as un-Catholic. The author had called for a new, non-antisemitic, Catholic people's party. In response, Deckert declared that he was glad the debate on racial antisemitism had been re-opened. It gave him the opportunity to answer some Christian Social antisemites who were asking if they should join with the Pan-Germans, who were

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[57] AEDW AOCk 1889.

[58] AEDW WeCk, 1888.

[59] See, for instance, Joseph Deckert, *Ein Ritualmord: aktenmäßig nachgewiesen*, (Vienna: Verlag des Sendboten, 1893).

[60] AEDW WeCk, 1894.

[61] Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, p.119.

[62] AEDW WeCk, 1894.

[63] Joseph Deckert, *Türkennot und Judenherrschaft*, (Vienna: Verlag des Sendboten, 1894).

[64] Joseph Deckert, *Arbeit, Lohn und Wucher*, (Vienna: Verlag des Sendboten, 1894).

[65] Joseph Deckert, *Rassenantisemitismus?,* (Vienna: Verlag des Sendboten, 1895).

exhibiting traces of racial antisemitism, or if they should instead join the Catholic Conservatives, who were not.

Deckert attacked the Conservatives for claiming a monopoly on patriotism. For Deckert, Christian Socials were at least as patriotic as Conservatives towards the Habsburg state. Deckert then proposed that racial antisemitism was a statement of fact, not necessarily racial hatred, as Jews had done nothing to elicit sympathy from the antisemites, nor had they done anything to lessen the 'powerful antipathy' that antisemites felt in their hearts towards them. In his view, a struggle was taking place against 'Jewish domination'.[66] The patriotism felt by Deckert and his allies set them against the Pan-German idea of union with Germany. Nevertheless, this did not mean that he and his supporters were less antisemitic than the Pan-Germans. 'We too, therefore, are racial antisemites'.[67] Deckert, like Latschka, seems to have enjoyed the favour of the Church. In 1895, from Parliament, Count Windischgrätz called on the Ordinariat to take action against Deckert. As was commented later, Deckert was able to maintain his antisemitic activities.[68]

John Boyer has argued that in the Christian Social Union, founded in 1887, the clergy 'sacrificed religion for a mildly nationalist and secular antisemitism' and expected other bourgeois groups to sacrifice anticlericalism in return.[69] This may have been the case with some, but for the priests presented here religion remained at the heart of their political activity. Politics was a means for them to protect the influence and power of the Church. Deckert and other priests supported visions that promoted strict hierarchies of the nations, including Jews. This was not mildly nationalist. Nor could the kind of antisemitism spread by the likes of Father Deckert or Father Abel be described as 'secular'. It covered a full range of hatreds of Jews.

Boyer has also argued that, in 1887, the founders of the Christian Social Union took a 'gamble that antisemitic voters would tolerate Catholic priests as sub-leaders and agitators'.[70] Priests in some parishes may have been satisfied with such a role, but some priests, such as Father Deckert, had by 1887 long established for themselves positions of influence and authority at the local level. In public rallies, social work and pilgrimages, they were replicating methods that had been used successfully in other parts of Europe, such as

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[66] Deckert, *Rassenantisemitismus?*, p.8.

[67] Deckert, *Rassenantisemitismus?*, p.43.

[68] *NFP*, 23rd March 1901, pp.24-25.

[69] Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, p.181.

[70] Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, p.114.

France and Germany.[71] The priests of Vienna were exploiters of tried and trusted methods, and Christian Social politicians recognised the role the priests played in building the movement. If, as has been stated, these politicians used *Bezirk* institutions to raise their influence, they also used them to reward their clerical activists. In Grinzing, the district council bought and demolished buildings, including the old town hall, to free up space next to the church. As the Grinzing *Chronik* records, the district council 'showed itself to be very generous'.[72]

Summary

The involvement of priests in politics in this period demonstrates that informal political channels are an important means to propagate political messages. This evidence is important as a demonstration of how priests were involved in politics, but the examples of other activities used here show how, in various ways, priests were involved in political activity at many levels, and used preaching at church services, public meetings, their writings and their social involvements, in order to develop networks along which an antisemitic message could be spread. As John Boyer has written, apparently non-political activities, such as pilgrimages, were used.[73] School children, who had not reached an adult awareness of the matter, were enlisted to spread propaganda. In relentlessly hammering home their message, antisemitic priests were contributing to a change that was at least as profound as the replacement of the liberals by the Christian Socials in power on the Vienna City Council.

Priests used antisemitism as a means of constructing 'the other', to distinguish between 'us' and 'them'. The likes of Father Abel portrayed Jews as completely foreign, alien to the 'normal' order. 'Aryans' were the 'true' indigenous people of the Empire, and Slavs and Germans were cousins. However, 'German values' were to underpin the state, alongside those of Christianity. In this respect, these priests were mixing a form of Pan-German cultural identity with a corrupted interpretation of a universal Christianity and Aryan brotherhood. They were helping to change the language of politics and creating, for some, an orthodoxy, that defined identity and belonging by exclusion.

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[71] Blackbourn, David, 'The Catholic Church in Europe since the French Revolution. A Review Article', *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* Oct.1991, Vol.33, No.4, pp.778-790. See also Anderson, Margaret L., 'The Limits of Secualrization: On the Problem of the Catholic Revival in Nineteenth-CenturyGermany', *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 38, No. 3, 1995, pp. 647-670.

[72] AEDW GrCk, entries for 1893 to 1895.

[73] Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, p.119.

CHAPTER 6: STATE, *VOLK* OR CLASS? 1896-1914

One prominent, but overdsimplified, conceptualisation of politics among German speakers of Cisleithania is that of the 'Three Camps' (*drei Lager*).[1] This model was originally applied to the First Republic but, by extension, can be applied to the last two decades or so of the Empire. It proposes that Germans moved in three irreconcilable, rarely overlapping camps, as Christian Socials, Pan-Germans or Social Democrats, promoting loyalty to State, *Volk* or class respectively. In this model, Cisleithanian politics was not about winning voters with a particular set of policies at a given election. It was about persuading people to sign up for one camp for life.[2]

According to the theory, parties represented their interest groups, and aimed to control the powerful state bureaucracy in order to be able to act on their behalf.[3] Each of the camps was said to launch vicious attacks on their opponents, which created barriers that could not be lowered. Certainly, Christian Socials and German nationalists fell out over 'liberal' issues of secularism, education, and where a German Austrian's primary loyalties lay. The Christian Social movement also 'released a new characteristic into Viennese politics which, with the best will in the world, could not be subsumed under the collective term liberal.'[4] However, rather than being divided into two of the three camps, it is perhaps better to describe Christian Socials and German nationalists in Vienna as being two parts of the same camp, agreeing on many things, but divided over others. At times, they came together as a bourgeois front against common enemies.

The period begins with the Christian Social Party, alongside German Nationalist allies, as the leading contingent in a common antisemitic front, newly in control of Vienna, although the Christian Socials would soon have the upper hand in this front. The party would now have to address how it might implement talk of acting against Jews and 'Jewish Capitalism'. It would soon also have to address the dilemma of whether it existed on behalf of all of the so-called 'indigenous' Christian peoples of the Empire, or whether its priorities were to defend the Germans who made up its core support, if State and *Volk* came into conflict. This chapter considers how successful Pan-Germans and Christian Socials were in their attempts to shape notions of identity and belonging. The chapter ends in 1914, with preparations for war, and uncertainty as to the form Austria as a whole might be about to take.

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[1] The *drei Lager* theory was first put forward by Adam Wandruszka in 1954, in his work *Geschichte der Republik*. The theory is discussed in, among others, John T. Lauridsen, *Nazism And The Radical Right In Austria 1918-1934*, (Copenhagen: Royal Library, 2007), pp.89-91. See also Thorpe, p.7, Ernst Hanisch, *Lange Schatten*, p.117, Pulzer, *Political Antisemitism*, p.276, and C. Earl Edmondson, *The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics 1918-1936*, (Athens: University Of Georgia), pp.11-12.

[2] Diamant, Alfred, *Austrian Catholics And The First Republic*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1960), p.viii.

[3] Ernst Hanisch, *Lange Schatten*, p.117.

[4] Höbelt, pp.96-97.

The Pan-Germans In Vienna

In March 1896, further electoral success consolidated the position of the Christian Social Party on Vienna City Council. Liberal candidates were defeated and two thirds of successful *Bürgerklub* candidates were Christian Social, as opposed to German Nationalist.[5] Christian Socials stressed their respectability, and proclaimed the party as a party of the Empire, a *Reichspartei.*[6] In April 1897, these tactics yielded results, and Lueger was confirmed as Mayor of Vienna.[7] In this month, too, Schönerer was back: after a break of nine years, he was re-elected to the *Reichsrat*.[8] Several other Pan-Germans formed a group with him, but they were a small part of a highly fragmented political spectrum, which included parties that represented other varieties of German nationalism.[9]

Out of the blue, the Cisleithanian First Minister, Count Badeni, presented the Pan-Germans with an opportunity to promote themselves as defenders of all things German in the Empire. Badeni had been appointed by the Emperor with the aim of winning support for his government in the *Reichsrat*. Czech MPs, obstructing business in the hope of obtaining advantageous changes to laws regarding the use of the Czech language in Bohemia, formed a major obstacle to this aim. Badeni, determined to make parliament a working institution, set course to make concessions to Czech demands.[10]

The Badeni Language Ordinances, introduced in April 1897, aimed at giving Czech the same status as German inside the public services in Bohemia.[11] By the terms of the decrees, all officials in Bohemia would be required to have a written and spoken command of German and Czech by July 1901.[12] Such abilities were far more common among Czechs than Germans. Going above Parliament, and aiming to avoid opposition from the German Parties – usually taken to mean the liberal and national German 'Left', from the Constitutional Party to the *Deutsche Volkspartei*, but not the likes of Schönerer's *Alldeutschen*[13] – he decreed the ordinances into existence.

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[5] Höbelt, pp.100-101.

[6] Whiteside*, Socialism,* p.164.

[7] Berthold Sutter, *Die badenischen Sprachenverordnungen von 1897*, Vol.1, (Graz: Böhlau, 1960), p.131.

[8] ABPD 1896 St5, 19th January, 13th and 29th February 1896.

[9] Whiteside, *Socialism*, p.158, discussed the fragmentation of the 'German nationalists'.

[10] Sutter, Vol.1, p.11.

[11] Sutter, Vol.1, p.11.

[12] Sutter, Vol.1, p.11.

[13] Höbelt, p.167.

A tremendous reaction exploded from many Germans, as a conflict over language rights in Bohemia came to be perceived as an attack on the rights of Germans in the Empire as a whole. This reaction to the ordinances was not confined to extremists. The *Neue Freie Presse*, displaying the national side of its liberal character, turned against an 'imposed settlement'.[14] Riots by Germans erupted in major cities, first across Bohemia, then elsewhere in Cisleithania.[15] Schönerer quickly made himself the central figure in opposition to the ordinances, obstructing business in parliament while simultaneously calling Germans onto the streets. He portrayed any attempt by 'German' politicians at compromise, however limited, as a betrayal of the German people. The government also made tactical mistakes, not the least of which was that the German parties had not been made fully aware of the extent of negotiations the government had held with the Czechs until the detail was announced via the press. Badeni now tried to negotiate with the German parties.[16] One by one, however, parties with a German base joined the opposition. Even the Social Democrats, who favoured the ordinances, protested at the government's handling of the matter.[17] The Christian Socials, too, were rocked by this crisis. Lueger, who originally underplayed the significance of the ordinances, came under pressure from some within his own party to oppose them.[18] On 24th May, Lueger decided to side with the German parties, excluding Schönerer.[19]

Riots eventually reached Vienna in November 1897, forcing Badeni's resignation, and the eventual repeal of his language ordinances in 1899.[20] Now, places with large Czech populations broke into violence, and martial law followed.[21] Violence receded, but only gradually. However, Badeni's language ordinances had a long-term impact. It has been said that they were a decisive turning point in the relationships between the nationalities of the Empire.[22] This was so for the political class, although Pieter Judson has shown that not everyone, even on the 'linguistic frontiers', became involved in 'national struggles'.[23]

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[14] *NFP* of 4th April 1897, in Sutter, Vol.1, p.217.

[15] Berthold Sutter, *Die badenischen Sprachenverordnungen von 1897*, (Graz: Böhlau, 1965), Vol.2, pp.11-49.

[16] Sutter, Vol.1, pp.140-141.

[17] Andrew Whiteside, 'The Germans as an Integrative Force in Imperial Austria: The Dilemma of Dominance', *AHYB*, 1967, Vol. III pt.1, 157-200, here p.193.

[18] Whiteside, *Socialism,* p.170.

[19] Höbelt, p.167.

[20] Whiteside, *Socialism,* p.185. Sutter, Vol.1, pp.274-278 for detail of the ordinances.

[21] Whiteside, *Socialism,* p.188.

[22] Sutter, Vol.1, p.8.

[23] See Judson, *Guardians*, for an exploration of this idea.

Nevertheless, it is fair to say that, in formal politics during the Empire, the national element became the dominant element the longer time went on.[24]

It would be easy to conclude that the Christian Socials had been 'subject to the same crude pressures from Pan-Germanism as were the other German parties'.[25] After all, however hard they might try, they were now seen as an essentially German party.[26] However, their actions in 1897 were for the short term, and the longer term proves that for most, like the more moderate German nationalists, 'Germanness' 'did not require the sterilisation of other national political movements and institutions for their own identity'.[27] The Christian Socials would have preferred to play a long game, using a message of Christian unity to build bridges with Slavic parties where possible. They had not been able to do so, for fear of seeing their support ebb away to the Pan-Germans.

German nationalists of all shades, especially the Schönerians, now portrayed themselves as having prevented an Imperial government from betraying the Germans of the Empire. They also portrayed themselves as the true protectors of German culture, especially as far as religion was concerned. In April 1899, police noted the close connection that Schönerer was making between Protestantism and the German people, as he threw his weight behind the *Los-von-Rom* movement, an attempt at engineering mass conversions from Catholicism to Lutheranism.[28] According to the reasoning behind *Los-von-Rom*, no 'true' German could also be loyal to the internationalist Catholic Church.[29]

1899 saw considerable efforts in Vienna by those associated with *Los-von-Rom*. Pan-German meetings returned to the Sofiensaal.[30] 'Anti-Catholic' pamphlets were widely distributed.[31] There was even a novel called '*Los-von-Rom*'.[32] Such efforts yielded small returns in the long term. Historically, net conversions in Vienna to Lutheranism had run at between 500 to 1,000 a year. After jumping to 6,385 in 1899, and peaking at 6,639 in 1901, net conversions fell to little more than 1,000 in 1910.[33] In typical Schönerian manner, the

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[24] Höbelt, p.19.

[25] Whiteside, *Socialism,* p.171.

[26] See Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, p.216 or Bled, p.148.

[27] John Boyer, *Culture And Political Crisis In Vienna: Christian Socialism In Power, 1897-1918*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p.165.

[28] ABPD 1899 St6, 3rd and 9th April 1899, from Döbling, in the North West of the city.

[29] See the newspaper *Odin*, Issue 1, April 1899, p.1, in ABPD 1893 St1.

[30] ABPD 1899 St6. Reports of 3rd April 1899.

[31] ABPD 1899 St6. Reports of 7th May 1899.

[32] ABPD 1899 St6, 30th August 1899.

[33] Whiteside, *Socialism,* p.254. Whiteside allocates the whole of chapter 10 to the *Los von Rom* movement.

movement shot itself in the foot. It used pastors from Germany as recruiting agents, and these pastors indulged in anti-Habsburg propaganda. As a result, many were expelled by the authorities.[34] The momentum from 1897 did give the German nationalists a boost. In the national parliamentary elections of 1901 the pro-Schönerer tendency won 22 seats, a gain of 14.[35] Other less extreme German Nationalist groups, such as Steinwender's *Deutsche Volkspartei*, which captured 41 seats, also made progress.[36] However, little progress was made in the capital, with gains mainly away from Vienna.[37]

In Vienna itself, the Christian Socials hounded the Nationalists. Christian Socials repeatedly promoted a vision of being 'good Germans, good Christians and good Austrians'.[38] In Vienna, the Pan-Germans garnered sufficient support to make their presence felt, but not enough for real influence. The national elections of 1901 gave them 40,000 votes.[39] Given the highly restricted franchise, support would have been higher than the numbers who voted, but even an estimate of 50,000 supporters in Vienna in the pre-war period leaves the Pan-Germans far behind the hundreds of thousands now mobilising behind the Social Democrats and the Christian Socials.[40] After a brief surge, decline set in for overt German nationalists of all colours in Vienna. In Lower Austria, once seen as a natural homeland, German nationalists lost ground massively to Christian Socials.[41] In the 1907 national elections, Schönerer too was defeated heavily.[42]

Some Pan-Germans, such as Josef Pommer, were astute as to what was needed for long-term success. Pommer believed, from experience, that formal politics was essential, but that societal life changed long-term attitudes, and 'served... as the means of expression for a grounded Pan-German and antisemitic world view'.[43] Pommer's assessment of the importance of societal life was correct. In 1906, 30,774 social or charitable associations existed in Cisleithania, with 3,544 in Vienna alone.[44] These societies were significant politically. As Peter Pulzer comments, after 1900 'parties played an increasingly smaller

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[34] Whiteside, *Socialism,* p.250.

[35] Höbelt, Statistischer Anhang I: Die Fraktionen.

[36] Höbelt, p.128.

[37] Whiteside, *Socialism,* p.217.

[38] *RP*, 30th September 1900, p.1 or *Vorarlberger Volksblatt*, 5th October 1900, p.1.

[39] Whiteside, *Socialism,* p.217.

[40] See Appendix E.

[41] Höbelt, p.97.

[42] Whiteside, *Socialism,* p.282.

[43] Iris Mochar-Kircher, *Das echte deutsche Volkslied: Josef Pommer (1845-1918) – Politik und nationale Kultur*, (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2004), p.381.

[44] *Ottakringer Rundschau* (hereafter *Rundschau*), 21st October 1906, p.3.

and social or semi-political organizations a larger part in political antisemitism'.[45] Associations had become increasingly politicised, and acted as a means for political participation.[46] The Social Democrats had a large and readily recognised network of associations. Links between associations and the Christian Social Party, on the other hand, while looser and less obvious, did exist.[47]

As a member of the student society *Silesia*, Pommer had helped to develop the *Satisfaktionsverbot*, under which gentile students who insulted Jews rejected demands from the insulted party for a duel, on the grounds that Jews were unworthy of satisfaction.[48] In 1897, Pommer was elected as MP for Celje, centre of language disputes between Germans and Slovenes.[49] Pommer was also a leading performer of the *Volkslied*, the rural song that had been popularised in Vienna, and he attributed some of his success to singing groups, where communal singing promoted antisemitism almost subconsciously. Yet the activities of the likes of Pommer ultimately came to little in Vienna for Pan-Germans. Lueger marginalised German nationalists electorally as he purged the *Bürgerklub*. German nationalists then regressed in Vienna in the new century.

Christian Social Vienna

Support for the Christian Social Party came mainly from white collar workers and those with small businesses. It has been said that many who voted Christian Social did so out of fear of a changing world, since Christian Social rhetoric offered a vision of comfort, a promise to return 'Christian society' to its allegedly natural state, protected against its liberal Jewish enemies.[50] In Ottakring around 1900, economic changes meant that some business owners were exposed to new competitors. If these businesses failed against competition from new, larger scale producers, no state safety net would prevent their owners from slipping into poverty and into the proletariat. Businesses that might have been under threat can be found in advertisements in Ottakring trade directories, for watchmakers and the manufacturers of

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[45] Pulzer, *Political Antisemitism,* p.182.

[46] Haas, Hans, 'Politische, kulturelle und wirtschaftliche Gruppierungen in Westösterreich (Oberösterreich, Salzburg, Tirol, Vorarlberg)' Helmut Rumpler and Peter Urbanitsch, eds., *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918, Vol. VIII: Die politische Öffentlichkeit*, Part 1*, Vereine, Parteien und Interessenverbände als Träger der politischen Partizipation*, (Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2006), pp.227-395.

[47] Werner Drobesch, 'Vereine und Interessenverbände auf überregionaler (Cisleithaner) Ebene', in Rumpler and Urbanitsch, eds., *Habsburgermonarchie Vol. VIII*, pp.1029-1132.

[48] Mochar-Kircher, p.79.

[49] Mochar-Kircher, pp.170-192; Sutter, Vol.1, pp.107-121; Sutter, Vol.2, p.46.

[50] Boyer, *Catholic Priests*, p.358.

leather uppers for shoes, or for glove manufacturers who sold their own products through their own stores in the district.[51]

Bourgeois fears of the consequences of descent into the proletariat would have been heightened by the presence of workers who, each working day, 'swarmed like ants' through the narrow streets of Ottakring towards the factory district in Neubau.[52] Social Democratic journalist Max Winter described proletarian life in Ottakring as a 'panorama of misery'.[53] Everyday pursuits, such as work or the search for shelter, could take on tragic dimensions. Ottakring workers died of poisoning from the chemicals used in a horse hair factory.[54] A homeless woman, aged 45, died of injuries incurred trying to find overnight shelter in the ovens at a local brickworks.[55] People committed suicide rather than live with the pain of their illnesses.[56] Vienna, though, was not exceptional. In 1907, Winter was shocked by children running wild in London, in conditions far worse than those in any of Vienna's proletarian suburbs.[57]

Nevertheless, the extent of fear among the Christian Socials' bourgeois support should not be over-stated. Alongside those in businesses threatened by modern times others, such as Emeric Langsam, an installer of electrical lighting, embraced change.[58] Ottakring's inns and restaurants continued to flourish and described themselves repeatedly with three words: elegant, first-rate, bourgeois.[59] Not all whose businesses failed would have given up without trying again. Business owners were part of social networks which promoted self-reliance, active citizenship and Christian values.[60]

Priests were often embedded in these networks, and clerical activity continued to be a principal means of developing support for the Christian Social view of the world. Old school priests continued in the ways that had brought them to prominence. Father Deckert unleashed a torrent of antisemitic pamphlets from Währing.[61] His language was violent and aggressive, but other priests, too, used the same language and imagery. According to Father

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[51] Graudenz, pp.lxx-c.

[52] Max Winter, in Wolfgang Maderthaner and Lutz Musner, *Die Anarchie der Vorstadt. Das andere Wien 1900* (Frankfurt: Campus, 1999), p.56.

[53] Winter, in Maderthaner and Musner, pp.68-85.

[54] *Rundschau*, 25th November 1906, p.3.

[55] *Rundschau*, 28th October 1906, p.3.

[56] *Rundschau*, 28th October 1906, p.3.

[57] Max Winter, in Hannes Haas, ed., *Max Winter: Expeditionen ins dunkelste Wien*, (Vienna: Picus, 2006), p.185-191.

[58] Graudenz, p.lxxxi.

[59] Graudenz, pp.lxxxi-xci.

[60] For instance, see page 131 of this thesis for examples of overlapping social networks.

[61] Such as Joseph Deckert, *Semitische und antisemitische Schlagworte in Doppelbeleuchtun*g, (Vienna: Verlag des Sendboten).

Josef Scheicher, a Christian Social MP, even international tensions were the fault of Jews, turning Aryan against Aryan. The only solution, for the defence of the 'German people', was to return Vienna to the Viennese, Austria to Austrians. Laws were needed regarding 'those who were and are foreign among us'. The reference to Jews was clear.[62] Scheicher, Deckert and other priests were not confined to the outer reaches of the Christian Social movement. Scheicher was a prominent figure in the movement for over thirty years.[63]

Father Deckert died in March 1901.[64] His will shows a legacy of over 107,000 Crowns.[65] His legacy was not just financial, however, as he became a role model to hold up for admiration.[66] Deckert was buried in the presence of the parish sponsor, Prince Czartorysky, Mayor Lueger and senior representatives of the Church. While the burial of a priest was an occasion for the powerful to turn out, this was a consecration of Deckert and his views. This is confirmed through the establishment of charities named after Deckert, and the description of Deckert by Father Joseph Pachmann, Deckert's immediate successor, as a 'true priest, full of living belief'.[67]

On his death, in 1905, The *Neue Freie Presse* recognised Latschka's importance in the development of Viennese politics and attitudes.[68] It noted his significance in developing clerical associations in the districts, and how he was among the first in 'mobilising women against liberalism'. In his later years, he had stepped down from his seat on the Council, but he had continued his activities in the Viennese Christian Social associations. Father Latschka left barely enough for his funeral costs, a regular mass to be said and small amounts of money for his immediate family, but he inspired a considerable legacy of loyalty. On 3rd July 1905, a curate at his parish, Father Brunner, sent two letters to the *Ordinariat.* In the first, he wrote that Father Latschka had died that morning. In the second, which Brunner sent immediately after the first, he resigned as Spiritual Provisor for the parish, stating that he was unable to continue without the support of Latschka.[69]

Latschka's death allowed recent trends in Vienna finally to reach his parish. A small, but noticeable, number of children of people from other faiths, or of no faith, were being

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[62] Joseph Scheicher, *Rede des Abg. Dr. Jos. Scheicher gehalten am 21. Februar 1902*, (St. Pölten: Self-Published, 1902), p.28 and p.39.

[63] *ÖBL*, Vol.10, p.61.

[64] *NFP*, 23rd March 1901, pp.24-25.

[65] AEDW WeCor, letter of 18th June 1904. Others estimate as much as 286,000 Crowns. Klusacek and Stimmer, p.162.

[66] For instance, AEDW WeCor, letters of 16th September 1901.

[67] AEDW WeCk, 1901.

[68] *NFP*, 4th July 1905, p.10; *WZ*, 4th July 1905, p.4.

[69] AEDW AOCor, 3rd July 1905 for both letters.

received into the Catholic Church. This required permission from the *Ordinariat* and was requested through the parish where the ceremonies would take place. No evidence was found that Latschka ever made such a request, although before Latschka's death one of his curates did write to the Ordinariat for permission to baptise one child of a mixed marriage.[70] In the immediate period after Latschka's death, however, the number of such baptisms at Neu-Ottakring rose. One case was Wolf and Eugeny Szuran in late 1905.[71] He was Jewish, she was Catholic. As marriages across religious boundaries were not allowed, the only route for them to come together legitimately had been for one of them to de-register from their faith, as the law had required since 1868.[72] They had married in 1900 and two children from this marriage had been baptised as Catholics. They now wished the same for a third child.[73] Numerous requests also now came from people who wanted either to join or to return to the Church.[74] For some, conversion was the fulfilment of an honest desire to cross into Catholicism. Doubtless, changes were also made in order to fit in with the new Christian Social Vienna. As the Christian Socials controlled the patronage of the city, Jews would find it difficult to progress in this branch of public service, perhaps even after conversion.[75]

Yet, it has been said that Christian Social supporters were disappointed with the Party in power, and calls were made in the 1900s for the exercise of 'authentic' antisemitism.[76] The Party may not have displayed a formal antisemitic façade, especially as it moved closer to being part of the Establishment, but its leaders practised exclusion, in their use of City power as patronage, and to enforce prejudice against Jews.[77] Support for this conclusion comes from another small but noticeable trend that emerged after 1895, that of changing surname, away from names that might be perceived as Jewish in origin. In 1895, the Ordinariat forwarded instructions to the church of Saint Rochus in the Landstrasse for such changes.[78] The Lower Austrian *Statthalterei* directed the Ordinariat to change the surname of one Heinrich Baruch to Krutter.[79] Many other name changes followed.[80]

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[70] AEDW NOCor, Father Beruth to Ordinariat, 26th December 1904.

[71] AEDW NOCor, correspondence of 16th July 1905.

[72] *RP*, 1st January 1908, p.6.

[73] AEDW NOCor, correspondence of 16th July 1905.

[74] For instance, Josef Tesar, AEDW NOCor, 23rd February 1905.

[75] Boyer, *In Power*, (Chicago: University Of Chicago, 1995), pp.164-165.

[76] Boyer, *In Power*, p.65.

[77] Boyer, *In Power*, pp.30-35 and p.165.

[78] AEDW SRCor, 10th January 1895.

[79] AEDW SRCor, 10th October 1898.

[80] AEDW SRCor, 28th August 1900 re: Goldstein, and on 13th November 1900 re: Pollack. Also AEDW WäCor, 11th November 1898 re: Sitzamtein *(sic)* family.

Changes in clerical antisemitic activity also occurred at this time, much of this being down to the taking of parishes by new generations of priests, who no longer felt the need to explain their cause. They assumed that people would agree with their antisemitic viewpoint, which slips in casually, at the most routine opportunity, aiming to reinforce attitudes. In 1896, an outbreak of measles closed a school in the Grinzing area of the city. The local priest recorded that the outbreak passed over Jews who were taking a summer break there. 'Antisemitic Grinzing', as he termed it, had become a meeting place for the 'shabbiest' Jews of Vienna, because 'the usual occupants are otherwise indisposed'.[81] In Währing, Father Treml at St. Laurenz noted Lueger's death in 1910, after long years of struggle against 'liberalism, the enemy of the people'.[82] No attempt is made to explain why liberalism was the enemy of the people, nor to define 'the people'.[83]

By the turn of the century the Church was encouraging Catholics to take part in public life, as a means to protect the Church. Some have identified this as part of a Catholic revival in the city dating back to the 1890s.[84] This was certainly the decade when the revival became obvious, but the roots of revival go back at least to the 1860s, and the 'importance of the 1860s and 1870s in the development of political Catholicism in Austria has largely been lost because of the sharp focus on the Christian Social Party of the 1880s and 1890s'.[85] Indeed, it was not just long term preparation that helped the success of this revival. The breakthrough came then, but the roots of the revival also lay in the wide range of associations in which members of the movement were active.

By 1900, singing groups remained extremely active. Each district might have several, and some had been long established. The author of a history of the bourgeois *Ottakringer Liedertafel,* which celebrated its fiftieth anniversary in 1908, understood that, while singing was the primary activity of these groups, they had a wider significance.[86] To him, singing groups were keepers of a tradition which sat at the heart of German values.[87] The author argued that these groups were akin to the small objects held in a museum, which are 'the most valuable indicator of the cultural condition of a people'.[88] Over the years the

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[81] AEDW GrCk, 1896.

[82] AEDW WäCk, 1910.

[83] AEDW WäCk, 1910.

[84] Judith Beniston, *Hofmannsthal, Richard von Kralik And The Revival Of Catholic Drama In Austria, 1890-1934*, (Leeds: Maney, 1988), p.252.

[85] Bowman, *Associations*, p.75.

[86] Anonymous, *Festschrift zur Feier des 50-jaehrigen Bestandes des Maennergesang Vereins Ottakringer Liedertafel*, (Vienna: Publisher Name Not Printed,1908), available in WbiR.

[87] Anonymous, *Festschrift zur Feier*, pp.55-71.

[88] Anonymous, *Festschrift zur Feier,* Introduction.

Ottakringer Liedertafel had several hundred members. In 1908, it had 92 active members who participated in performances, mostly professionals and businessmen.[89] Honorary members included current and past priests of Alt-Ottakring.[90] Families were well integrated into membership, contradicting the argument that a generational revolt took place in Vienna around 1900.[91] In 1908, the group included Rudolf Lehner and his three sons, all school teachers.

The *Liedertafel* had ties with similarly minded singing groups and charitable organisations in Austria and abroad.[92] Between 1860 and 1879, the group went from giving a handful of performances per year to fifteen performances per year. The figures then went up in leaps and bounds. Between 1901 and 1907 the group averaged 55 performances per year, including fourteen per year with other groups. The bare statistics, however, do not tell the whole story of the networks in which the *Liedertafel* operated. On 6th October 1898, the group performed at the dedication of the church at Neu-Ottakring, in the presence of Father Latschka and the church's patron, Count Liechtenstein. Also present was the Emperor.[93]

Bourgeois groups and associations overlapped each other with considerable frequency. The *Ottakringer Liedertafel* provided the entertainment as the Ottakring Volunteer Fire Brigade celebrated its 35th anniversary at a dinner in October 1903. Elected representatives from the *Bezirk* and City councils, including Lueger, were present, and the evening finished with a great *'Hoch'* to Franz Joseph.[94] These volunteer fire brigades, and other voluntary groups, were much more than a means of protection. They were a way for citizens to show they contributed to public life, as members of associations that were embedded in life in the districts. Marches were even composed in honour of these associations that were embedded into social life in the districts.[95] The silver wedding of the captain of the Ottakring Brigade gives evidence of this. Karl Kantner and his wife arrived at church in Alt-Ottakring in October 1906 to find a surprise party. Father Johannes Pax, Latchka's successor as parish priest, greeted them at a church decorated for the occasion.[96] Celebrations went on into the evening, spent at a café owned by one Franz Tichy, a member of the *Ottakringer*

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[89] Anonymous, *Festschrift zur Feier*. The full membership is listed on pp.78-94.

[90] Anonymous, *Festschrift zur Feier*, pp.90-96.

[91] The idea of generational change and conflict is central to the thesis presented in Schorske, *Fin-de-siècle Vienna.*

[92] Anonymous, *Festschrift zur Feier*, pp.103-109.

[93] Anonymous, *Festschrift zur Feier*, p.32.

[94] Graudenz, p.79 and Anonymous, *Jahresbericht der freiwill. Feuerwehr Ottakring*, (Vienna: Nekham, 1908), p.80.

[95] *Ottakringer Feuerwehr-Marsch*, Theodor-Franz Schild (music) and Eduard Merkt (text), 1898. Available in WbiR MkS 4597.

[96] *Rundschau*, 14th October 1906, p.3.

Liedertafel.[97] Eighty eight firemen attended. Entertainment was provided by the *Gesangsklub der Feuerwehr*, under the direction of Karl Lehner, of the *Liedertafel.*

In 1906, priests and members of bourgeois associations and business groups, with a considerable representation from Ottakring, gathered at large scale celebrations for the sixtieth birthday of Count Alois Liechtenstein, 'benefactor' of several Ottakring charities. These took place in Ottakring's Richard-Wagner-Platz, in front of the newly-built and imposing Bezirk offices.[98] This was a public demonstration of Christian Social power, in the manner of Lueger's attendances at events to commemorate the founding of churches or schools.[99] Lueger knew that a highly visible presence of leading Christian Socials was a means of demonstrating Christian Social control of power.[100] Priests, highly visible representatives of a Christian Social vision of the world, repeated this tactic at local levels.

Friedrich Funder later proposed that the movement owed its success to three men. One was Lueger, representative of the Viennese bourgeois.[101] The second was Prince Liechtenstein, an aristocrat who gave up his place among the Conservatives, winning for the fledgling movement the Hernals-Ottakring constituency of Vienna in 1891.[102] The third was Heinrich Abel, a man capable of crude and earthy talk, but whose rhetoric could rouse an audience. According to Funder, the success of these men came from a 'harmony' that emerged from their very differences.[103]

Aristocrats may not always have existed as figureheads of the party when it came to district level organisation, but two elements did exist: the party organiser and the priest. As John Boyer has described, Christian Social Party strength lay in its district organisation, despite the sometimes chaotic atmosphere that local competing groups could create.[104] Men like Anton Baumann, in Währing, chosen personally by Lueger, ran the Christian Socials with firmness and diligence.[105] In the same district, at the parish of Weinhaus, he found support for Christian Social ideas from Father Deckert.

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[97] *Rundschau*, 14th October 1906, p.3.

[98] *Rundschau*, 25th November 1906, p.2.

[99] Geehr, *Lueger*, p.156. For a specific example, the consecration of the Canisiuskirche, in 1899, see Boyer, *In Power* p.166.

[100] Boyer, *In Power* p.37.

[101] Hawlik, p.58.

[102] Funder, *Vom Gestern*, p.84. See also entry on Liechtenstein in *Neue deutsche Biographie*, http://www.deutsche-biographie.de/sfz51239.html.

[103] On all three men, see Funder, *Vom Gestern*, p. 106.

[104] Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, p.114; pp.237-242.

[105] Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, p.237; Boyer, *In Power*, p.56.

Conflict And Common Ground

Christian Socials frequently highlighted the differences between themselves and Pan-Germans. One priest described the Pan-German *Alldeutsche Tagblatt* as a blasphemous, Prussian-weaned, atheistic *Los-von-Rom* sheet.[106] Other priests, like Father Abel, took a similar line. They favoured German culture, but vigorously opposed its expression in Pan-German terms, especially when Protestantism was involved, and Pan-Germans and Christian Socials came into conflict in many areas. Education was a major battle ground for the two camps, and Lueger was determined to control the schools.[107] Speaking to the Lower Austrian assembly in December 1904, Lueger proclaimed that '… teachers who instruct our children must be of good Austrian, good German, and Christian disposition…. Others cannot and will not be tolerated'.[108] All who took up residence in Vienna, including Slavs, were required by the Christian Social administration to swear an oath to protect the German character of the city.[109] German nationalists complained that Lueger purged Pan-Germans from public employment.[110] They may have claimed to be good Germans and good Christians, but for Lueger they were not good Austrians.

This dispute over education was also part of a longer war over the role of the Catholic Church in the State, with German nationalists, with secularising ambitions, fearing an increase in the formal influence of the Church. For instance, a brief revival of active anticlericalism broke out when clericals tried for the reintroduction of confessional schools around 1900.[111] This may have seemed a permanent point of division. As Lothar Höbelt indicates, the 'German electorate' divided over anticlericalism, a position set in Parliament from 1891, at a local level later.[112] This is true, but Germans on the Right also found coalitions of convenience when necessary.

Politicians and their supporters in the two antisemitic groups also often found common ground in the cultural sphere. For instance, Josef Pommer's Pan-Germanism and Karl Lueger's Habsburg loyalties seem to put them at opposite ends of the antisemitic political spectrum. Yet Lueger sent a message of congratulations to Pommer on the occasion of Pommer's sixtieth birthday, in which he spoke of his joy that Pommer used folk song for the

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[106] AEDW GrCk, 1905.

[107] Boyer, *In Power* p.47, p.51, p.83.

[108] Geehr, *Lueger*, p.265.

[109] Boyer, *In Power*, pp.214-218.

[110] Boyer, *In Power*, p.225.

[111] Höbelt, p.177.

[112] Höbelt, p.67.

'benefit and piety of our German people'.[113] Similarly, Richard von Kralik, a prominent music critic for the Christian Social *Reichspost* and playwright, was an ardent Habsburg supporter and a devout Catholic.[114] Yet Kralik, like Lueger, was not isolated from Austrian antisemites who leant in a Pan-German direction.[115] In 1913, Kralik was co-founder of the *Christlich-Deutsche Volksbühne,* a group for the promotion of 'true Christian German values', which reached out to all Germans.[116]

In the early decades of the twentieth century, the expression 'Christian-German' was becoming a *Leitmotif* that could be used by a broad spectrum of the political Right. The *Christlich-deutscher Turnverein*, with which Kralik was later connected, was founded in Kleinmünchen, near Linz.[117] The *Währinger Turnverein*, another gymnastics group, published the *Mitteilungen des christlichen-deutschen Turnerbundes 1900*.[118] This use of 'Christian German' sat alongside the use of the word 'Aryan' to give another common ground, that of language. Kralik worked for the *Kaiser-Franz Joseph-Jubiläums-Theater*, founded in 1897 and soon nicknamed the 'Aryan Theatre', whose management boasted that no Jew could be found at the front or back of house.[119]

Other expressions of German solidarity in daily activities were common, such as in the *Ortsgruppe Ottakring des Bund der Deutschen in Niederösterreich*.[120] The local newspaper reported that a 'pleasurable fund-raising event' had been held by the group at an Ottakring restaurant, to collect clothes for needy children of German Austrian origin. This lasted until dawn, with speeches, songs and raffles. The naming of the group, its intention to distribute clothing to Austrian German children, show that in this world even charity could be segregated along national lines.[121]

Christian Social Hegemony?

Despite Christian Social electoral success in the city after 1895, Vienna in these years was not a place of total Christian Social dominance, nor was antisemitism dominant in all walks of life and in all sections of the population. Antisemitism may have been everywhere, in

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[113] Mochar-Kircher, p.193.

[114] Beniston, p.126.

[115] Beniston, p.119 and p.126.

[116] *ÖBL,* Vol.4, p. 36 and Beniston, p.171.

[117] Richard von Kralik, *Gedicht zum 10jährigen Gründungsfeste und zur Fahnenweihe des Christlich-deutschen Turnvereines Kleinmünchen*, (1923), available in WbiR Handschrift 105926.

[118] Available in ABPD 1930.

[119] Beniston, p.116.

[120] *Rundschau*, 2nd December 1906.

[121] *Rundschau*, 2nd December 1906.

terms of the antisemites trying to spread their message everywhere, but they did not succeed everywhere. Individuals and organisations did challenge the antisemitic message directly. One of these, the *Verein zur Abwehr des Antisemitismus*, never grew beyond a few thousand members, but these included some of the most significant Viennese of the day.[122] The association did not promote itself well. Its newspaper, the *Freies Blatt – Organ für Abwehr des Antisemitismus*, was worthy but dull. Any organisation that wanted to reach a mass audience needed to be far more street-wise and punchy in its communications than the *Verein*.[123] The movement against the antisemites did receive support from one prominent source. The Emperor described antisemitism as an 'illness' which was reaching the highest levels of society.[124] Even the Emperor, however, could not put a lid on antisemitism.

Antisemites would have hoped that electoral success from 1895 onwards was just the first stage in their take-over of political life in Vienna. They would have been aiming to build their antisemitic ideology into a widely accepted orthodoxy, not just one that was accepted by their 'natural' constituency. Christian Socials set about achieving the dominance of ideas by finding many avenues for the spreading propaganda, not just formal politics. Gauging the success of this approach is difficult, and debate continues as to just how propaganda works and is received.[125] It is possible to attempt to build a picture of prevailing attitudes by examining the evidence that is available from the popular culture of the time, but this evidence must be interpreted in its historical context, and not just taken at face value.

One popular form of entertainment, variety theatre, featured acts combining music with jokes and comic sketches. One of the most successful acts was the *Budapester Orpheumsgesellschaft*.[126] First appearing in Vienna in 1889, the *Orpheumsgesellschaft* performed over the next thirty years. An abiding feature of the *Budapester* was a routine that was 'peppered with jokes about Jews... for the amusement of an audience that was, to a great extent, Jewish', although many non-Jews were also in the audience.[127] While the performers in the *Budapester* were Jewish, this did not save them from the wrath of Jewish members of the audience who grew tired of the Jewish stereotypes that were put in front of them. Some accused the *Budapester* of playing into the hands of the antisemites, by

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[122] Brigitte Hamann, '*Der Verein zur Abwehr des Antisemitismus'*, p.253-263, in Elisabeth Klamper, ed., *Die Macht der Bilder. Antisemitische Vorurteile und Mythen*, (Vienna: Picus, 1995).

[123] See, for instance, *Freies Blatt*, 10th April 1892.

[124] Wistrich, *Jews Of Vienna*, p.182.

[125] For instance, Daniel Lerner, untitled review of *Propagandes*, by Jacques Ellul, *American Sociological Review*, (1964), Vol.29, No.5, pp.793-794.

[126] Georg Wacks, *Die Budapester Orpheumsgesellschaft*, (Vienna: Holzhausen, 2002).

[127] Michael Buhrs and Barbara Lesák and Thomas Trabitsch, eds., *Kabarett Fledermaus 1907 bis 1913*, (Vienna: Christian Brandstätter, 2008) p.31.

justifying antisemitic caricatures. As one irate newspaper correspondent declared: 'We want no seed bed for antisemitism in the Leopoldstadt'.[128]

It should not be concluded that antisemitism was so widespread that even some Jews fell into the trap of repeating stereotypes unthinkingly. The use of stereotypes may just as easily be self-parody on the part of performers. It has correctly been written that, in 'engaging with various forms of Viennese humour, one constantly runs into expressions concerning Jews that the modern reader can interpret incorrectly'.[129] This is especially the case if no context is considered and only the comments themselves are examined. To modern sensibilities, comments, jokes and songs with an apparently antisemitic flavour are rightly shocking, but they form only part of a view of the world based on multiple hierarchies of, among other things, race, nation, class, gender and religion. The lyrics of songs with what is described as antisemitic content often also contain other views that modern sensibilities would find just as unacceptable. Some people would have joined in with Jewish jokes in the same way they joined in with jokes about mothers-in-law or about fat, philandering businessmen, not through any antisemitic motive.[130] Jokes about alleged 'Jewish characteristics' may now be considered repellent, but jokes from the period under consideration are not all to be taken as expressions of antisemitism as it is understood today. They were crude and simplified reflections of how the world seemed to be ordered.

This ordering of the world is visible in different ways, such as at the *American Bioscop* cinema in Ottakring.[131] Programmes were long and varied, showing everything from scenes of New York or Paris to the grotesquery of a 'Cure For Ringworm'. Yet these sometimes bland, sometimes distasteful, films also betray attitudes to life. A filmed 'ethnographic study', entitled 'In The Negro Village By The Congo', drew on all the European clichés of African life, as it described the mass of village 'natives'. 'In a colourful swirl, the negroes *(sic)* stream through the streets, to take part in one of their festivals'. Ascribing to these 'natives' an 'incomparable skill' at stripping palms for food, the image is one of foraging people who take food from nature, rather than by farming. 'The native uses his free time for dancing and games, which he greatly loves'. This is comparable with antisemitic depictions of Jews as parasites who shun work and prefer to live at the expense of others.[132]

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[128] Wacks, p.55.

[129] Presler, p.63.

[130] For instance '*Verschiedene Wiener Plätze'*, text by Robert Blum, available from Wiener Volkslied Werkstatt.

[131] The items mentioned here are from thirty cinema programmes for the American Bioscop *(sic)* cinema, January 1910 to January 1911. Available in WbiR. Hereafter *Bioscop*.

[132] The Congo Village is from *Bioscop* for 10th February 1910 to 16th February 1910 according to the cover, but dated inside 1911. Available in WbiR.

These images of the world of the white man *(sic)* as superior to those of others, yet with a hint of the threat that comes from these others, are repeated constantly. In film of a world championship boxing match between Jack Johnson and Tommy Burns, the element of the fight that attracted most attention was that the challenger was the 'huge Negro' Johnson.[133] The programme declared that 'the spectators place all hope in the white man'. Burns stands against 'the powerful Negro'. When the judges declared Johnson the winner, 'Burns, incensed over his defeat, refused the handshake of the Negro' and left the ring. No comment is passed on the unsporting behaviour of Burns. Perhaps Johnson, like the Jews of Vienna, was not considered 'worthy of satisfaction'.

This world view categorised people not as individuals, but as members of racial or national groups with ascribed characteristics, but these late nineteenth and early twentieth century attitudes were not the views of everyone, otherwise racial supremacists, nationalists and antisemites would not have been trying so hard to convince and to recruit. As has been shown elsewhere, nationalists were often deeply disappointed that their co-nationals did not display enthusiasm for nationalist doctrine.[134] The same applied to antisemitism. Pan-German and Christian Social antisemitism provided a backdrop, but people who lived in this world, and who used casual insults or jokes which stressed the Jewish nature of their targets, may not have condoned antisemitism. In behaving as they did, they were fitting in with how the world was portrayed to them. This is not the same as antisemitism, as prejudice against Jews simply for being Jews. This does not diminish the insidious and damaging nature of antisemitism, but it does help to identify where and when it occurred and where it did not.

The notion that antisemitism was everywhere also reduces genuinely antisemitic comments and actions to nothing more than a general background noise, and can attribute antisemitism to groups and individuals who were not antisemitic. One quarter that has been attacked as a source of antisemitism in Vienna is the Social Democratic Party, yet attacks on the Social Democrats often fail to distinguish between Socialism as an ideology, individual members and their attitudes, and the Party as a whole, especially its culture. Some individuals within the party would have held views that were incompatible with the universalism of Socialism, but the culture of the Social Democratic Party was not a racist culture. The leaders of the Party in Vienna have been attacked for failing to tackle antisemitism directly, but such attacks fail to take account of the belief of the leaders of the Party that antisemitism was a

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[133] *Bioscop*, 13th January 1911 to 19th January 1911. This fight had taken place in Sydney in December, 1908.

[134] Judson, *Guardians*, pp.2-6.

secondary issue to the class struggle. For them, the proposition that 'The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles' held true.[135]

Two main charges have been brought against the Social Democrats with respect to antisemitism. The first is that the party did not attack antisemitism. Yet, Social Democrats disrupted Christian Social rallies on numerous occasions.[136] Father Adam Latschka recorded Social Democratic attacks on antisemitic public meetings. Latschka claimed that Social Democratic attacks were so strongly mounted that they were counter-productive, in that they rallied antisemitic support.[137]

The second charge is that the Social Democratic movement predated, and allowed itself to be infiltrated by, antisemitism. The chronology, however, shows a different story. One work, in a section headed 'Antisemitism breaks into the Socialist ranks', singles out a passage in the memoirs of Social Democrat Adelheid Popp, where Popp admits that she had engaged in antisemitic activities.[138] This singling out, however, does not mention that Popp is clear that her involvement with antisemitism was restricted to her immature years, and that she had been encouraged by priests to boycott Jewish shops and to spread the antisemitic word. Popp is perfectly clear that the Socialists opened her eyes to a number of questions apart from antisemitism, such as women's emancipation. She is also perfectly clear that the Social Democrats broke into antisemitic strongholds, not the other way around.[139]

Sustainable evidence against the Social Democratic party as a party of institutional antisemitism is lacking. One 'Social Democratic' writer, Christian Hinteregger, has been brought forward in an attempt to demonstrate that the relationship between the Social Democratic Party and Jews, from the 1890s into the inter-war period, was 'problematic'.[140] Hinteregger's pamphlet 'The Jewish Swindle' is used as the evidence to prove this. Yet commentators who use this evidence in this way differ as to its meaning and significance. Bruce Pauley states that the pamphlet's title is a pun, with the secondary meaning of 'the swindle about the Jews'.[141] It would be reasonable to conclude therefore that Pauley believes Hinteregger's primary meaning is the swindle by the Jews. Yet this misses the

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[135] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Manifesto Of The Communist Party*, (Lodon: Verso, 1848, 1998 Edition, Eric Hobsbawm, ed.), p.34.

[136] See, for instance, ABPD 1893 St1, 12th September 1893.

[137] AEDW AOCk, 1897. AEDW NOCk, 1899.

[138] Böck, Susanne ''Kuhl bis ans Herz hinan'? Das ambivalente Verhältnis der österreichischen Sozialdemokratie zu den Juden, 1890-1950' p.272-283, in Klamper, ed. See also Popp, pp.58-59.

[139] Popp, pp.67-70.

[140] Böck in Klamper, ed., p.276.

[141] Pauley, pp.142-143.

point behind Socialist propaganda that used images of rich Jews. These people were rich and they were capitalists, which is why they were being attacked. Socialists also argued that the real swindle in Christian Social antisemitism was that it aimed at fooling people into ignoring the real problems of society: the class system and economic relationships. Over a long period, even newspapers that would have been expected to be supportive of a Christian Social agenda acknowledged the argument that the Christian Social Party attended to the interests of large scale capitalists, to the neglect of the *petit bourgeois* Christian rank and file.[142]

The blanket case against the Social Democrats rests on a repeated gap between evidence and conclusions. Another critic of the Social Democrats who cites Hinteregger concedes, in a footnote, that Hinteregger was probably a pseudonym.[143] Attacks on 'rich Jews', 'Jewish capitalists', or even Zionists, are equated with antisemitism.[144] These are not the same thing. The Socialists are condemned as being prepared to offer 'at most' spiritual and material help to poor Jews.[145] It has to be asked what else they could offer.

Accusations of antisemitism in the Party are turned on leaders who had Jewish backgrounds. Pauley and Robert Wistrich both condemn these people for distancing themselves from their 'co-religionists'.[146] No consideration is given as to whether leaders of the Party who came from Jewish backgrounds considered themselves to have a religion. Social Democratic leaders are condemned for creating a party where only those Jews who had abandoned their religion, and who were not capitalists, could feel comfortable.[147] Given that the Social Democrats formed a Marxist, anti-bourgeois, atheist party, they would expect people who joined to be in sympathy with their aims, whether they originally came from Catholic, Protestant or Jewish backgrounds.

The case of Victor Adler highlights this point. A founder of the Social Democratic Party, Adler was an opponent of Zionism, who saw himself as German. He believed that the best way forward for Jews in Austrian society was through assimilation.[148] Adler treated antisemitism as a secondary issue, rejecting the arguments of Socialist colleagues like Karl

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[142] *Rundschau*, 16th December 1906, p.2; Unentgeltliche Nachrichten der organisierten Ottakringer Hausbesitzer, December 1926, pp.2-3.

[143] Böck in Klamper, ed. The allusion to Hinteregger is on p.276, the concession regarding the pseudonym in the footnotes on p.282. Hinteregger is here referred to as Christoph, not Christian.

[144] Pauley, p.136, p.143 and p.149.

[145] Pauley, p.149.

[146] Pauley, p.140. See also Wistrich, *Socialism*, p.352.

[147] Pauley, p.139.

[148] Jack Jacobs, *On Socialists And "The Jewish Question" After Marx*, (New York: New York University Press, 1992), pp.90-91.

Kautsky, that antisemitism was Social Democracy's most dangerous opponent.[149] As Jack Jacobs has pointed out, Adler made mistakes. Attempts to appropriate the language of antisemites, such as through the ironic use of the word 'Aryan', backfired badly.[150] Adler converted from Judaism to Protestantism in 1878 but, in his will, he stated that he converted to Protestantism to help his children to assimilate, without the problems he felt would come from being *konfessionslos*.[151] Adler was trying to promote assimilation as a positive step for Jews. He had left behind religion, not just his Jewish roots. He had no 'co-religionists'.

Adler would certainly have rejected criticism that the Social Democrats should have adopted a philosemitic stance.[152] This incorrectly implies that philosemitism is the opposite of antisemitism, and was the only way to combat antisemitism. Social Democrats would have considered philosemitism to be as irrational as antisemitism. For them, the best way to attack antisemitism was to show what they perceived as the true roots of the Christian Social Party, not to privilege a group based on attributed religious, national or racial qualities.

It is important in analysing Vienna in the period under consideration to be aware that the effect of these attacks is to build a wall of criticism against the Social Democrats, which outweighs any concessions made that the Social Democratic Party was not a party of antisemitism. Pauley eventually accepts that 'such attacks were not motivated by racial or religious antagonism', and that the Social Democrats' world 'was not divided between Jews and Christians but between capitalists and the proletariat'.[153]

Yet the general tenor of Pauley's work creates the impression that the Social Democrats were antisemites who, in his words, attacked 'Jewish capitalists with the same rhetoric used later by the Nazis'.[154] The Social Democrats made mistakes in their propaganda. They were guilty of bad taste. However, a party whose intellectual cadre, by Pauley's estimate, was eighty per cent Jewish, did not use the same rhetoric as the Nazis.[155] As Pulzer writes, despite 'superficial resemblances', Social Democrats and antisemites were at 'opposite poles of the political world'.[156]

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[149] Jacobs, p.11.

[150] Jacobs, p.103.

[151] Jacobs, p.89 and p.211.

[152] Wistrich, *Socialism*, p.244.

[153] Pauley, p.149.

[154] Pauley, p.149.

[155] Pauley, *Political Antisemitism,* p.139.

[156] Pulzer, *Political Antisemitism*, p.252.

In his analysis of antisemitism, Pulzer accepts that coming to an awareness that there was 'an antisemitism of the left in the course of the nineteenth century is nothing new', but he works from the premise that the Socialist Left in Europe was, 'with some qualifications, anti-antisemitic'.[157] This position is adopted in this thesis. This does not mean, as has been said, that no member of the Social Democrats was antisemitic. As Jacobs writes, 'there was a rainbow of perspectives within the socialist world on the Jewish question'.[158] This is true, but it does not mean that each view carried equal weight. A full analysis of antisemitism among Socialists would require far more space than is available here, but this thesis does take the view that the case for the extent of antisemitism in the Party has been considerably overstated. As shown in Adelheid Popp's memoirs, the Socialists were leading an education process to counter antisemitism and antisemites.

Worryingly for the antisemites, the curial system and the restricted franchise held down the Social Democratic vote, but only temporarily.[159] As late as 1900, the only district where a majority of votes had been cast for the Social Democrats had been Ottakring. By 1906, the Social Democrats held a majority of votes in seven of the city's districts.[160] The day was coming for Christian Socials to face up to the fact that they attracted the support of only a minority of the citizens of the city, albeit a substantial minority. In 1912, the Social Democrats took a majority of votes in just under half the districts. This was despite only 18.1% of the City's population being eligible to vote, and with a franchise heavily weighted against the party. [161]

Debating The Future: Which Way For The Germans?

Democratic reform was not the only area of political speculation, and Nationalists of all kinds developed reform plans that might benefit them.[162] German nationalists had long promoted visions for change, such as the 1882 Linz Programme. These visions had been pursued from opposition but, after the turn of the century, some German nationalists entered government.[163] Here, they faced the dilemma that, unable to command a majority in Cisleithania, they had either to turn for allies to their clerical foes, the Christian Socials, as

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[157] Pulzer, *Third Thoughts*, p.150.

[158] Jacobs, pp.2-3.

[159] On electoral reform, see Seliger and Ucakar, Vol. 2, pp.761-766.

[160] Seliger and Ucakar, Vol. 2, p.941.

[161] Districts: II, V, X, XI, XIV, XV, XVI, XX, XXI. Seliger and Ucakar, Vol. 2, p.941 and *RP* 24th April 1912, pp.1-3, *RP* 26th April 1912, pp.1-2 includes results from districts where a run-off ballot was necessary. Also Seliger and Ucakar, Vol. 2, p.919.

[162] Höbelt, p.312.

[163] See Höbelt, chapter 'The Domestication Of The Radicals, 1901-1904', pp.187-199.

Germans, or to their national rivals, who were bourgeois and anticlerical.[164] German nationalists also continued to be divided among themselves, on questions such as state intervention. The outcome was a series of shifting alliances, crossing over ideological and national boundaries, which exhibited a fluidity in politics that would not be expected if the bourgeois parties are considered using the 'Three Camps' model.

Unlikely alliances were formed.[165] Czechs sat in cabinet with representatives from German parties, although not without protest at the over-representation of Germans. German nationalists sat in a cabinet headed by a clerical, Count von Beck, a cabinet which ostensibly supported the 'German Course', the maintenance of German privileges in the Empire, but which *de facto* opened the way for the use of Czech in the inner service of the Bohemian administration.[166] In this cabinet, they were joined by the Christian Socials, who in 1907 merged with the Catholic Conservatives.[167] Christian Socials now looked to position themselves, as a *Reichspartei*, for the whole of Austria, but still maintained a position as a 'legitimate national party', defending German interests in the Empire, wherever they came under threat.[168]

German nationalists gathered under the banner of the *Nationalverband*, but this was little more than a parliamentary grouping. They lost nearly all their parliamentary seats in Vienna, and now found their support, mainly, in the zones of national conflict in Bohemia and Styria.[169] Periodic, and unsuccessful, calls were made for the merger of all antisemitic forces.[170] A certain sense of being 'kindred spirits' existed between the Christian Socials in Vienna and the German nationalists in the provinces but, in Vienna, the two groupings had been locked in a bitter struggle, down to the turn of the century.[171]

In 1908, Richard Bienerth, a member of Franz Ferdinand's Belvedere faction, replaced Beck. German Bohemians withdrew their support, because of the presumed stance of Franz Ferdinand in favour of giving the Czechs a greater say in the Empire yet, in 1910, the government and some German nationalists were said the be 'arm in arm' when it came to plans to create a government of technocrats who would referee national disputes.[172] Karl

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[164] Höbelt, p.263.

[165] This section on the shifting positions of German nationalists in the period is based on Höbelt, pp.253-263.

[166] Höbelt, p.263.

[167] Boyer, *In Power*, pp.88-99 on the merged party, and pp.111-118 on entry into the cabinet.

[168] Boyer, *In Power*, pp.102-103.

[169] Höbelt, p.262.

[170] Höbelt, p,260.

[171] Höbelt, p.97.

[172] Höbelt, p.267.

Lueger died in 1910 and the Christian Social Party lost its electoral touch. In the national elections of 1911 it performed well in the provinces, but poor policy decisions and internal disputes opened the way in Vienna for some successes for German nationalists and, above all, for the Social Democrats, as late efforts to unite bourgeois factions came to nothing.[173]

In Parliament, the *Nationalverband* could now count on over one hundred members, but too much should not be read into this figure. Several parties existed within the *Nationalverband*, and 41 members described themselves as independents.[174] This was a broad alliance, elected on a highly restricted franchise, not a party that was ready for mass politics. Nationalist groupings joined the Christian Socials in following a course of loyalty to the state, but continued to speculate about reform of the Empire.[175] Plans were put forward for the division of Bohemia, or for going beyond Trialism, with areas designated as the preserve of local national elites.[176]

The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, in June 1914, brought an abrupt, if temporary, pause in plans for change, as the declaration of war on Serbia acted as an initial impulse to unity. Differences were to be put aside, and Austrians of many viewpoints subscribed to the notion of a *Burgfriede,* a civil peace, in the face of the common external enemy. Even some Social Democrats fell in line with this view at the start of war.[177] Unity was the order of the day for most, but it was not long before some saw in the war the possibility of new beginnings, based on their earlier plans. The *Burgfriede* proved to be short lived.

Summary

Between 1896 and 1914, the Christian Socials controlled the power of Vienna City Council. They did so at first with their German Nationalist allies in the *Bürgerklub*, with whom they were able to bury their differences over the relative importance of the nation, and also over matters such as anticlericalism. Their alliance of convenience allowed them to defeat the long-ruling liberals. It was not long, however, before Lueger tightened his grip on power, by either eliminating or sidelining German nationalists who would not follow a Christian Social view of the world. However, the Christian Socials offered a sufficiently broad bourgeois agenda to allow others to cross into their ranks.

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[173] See Boyer, *In Power*, pp.258-267, for an analysis of the elections.

[174] Höbelt, Statistischer Anhang I: Die Fraktionen.

[175] Höbelt, p.279 and pp.305ff.

[176] Höbelt, p.312.

[177] Boyer, *In Power*, p.370

In power, Christian Socials attempted to protect what they defined as Vienna's Christian German character, including making those newly taking up permanent residence swear an oath to this effect. While they were prepared to work with Pan-Germans, many of whom had a Protestant agenda, they may have been more comfortable with the idea of Catholic Slavs who assimilated into German culture. For Christian Socials, in general, the nation was important, but often secondary to religion.[178] German nationalists took a very different line. At the time of the Badeni Language Ordinances, even the more moderate German nationalists pursued a hard line in public opposition. In government, however, they could be more conciliatory, such as during the Beck cabinet, when Czech became a de facto language of use in the Bohemian inner service. German nationalists looked to protect German bourgeois interests, even if this meant marriages of convenience with bourgeois Czechs.

Towards the end of the reign of Franz Joseph many people, not just German nationalists, began to draw up plans for reform. In an ideal world, German nationalists would have preferred national solutions but, as a minority in Cisleithania, they recognised the need for allies from other nationalities. They also recognised that the old politics, that of disputes between the limited bourgeois electorates of each nation, was being challenged by a politics of class, with nations divided among themselves, and that a purely bourgeois politics was probably drawing to a close. Yet, Christian Socials and German nationalists alike were building a legacy in Vienna during this period. Vienna City Council discriminated against Jews, and Socialists and others who did not fit. Some Jews changed names, or converted, to try for acceptance, but exclusionary visions on who belonged, and what made up the identity of a 'true' Viennese, had taken root among a considerable section of the population. Spread by politicians, but also by priests and other 'respectable' members of bourgeois society, it was now acceptable in many circles to say publicly that Jews were 'the other', the outsider who could never belong.[179]

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[178] See the chapter 'Religion and Nation in Viennese Politics, 1907-1914', Boyer, *In Power*, p.164-235.

[179] See Wingfield on 'Creating the other'.

CHAPTER 7 – RATIONALISING THE END OF A WORLD: VIENNA 1914 TO 1920

This chapter begins just after the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war on Serbia in July 1914, and ends shortly before October 1920, in the very different circumstances of the new Austrian Republic. It covers this period in order to chart the evolution of thinking among parts of the radical Right as it faced two completely different worlds of possibilities, not least in terms of defining identity and belonging. In 1914, within the radical Right, shifting alliances were built between Pan-Germans of various hues, Christian Socials, and even non-German bourgeois groups. In July 1914, the extreme Right continued to hold aspirations for German dominance within the multinational state.

By 1920, such aspirations had been shattered, and the radical Right faced very different prospects. They now lived in a democratic, much reduced and linguistically mostly homogeneous state. This state was ideologically divided, broadly, though not entirely, between a Social Democratic Vienna and bourgeois rural regions. Within the new Austria, the main enemies of the radical Right were now Marxists, but they intertwined Marxist threats with alleged threats from Jews, against the German and Christian character of Vienna. As David Rechter has written, the impact of the 'Jewish Question' was the prime mover of politics among Jewish groups, but it was also high on the list of priorities for the radical Right.[1] The main nationalities question facing the Right was whether their future as Germans lay alone or as part of the new Weimar Germany.

Between 1914 and 1920, the experience of war, material deprivation, hunger and demographic change in Vienna affected the entire population.[2] Against this background, numerous groups and individuals attempted to shape the future. The tensions that had existed before the war, concerning political reform and national expectations, continued, but in a new and even more intense manner, as the First World War 'exacerbated tensions embedded within the polity'.[3] This chapter shows how expressions of German identity on the radical Right were examples of both continuity and change. Against the background of high-level politics, this study of identity returns to some groups and individuals who have come under consideration, to show their exclusionary reactions to change. The chapter shows how, in the aftermath of war, the radical Right attempted to build on myths of betrayal, labelling scapegoats as un-German and un-Christian.

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[1] David Rechter, *The Jews of Vienna and the First World War*, (London: Littman, 2001), p.2.

[2] Boyer, *In Power*, p.369

[3] Boyer, *In Power*, p.369

A Refugee Crisis

Despite calls for unity in Autumn 1914, the *Burgfriede* broke down. The war, 'as everywhere in Europe', exploded tensions, and politicians looked to further their positions.[4] Gustav Gross, chairman of the *Deutscher Nationalverband*, was formulating war aims even before war had been formally declared.[5] Gross wanted to reorganise the Empire, creating once and for all a German hegemony, victory permitting, even if it necessitated a coup.[6] Yet, younger affiliates of the *Nationalverband* criticised Gross for betraying anti-clerical principles, through the 'clerical alliances' he entered into with the Christian Socials.[7]

Even in the early days of the war, however, German radicals saw not just opportunities but threats, especially in the influx of refugees that in late 1914 flooded into Vienna as a Russian offensive bit into Galicia.[8] Official statistics for November 1914 indicate 80,000 refugees in the city. These were not just Jews, but Jews counted disproportionately among the refugees.[9] While official reports spoke of 'compassion' for these refugees, who were after all internal migrants, 'compassion' must have been limited.[10] Police reported from the Leopoldstadt and Brigittenau districts that the locals felt 'invaded' and, after some initial sympathy, even Vienna's Jews turned against the incomers, at least to some extent.[11]

As early as September 1914, Christian Socials had called for an end to acceptance of any further refugees in the city, and even repatriation if the Russian advance had not yet reached the homes of refugees. Mayor Richard Weiskirchner complained that the refugees were devouring scarce resources and were a health hazard, further cramping the already overcrowded city. Weiskirchner had deeper objections to the refugees, however. In his view, they were 'incapable of adapting to Viennese mores', and 'their presence posed a threat to the city's character'.[12] Weiskirchner was not alone in attacking the refugees from the Right. Heavily antisemitic articles appeared in the press from early in 1915, in contradiction to the principles of the *Burgfriede*.[13]

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[4] Boyer, *In Power*, p.369

[5] Höbelt, p.313

[6] Boyer, *In Power*, p.381.

[7] Boyer, *In Power*, p.381.

[8] Rechter, pp.68-70.

[9] Rechter, p.74.

[10] Rechter, pp.22-23, and p.93.

[11] Rechter, p.93.

[12] Rechter, p.72, p.78 and p.93.

[13] Rechter, p.94.

The refugee crisis eased a little in the summer of 1915, after the Austrian reconquest of Galicia, and the police saw 'great joy' at the subsequent departure of many refugees. However, any relief must have been slight. Official statistics show that, in October 1915, 125,000 refugees were destitute in the city, with up to 60,000 more non-destitute. The situation worsened again with new Russian offensives in Spring 1916, as refugees headed in any direction where they might find safety. Vienna remained their prime destination.[14]

By this time, Jewish refugees who headed to Vienna must have known that they would face very difficult circumstances. Jewish groups, sometimes funded by the government, set up centres where refugees could find food, work and accommodation.[15] They did not, however, find acceptance. Vienna's westernised Jews attacked the 'ostentation' of Galician Orthodox Jews, whose wearing of jewellery in a traditional manner was seen as offensive at a time of hardship. Academic Samuel Kraus, while recognising an 'authentic Jewish heart' in these Orthodox Jews from the East of the Empire, felt it was hidden beneath their 'repulsive exterior'.[16] Vienna's antisemites took the opportunities that came from an easily identifiable and visible target. The initial targets of the antisemites were the refugees but, as will be seen, Vienna's own Jews became their targets too.[17]

The 'German Course'

Throughout the war, German nationalists continued to try to win government support for a 'German course', policies to favour Germans and to Germanise Cisleithania. They attempted to reinforce their own image as the *Staatsvolk*, often using claims of alleged disloyalty on the part of other peoples in the Empire.[18] The authorities sometimes found evidence to support such claims. Reports from New York in October 1914 indicated that an allegedly *Entente*-backed Czech committee for the independence of Bohemia had raised a sum of over $23,000 for its aims.[19] Signs of 'Slavic radicalisation' could be found closer to home. Statements taken from the inn *zum silbernen Bären,* in the Prater, confirmed that Czechs who had been drinking there in December 1914 had loudly sympathised with Serbia.[20] Reports of alleged disloyalty by non-Germans of the Empire were common.[21]

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[14] Rechter, p.74, p.76, and p.93.

[15] Rechter, p.55.

[16] Rechter, p.73.

[17] Rechter, pp.72-73, and p.93.

[18] Boyer, *In Power*, p.408.

[19] ABPD 1914, St9, 29th October 1914 and 12th December 1914.

[20] ABPD 1914, St 9, statement date 3rd January 1915.

[21] See numerous reports in ABPD 1915, V17, or 1916 St16.

Before the war, many had expected that change would come with Franz Ferdinand.[22] The war that followed his death seemed to offer the opportunity to fulfil expectations, but this was an uphill task for German groups. Mass mobilisations saw young and active members of political groups called up in late 1914.[23] The *Vereine*, the 'central, collective expression of ethnic society', were also affected by mobilisation, but also because the authorities recognised their underlying political nature and curtailed their activities.[24] Parliament, which had been adjourned in March 1914 by Prime Minister Count Stürgkh, because its functioning was badly affected by obstructionism, no longer provided an outlet for German protests.[25] Stürgkh maintained its suspension into the war, governed by decree, extended censorship and aimed to suppress all activities that might harm the war effort.[26] Nevertheless, German groups, as they had before the war, proposed many programmes for permanent German predominance in the Empire.[27]

From 1915, radical German nationalists formulated their demands into a manifesto that became known as the 1916 *Osterbegehrschrift*.[28] The *Osterbegehrschrift*, put forward by all the German non-clerical parties, contained familiar radical German demands, but also exceeded previous limits.[29] It called for close military and economic ties between Austria-Hungary and Germany, and the continuation of dualism. Galicia would occupy a special position in Cisleithania, and Dalmatia would be separated from this part of the Empire.[30] This would provide a German majority in what was left of Cisleithania, and a justification for the legal enshrinement of German as the state language. Bohemia would be divided into *Kreisen*, each of which would be characterised as either German or bilingual. None would be characterised as Czech. These German demands were so ambitious that they even met the scepticism of many Bohemian Germans, who wondered how such demands could be imposed on the Czechs.[31]

The *Osterbegehrschrift* is another example of a programme that in part united and in part divided radical Germans, as the Christian Socials did not sign up to the programme.

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[22] Redlich, p.87.

[23] Boyer, *In Power*, p.370.

[24] Rechter, pp.31-32.

[25] Boyer, *In Power*, p.294.

[26] Redlich, p.77; Rechter, p.31.

[27] Höbelt, pp.333-334; Boyer, *In Power*, p.380-388.

[28] Redlich, p.144. For details, see Höglinger, p.132, Höbelt, p.313, and Boyer, *In Power*, p.383.

[29] Boyer, *In Power*, pp.382-383, and Felix Höglinger, *Ministerpräsident Heinrich Graf Clam-Martinic*, (Graz-Köln: Böhlau, 1964), p.132.

[30] Höbelt, p.131.

[31] Boyer, *In Power*, p.384.

However much some Christian Socials would have sympathised with the aim of enhancing the position of the Germans of Cisleithania, support for such an extreme programme would have undermined Christian Social claims of being a *Reichspartei*. The fact that the non-clerical parties supported the programme underlines old divisions between clerical and non-clerical parties. The programme can be seen as an example of how radical Germans developed their own agenda, but also reacted to what was perceived to be a radicalisation on the part of other nationalities in the Empire.

Without power, however, such plans had no prospect of becoming reality, so German nationalists would have taken heart from Stürgkh's hints that he might enforce a settlement in Bohemia.[32] In January 1916, Stürgkh had also commissioned one of his ministers to prepare a new constitution for Cisleithania.[33] Yet, by the time the proposals were ready, Stürgkh was too busy working on the coming *Ausgleich* and on food problems to give them consideration. Stürgkh was then murdered, in October 1916. Stürgkh may have been buying time by not taking a clear position, as he was at the same time also talking to the Czechs about possible reforms.[34] Any deal to favour the Germans was a long way from completion, and depended on other interested parties. For instance, Hungarian assent to any reorganisation would have been vital, and was far from assured.[35]

After Franz Joseph

In November 1916 Franz Joseph died, and Karl was proclaimed Emperor.[36] Karl immediately made his priorities clear, and the first act of Prime Minister Ernest von Koerber under Karl was to reorganise food supplies.[37] Koerber was soon replaced by Karl, and in December 1916 he gave way to Heinrich Clam-Martinic.[38] German nationalists formed a large part of an expanded cabinet that was created in January 1917, something which provoked Czech protests.[39] Rumours of a forced solution to the question of Bohemia persisted, but Clam-Martinic maintained an ambiguous position. While Clam-Martinic promised Germans that a 'new ordering of internal relationships would be carried out', he stipulated that this was not an immediate priority.[40] The new Emperor's closest advisers

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[32] Höbelt, p.315.

[33] Höglinger, p.133 Boyer, *In Power*, p.391.

[34] Höglinger, p.133.

[35] Boyer, *In Power*, p.390.

[36] Höbelt, p.11.

[37] Redlich, p.136.

[38] Höglinger, p.133.

[39] Höglinger, p.126.

[40] Höglinger, p.136.

counselled Karl to stand by the Germans, as the cornerstone of the Empire, but they also warned Clam-Martinic against using force to achieve a solution in Bohemia.[41] In 1917, despite the importance attached to Bohemia by German nationalists, state priorities remained a new Hungarian *Ausgleich* and food supplies.

By 1917, war weariness had long since set in. Karl, influenced by the events of the Russian Revolution, secured the relaxation of some political controls and the restoration of open party political activity.[42] Discussions about plans for reform continued at the highest level, but this was not enough for some and, in April 1917, some German nationalists threatened to resign from the Cabinet.[43] On 30th May 1917, the *Reichsrat* re-opened, with membership based on the last elections, from 1911. A number of Germans in the cabinet opposed this 'democratic course for government'.[44]

One unintended consequence of the relaxation of political controls was a sudden and alarming increase in antisemitic activity. In Vienna, German nationalists led these attacks, and Christian Socials followed, from parliament, the *Rathaus* and the press, from the latter half of 1917 into 1918.[45] Antisemites justified themselves by, among other things, pointing to yet another refugee crisis.[46] Antisemites tried to stir up public opinion and, towards the end of the war, the antisemitic mood grew worse. Antisemites had settled into a mindset where generally they felt no need to explain why Jews were the enemy. Where explanations were made, they were extreme in their violence, and had become part of the everyday experience.

In October 1917, for instance, the weekly *Währinger Bezirksnachrichten*, published by the Währing branch of the Christian Social Party, led on the need for the paper's continuing role as protector of all 'honest working Christians' of the Währing district, against the 'threats' and 'lies' of the 'Jewish Press'. Judging by the rest of the content in the newspaper, others in the district shared this view. The *Bezirksnachrichten* carried advertisements for a considerable number of local associations, many of which included the words 'Christian', 'German' or 'Christian-German' in their names. In cities such as London or Paris, words

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[41] Höglinger, p.117.

[42] Höglinger, p.146.

[43] Höglinger, pp.149. See also Helmut Rumpler, *Max Hussarek. Nationalitäten und Nationalitätenpolitik in Österreich im Sommer des Jahres 1918*, (Vienna: Böhlau, 1965).

[44] Rumpler, Hussarek, p.18.

[45] Rechter, pp.93-95.

[46] Rechter, p.80.

like 'Christian' would be purely descriptive, but in Vienna these words were loaded with meaning. 'Christian' was, to a considerable extent, synonymous with antisemitic.[47]

Over forty associations appear in the events column of one edition alone of the *Bezirksnachrichten*.[48] Some were oblique in their support for antisemitism, but stressed their Germanness. The *Währinger Liedertafel*, for instance, had long expressed its pride that it was not just a singing group, but a group which was at the forefront of the movement to protect German identity. Its publications boasted that, while the group's efforts in this respect, and its willingness to show leadership, had not always been appreciated, they had come to be valued.[49] Some went so far as to proclaim their anti-Jewish purpose in their name, such as the *Deutsch-antisemitischer Herrenklub 'Jung-Währing'*. *Jung-Währing* was a well-connected organisation, not a fringe group that was beyond the pale.[50] Its tenth anniversary was to be celebrated at the '*wilder Mann*' inn, under the patronage of the deputy mayor of the district, Herr Dworak. It would also be attended by *Weihbischof* Dr. Pfluger.[51] In December 1917, the attitude of the *Bezirksnachrichten* towards German unity was equally clear. In an article entitled 'The Position Of The Germans In Austria' it proclaimed that the Christian Social Party was the true standard bearer of Germans within the Empire. Pan-German parties were working against the interests of the Empire as a whole, and were nationalist splinter parties.[52] The *Bezirksnachrichten* carried articles extolling the value of German culture, but showed no enthusiasm for the coming together of all Germans in one state.

The *Bezirksnachrichten* was not alone in attacking Jews at this time. Prominent Christian Social politician Leopold Kunschak declared that 'anti-Semitism is more justified now than ever before. Usury, price fixing and black marketeering are undertaken almost exclusively by Jews'.[53] Yet, as John Boyer has pointed out, such activities were far from a Jewish preserve.[54] MP Heinrich Mataja attacked his own Christian Social Mayor, Richard Weiskirchner, for being insufficiently antisemitic. Rank and file Christian Socials called for

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[47] In 1930, a delegation from the American YMCA was greeted in Vienna as 'an important antisemitic organisation'. George Clare, *Last Waltz In Vienna*, p.83.

[48] *Bezirksnachrichten*, 17th November 1917.

[49] Carl Hanisch, *Jahresbericht der Währinger Liedertafel 1899/1900*, (Vienna: Publisher Not Named, 1900).

[50] *Bezirksnachrichten*, 17th November 1917.

[51] A bishop without a diocese.

[52] *Bezirksnachrichten,* 8th December 1917, p.1.

[53] Boyer, *In Power*, p.427

[54] Boyer, *In Power*, p.427

the restoration of the 'old policy', alongside an 'enormous outbreak of hatred of Jews in Viennese *kleinbürgerlich* circles in 1917 and 1918'.[55]

The viciousness of antisemitic attacks was in stark contrast to positions taken on the nationalities question by leading antisemites. Leopold Kunschak would later go on to propose a legal separation of Jews from the 'indigenous' German Austrian population.[56] In 1917, however, he was conciliatory when it came to questions of nationality. He urged his colleagues to accept that Germans should accept that they could never command a majority in the 'democratic age'. They should instead work to protect German interests, but alongside the other peoples of the Empire.[57] It is a reasonable conclusion that that Kunschak, and others, believed the Jews could not be a people of the Empire, and could not belong.

The Coming Of The End Of The Empire: 'Not The Peace We Had Expected'

Late in 1917, Ludwig Heppenheim, parish priest at Weinhaus, was cautiously optimistic as he wrote his *Chronik*: 'We believe in justice and conscience. Peace movements are growing among the peoples, if the leaders will only listen.... What is certain is that the Empire will never be destroyed'.[58] More realistic assessments were made elsewhere, a few months later. Joseph Redlich describes how, after the failure of the German Spring offensive of 1918, the feeling pervaded that the War was coming to an end.[59] The Imperial Parliament was now seen as an assembly of the peoples gathered together one last time.[60]

In many respects, the destinies of these peoples were being decided elsewhere, by those who would be the victors of the war. In January 1918, President Wilson published his Fourteen Points programme, which aimed to ensure that 'The peoples of Austria-Hungary… should be accorded the freest opportunity for autonomous development'. It called for 'national self-determination', and was the death-knell for the Habsburg Empire.[61] When, in May 1918, Viennese newspaper *Die Wahrheit* wrote that a revision of Austria-Hungary on a national basis was inevitable, it would not have realised how far-reaching that revision would be.[62]

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[55] Boyer, *In Power*, pp.434-435.

[56] Anton Staudinger, 'Austrofaschistische "Österreich"-Ideologie' in Tálos & Neugebauer, eds., pp.28-53, here p.45.

[57] Boyer, *In Power*, p.417.

[58] AEDW WeCk, 1917.

[59] Redlich, p.159.

[60] Redlich, p.159.

[61] Patrick O. Cohrs, *The Unfinished Peace After World War I*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p.32.

[62] Rechter, p.30.

The feeling was widespread, however, that change was to follow soon, as reflected in the pages of the *Währinger Bezirksnachrichten*. The paper had been resolutely anti-Pan-German in 1917, but cracks were beginning to appear in its position as the end of the war was perceived to be drawing near. In June 1918, the paper gave huge prominence to a forthcoming *Deutscher Volkstag* at Vienna's *Rathaus*.[63] The conference, with delegates from across the Empire, was to discuss the dangers to the state of the activities of the North and South Slavs, the perilous state of food supplies and the alliance with Germany. The paper declared it the duty of all Christian Socials to participate in this gathering of the German people in Austria.

This was a high profile event, with speakers to include Count Liechtenstein and Mayor Weiskirchner. The Pan-German content of the conference is clear. For example, Karl Angermayer, 'Chairman Of The Eastern March, Vienna Region And Surrounding Areas' appealed for all 'Ostmärker' to attend the *Deutscher Volkstag*.[64] Such language is indicative of the thinking of at least some of those at the event. Austria, or at least part of it, was again being portrayed as the Mark, the historic Eastern frontier of the Holy Roman Empire against Slavs and non-Christians.[65] Those attending the *Volkstag* may have gathered in order to discuss how to protect 'German' interests in the Empire, but the areas in which they found agreement were generally negative in nature. Mayor Weiskirchner again accused Jews of using the war to profit from shortages. Heinrich Mataja joined in.[66]

Antisemitism helped to bring Christian Socials and German nationalists together, but old divisions kept them apart. Rank-and-file German nationalists objected to the collaboration of their leaders with the Christian Socials, on the grounds that the Christian Social Party was promoting regional autonomy, hence threatening the unity of the state, and the favoured position of Germans within it.[67] Robert Pattai returned to his former predominantly German-orientated course, and in 1918, spoke in favour of the Pan-Germans. Pattai was immediately repudiated by Christian Social leaders.[68] Archbishop Piffl warned Weiskirchner against taking too nationalist a line, and against supporting the

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[63] *Bezirksnachrichten*, 1st June 1918, p.1. The event was to take place on 16th June 1918, *Bezirksnachrichten,* p.2.

[64] *Bezirksnachrichten*, 15th June 1918, p.1.

[65] See also page 99.

[66] Rechter, p.97.

[67] Boyer, *In Power*, p.392.

[68] Boyer, *In Power*, p.411.

Nationalverband, threatening to form a separate Catholic party if Weiskirchner went too far.[69]

By October, defeat was close. On the home front, people were hungry, ill and cold. Agitation against the dynasty was rising. German Nationalist political groups splintered into even smaller factions.[70] Karl tried to keep his lands together, by declaring the Cisleithanian part of the Empire to be a federal state, and Austria-Hungary signed an armistice with the *Entente,* but it was too late.[71] State after state was declared into existence, then seceded from the Empire. In Vienna, uncertainty was the order of the day, and senior politicians failed to predict the near future: Karl Renner drew up a draft constitution for what would become German Austria but which, in October 1918, he termed South East Germany.[72] In Währing, the *Bezirksnachrichten* was caught in two minds. Its edition of 30th October 1918 led with a six-verse paean to the new state that was being born, the '*Lied der Deutschösterreicher'*.[73] It declared that it would never forget Old Austria, but ended with the plea: 'Protect, oh German God, your German Austria!' The paper, however, must have thought that German Austria as an independent entity would be short-lived. It went on to call on the Christian Socials to meet with the German nationalists, to plan for the future.[74]

In Vienna, a few leading Christian Social figures tried to hold out against the declaration of a republic, but finally had to concede to reality.[75] On 11th November 1918, Karl renounced his rights to participate in government.[76] The next day, before cheering crowds, the Republic of German Austria was proclaimed from the parliament in Vienna.[77] A provisional National Assembly was formed.[78] Despite the presence of a reasonably large number of Czechs who would stay on in Vienna and a cluster of Slovenes in Carinthia, the state was overwhelmingly populated with Germans. German Austria, in accordance with the nationalities principle, was styled as an integral part of the new German Republic. Few understood the consequences for this rump of Austria, and few foresaw the 'the radical crisis

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[69] Boyer, *In Power*, p.397.

[70] Höbelt, p.346.

[71] Höbelt, p.346.

[72] Stourzh, p.31.

[73] *Bezirksnachrichten*, 30th October 1918, p.1.

[74] *Bezirksnachrichten,* 30th October 1918, pp.4-5.

[75] Boyer, *In Power*, p.442.

[76] *RP*, 12th November 1918, p.1.

[77] *RP*, 13th November 1918, p.1.

[78] Boyer, *In Power*, p.439.

in the concept of Austria and of Austrian consciousness after the downfall of the Monarchy'.[79]

The *Bezirksnachrichten* was now attempting to explain the fall of the Empire. On the day Karl stepped aside, the paper started a six part series on 'The Jews And The War'.[80] The *Bezirksnachrichten* attacked Jews for their supposed avoidance of conscription and their lack of enthusiasm for the war. It accused them of collaboration with invading Russian armies in Galicia, and extended old economic stereotypes to label Jews as profiteers, usurers of food, and inherently untrustworthy.[81] In the *Bezirksnachrichten*, such attacks on Jews were commonplace, providing scapegoats for all of the ills of war. Explanations for these attacks were rare but, when the paper did feel the need to explain, it went to extreme lengths to develop its case. These attacks fitted into a pattern of verbal and 'mild' physical assaults on Jewish refugees in Vienna, just after the founding of the Republic.[82]

For all the bravado of the *Bezirksnachrichten* in running this and similar articles, Christian Socials and Pan-Germans alike would have been deeply concerned that their world was being swept away. Bourgeois sectors of society had difficulties not just in maintaining basic standards, but even food supplies. These sectors felt themselves to be at a disadvantage compared with other classes. They perceived that while the rich had money, and workers were fed at work, the middle classes suffered on fixed incomes. Middle class suffering was made worse by self-infliction: some would not queue for food, as this reduced the 'proper distance' from working classes.[83]

The values of the Empire and those of the radical Right had by no means been perfectly aligned, but shared beliefs in hierarchy and the centrality of Christianity had given the Empire and the radical Right common ground. A heavy paternalism prevailed, and stereotypes ridiculing women who worked, for instance, were common.[84] Now, democratic and Socialist movements, those who wanted to separate church and state completely, feminist movements, and others, would be free to stake their own claims to provide the values on which the new state would be based.[85]

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[79] Stourzh, p.31.

[80] *Bezirksnachrichten,* 11th November 1918, pp.2-3.

[81] *Bezirksnachrichten,* 11th November 1918, pp.2-3.

[82] Rechter, pp.97-98.

[83] Boyer, *In Power*, p.425

[84] *Rundschau*, 25th November 1906, p.1. On women moving into white collar occupations, see Boyer, *In Power*, p.426.

[85] Funder, p.603.

Alongside longer term considerations, immediate shocks also had to be faced. Two blows struck home. The first was that German Austria was prevented from becoming part of the new German Republic, even before the Versailles peace treaties had been signed.[86] The French were especially vigorous in opposing *Anschluss*, partly in an attempt to prevent Austrian manpower from becoming part of a German army. Peace terms were dictated to Germany, Austria and Hungary.[87] Austria was forced to keep its independence, and its people could only renounce this with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations.[88] A second blow to German-Austrian self-determination came when German speaking areas of the former Empire, on the largest scale in Bohemia, were prevented from joining German Austria. The victors of the war rejected claims by the German Austrian national assembly for all German areas of Cisleithania to be included in the new state.[89] Plebiscites in these areas returned large majorities in favour of union with German Austria, but these were ignored in favour of giving Czechoslovakia, and to a lesser extent Italy, what were considered to be defensible borders against potential aggressors.[90]

Bohemia, whatever the reality that Czechs formed a majority of the population as a whole, was considered by many German Austrians to be a part of German Austria, and not just by Pan-Germans. A few months after the separation, leading Social Democrat Otto Bauer appealed, on behalf of the estimated four million Germans in Czechoslovakia, for the fair implementation of Wilson's Fourteen Points, and the joining of all Germans to the new German Republic. Bauer was motivated by cultural nationalism and fellowship, but also by a very practical concern. German Austria was not believed to be economically viable.[91] As Bauer wrote to fellow Social Democrat Karl Renner, *Anschluss* was the only way forward, a point 'even the bourgeois parties' conceded.[92] The feeling also existed that Austria, as it was being shaped, was 'a state without a national tradition'.[93] German Austria's national traditions were beyond its borders, in the wider German cultural area. The new Austria was a rump, cut off from its heritage.

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[86] Cohrs, p.62.

[87] Johnson, p.191.

[88] Jürgen Gehl, *Austria, Germany and the Anschluss, 1931-1938*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), p.2.

[89] Judson, *Guardians*, p.234.

[90] Johnson, pp.193-195. See F.L. Carsten, *The First Austrian Republic, 1918-38 A study based on British and American Documents*, (Aldershot: Gower Publishing, 1986) p.9, for details of plebiscites.

[91] Edmondson, p.16.

[92] Carsten, p.7.

[93] Edmondson, p.16.

As 1919 opened, it was clear that the new order was not attractive to those on Austria's Right. In Vienna, the Church at the highest level set out its opposition to the post-war settlements, both internationally and domestically. In a pastoral letter of January 1919, the bishops and archbishops of German Austria *(sic)* offered their sympathies to the brave armies of Austria-Hungary and Germany, who had been 'undefeated in the field'.[94] The letter discussed the peace at length. This was a time when myths were being built about the Central Powers being 'stabbed in the back' from the home front, by disloyal Slavs, Jews and Socialists.[95] The pastoral letter's portrayal of the 'undefeated' did not allow the intrusion of the reality was that the Central Powers would have been defeated if they had continued the war, as the German High Command had recognised.[96] Nevertheless, the letter was accurate when it declared: 'God be thanked. The war is over, peace is near! But not the peace we expected'.[97] It was not just defeat, but the peace terms and the denial of self-determination that were shattering blows. 'Not the peace we expected' was, if anything, an understatement.

The bishops also used the pastoral letter to spell out their understanding of the new world as it affected Austria domestically. For them, a new war was now beginning behind a façade of democracy, this time against believers.[98] While some on the Right condemned democracy as a dangerous concept, the bishops believed the danger lay not in ideas but the ways in which they were applied. The political nature of the state was irrelevant compared with the values that underpinned that state. These should include religion, family, property, the Ten Commandments and the Sermon on the Mount. The bishops were alarmed that the new Republic would instead distance the Church from the state. Above all, the establishment of 'free' schools and 'free' marriage, independent of the Church, would remove the people from the sacraments they needed for salvation.

The importance of this pastoral letter for an understanding of the political stance of the Church in the next two decades cannot be overemphasized. The letter declared that all priests should show unconditional loyalty to the new state, at least while a new constitution was being drawn up. The bishops accepted the nationalities principle as a means for organising the state, when they declared that 'as Germans' they felt loyalty to German Austria. Statements that democracy was not to be feared and that the form of the state was

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[94] *Wiener Diözesanblatt* (hereafter *Diözesanblatt*), 23rd January 1919, p.1.

[95] Tauchmann, p.64.

[96] Johnson, p185.

[97] *Diözesanblatt,* 23rd January 1919, p.1.

[98] *Diözesanblatt,* 23rd January 1919, pp.1-7.

irrelevant to the Church can be taken as true at some level, yet an implied threat exists here too. The Church would support a democratic state only if it was based on Christian principles.[99] In other words, the Church would support the state for now, but the state could lose this support if the constitution was not to its liking. This does not mean that the Church would support the violent overthrow of the state. In 1919, the Church was just setting out on its relationship with the new Austria, but it wasted no time in declaring what it expected of the state.

In Weinhaus, the importance of the message was certainly picked up by Father Heppenheim, as he transcribed the opening of the pastoral letter in his *Chronik* for 1918.[100] In order to ensure that the rank and file faithful also understood its importance and its meaning, the letter was to be read at mass in all parishes on 26th January and 2nd and 9th February 1919.[101] These dates were chosen with care. A week after the final reading, elections to a constituent assembly for German Austria took place. The election was marked by vicious antisemitism on the part of the Christian Socials and Pan-Germans on the one hand, and Marxist sloganeering by the Social Democrats on the other.

In the difficult conditions of the post-war winter, the results trickled in. Early indications gave the Social Democrats 72 seats, followed by the Christian Socials with 64. Various Pan-German parties returned 24 representatives, and other parties collected a handful of seats.[102] Final results gave the Social Democrats 41% of the vote with 36% for the Christian Socials.[103] No party came near to controlling a majority of the 179 seat assembly, and a coalition including the Christian Socials and the Social Democrats was formed.[104] Despite fears on the Right, the Social Democrats had been kept at bay in the national elections. The elections for the Constituent Assembly were the first to be held under a full, free and equal suffrage for all classes, and for men and women alike. The Right had commanded sufficient support in rural areas to stand firm at the national level.[105]

In Vienna, the situation turned out to be very different when, in May 1919, elections to the city council took place. Here too, the franchise was fair and equal for the first time, and the Social Democrats achieved an outright majority, pushing the Christian Socials down to a

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[99] *Diözesanblatt,* 23rd January 1919, p.7.

[100] AEDW WeCk 1918.

[101] *Diözesanblatt,* 23rd January 1919, p.9.

[102] *NFP*,18th February 1919. See also *RP* and *NZ* for the same day.

[103] Boyer, *In Power*, p.446.

[104] Edmondson, p10.

[105] Boyer, *In Power*, p.446.

little over a quarter of the vote. The Social Democrats won one hundred of the 165 seats, and made inroads beyond working their class constituency, into the disaffected middle classes to whom the Christian Socials had promised much, but had delivered little.[106] The first post-war inheritor of Karl Lueger's position as Mayor of Vienna was now Social Democrat Jakob Reumann.[107]

The result was a reaction to the long-term misery of life in Vienna for many of its inhabitants. It came when Vienna's citizens finally had a fair chance to express their views on how they wanted to shape the city. During the Empire, Vienna may have offered better prospects than life in other cities, but the Christian Socials had done little for the proletarian population. They had beautified parts of the city and improved certain aspects such as transport, but many people lacked access to even the most basic amenities. Death rates in pre-war Vienna had often been far worse than those in other major European cities.[108]

The change in the political direction of the city opened the door to tackle much of what had gone before. The city council drew up ambitious plans for health provision, secular education and social housing.[109] The housing crisis was serious before the war but, after the war, as soldiers returned from prisoner of war camps and refugees flooded the city, such problems and subsequent shortages of food and fuel threatened to create significant social unrest.[110] Yet international events cast doubt on the feasibility of the Socialists' plans, as the terms of the Versailles peace settlement demanded reparations from the new republic, to make it pay for the war.[111]

In Weinhaus, Father Heppenheim was drawing his own conclusions about the connections between international events and the city's Socialist administration. These were all signs of the modern world and its rejection of religion. Writing in 1919, he launched a long tirade against Vienna's Socialists, reflecting much of the thinking of the pastoral letter sent earlier that year by the bishops. According to Heppenheim, the people needed to hold firm together. Peace had brought nothing but hunger and misery. Bolshevism, a 'madness', was

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[106] Boyer, *In Power*, p.445.

[107] Seliger and Ucakar, Vol. 2, p.1139. Also *RP*, 5th May 1919.

[108] Death rates for 1913, comparing major cities, per 10,000 inhabitants: New York, 20.0; London 16.5; Berlin 18.7; Moscow, 26.7; Vienna. 30.0. Paris at 32.8 is discounted as the statistical recording method is different. Seliger and Ucakar, Vol. 2, p.1111.

[109] Wegs, pp.43-44 and Edmondson, p.13.

[110] For reports of unrest, see ABPD 1919 V3. For numerous reports of the tracking of former prisoners of war arriving in Vienna from England, ABPD 1918 St 6, from Russia see ABPD 1918 St7 and from France ABPD 1918 St5.

[111] Jill Lewis, *Red Vienna: Socialism*, p.337.

aiming to destroy religion. This aim was not something confined to Vienna, as the Bolsheviks were now a world power. [112]

Heppenheim was at pains to stress the dominance of the Social Democrats on the Vienna City Council. Like that of others, his writing can give the impression that such control reached everywhere. In 1919, the Party won a majority of the vote in elections for the city council, and its share would edge upwards over the next few years, but it did not control everything in the city. The Party was dominant in the council chamber. It began to shape culture, but attitudes that existed in the city before the war persisted into the new republic. Many of the societies on the Right that have already been encountered continued to thrive, presented their vision of the world, and remained at odds with the Social Democrats.

Across the political spectrum, however, and across Austria, hope gave way to despair at the results of the international settlement. Peasants who had hoped for freedoms from their landlords faced new disappointments.[113] Animosity grew between peasants and workers as their needs in the post-war world diverged.[114] The aristocracy, the landed gentry, industrialists and the petite bourgeoisie tried to resist change.[115] In the rural areas, militias sprang up, the likes of the *Heimwehr* and the *Heimatschutz*. They protected against incursions of foreign invaders, such as 'irregular bands of Yugoslavs', who tried to seize territory for new states. They also protected against workers' groups from the cities, who attempted to commandeer food.[116]

Pan-Germans would have seen the solution to these problems in forging a union with the new Weimar state. Christian Socials had not changed their basic position, and despite their loss of the municipality of Vienna they were within touching distance of control of the government of the new Austrian state. *Anschluss* with the Weimar Republic, whatever sense it seemed to make economically, was not an attractive option for the Christian Socials, and without their support it was unlikely to come about. In national elections in October 1920, they gained 42% of the vote to the Social Democrats' 36%.[117] Whatever qualms they had as a new constitution for Austria came into being in October 1920, an independent Austria was a more attractive home for them than the potentially Socialist state to the North.[118]

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[112] AEDW WeCk, 1919.

[113] Lauridsen, p.97.

[114] Lauridsen, p.99.

[115] Edmondson, p.9.

[116] Edmondson, p.20.

[117] Boyer, *In Power*, p.446.

[118] Diamant, p.105.

Summary

Between 1914 and 1920, the world changed radically as a result of war. The demise of the Habsburg Empire transformed the possibilities that were open to the radical Right in its efforts to create political settlements that would favour Germans. During the war, they had planned for German domination of a large part of Central Europe. Efforts had been made to gather allies within the Empire – Hungarians, Poles and Italians – in order to dominate the 'non-historic' peoples. Plans for reorganisation of the Empire were often the result of responses to conflicts that had continued from before the war, and were often also extensions to plans that German nationalists in particular had been making then. Even as the *Burgfriede* was being declared, some such as Gross were attempting to strengthen the 'German Course'.

At times, however, the radical German Right in Vienna turned on another target, with a vicious ferocity. The *Burgfriede* was breaking down at the same time as a refugee crisis was overwhelming Vienna. There is no doubt that it increased the wartime suffering of the people of Vienna, but Mayor Weiskirchner's attitudes towards Jews suggest that he and other radical Germans also used it as an excuse to attack Jews in general and to create Jewish scapegoats. The differences in the attitudes displayed by Leopold Kunschak to nationalities questions on the one hand, and the position of Jews in Austria, illustrate the 'Aryan mindset' that had taken root in parts of the Christian Social Party. This continued the earlier work of the likes of Father Abel: that the Jew was the real enemy. From Weiskirchner's attacks on 'Eastern Jews' as people who could never fit into Vienna, it was a short step to claim that no Jews should have been allowed to settle there.

The peace that emerged after 1918 was not the peace that had been expected. It was harsh on the remnant state of Austria, but it also brought shocks within the state, to those who had been supporters of 'authoritarian' Habsburg rule and had been accustomed to the privileged place of the Catholic Church in society.[119] As they tried to rationalise the end of a world, the radical Right, in the form of barely veiled threats against the Republic, could not disguise its antidemocratic nature. Now that the Empire was gone, this group could look only to the rump Austria or to the revised Germany to the North. Barred from *Anschluss*, some radical nationalists could not accept the Austrian state, because of its boundaries. Radical nationalists, and a number of Christian Socials, could not accept the democratic nature of the state. Many Christian socials rejected the secular state.

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[119] Edmondson, p.9.

This was a legacy of war and its consequences that would haunt the Austrian First Republic such that, for thirty years after the coming of peace, 'stable political and social institutions in Austria were virtually impossible...'[120] The effect would be a state in constant flux, where definitions of identity and belonging were constantly under challenge, and the search for scapegoats for all of the ills of society became an acceptable part of life for many. Radical Germans had begun the war with high hopes of being able to influence how the state defined itself. They had hoped to be one of the privileged groups in the Empire, and perhaps the pre-eminent group in a Cisleithania defined by its German identity. At the end of the war, they were being consigned to a state which, in one way or another, they were having trouble considering as their home.

[120] Boyer, *In Power*, p.369

CHAPTER 8: THE PROVISIONAL REPUBLIC? VIENNA 1920-1932

In October 1920, as a consequence of the Versailles treaties, the state of German Austria that had been declared in November 1918 was dissolved. 'German' was to form no part of the name of the state that took its place, the Austrian Republic.[1] Troubled by political instability, often by political violence, this Austria mirrored the widespread uncertainty that post-war Europe was experiencing. In the early 1920s, many predicted the fall of democracy in Austria, with tensions between Left and Right being identified as the most likely cause. This chapter addresses the question of what those on the Right would wish to see as a replacement for the Republic, as it says much about their views on nation, identity and Germanness. It does so in two ways. The first is to examine support on the Right for the idea of the Austrian Republic as a provisional state, which should eventually be absorbed into Germany. The second is to examine support on the Right for the idea that the Republic was a provisional state form, and that Austria should remain independent, but be shorn of its newly erected democratic institutions.

The chapter examines how Right-wing sub-cultures continued to contribute to the creation of exclusionary views of the world, and that even at the peak of 'Red Vienna' these sub-cultures remained more than a trivial minority. Christian Social and German Nationalist sub-cultures had distinct and at times vigorous differences, but they often 'worked closely together during most of the First Republic and shared the same social basis'.[2] They buried their differences and formed alliances against the common enemy, resulting in the 'bitter political conflict between the bourgeois and socialist blocs in the years following the First World War'.[3]

One other key point emerges from an examination of these exclusionary subcultures. The challenge to Red Vienna was often presented by those on the Right as a struggle between the urban and the rural.[4] This challenge, however, was driven by people of influence, sometimes with power, who were from or near to the grass roots, and was already alive within the city itself as the Austrian Republic was born in October 1920.

A New World

The October 1920 constitutional settlement came in the middle of a long period of turmoil that outlived the end of the war. Across Europe, violent clashes frequently marked attempts to reach settlements to replace the era of Empires. By 1920, the successor states of the

[1] Johnson, p.193.

[2] Lauridsen, pp.89-90.

[3] Lauridsen, p.90.

[4] Edmondson, p.13.

Habsburg Empire were at various stages of their nation-building projects. Czechoslovakia grappled with the problems it inherited in the form of a large minority of German former inhabitants of the Habsburg Empire.[5] Poland looked aggressively at territory beyond its borders, and waged war with the Soviet Union.[6] In 1920, Admiral Horthy effectively became dictator in Hungary, blaming defeat in war on the imposition of alien values on the people of Hungary.[7] He denounced Budapest as a hotbed of liberalism and communism, and declared his government to be 'national and Christian'. By implication, Jews and atheistic Socialists were part of the guilty past.[8]

Austrian politicians used these terms when proposing provincial breakaways from the new Austria, between 1919 and 1921.[9] To them, the provinces were the soul of a true timeless Austria. Plebiscites in places such as the Tyrol demanded that provinces be allowed to leave Austria and join the Weimar Republic.[10] The Vorarlberg voted to join Switzerland, but none of these plebiscites resulted in anything concrete. Some concluded that this Austria, and Austrians, had been forced together, and that no historical, religious or cultural grounds could justify the state.[11]

At the same time as these attempts to reject Austria as an independent state took place, others hoped that Austria could be transformed from within. This republic was, for the Social Democrats, a transitional stage on the way to a socialist state, whether as part of Germany or not, but the Social Democrats were far too reformist by 1920 to force the issue through a Soviet-style revolution, and were set on the transformation of the Republic by parliamentary means.[12] Many Christian Socials also only grudgingly accepted the new state, and some of their number would have preferred a reformed constitutional monarchy, rather than the Republic.[13] From the beginning, therefore, the settlement of 1920 lacked profound support, at least among segments of the political classes. The high turnouts for elections

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[5] Johnson, p.193.

[6] Johnson, pp.182-190.

[7] Lukacs, p.105.

[8] Lukacs, p.294.

[9] Rolf Steininger, '12 November 1918-12 March 1938: The Road to Anschluss', in Steininger, Rolf and Bischof, Günter and Gehler, Michael, eds., *Austria In The Twentieth Century,* (New Brunswick, USA: Transaction Publishers, 2002), pp.85-114, here pp.92-96.

[10] Steininger, '12 November 1918', here pp.92-96.

[11] Stourzh, p.33.

[12] William M. Johnston, *The Austrian Mind: An Intellectual And Social History*, 1848-1938, (Berkeley: University Of California, 1972, 2000 edition), pp.105-109.

[13] Diamant, p.81.

indicate that voters felt the arguments were important. Over eighty per cent turned out for the national elections of October 1920.[14]

The Social Democrats talked of a workers' state and even formed workers' councils that mirrored those of the Soviet Union.[15] Some Social Democrats thought that social revolution was the priority, and that *Anschluss* was an irrelevance. Other Social Democrats, such as Otto Bauer, saw *Anschluss* with the new German Republic as a key aim, and *Anschluss* by peaceful means was an element of the Social Democrats' programme.[16] For Bauer, it would be sensible, practical and liberating to create a German-speaking space by peaceful means. This aim was based on a cultural view of the nation, not an aggressive form of nationalism. It was a way of bringing German culture into one state. It was an inclusive vision, that allowed for assimilation, as well as for the rights of minorities.[17]

Within the Christian Social Party, the idea of *Anschluss,* while it was not without support, had limited appeal. It would end any remaining hopes that Catholic values could be placed at the centre of public life, and practical considerations also arose, as Austrian industrialists feared competition from German industry.[18] As long as solutions could be found to immediate economic problems, such considerations outweighed the undeniable fact that a common German feeling (*Deutschfühlen*) and a German consciousness prevailed among the intellectual and political classes.[19]

Viennese society was deeply divided. Viciousness erupted in the 1919 and 1920 elections, and street fighting broke out, a reflection of the images of violent struggle in the posters of all parties that filled the walls of the streets of Vienna.[20] Christian Social and Pan-German propaganda was filled with anti-Jewish, racially-motivated imagery.[21] All Jews were a threat in this world view. The viciousness of the politics reflected the harshness of an economic situation which, as 1920 went on, became progressively worse in the whole of the new Austria. The people of Vienna suffered, as the capital's trade routes with the former Empire's hinterlands had been severed. The city retained an industrial sector, but its economy was now excessively focused on administration, bureaucracy and entertainment.

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[14] *RP*, 19th October 1920, p.3.

[15] Carsten, p.20.

[16] See, for instance, Thorpe, p.28.

[17] Carsten, p.7.

[18] Edmondson, p.16.

[19] Stourzh, pp.33-34.

[20] See Carsten, p.25, p.44 or p.70.

[21] Election posters from 1919 and 1920, in Wiener Stadt- und Landesbibliothek, ed., *Tagebuch der Strasse,* (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1981), p.136 and p.152.

The city's white collar workers, the sort of people who belonged to singing groups and attended church, could barely be paid. Unemployment, poverty, hunger and housing shortages combined.[22] The situation was made worse by the large numbers of refugees who remained in the city, still including many Galician Jews. Failure by the city's Socialist administration to succeed in expelling those who had no residency rights was described by Christian Socials as typical of a 'red Jewified Vienna'.[23] Attempts to expel these refugees, however unsuccessfully, were greeted by some later commentators as signs of Socialist antisemitism.[24]

After the elections of October 1920 the Social Democrats broke their coalition with the Christian Socials, who now emerged as the largest party in a Right-wing coalition government.[25] This coalition aimed at economic retrenchment. Within Vienna, in contrast, in order to remedy years of neglect, the Social Democratic City Council was drawing up expansive plans for a programme of house building and social welfare. There were now two clear directions of policy in the country, but neither could outweigh the other and this caused considerable political tension. Vienna was also part of Lower Austria, and the needs of the city were different from the needs of the Lower Austrian rural areas. Politicians therefore drew up plans for Vienna to break from the rest of Lower Austria, and to become its own *Land*. This would not solve all problems, but it would mean that some of the tensions between Vienna as local authority and a quarter of the country's population on the one hand, and Vienna as federal capital on the other, would be released.

In October 1920, survival and the immediate future were the priority, even if the bigger issues were never completely dispelled, as can be seen in the thinking of some priests. Father Pax was still at Alt-Ottakring, as he had been since 1899. In 1921, he was having such a struggle to keep the parish afloat on limited resources that the federal Minister for Education took the unusual step of writing to the Mayor of Vienna, asking him to aid with funding.[26] At the same time, in Weinhaus, Father Heppenheim raged at a charitable mission of American Quakers in his parish. This presumably came with strings of a religious nature attached, which Heppenheim considered a threat to his Catholic parishioners.[27] Heppenheim unleashed diatribes against the Social Democrats which show that he considered them to be

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[22] Jill Lewis, *Fascism and the Working Class in Austria, 1918-1934: The Failure of Labour in the First Republic*, (New York: Berg, 1991), p.71-77.

[23] Steininger, '12 November 1918', pp.92-96.

[24] Pauley, p.143.

[25] Lewis, *Fascism,* p.66.

[26] AEDW AOCor, 10th June 1921.

[27] AEDW WeCor, June 1920. Several items of correspondence between Heppenheim and the Ordinariat.

at least on a par with the Soviet Communists.[28] Heppenheim did not see out the winter, dying in February 1921.

Heppenheim's successor, Father Leopold Lojka, took office in October of that year. Lojka had been a priest in various roles and parishes from 1897, and he would have needed all his experience as he endured a difficult and wearing introduction to his new parish. The winter was 'terribly cold', something that was exacerbated by a complete lack of coal. Then the worldwide influenza epidemic hit the parish. At its peak, influenza caused six deaths a day, and Lojka had to deal with these on top of deaths from other causes.[29] Yet these everyday concerns did not prevent him from reflecting on the past. Lojka had been a schoolchild in a choir in the district of Döbling, not far from Weinhaus. This choir had been invited to sing at Weinhaus, where Lojka heard Father Deckert, the early antisemitic activist, preach at the very church which he now ran. Lojka tells us that Father Deckert had been an inspiration in his becoming a priest, 'perhaps the main prompting' for his taking holy orders.[30]

Others in the 1920s also attested to the influence of earlier priests. In 1926, Jakob Fried noted how the Christian Social Party of 1896 had been one which used religion from opportunism and for the sake of appearances. It had been a Catholic party on the surface only.[31] According to Fried, some priests had been willing simply to accept City council subsidies for Catholic organisations, from the hands of the Christian Social administration, in return for their participation as political agitators.[32] This had now been changed and, according to Fried, the Party of 1926 possessed a true Catholic spirit. The principal credit for this should go to Father Heinrich Abel who, in the 1920s, was still active on pilgrimages.[33]

Both Abel and Lojka battled for a Church struggling to maintain its privileges in the First Republic.[34] For all the need to address immediate concerns, Lojka went to great lengths to copy into his *Chronik* a large section of a pastoral letter the Bishops had sent in 1921: 'At last, the fiction of Peace can be addressed'.[35] It accuses the Socialists, 'here in Vienna', of waging war from on religion, especially in the schools. This, it says, is nothing less than a *Kulturkampf*.[36] The pastoral letter of November 1918 from the Bishops of German Austria

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[28] AEDW WeCrk 1920.

[29] AEDW WeCk, 1921.

[30] AEDW WeCk, 1921.

[31] Boyer, *In Power*, p.168.

[32] Boyer, *In Power*, p.166.

[33] Boyer, *In Power*, p.165.

[34] Ernst Hanisch, *Lange Schatten*, p.33.

[35] AEDW WeCk, 1921.

[36] AEDW WeCk, 1921.

had warned that they would support the Republic only as long as it was run on Catholic principles. The 1921 pastoral letter repeated the warning to Vienna City Council. In this, the Church was challenging a new world.[37] Catholicism had once been central to the support that kept the Habsburgs in place, and had been privileged in the state.[38] Now, just as had been the case at the time of the liberals, the Church clashed repeatedly with the State over matters such as marriage and education.[39]

Within Red Vienna

On 1st January 1922 the City of Vienna become a *Land* in its own right. This arrangement was sensible from an administrative point of view, but it highlighted the contrasts between 'Socialist Vienna' on the one hand and the rest of Austria on the other, between old, Catholic Austria and the new Republic. Supporters of the old order saw huge Socialist May Day parades overwhelming celebrations of the Virgin Mary.[40] They saw November celebrations of the declaration of the Republic as an opportunity for the Socialists to 'insult' centuries of Habsburg rule.[41] The priests of Vienna reflected these thoughts, and the same concerns as had been raised in the past, from the time of the early liberal governments to the Bishops' attack on the alleged post-war *Kulturkampf* of the Vienna Socialists, came to the surface repeatedly. In 1922, Father Lojka described the education proposals of one Socialist MP, Frau Schlesinger, as terrorism and persecution. Lojka had a particular objection to the 'American style' placement of boy next to girl which, in his view, could only lead to sexual arousal. His anger was no less pointed towards mixed-sex Sunday excursions encouraged by Socialists, when children should be at mass. He clearly despised those he described as *'Sozilehrer'*.[42]

This, however, is not just a representation of Lojka's views of the struggle between Church and State. He goes on to reveal what underpins his anger:

> 'In this way, Christian youth is made Godless and immoral, which is the goal of Jewish freemasonry, whose willing slave is Social Democracy'.[43]

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[37] See Diamant, pp.99-152, for an exposition of the range of Catholic criticisms of the Republic and views on the form that the state might take.

[38] Latschka, p.76.

[39] Alfred Kostelecky, 'Kirche und Staat', in Ferdinand Klosterman, Hans Kriegl, Otto Mauer and Erika Weinzierl, eds., *Kirche in Österreich 1918-1965*, (Herold, 1966), pp.201-217, here p.202.

[40] Ernst Hanisch, *Lange Schatten*, p.34.

[41] Ernst Hanisch, *Lange Schatten*, p.35.

[42] AEDW WeCk, 1922.

[43] AEDW WeCk, 1922.

Lojka felt no need to explain the connection between Jewish Freemasonry and Socialism. It was to him self-evident, but this was not just a private thought in the *Chronik*. Each *Chronik* was inspected, so the inspector was expected to understand what was being said. He would also have been expected to understand why Father Lojka recorded in 1922 that he had been told that one procession at the church was 'as beautiful as in Father Deckert's time. I am satisfied with this praise'. Similar pride shows through, as Lojka informed the office of the Archbishop that he had been appointed to the management committee of the *'Dr. Deckert-Vereinshaus für den XVIII Bezirk'*.[44]

Like priests in other parishes, Lojka struggled under post-war conditions to make ends meet. Weinhaus had once been a rich parish but, in 1912, the sponsor of the parish had paid a settlement to the Church in order to renounce his obligations.[45] Income from that source was therefore no longer available. However, the parish *Sendbote*, founded by Deckert as a fund raiser for the parish, was still being published in the 1920s. It is to be assumed that at some point the Ordinariat had taken over the receipts, as Lojka wrote to the Ordinariat and appealed for the proceeds to be made available to the parish 'as in the terms of Deckert's will'.[46] The *Sendbote* must still have been selling reasonably well, as Father Lojka was able to report an easing of the finances, but it was not before 1927 that he could record that the financial situation was fully resolved.[47]

While no records of Father Lojka's sermons exist, it is probable that he would have passed on to his parishioners his sentiments regarding education, the city of Vienna and Jews. He seems to have been successful in retaining his parishioners, noting that at Easter 1922 Haydn's 'Seven Last Words' was performed to an overflowing church.[48] Lojka's observations over the coming years show him to be confident in his own abilities and knowledge. As would be expected, he supported the thrust of Christian Social policy for an independent Austria, a policy which received a major boost in 1922, when Monsignor Ignaz Seipel took over as Chancellor.

Seipel, a figure of prominence in both the Church and the Christian Social Party, would be Chancellor for five of the next seven years.[49] He was an enthusiast for Austrian

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[44] AEDW WeCor, 10th May 1922. Lojka to Ordinariat.

[45] Prince Czartorysky had applied in 1907 to be released from his obligations. In 1910, he offered 20,000 crowns as a one-off settlement. In 1912, he paid 115,000 crowns. AEDW WeCor 1907, WeCk 1907-1912.

[46] AEDW WeCor, 13th May 1922. Lojka to Ordinariat.

[47] AEDW WeCor , 13th June 1927, to Ordinariat.

[48] AEDW WeCk, 1922.

[49] Edmondson, p.15.

independence.[50] He was also typical of a significant strand in Catholic approaches to the post-war world. He had initially, if reluctantly, led Catholics to accept democracy.[51] Ultimately, he would demonstrate a 'contempt for democracy which had all along been a dominant theme of Catholic thought'.[52] This made it easier for others on the Catholic Right to reject democracy.

Lojka could not completely banish his fears as to whether the national coalition forced on the Christian Socials might yet undermine this pro-independence policy, or even if their coalition partners could be trusted in other ways. Lojka would have been concerned, however, that an agreement between Christian Socials and German nationalists in 1922 committed the parties to 'initial contact' with the German government to explore possibilities for *Anschluss*, even though there were significant numbers of '*Anschluss* opponents' in the Christian Social ranks.[53] Anschluss was the key policy aim of German nationalists, but it was a secondary issue for many Christian Socials. In 1922, though, *Anschluss* receded as an issue, when economic difficulties forced the government to seek a rescue package from Britain, France, Italy and Czechoslovakia.[54] Seipel had needed to renounce *Anschluss* for twenty years in return for loans.[55]

Lojka sympathised with the opponents of *Anschluss*. In 1923, he wrote that Seipel, the 'rescuer of 'little Austria'', was steering Austria between the Scylla and Charybdis of bankruptcy and revolution. He was less flattering to the Christian Socials' coalition partners, the *Deutsche Volkspartei*, whose liberal roots he recognised when he described them as '... these gentlemen who would like to join in with the *Sozi (sic) Kulturkampf*'.[56] Anticlericalism remained a feature of the political outlook of many German nationalist groups, and had potential to cause difficulties for the allies on the Right. Lojka was a keen observer of politics. He described the German-Russian accord of that year as a 'bombshell'. He noted that there had been antisemitic agitation at the universities in Prague and Vienna. He suggested that these would be exploited, presumably for propaganda, by the Social Democrats.

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[50] Alan Bullock, Preface to Gehl, p.viii.

[51] Diamant, p.105.

[52] Diamant, pp.286-287.

[53] Andreas Lüer, 'Nationalismus in christlich-sozialen Programmen 1918-1933', *Zeitgeschichte*, 14,4 (1987): pp.147-166, here p.147.

[54] Gehl, p.3.

[55] Edmondson, p.29. See also Steininger, '12 November 1918', p.96.

[56] AEDW WeCk, 1923.

Lojka is a realistic observer of the elections for the *Reichsrat* and Vienna City Council. In the national elections, the Christian Socials had risen from 42% to 45% of the vote, with the Social Democrats rising from 36% to just under 40%.[57] Not falling for the line that the Social Democrats were completely dominant, he believed that the National and City elections had turned out 'fifty-fifty' over all, but he recognised that in Vienna the 'Red floodtide' had not yet peaked. As evidence, he notes that in elections to the Währing district council, the Socialists did well and appeared to be moderate, but they were moving people into the area, through their building programmes, to 'arm themselves' for the next election.

Alongside these direct political references, Lojka took time to register his disgust at the opening by the City Council of a crematorium, despite a government ban on the development of such a facility.[58] Lojka believed the crematorium would find many customers among his 'dear compatriots', the Viennese.[59] Lojka must therefore have believed either that cremation would be spiritually dangerous for Catholics, or that it would be harmful to the Church. Cremation, along with modernity in general, had been seen by some in the Church as a sin. It had even been associated by some Austrian clerics with plots by Protestant Pan-Germans to trick Austria's Catholics into losing their souls. These clerics declared that the dead should be buried, not cremated.[60] If Lojka believed that the crematorium would be harmful to the Church, this might have been on the grounds that it deprived the Church of income from funerals or that it was a further step in the separation of the people from the Church. Whatever the reason, Lojka was clear in his mind that this was yet another action by the City in its *Kulturkampf*.[61] Lojka was being perhaps unduly pessimistic, but he had some cause. In Vienna at this period, thousands were estimated to be leaving the Church every year, with the figure peaking at 23,000 in 1922.[62] Despite this, and despite suffering from illness over the next two years or so, he was able to report that while the *Stolla*, the official income of the parish, was falling, the number of participants at mass was up, as was their contribution to collections.[63]

While Lojka pursued a line in support of Austrian independence, occasionally a priest would take a different direction. In 1921, Father Leopold Schmid, then a curate at Adam

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[57] Edmondson, p.35.

[58] AEDW WeCk 1923.

[59] AEDW WeCk 1923.

[60] Persifor Frazer, 'A Recent Chapter in the Modernist Controversy', *The American Journal of Theology*, (1909), Vol.13, No.2, pp.238-259.

[61] AEDW WeCk, 1923.

[62] Viktor Reimann, *Innitzer: Kardinal zwischen Hitler und Rom*, (Vienna: Molden, 1967), p.27.

[63] AEDW WeCk, 1925.

Latschka's old parish of Perchtoldsdorf, was actively supporting the Pan-Germans.[64] Schmid – who will be encountered again later in this work, as parish priest at St. Rochus – recognised that a Pan-German audience would be sceptical about his involvement in their cause, given the Church's long-standing support for an independent Austria, so he set out his own position. At a rally in April 1921, he told his audience that all of Austria's 'Christian German brothers' needed to stand together, regardless of their denomination. Once this happened, the problems of the class struggle and the 'Jewish question' would become resolvable. Schmid urged Austria's Catholics to take their German co-religionists as role models for how they should view Germany, and to give up on the idea of an independent Austria. Schmid assured his audience that, whatever their public statements, most priests in Vienna privately supported a Pan-German line.[65] This was either an exaggeration or a misunderstanding on Schmid's part. In general, Vienna's priests did not support Schmid's suggestions for the abandoning of Austria.

Political activity by priests varied from parish to parish. At Neu-Ottakring, Father Leopold Rössler had taken office in 1912, and he stayed until October 1938. His correspondence and *Chronik* entries between these dates show no signs of political activity. At Alt-Ottakring in the early 1920s, the ageing Father Pax also seems to have had no involvement in politics, but he did become involved in a very public libel trial. The editor of a local newspaper, the *Ottakringer Bezirksblatt,* accused a lay church assistant of financial wrong-doing. Pax defended his assistant, but this opened a can of worms. The running of the parish and its finances were called into question and an investigation was launched, chaired by a Christian Social MP.[66] To the embarrassment of all connected with the parish, Pax lost the libel case.[67]

During the enquiry, Pax had been assisted by a curate, Father Karl Schwarz, who had been appointed with the specific brief of looking after those spiritual aspects of the job which were now beyond the elderly Pax. Schwarz went well beyond his remit and, by the end of the libel trial, he was well known to the Ordinariat. Schwarz showed himself to be a man of wide interests, including petitioning to hold masses according to Armenian and Ukrainian rites.[68] Schwarz had taken up the cause of former military men in his parish. He had made repeated representations on their behalf to the Ordinariat for space to be made available for a

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[64] *St. Rochus Pfarrblatt*, hereafter *SR Pfarrblatt*, March 1938, citing *Deutsches Volksblatt* of 17th April 1921, pp.53-57.

[65] *SR Pfarrblatt*, March 1938, citing *Deutsches Volksblatt* of 17th April 1921, pp.53-57.

[66] AEDW AOCor, 20th April 1923.

[67] Numerous pieces of correspondence between parish and Ordinariat cover the case. AEDW AoCor, 1923-1927 e.g. 5th June 1923, a letter of support for Pax, but also 22nd May 1927 Schwarz to Ordinariat on the loss of the case.

[68] AEDW AoCor, 9th January 1923.

war memorial to be consecrated at the Alt-Ottakring parish church.[69] At a time when the Church was concerned that such memorials might take on political significance, Schwarz was persistent in his request, eventually succeeding.[70] Then, after the libel trial, he pushed for the removal of Pax. Pax, he declared, had embarrassed the Church by supporting a man generally considered to be a liar.[71] Pax was effectively frozen out, then retired, leaving Schwarz in day-to-day control of the parish. Cardinal Archbishop Piffl then made Schwarz parish priest, as Schwarz had shown himself 'worthy and suitable' to take the parish, with immediate effect.[72]

Courts and libel trials were one way of settling disputes, but Austria was afflicted by underlying violence throughout the 1920s. Right-wing groups such as the *Heimwehr*, a militia often linked with the Christian Social Party, but which also had links with other radical Right parties, clashed with the Social Democratic militia, the *Schutzbund*. The *Heimwehr*, and similar Right-wing militias, traced their origins back to the end of the First World War. They justified their continued existence into the middle and late 1920s by pointing to a 'Red Threat'.[73]

Right-wing militias were, to some extent, reflections of, and extensions to, the Right-wing government coalition. The *Heimwehr*, for instance, was not a party-based organisation. Its members came from all parties of the Right and none. *Heimwehr* provincial organisations were normally run by a committee in proportion to the local strength of Christian Socials and German nationalists.[74] It was also not a single, national organisation, more a federation of provincial *Heimwehren*, reflecting local concerns. The strength of the movement lay in the rural areas, and it has been estimated that 70% were peasants.[75] The lack of strong central leadership often led to internal divisions, complemented by clashes with other groups on the Right, such as with the more 'nationalistic' *Heimatschutz* in Styria in the early 1920s. Unsuccessful attempts were made to unite these groups, including an effort by Seipel to win finance for a strong, unified anti-Socialist force in 1921.[76] Nevertheless, they remained a possible source of armed support for the Right-wing government.[77]

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[69] AEDW AoCor, Schwarz's note of 23rd January 1923.

[70] AEDW AoCor, 28th April 1926.

[71] AEDW AoCor, 22nd May 1927, Schwarz to Ordinariat.

[72] AEDW AOCor, 30th March 1928, Piffl to Schwarz.

[73] Edmondson, p.40.

[74] Edmondson, p.59.

[75] Lauridsen, p.151.

[76] Edmondson, pp.28-30 and p.37.

[77] Edmondson, p.39.

Violence took on many forms, and language continued to become more violent too. By the 1920s, Deckert's once controversial antisemitic sentiments had become commonplace among significant sections of the population. For instance, multi-page flyers produced in this decade by the Währing–based *Karl-Lueger-Bund* proudly promoted German and openly antisemitic societies in that district. These flyers could list up to fifty societies publicising their gatherings.[78] German, in these circles, was shorthand for non-Jewish, and this aspect of language can be seen in many sources.

In July 1926, the Vienna-based gymnastics organisation *Deutscher Turnerbund (1919)* organised the Second Federal Gymnastics Festival, in Vienna.[79] Its commemorative programme included that perennial feature of nationalist publications, a list of 'German' businesses. The definition of German seems to have had some flexibility, as the list includes business owners with Slavic names such as Maly and Plaschkowitz. The *Deutschösterreichsiche Tages-Zeitung* advertised here, describing itself as 'the only independent people's (*völkisch*) newspaper in Vienna'. Whereas previous publications by gymnastic groups had stressed the words German and Christian, this commemorative programme indicates that changes were in progress. The word Aryan appears in an advertisement for a department store, the *Arisches Warenhaus* in Währing. The *Warenhaus* clearly had a view on what would appeal to those who attended the gymnastics festival. The word 'Aryan' has been carefully selected, as it does not appear in advertising in other publications, where it appears simply as the *Warenhaus* on the Währingergürtel.[80] An advertisement for the *Österreichischer Beobachter*, an Austrian version of a German National Socialist paper, indicates that the Nazis believed the gymnastics event might be a fruitful recruiting ground.

Other groups participated in a range of activities where efforts were being made to shape Austria's German identity. Catholic and nationalist theatre groups frequently used the opportunities and occasions presented by the churches with which they were associated in order to disseminate a Catholic, German message. In 1926, the *Verband katholischer Schriftsteller und Schriftstellerinnen Österreichs* organised plays at churches and religious sites across Vienna. Among those taking part in these groups was playwright Richard von Kralik.[81]

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[78] *Mitteilungen christlicher Vereine in Währing*, available in the Austrian National Library for 1924 to 1929.

[79] Commemorative programme for *Festordnung des 2. Bundesturnfestes in Wien*, 15th-18th July 1926 , in ABPD 1926-1927.

[80] For instance *RP*, 27th April 1927, p.1.

[81] Beniston, p.175.

As Richard Geehr has pointed out, Kralik pointed to scapegoats for the causes and consequences of war.[82] He promoted his version of a German-Christian message. In the 1920s, Kralik continued his association with the *Christlich-deutsche Volksbühne*. In 1923, the tenth anniversary issue of the group's magazine quoted him at length:

> 'The purpose of our People's Theatre is to bring to the consciousness of each and every one in our fellow national community [*Volksgenossen*], in a lively way, the ideal goods of a nation, in a form in which they have become, in the Christian German cultural circle, the spiritual property of the German tribe. Our Art is formed out of the people themselves'.[83]

As Kralik put it: 'To our people, the theatre is no business, but a national institution'. This manifesto-like declaration from Kralik is counter-signed by Josef Rütsch, leader of the Catholic *Vogelsangverein*, and Michel *(sic)* Röbauer, Deputy Chairman of the North East Vienna section of the *Alldeutsches Verband*. The *christlich-deutsche Volksbühne* was a common ground for those with radical German views of various kinds.

From 1922 onwards, the early plays of Kralik were revived for young performers. Everything associated with the group was calculated to present an image of German Christianity, down to the Gothic script and Catholic imagery of posters for its productions. This was a widespread activity, as the *Volksbühne* aided many groups in many districts. One of these alone, the *Spielleute Gottes*, gave 2700 performances, by invitation only, between 1925 and 1933, approximately one performance every day.[84] It was a group that was well regarded in some sections of the Viennese press.[85]

Kralik used *Reichspost* to voice antisemitic and anti-democratic viewpoints.[86] He published pamphlets which targeted younger readers and aimed to draw them into an antisemitic orbit, but the antisemitic context in which his plays were performed was as important as their overt content.[87] Not every member of these groups, not even every group, would have had an exclusionary purpose, nor would every member have been susceptible to these messages, but activity layered upon activity in spreading exclusionary messages. Practising Catholics who participated in these groups were exposed to sermons and parish newsletters which urged

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[82] Geehr, *Kralik*, p.103.

[83] *Christlich-Deutsche-Volksbühne*, undated, but calculated as 1923, as it refers to being 'true to our ten year tradition'. The *Volksbühne* was founded around 1913. Available in WBiR, catalogue E 70795.

[84] Beniston, p.117 and p.170.

[85] See review in *WZ*, 4th October 1933, p.9.

[86] Geehr, *Kralik*, p.91 and p.103.

[87] Geehr, *Kralik*, p.22 and p.104.

Christians to 'buy only from Christians' and only to read the 'Christian' press – in other words, not the 'Jewish' press.[88] As has been seen, Kralik could extend the boundaries of who might be allowed to belong to include Pan-Germans, whether Catholic or not, as long as they were Christian.

A Muted War

In April 1927, elections took place for the national parliament and for the Vienna *Rathaus*. Christian Socials and Pan-Germans stood together on a 'Unity List', the *Einheitsliste*. In the municipal elections, the Socialists retained control of the *Rathaus*, with no change in the number of their representatives. The *Einheitsliste* polled 35% of the vote in Vienna, far from a majority, but still a substantial proportion of the vote. In the national elections, the *Einheitsliste* won 85 seats, down from its previous combined total of 92. The Socialists moved up to 42% and 83 seats. The largely anticlerical Agrarian League progressed from five seats to nine. It was persuaded to bury its differences with the Christian Socials and to enter government, in the interests of a common bourgeois front. The bourgeois coalition now had 94 seats, two more than before, and the Christian Socials, still under Monsignor Seipel, emerged as leaders of the government.[89] Perhaps fear helped to bond the parties of the Right. The Social Democrats were now the largest single party in parliament, and might still have capacity to grow further.

On the day after the election, the Christian Social *Reichspost* pointed to setbacks for the Pan-Germans, who lost the last two parliamentary seats they had held in Vienna. *Reichspost* declared, probably with some relief: 'Marxist Victory Thwarted'.[90] The liberal *Neue Freie Presse*, traditionally a target for *Reichspost* because of its alleged Jewish connections, was no less triumphalist, with a headline of: 'Social Democratic Assault Beaten Back'. It continued: 'Austria will not be ruled by Marxists.... the high water mark of the red terror has been reached'.[91] While differences existed between Christian Socials and German nationalists, these could often be overcome for common bourgeois purposes. Only the most extreme Nationalists, very few in number, stayed away from coalition. Despite later attempts at the 'decoupling of Christian Socials and the German nationalists', they 'shared political positions on a range of domestic issues' throughout the First Republic.[92]

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[88] Scholz and Heinisch, pp.57-65.

[89] Edmondson, p.43.

[90] *RP,* 25th April 1927, p.1.

[91] *NFP,* 25th April 1927, p.1.

[92] Thorpe, p.7.

At the time of the elections, tensions between Left and Right were even higher than usual under the Republic. In January of that year, a Socialist outing had turned into a political demonstration. Fighting broke out between the Socialists and members of a Right-wing veterans' association, the *Frontkämpfervereinigung*. Shots from the *Frontkämpfervereinigung* killed a man and child among the Socialists. The trial of those alleged to have committed the killings took place in July 1927 but, despite the evidence against them, the accused were acquitted. Socialist-supporting centres exploded into violence. In riots in Vienna, the Palace of Justice was burnt down, the army was called in and, in the subsequent action, nearly ninety workers were killed and six hundred wounded. [93]

The public reaction of Social Democratic leaders was to blame the Vienna chief of police, Johann Schober, for these latest killings of workers. Schober, who had also been police chief under the Habsburgs, now also led a Pan-German party in the national coalition with the Christian Socials.[94] He had also expressed sympathy with Right-wing militias such as the *Heimwehr*.[95] The Socialists denounced Schober as an 'assassin'. Even a priest, Father Lojka, forgot the seriousness of murder, favouring property rights over life. He noted that the 1927 disturbances were nothing more than the result of the Socialists becoming worked up about some of their number being shot by people legally protecting their property.[96] Condemnations and recriminations came from all sides, and there were fears that serious armed confrontations would lead to civil war. The Church made calls for its followers to join the *Heimwehr*.[97] The Socialists called on their followers to leave the Church.[98] Somehow, the situation calmed. Violence was still a frequent occurrence, but remained sporadic rather than systematic. The main violence was between paramilitaries from the Social Democrats on the one hand and *Heimwehr*-like groups on the other.[99]

In the late 1920s, for all the talk of a 'Red Menace', and while the Social Democrats were still nominally in control of Vienna, the Party's position would come under threat from the superior forces that could back up the government if violence provoked a real crisis. The events of 1927 had given the impetus to what has been described as 'a sustained counter-revolutionary thrust and the rapid growth of the *Heimwehr'*.[100] Certainly, the radical Right

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[93] Lauridsen, pp.131-132.

[94] Reimann, pp.32-33.

[95] Lauridsen, p.131.

[96] AEDW WeCk, 1927.

[97] Lauridsen, p.133.

[98] Edmondson, p.49.

[99] Kurt Bauer, 'Die kalkulierte Eskalation', in Kos, ed., pp.35-45.

[100] Edmondson, p.9.

would have viewed its activities as counter-revolutionary, in terms of threatening to prevent by force the political, social and economic objectives of the Social Democrats, but it was elements of the Right that were behaving in a revolutionary manner, acting against the Republic.

The events of Schattendorf, and of July 1927, have been singled out as the last chance for the warring groups of the Republic to lay down their arms, metaphorically and literally, and to work together.[101] Yet, little more than a year later, a major event to commemorate the centenary of the death of one of Vienna's most famous citizens, Franz Schubert, organised under the banner of the *Deutscher Sängerbund*, was attended by singers of all political persuasions.[102] Leading political figures from all parties greeted the participants in July 1928: Social Democratic mayor of Vienna Karl Seitz; Christian Social chancellor Cardinal Seipel and German nationalist and Vienna police chief Johannes Schober.[103] Police estimated that 200,000 singers came from all over the territory of the former Habsburg and German Empires. During the eight days over which the event took place, much attention was paid to Schubert as a 'true son of Germany', but the event took on a political tone. Spontaneous cries rang out, calling for *Anschluss*.[104] Remarkably, given the events of the year before, and despite new reports of a *Heimwehr* shooting of participants in a worker's gathering in Au bei Kapfenberg, no trouble was reported at the *Schubertfest*.[105]

One interpretation of the Schubert centenary is that it disproves that Schattendorf and its consequences were terminal for relationships between Austria's competing groups. It should be seen as an occasion at which Austrians could put aside their differences and rally to a Pan-German cause. German solidarity was certainly on display during the event but, as has already been shown, this had very different meanings for different people. The event did demonstrate that a broad form of Pan-Germanism could bring people together – as did the music of Schubert – but this was a passing moment. It is just as important, for this study, to assess what the behaviour of delegates would have been away from the event. Before the event, singers would have operated within their own, politically defined groups, whether Social Democrat or bourgeois, something recognised within the Social Democratic ranks. The Social Democrats went so far as to say that, while this was an event which demonstrated what would happen if Austrians were granted self-determination, they were the modern and

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[101] Edmondson, p.49.

[102] See Gabriele Eder, *Wiener Musikfeste zwischen 1918 und 1938*, (Vienna: Geyer, 1991), pp.200-242.

[103] *RP*, 23rd July 1928, p.1.

[104] *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, hereafter *AZ*, 23rd July 1928, pp.3-4.

[105] Helmut Loos, 'Franz Schubert im Repertoire der deutschen Männergesangvereine. Ein Beitrag zur Rezeptionsgeschichte', *Archiv für Musikwissenschaft*, Vol. 57. No, 2. (2000), 113-129.

progressive side of a German future, compared with the nostalgia on display in the *Trachtl* and carriages of those on the Right who looked to the past.[106] Too much should not be read into Pan-Germanism as a single unifying force. The agendas and objectives of the groups that gathered for the celebrations would have been very different, as would their visions of society. After the event, despite their common desire for a union with the kind of Germany that was on offer in 1928, they would go their own ways.

In late 1929, Monsignor Seipel was a prominent figure in a group that wished to replace parts of the constitution, to the extent that the Republic would be transformed along an 'authoritarian course'. Under these plans, the government would be run by a directly elected president with extensive powers, supported by a corporate chamber in Parliament. Seipel expected that support in these objectives, if he needed resort to arms, would come from the *Heimwehr*. The risk to democracy was such that Western governments threatened to withhold loans that were needed to keep the economy running. In the end, the threats were not carried out.[107]

Chancellor Schober entered into secret negotiations with the Social Democrats to achieve reform through legal means.[108] In December 1929, a compromise agreement gave strong powers to the President, who could now issue emergency decrees, at least for a limited period. The President could also dissolve Parliament. Local government, including the Socialist stronghold of Vienna, was left largely untouched. This was not the outcome that Seipel, and others around him, had intended. Parliament may now have had to share power with the President, but democracy was intact. While Seipel may have lost this battle, he felt he had not lost the war. He lamented that 'people are dissatisfied with the old forms of democracy and parliamentarism', and predicted further turmoil before his kinds of reforms could be implemented.[109] Seipel, and others on the Right, were disappointed that a more authoritarian stance, which would have favoured the national government that they controlled, had not been approved.

Seipel and his German Nationalist allies found less agreement on the state in which they saw their future. While Seipel had been publicly ambiguous towards *Anschluss*, foreign observers noted that in late 1929 he was changing his position. Seipel was 'coming out

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[106] *AZ*, 23rd July 1928, p.1.

[107] On Seipel and authoritaranism, see Edmondson, pp.90-94.

[108] On the reform planse, see Edmondson, pp.83-94.

[109] Edmondson, p.91.

definitely, though of course not publicly, as an opponent of the *Anschluss*…'.[110] This did not stop Seipel from writing in private in 1930 that he had 'no objection' to *Anschluss*, but he did not want 'agitation'. He felt that Austrians, from their Habsburg heritage, were a 'big state' people, suited to a larger role in European politics.[111]

Seipel may have had 'no objection', but he was no enthusiast for *Anschluss* and he could say one thing while meaning another. In 1928, in an exchange of private correspondence in which he states he has no objection to *Anschluss*, Seipel writes of his belief that Austria's Germans were part of a larger community not just of Germans but of Central Europeans:

> The question of whether or not *Anschluss* ought to come at any time is bound up with the other question of whether or not the Austrian Germans have trifled away their historical task for all time. This mission might be placed before them once more, either as an Austrian, an eastern European, a central European, or a pan-European task.[112]

Seipel personified the position of many in the Christian Social party. They viewed Austria as their rightful home, but they saw other homes, interpreted in many ways, in Germany and Central Europe. Their Pan-German heritage was, however, only part of their identity. They would have viewed the Republic as nothing more than a provisional stage in a longer Austrian history.

Father Lojka in Weinhaus certainly opposed the idea of union with Germany, but he was no supporter of the Republic. As has been seen, he was an antisemite who objected to anything that had the flavour, for him, of Socialism or Freemasonry. By 1930, his *Chronik* entries show that he was turning against the Republic and democracy in other ways. While most of Lojka's concerns seem to have been of the everyday kind, he continued to be a keen chronicler of political developments He wrote at length about the *Heimwehr* and one of its leaders, Richard Steidle. Steidle was a man who had 'finally unmasked himself and declared that the *Heimwehr* rejects democracy and parliamentarianism'.[113] Lojka welcomed 'with an open heart' the *Heimwehr*'s intentions to use Fascism as the basis on which to build society.[114] He was not alone. Elements of disaffected bourgeois society did the same and,

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[110] Medlicott, W.N., Dakin, D.D., Lambert, M.E. eds., *Documents On British Foreign Policy 1919-1939 Series 1A, Vol VII*, (London: HMSO, 1975), p.51.

[111] Thorpe, p.30.

[112] Seipel, in Paul R. Sweet, 'Seipel's Views on Anschluss in 1928: An Unpublished Exchange of Letters', *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Dec., 1947), pp. 320-323.

[113] AEDW WeCk, 1930.

[114] AEDW WeCk, 1930.

continuing a long tradition of political involvement, trade groups in the 1920s maintained links with radical groups such as the *Heimwehr.*[115]

Lojka wrote approvingly of Steidle and followed Seipel in extolling an authoritarian approach to government that would replace democracy but, by 1930, this was not just the opinion of a few individuals in the fractious political climate of Vienna and Austria. Across Central and Eastern Europe, many of the 'nation states' founded in the aftermath of the First World War had shed their democratic constitutions. From Latvia through Poland to Hungary, authoritarian régimes had taken power one after the other, claiming that such steps were necessary to deal with economic and social crises, or to protect the state from the Soviet Union to the East.[116] Some modelled themselves, to some extent, on Mussolini's Fascist Italy, and it was well known that the *Heimwehr* received subsidies from Mussolini, in the shape of cash and arms.[117] Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that the *Heimwehr* was a home grown movement, whose origins were deep in Austria.[118]

Lojka would have been aware of this, and of the swearing by the *Heimwehr* in 1930 of the Korneuburg oath, an undertaking to work to take power in order to renew the state and defeat those who promoted class struggle.[119] This oath also declared the state to be the embodiment of the *Volksgemeinschaft*, the community of the people. Lojka's *Chronik* hinted heavily that he thought this Fascist style approach was an idea which might be applied successfully in Austria.[120] It was not clear, however, what that Fascist style would be, nor where it would lead. The *Heimwehr* was initially split over the question of *Anschluss*. It was also clearly fascist leaning, but divided as to whether it should see its role models in Germany or Italy. In April 1930, Steidle won financial support from Italy. By September of that year, the far more German leaning Prince Ernst Rüdiger von Starhemberg had forced him out.[121] To some extent, whether Austrians took a position for or against *Anschluss* was irrelevant since, even in 1930, the *Entente* powers were not prepared to allow such a move. In 1930, the French banned the signing of the trade agreement between Austria and Germany as, in their view, this was a step towards *Anschluss*.[122]

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[115] Ernst Hanisch, *Lange Schatten*, p.105.

[116] Johnson, *Central Europe*, pp.197-201.

[117] Edmondson, pp.77-78.

[118] Lauridsen, pp.95-96.

[119] Tálos and Neugebauer, p.421; Edmondson, pp.97-101.

[120] AEDW WeCk 1930.

[121] Gehl, p.47.

[122] See Low, *Anschluss 1931-1938*, pp.42-45.

A Political Reconfiguration

In November 1930, national elections took place. The Social Democratic Party emerged as the largest party, with 41% of the vote nationally and 72 seats, but short of a majority. The *Heimwehr* broke its normal non-party stance and fielded its own candidates, giving it the appearance of being yet another political party.[123] *Heimwehr* leaders in Styria and Salzburg had wanted to work with the National Socialists, while others elsewhere favoured the Christian Socials. The *Heimwehr* won 6.2% of the vote and eight seats.[124] In the end, the Christian Socials fell back to a little under 36% of the vote and 66 seats. In order to form a governing coalition, the Christian Socials needed the support of Schober, who had established his own grouping, the *Nationaler Wirtschaftsblock und Landbund*, which polled 11.6% and gained 19 seats.

In Vienna itself, the 1930 elections gave the Christian Socials a bigger shock. In the 1923 national elections, they had been far the biggest party of the Right in Vienna, and with nearly 340,000 supporters they had commanded more than six times the support of the Pan-Germans. The Christian Socials must have been shocked in 1930 as, in Vienna, the Pan-Germans surged past 150,000 votes, and the Christian Social Party fell back to 283,000 votes. If the Pan-Germans were not snapping at the tails of the Christian Socials, they did now at least have them in sight.[125]

At this time, the National Socialists were far from being a threat in Austria. In national elections in Germany in September 1930, they had polled 18%.[126] In the 1930 Austrian elections, they polled three per cent and won no seats.[127] They were not, though, without admirers. Prince Starhemberg was happy that a large number of votes on the Right had gone against the government, and he was convinced that the *Heimwehr* and the National Socialists would eventually join together.[128] His vision was to reunite all Germans and, in October 1930, he declared:

> We are all conscious that we are a German people; we want to make the old *Ostmark* German and Christian again; this will be only the first stage, until a

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[123] Lauridsen, p.195 and p.442.

[124] Gehl, p.47.

[125] The sources for these voting figures are: Seliger and Ucakar, Vol. 2, pp.1158-1178; *RP* 22nd October 1923, and 25th April 1932; *NFP* 22nd October 1923.

[126] *RP*, 15th September 1930; *dkB*, 15th September 1930.

[127] *RP*, 15th November 1930; *dkB*, 15th November 1930.

[128] Gehl, p.47.

> greater German Empire comes into being, which will last for many thousand years.[129]

He vowed that he would now 'lead the *Heimwehr* under the Pan-German idea against the Parliamentary parties'.[130] Starhemberg was hoping to take it back to a state where it would be perceived as 'above class', for the whole *Volksgemeinschaft*.[131] This was to be a pipe dream, and Starhemberg had significantly overestimated his own and his movement's capabilities and appeal. In Provincial Elections in 1931, the *Heimwehr* won no seats. Starhemberg was forced out as leader, then brought back again when his successor, Walter Pfrimer, took part in a failed *Putsch* in September 1931.[132]

A little over six months later, in April 1932, the political climate had become even more radicalised. In Germany, Nazi paramilitary units had taken to the streets. In Austria too, especially in Vienna, these units stepped up their attacks and somehow evaded justice, for the most part.[133] The Nazis put themselves forward as 'men of action', brave enough to take the 'necessary steps' to remedy the situation. In Germany, they were beginning to have success in this portrayal. If the Nazis could repeat their German successes in Austria, they might threaten Austrian independence.

SUMMARY

Elements on the Right struggled to find an accommodation with the Austrian Republic that came into existence in 1920. Its constitution, according to some, was an alien imposition, and some believed that, while the First World War was over, little more than the 'fiction of Peace' prevailed. Many on the Right gave Austria as a state only qualified support, as they aimed for an eventual *Anschluss*, and the Right as a whole expressed its antipathy to the new world in many ways. Social Democratic Vienna was pictured as a Bolshevik menace, another alien imposition. Vienna was presented in opposition to the 'true' heritage of Austria, in its rural heartlands.

In looking to turn back the clock to an idealised world, the Right tried to find ways forward. *Anschluss* was seen as one way out of the difficult economic conditions of the 1920s, but not by everyone. Chancellor Seipel was not alone, and not just among the clergy, in staying loyal to an independent Austria. His vision of Austria was not, however, democratic. It was

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[129] Gehl, p.47.

[130] Gehl, p.47.

[131] Ernst Hanisch, *Lange Schatten*, p.311.

[132] Gehl, p.48.

[133] See page 186 of this thesis.

the kind of Austria promoted by some bourgeois groups in familiar terms, as 'Christian German'. German nationalists and Christian Socials sometimes stood against each other in elections, while at other times they formed electoral alliances and put together coalition governments. In the militias, the barriers between them came down completely, as they mingled in local groups to protect bourgeois interests. The militias, many of which were formed at a time of instability in the immediate post-war period, became in turn a cause of instability.

The events of 1927 reinforced the division between a Socialist bloc on one side, and a bourgeois bloc on the other. As part of a wider pattern of reaction in Europe, the likes of Seipel were reinforced in their authoritarian instincts, and others who shared this view came to prominence, such as Steidle and Starhemberg. Their views found echoes in the parishes, such as in the Chronik of Father Lojka. They could agree that their principal target was Bolshevism. Seipel, Starhemberg and others could imagine Austria, somehow, as part of a Pan-German crusade in Europe, but they could not agree on how. In 1932, agreement, if it involved Anschluss, would have led nowhere anyway. Without the consent of the *Entente*, any such move would have been blocked in the League of Nations. In this, the pro-*Anschluss* Right was without great influence.

Yet, within Vienna, the Right did have influence, despite the political dominance of the Social Democrats at the City level. The long term influences, the language and ideas that had been promoted by antisemitic politicians and the likes of Fathers Abel and Deckert, were still coming through, as attested by witnesses such as Funder and Lojka. Their vision of how identity and belonging should be defined, as ethnic and exclusionary, was rooted deeply in sections of the Right, and taken to be a normal view of the world.

CHAPTER 9: 'THE HOTLY RESISTED *ANSCHLUSS*'

At the beginning of 1932, the Christian Socials remained the major party on the Right in Austria. Collectively, they supported Austrian independence, although some would have been of a mind that independent Austria did not have to be democratic. Christian Social strength was, however, uncertain. German nationalists had made great gains in the 1930 elections. The question in 1932 was whether elections to Vienna City Council would see the National Socialists mirror in Austria the growing electoral success of their German co-party. If so, the Nazis might threaten not just the democratic Republic, but the independence of Austria. Nevertheless, changes in Austrian domestic politics alone, without changes in the international political and diplomatic climates would be insufficient to bring about *Anschluss*.

This chapter divides the years 1932 to 1938 into four periods, each of which contains at least one major event in the shaping of Austrian history. In the first three of these periods, to 1936, the likelihood of *Anschluss* between Austria and Germany was slim. Only from mid-1936 could it be said that an imminent *Anschluss* began to look possible. This chapter does not go into international events in detail, important as they were for the mechanics of achieving *Anschluss*. This chapter shows instead how, right into the 1930s, those on the radical Right in Vienna, who wanted to pursue a policy of independence, remained a fairly coherent bloc, even if that bloc was beginning to erode at the edges. After 1933, and the Nazi seizure of power in Germany, the idea of *Anschluss* with Nazi Germany, was fiercely resisted by many antisemites.

This chapter begins to sum up answers to two key questions posed in this work, concerning the depth and extent of radical German nationalism in the city. It examines the question of whether, by early 1938, many who had previously supported an independent Austria now saw *Anschluss* as the primary means by which their radical German visions could be achieved. It does so by continuing to examine the activities of Pan-German and Christian Social activists, while looking at the impact on these circles of the rising Nazi Party. This chapter sets its analysis after 1934 against the background of changes to the political form of the Austrian state. It looks at whether, with regard to antisemitism, the practices, rather than the official policies, of the Corporate State helped to reinforce antisemitic and exclusionary visions of being German.

An End To Austrian Democracy

On 23rd April 1932, *Reichspost* reported a series of political terror attacks, indicating the Nazis as the prime culprits.[1] The newspaper also indirectly recognised the threat the Nazis now posed to the electoral base of the Christian Socials in Vienna, but less clearly. *Reichspost* was uncertain just how vulnerable the Christian Socials and the Pan-Germans were to the new threat from their Right, so the extent of the breakthrough that the National Socialists then achieved in the elections of April 1932 to Vienna City Council must have been a huge shock.

On the day after the elections, 25th April 1932, the Viennese Socialist paper *Das kleine Blatt* trumpeted another successful campaign for the Social Democratic Party. Its front page shouted out: *Victorious in Vienna!* to indicate the Socialist hold on the Council. A smaller headline announced: 'Swastika men halve the Christian Socials and annihilate the Pan-Germans'.[2] The figures made depressing reading for the Christian Socials. The Social Democrats dominated, with 682,323 out of over 1.1 million votes. The Christian Socials lagged far behind, on 233,461. The most remarkable result, however, was that achieved by the Nazis.

The Nazis gathered 170,000 votes more than they had won in 1930, the previous elections that had involved the whole of Vienna. They reached over 200,000 votes in total. The Pan-Germans were almost wiped out. They lost most of their 150,000 supporters from 1930, and fell back to 35,000 votes. This was below even the levels of support they had achieved before their surge in 1930. Most, if not all, of their defecting supporters must have passed to the Nazis. Compared with the Social Democrats' 66 seats, the Christian Socials had 19 and the National Socialists now had 15. No other party was represented. *Das kleine Blatt* was clear how it viewed the result: 'The Christian Socials are defeated – now on to battle with the Swastika men!'[3]

The result as it affected the Right in Vienna was replicated in large part in places where elections were held across Austria. Christian Socials were repeatedly challenged by the Nazis for their leading position on the Right. In elections to the Salzburg *Landtag*, the Christian Socials retained twelve of their thirteen seats, but lost the majority they had previously held there. They also lost sole control of Lower Austria, but the big losers again

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[1] *RP*, 23rd April 1932, p.4, reports on the stabbing of a Schutzbund member in Liesing and a 'stormy election gathering' in Hadersdorf-Weidlingau. See also *dkB*, 25th April 1932, p.3, on a bomb attack in Linz.

[2] *dkB*, 25th April 1932, p.1.

[3] *dkB*, 25th April 1932, p.1.

were the Pan-Germans, who lost all five seats they had held.[4] In municipal elections in towns other than the provincial capitals in Carinthia and Styria, the Social Democratic Party had mixed fortunes. The Party claimed that its vote was down in areas where workers had left because of unemployment. In other towns, the Left vote held up.[5] *Das kleine Blatt* favoured a Social Democratic interpretation of results, noting that the Social Democrats' figures held up in Vienna at a level comparable with the elections of 1930. The Christian Social *Reichspost* agreed, but from a different point of view. 'No red Austria' was its lead. It continued: 'Explosion of National Socialism, but great losses for the moderate bourgeois parties'.[6]

On the same day, *Das kleine Blatt* reported the results of elections to state assemblies in Germany: 'Huge Successes For The National Socialists'.[7] In Prussia, eight million had voted for the Nazis, compared with 4.7 million for the Social Democrats, 3.4 million for the Catholic party, the *Zentrum*, 2.8 million for the Communists and 1.5 million for the German nationalists. While these results were impressive for the National Socialists, and no doubt a sign of what might happen in Austria, the Nazis had still not managed a majority in Prussia. The pattern was repeated in Bavaria, Anhalt and Württemberg.[8]

The figures across Vienna strongly indicate that the Nazis had made their gains almost exclusively from former supporters of the Christian Socials and the Pan-Germans.[9] The total Nazi gain was 173,000, while the combined losses for the Christian Socials and the Pan-Germans were 165,134. In many districts, the gains made by the Nazis were extremely close to the joint losses of the Christian Socials and Pan-Germans. In Simmering, the bourgeois parties lost 1,347 votes and the Nazis gained 1,166. In Favoriten, the bourgeois parties lost 7,545 votes compared with 7,288 gained by the Nazis. Only in Floridsdorf did Nazi gains significantly exceed these losses, which initially appears to suggest that, in this district, voters from other parties also crossed over. However, turnout was up significantly in Floridsdorf on that of 1930, and the Social Democrats also gained over 2,000 votes.[10] As John Lauridsen has observed:

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[4] *dkB*, 25th April 1932, p.2 and p.11.

[5] *dkB*, 25th April 1932, p.2.

[6] *RP*, 25th April 1932, p.1

[7] *dkB*, 25th April 1932, p.3.

[8] *dkB*, 25th April 1932, p.3.

[9] Appendix E for details of the results in the districts.

[10] Appendix E, Table 1.

> 'The political reconfiguration [of 1930 to 1933] took place not between the blocs, but within the bourgeois bloc. Furthermore, it was not only the adherents of the national camp who found their way to Nazism'.[11]

The claim by *Das kleine Blatt* that the Christian Socials had seen their support halved was an exaggeration, but the party had lost about eighteen per cent of its vote. The Pan-Germans, by contrast, lost three voters in four.

The near elimination of the Pan-Germans shifted the political landscape. If repeated at the national level, this would remove a potential government coalition ally from the Christian Socials. While the Christian Socials had been able to find a *modus vivendi* with the Pan-Germans, it was unlikely that the Nazis would accept a being junior partners of the Christian Socials. The Christian Socials were also now on the verge of becoming a minority party on the Right in Vienna. In five districts, they were displaced by the Nazis as the largest Right-wing party. In a further four, Nazi and Pan-German votes combined exceeded the Christian Social total.[12] The Christian Socials now had clear water between themselves and their opponents to the Right in very few districts.

After 1918, the Party had accepted that it would have to play second fiddle in Vienna to the Social Democrats, as it had expected. The new prospect of falling further down the political pecking order would have been a shock. The Nazis had roots in predecessor parties in Austria, not just in Germany, but only recently had they begun to develop an extensive party organisation in Austria. This was paying off.[13] Well informed Christian Social leaders would have been aware that membership of the Nazi Party, from a low base, was growing.[14] Nazi successes in the elections shook the national government. The Buresch administration fell and was replaced by one led by Engelbert Dollfuss, who became Chancellor on 20th May 1932.[15] Dollfuss adopted the stance of a strongman, and brought the *Heimwehr* into his coalition government.[16] This further split the non-Nazi paramilitary Right, as the Styrian *Heimatschutz* immediately broke relations with the *Heimwehr*.[17]

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[11] Lauridsen, pp.90-91.

[12] See Appendix E, Table 2.

[13] Friedrich Funder, *Als Österreich den Sturm Bestand: Aus der ersten in die Zweite Republik*, (Vienna: Herold, 1957), p.57.

[14] Lauridsen, p.323-325.

[15] Tálos and Neugebauer, eds., p.421.

[16] Edmondson, pp.159-162.

[17] Edmondson, p.162.

Das kleine Blatt saw the National Socialists as 'the party of brutal reaction'.[18] Other opponents of the Nazis in Vienna saw something new, not just reaction, and some of the most vigorous of these opponents were Catholic priests. One such, Father Albert Schubert, was to be found in the district of Währing, at the church of St. Laurenz-Gertrud, where he was priest from 1923 to 1942. In his *Chronik,* Schubert, like his near neighbour Father Lojka, encountered earlier, combined the everyday with the political. In 1932, he recorded the plight of the unemployed and efforts to help them by the Church, Government and the City Council. He noted the shortages of fuel and food and, in particular, the effect of inflation on those *Mittelständer* with fixed or barely rising incomes. He paid great tribute to Cardinal Piffl, Archbishop of Vienna, who had died in April, just before the municipal elections.[19]

While the parishes of Schubert and Lojka are divided from each other by little more than a ten minute walk, and both lie within the district of Währing, the two men were divided from each other in their approach to politics. Schubert was in this respect much more directly engaged than Father Lojka. As well as his *Chronik*, he had an additional vehicle of record, his parish newsletter, the *St. Laurenz-Gertrud Pfarrblatt*, established in 1932.[20] A founding purpose of the newsletter was to provide a serialised history of the parish, which would give local people a better understanding of the church's roots in the district. The primary focus of the parish newsletter was religion, but it was also a favourite tool of Schubert's for talking about current events. In December 1932, he wrote that, while he did not engage in politics, he had to address the question of what the Nazi Party meant to religion. Schubert did not see the Nazis as a form of reaction. He recognised the Nazi Party not only as a political party, but as a totalitarian movement that aimed at forming people's *Weltanschauung*. Because many Catholics and even Protestants had shown that this was a dangerous movement for them, he had a responsibility to speak up. As he put it: 'Should I be a dog who fails to bark when enemies break in?'[21]

At the time when Schubert was writing, the Nazi Party was growing in strength. It made gains in provincial elections in November, 1932 and April 1933.[22] In the Viennese district of Währing, where Father Schubert was based, the Nazi Party had polled over 15,000 votes in the recent election. This made it the largest party of the Right in Währing, with 28 per

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[18] *dkB*, 25th April 1932, p.3.

[19] AEDW WeCk, 1932.

[20] Issue number 1 of the newsletter, from May 1932, is pasted into the *Chronik*, AEDW WäCk.

[21] *St. Laurenz-Gertrudsblatt*, hereafter *SLG Pfarrblatt*, December 1932.

[22] Tálos and Neugebauer, eds., pp.421-422.

cent of turnout.[23] The party was able to produce a newsletter of its own, the *NS Nachrichten für den XVIII Bezirk*, and its December 1932 issue ran to 32 pages. There were the expected propaganda pieces, including one attacking Jews for exploiting Gentiles in the Christmas trade, but the paper also carried nearly five pages of advertising.[24] There were advertisements for small shops, delicatessens, radios for rental or purchase, skiing equipment, and for a French lady who taught English and Italian. The businesses that advertised were not just in Währing, but from other districts, including Alsergrund, the Josefstadt, Wieden and the *Innere Stadt*. Advertisements appeared for the perfumery Floris, in Vienna's richest shopping street, Graben. Floris described itself as an 'Aryan firm'. The *Altes Währinger Brauhaus*, in the very smart and respectable Gentzgasse, declared itself to be the meeting place of the local Nazi Party.[25] This local party was attracting members, and these businesses did not want to miss out on their custom.

Schubert was therefore taking on a significant local enemy. His comments in the December 1932 issue of his parish newsletter stirred up trouble with the Nazi Party in Währing. They condemned his intervention in politics as part of a general trend for priests to act as propaganda agents for the Christian Socials. In the January 1933 edition, Schubert asked why the Christian Socials complained of a lack of clerical support if priests were intervening on their behalf. He added the reasons for his comments against the Nazis. 'Above all, I confirm that I distance myself from this movement not because of its political aims, but purely because of its world view.'[26] He re-affirmed that a priest had a duty to lead, as politics had a cultural dimension. 'First and foremost, I am a Catholic priest, and I am so from complete conviction'. He had no classes of 'parish children'. They were all the same to him, whatever their political allegiance, even if some had strayed.

Schubert went on to rebut claims, made in letters he had received, that Hitler was a prophet. This was not, he says, compatible with Catholicism. Nazism was more like an 'idolatrous cult', foreign to the German way, and he quoted Bismarck: 'Bow only to God, not men!' To make sure his parishioners understood that the Church was united on the matter, he stated that he was not alone in this belief and his curates fully supported him.[27] Schubert, however, was not just replying to Nazi attacks on his intervention in politics. He had a second reason for writing. His 'national feeling had been called into doubt', even though he had an 'inner

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[23] Appendix E.

[24] *NS Nachrichten für den XVIII Bezirk* (hereafter *NS Nachrichten*), December 1932, p.2.

[25] *NS Nachrichten*, December 1932, pp.29-32.

[26] *SLG Pfarrblatt*, January 1933.

[27] *SLG Pfarrblatt*, January 1933.

love for our German people' and his whole heart reached out to his Sudeten German Homeland. He reminded his readers that he was, after all, an honorary member of a *Landsmannschaft*, a cultural and welfare organisation called '*Riesengebirge*', based in Trautenau, Bohemia.[28]

This reference to his Sudeten background would have carried considerable weight with his readers. The Sudetenland had connotations both as a German heartland and a place that was at that time said to be under threat from a Czechoslovak government allegedly discriminating against Germans there. This reference placed Schubert firmly in the vanguard of German culture and its defence. In January 1933, Schubert added to this image, when he defended himself from accusations by Nazis in the Währing district that he was close to Jews. Father Schubert wrote in the parish newsletter: 'I was a convinced antisemite before there were any Nazis, when certain gentlemen sat in junior school'.[29] These 'certain gentlemen' were his Nazi accusers. Schubert and the Nazis then exchanged insults in their respective publications. Schubert would learn later that the Nazis had long memories.

Not all priests played such a forthright role in politics, even though they would later be drawn reluctantly into this world. The biography of Father Schwarz, of Alt-Ottakring, tells us that he had nothing to do with party politics, but he did run into controversy in other ways. In 1932, he was still picking up the pieces from the libel trial with which his predecessor had become involved.[30] Separately, a dispute broke out between two curates. One alleged that the other had been signing cheques in the name of the other, while staying too long on holiday. There were added suspicions of drink and gambling. In the heat of the dispute, one curate went so far as to question Schwarz's credibility as parish priest.[31]

By 1933, Schwarz was recording how shortages of funds were making it difficult to find sufficient resources for the institutions for children that were run by the parish.[32] As well as providing education to the young and deprived, he attempted to alleviate the problems of child birth and large families, by giving women information on natural birth control.[33] While this was not against the letter of Catholic doctrine, some of his more conservative fellow priests might have thought it against its spirit. They would have stressed the need for love in a sexual relationship, with the objective of producing children, not pleasure.

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[28] *SLG Pfarrblatt*, January 1933. Schubert referred to his *Sudetendeutsch Heimat.*

[29] *SLG Pfarrblatt*, 24th January1933. Also Scholz and Heinisch, p.64.

[30] AEDW AOCk, 1932.

[31] The family of the curate wrote to the Ordinariat on this subject, in letters dated August 1932. AEDW AOCor August 1932.

[32] AEDW AOCk, 1933.

[33] Wolfgang Kluger and Franz Loidl, *Zwei Volksseelsorger im Arbeiterbezirk Altottakrings: Pfarrer Karl Schwarz, Religionslehrer Ernst Patzak*, (Vienna: Wiener katholische Akademie, 1983), pages unnumbered.

Schwarz must have been mentally tough to provide this teaching. In years to come, he would need this toughness.

By this time, Austrian politics was about to reach a conclusion that many had feared, although the manner in which it came about was completely unexpected. On 4th March 1933, Parliament was left without senior procedural officers, after a series of resignations. In their absence, Chancellor Dollfuss suspended Parliament and announced he would rule by decree, as allowed under laws dating from 1917.[34] On 5th March, he went further, and announced that he would run the country in an authoritarian manner. He gave assurances that this would be a temporary measure, solely to take firm action and circumvent delays caused by parliamentary debate.[35] Despite this, Dollfuss would have had one eye on events to the North. On 5th March 1933, the Nazi Party in Germany won 43% of the vote for the *Reichstag* elections and emerged as the largest party, consolidating Adolf Hitler in the role of German Chancellor that he had occupied since January. These elections confirmed that Germany was run by a party with an expansionist policy and designs on Austria.[36]

Despite reassurances from Dollfuss, the end of democracy was hastened through. In this, he was supported by a Church which encouraged the restoration of 'Austria's traditional social order'.[37] On 7th March 1933, the cabinet announced it would govern without Parliament.[38] On 15th March, Social Democratic and Pan-German MPs attempted to counter Dollfuss, by entering Parliament and taking their seats, but they were prevented from doing so by police. On 31st March 1933, the *Schutzbund* was banned and steps were taken to disarm it.[39] One month after the suspension of parliament, the Church celebrated a new start for Austria with the ringing of bells.[40]

On 23rd April, local and provincial elections in Innsbruck showed losses for the established parties. Only the National Socialists made gains.[41] In Vienna, the trend in voting patterns on the Right from 1923 to 1930 had been away from the Christian Socials and towards the Pan-Germans. In 1932, the trend was even more distinctly away from the Christian Socials, and now towards the Nazis. A ban was placed on all May Day activities, according to some

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[34] Carsten, p.180.

[35] Talos and Neugebauer, eds., p.422.

[36] Adolf Hitler had written in *Mein Kampf* of his intention of 'rejoining Austria with the German 'Motherland'. Allan Bullock in Gehl, Foreword, p.vi.

[37] Edmondson, p.182.

[38] Edmondson, p.179.

[39] Talos and Neugebauer, eds., p.422.

[40] See Ernst Hanisch, 'Der politische Katholizismus als Träger des "Austrofaschismus"', in Emmerich Tálos and Wolfgang Neugebauer, eds., *Austrofaschismus. Politik – Ökonomie – Kultur 1933-1938*, (Vienna: Lit, 2005), pp.68-86. eds., here p.74.

[41] Talos and Neugebauer, eds., p.422.

with the aim of preventing the Nazis and Socialists clashing.[42] On 10th May 1933, all elections at local and national level were abolished. On 15th May, the Nazis and the Pan-Germans announced a joint front against Dollfuss, the 'Union of Struggle'.[43] Five days later, Dollfuss announced the founding of the *Vaterländische Front,* the Patriotic Front, a grouping to supersede political movements.[44] Finally, in recognition of where he believed the most significant threat to his state-building project lay, on 19th June 1933 Dollfuss dissolved the Austrian National Socialists.[45]

It has been argued that, initially, Dollfuss did not intend to go as far as he did.[46] However, by Spring 1933, Dollfuss had seen from events in Germany that the Nazis could dominate the Right, and there can be little doubt that Dollfuss took the opportunity to launch a coup that was anti-Nazi.[47] He would have been concerned that his party's traditional bourgeois support was defecting to the National Socialists.[48] Yet he would have known that there was also bourgeois opposition to *Anschluss*, with others sharing his fears of the kind of state that the Nazis were trying to create in Germany.[49] Dollfuss himself had shown ambivalence with regard to the idea when, in the 1920s, he briefly supported the idea, as Austria faced economic collapse.[50] Now, with the Nazis in power in Germany, he opposed it.

The principal long-term enemy of the Christian Socials had been the Social Democratic Party. Beyond the Christian Social rhetoric, however, few would have believed that the Social Democrats were an immediate threat to the post-First World War settlement. This settlement may not have been ideal for the Christian Socials, but it gave them a share in power, and allowed the Church to exercise social influence. The timing of the actions taken by Dollfuss and his allies points to their belief that the situation had changed. For them, the threat from the pro-*Anschluss* bloc was now greater than that from the Socialist camp, and was reaching a critical mass. This was clear from the elections, but it was also true in other ways. Although the pattern varied across Austria, large numbers of members of the *Heimwehr* were said to be passing over to the Nazis by1932.[51]

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[42] AEDW WeCk 1933.

[43] Talos and Neugebauer, eds., p.422.

[44] Talos and Neugebauer, eds., p.422.

[45] Talos and Neugebauer, eds., pp.422-423.

[46] Edmondson, pp.182-183.

[47] Lauridsen, p.439.

[48] Lauridsen, p.355 and pp.391-392.

[49] Lauridsen, p.419.

[50] Edmondson, p.177.

[51] Carsten, p.170.

Dollfuss acted when he did for several reasons. He aimed to prevent Nazi plans to exert electoral pressure.[52] The Nazis hoped that, even if they failed to win a majority, they could undermine the traditional bourgeois Right. Dollfuss also intended to undermine the Social Democrats.[53] His party's conditional acceptance of democracy would also have played its part. Dollfuss was also confident that no foreign interventions would come, despite earlier British and French protests against treatment of the Social Democrats by the Austrian government.[54] Hitler was newly in power and preoccupied with internal affairs. Mussolini also made it clear that if Germany intervened in any way he would use force to keep Austria free of German control.[55]

In September 1933, the government and its supporters took to the streets in a demonstration of power. Taking advantage of a conference of Catholics that was taking place in the city, Christian Socials and members of the *Heimwehr* assembled on the *Ringstrasse*. Dollfuss announced plans for a Corporate State.[56] German Christian values were to be at its heart. Father Lojka at Weinhaus believed the announcement was met with 'enormous celebrations'. He does not say by whom.[57] At the highest levels, the Church echoed Lojka's support for the building of a Catholic Austria, even expressing its 'joy' at the prospect.[58]

Catholicism, Austrian patriotism, and 'German values' were intended to provide metaphorical common ground for Austrians, yet such a meeting place would be uncomfortable for Social Democrats, non-Catholics, Pan-Germans and others. This vision sent out a message to Austrians that if they did not conform to these values, they would no longer belong in Austria. *Reichspost* understood this perfectly well: 'Austria is a Christian-German state and, accordingly, it is organised to determine who can and may participate and who can and may not'.[59] Some people tried to belong. In an echo of the late 1890s, a spate of conversions and readmissions to the Church occurred from 1934 onwards, presumably for the same mixed set of motives as had existed earlier.[60]

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[52] Lauridsen, p.420.

[53] Lauridsen, p.439.

[54] Medlicott, p.viii.

[55] Mazower, p.62.

[56] *RP*, various reports, 9th to 11th September, 1933.

[57] AEDW WeCk, 1933.

[58] *Diözesanblatt*, 11th October 1933, p.72.

[59] *Reichspost* of 12 November 1933, quoted in Ernst Hanisch, *Lange Schatten*, p.38.

[60] AEDW AOCor, Schwarz to Ordinariat 20th September 1937. See also Ernst Hanisch in Tálos and Neugebauer, eds., pp.68-86.

This new version of independent Austria would need time to succeed, and its enemies were all around. The threat from external enemies burst into the foreground when Nazi Germany introduced a tourist tax in May 1933. Any German visiting Austria was obliged to pay 1,000 Marks on crossing the border. A seemingly small measure, the tax was intended to reduce Austria's international earnings, hence threatening its economic viability.[61] Internal enemies were easier to deal with. In September 1933 internment camps for dissidents were set up. Dollfuss's opponents, whatever their political complexion fled abroad, but almost 16,000 who remained in Austria ended up interned for political offences.[62] Father Lojka applauded this anti-democratic stance, noting approvingly that Dollfuss was bringing in 'the right men for the job', in the way the *Heimwehr* was being used by the government.[63]

Lojka was not alone in this view. A pastoral letter of December 1933 demonstrated the approval of the Church in Vienna for the *Dollfusskurs*.[64] The *Dollfusskurs* would hand the Church a greater role in the moral basis of Austrian society, via a Concordat that was being negotiated. It also aimed to strengthen Austrian independence, while emphasizing Austria's unique combination of attachment to a wider *Deutschtum*, in its language and culture, and its particular *Volkstum,* in its history, landscape, religion, customs, and arts.[65] In this way it is not unreasonable to conclude, as has Julie Thorpe, that 'Austro-fascists as state builders and nation builders', attempted to 'fend off' the Nazi state, while 'mythologising' and 'racialising' a German identity against others within Austria.[66] The pastoral letter singled out for praise the aim of Dollfuss to 'erect a Christian-German state in our homeland'. These steps were, in fact, to be embraced 'with our whole hearts'.[67]

Between Republic And Corporate State

On 4th October 1933, a small band of Nazis attempted to assassinate Dollfuss. The reaction in Vienna, at least as recorded in what remained of the press under Dollfuss, was one of huge relief that the attempt had failed.[68] On the evening after the attempt, Dollfuss supporters gathered outside the Chancellor's office in central Vienna. Among them were army units, *Heimwehr* groups, 'Christian-German' gymnastics groups, and societies loyal to

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[61] Gehl, p.57.

[62] Wolfgang Neugebauer: 'Repressionsapparat – und Maßnahmen' in Tálos and Neugebauer, eds., pp.298-321, here p.314.

[63] AEDW WeCk, 1933.

[64] *Diözesanblatt,* 21 December 1933, p.99.

[65] Thorpe, p.31.

[66] Thorpe, p.232.

[67] *Diözesanblatt,* 21 December 1933, p.100.

[68] *WZ,* 4th October 1933, pp.1-6, for a full account of the attempt, the subsequent arrests, the immediate police investigation and messages of support from foreign leaders. See also *RP* of the same day, pp.1-5.

'the fatherland'. Red-white-red flags waved to celebrate that 'a good angel looked over our Austria today'.[69] This was a display of the assembled Catholic Right, demonstrating their fidelity to the separate path of development that Dollfuss was mapping out.[70] The Nazi move was immediately recognised as an attempt not just to kill Dollfuss, but to destroy an independent Austria. Dollfuss was lionised as leader of the struggle for the freedom of Austria.[71]

Despite this, Dollfuss soon found that all opposition had not been stamped out. The Social Democrats still kept an organisation of sorts in place. The official policy of the Party was not to offer active resistance, as this would lead to bloodshed. From exile, the Party's leaders kept in touch with underground trade unionists, some of whom organised themselves into the Revolutionary Socialists.[72] The Nazis had been forced underground but, in the long run, this only served to make them better organised.[73] In Vienna, active Nazis were believed to be few in number, but they were audacious, and the police identified Nazis as the source of much agitation.

Around 10 o'clock on the morning of 19th January 1934, for instance, Nazi flags were unveiled at the Technical High School in the Wieden district of the city.[74] The flags, measuring three metres by one, were hung from several windows on the third floor, pointing in different directions for maximum visibility. Made from crepe paper, the flags would have folded small, so that they could be smuggled in to the building. The flimsy nature of the material used to make them would have meant, however, that they would tear easily. They must have been raised from the windows with some care and it would have required some time to raise them.

Despite this, and even though the police estimated that their officers reached the site within six to eight minutes of an alarm being raised, none of the students questioned admitted to having seen anything. One student, Robert Rosenauer, stated that he was playing cards and had noticed nothing wrong until the arrival of the police.[75] Another, Karl Kollar, from Währing, a member of the *Deutscher Turnerbund*, a gymnastics association with well known sympathies for a radical German stance, claimed not to be 'otherwise politically

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[69] *RP*, 4th October 1933, p.5.

[70] *WZ*, 4th October 1933, p.5.

[71] Also *NFP* and *dkB* of 4th October 1933.

[72] Herbert Steiner, 'The Role of the Resistance in Austria, with Special Reference to the Labor Movement', *Journal of Modern History*, Supplement: Resistance Against the Third Reich, Vol. 64, (1992), pp. S128-S133.

[73] Lauridsen, p.424.

[74] ABPD 1934, 19th January 1934, various reports.

[75] ABPD 1934, 19th January 1934. Rosenauer to the Police at Wieden.

organised'.[76] The incident was enough to cause the police to launch a significant operation, in order to check if the incident in Wieden was an isolated event. Reports were obtained from several police stations across the city. The police in Wieden reported that the flags had, in fact, only been hanging from the windows for a few minutes and had caused no great stir. The reaction of the central police suggests otherwise, and they were taking no chances.[77] In the case of one student, Kurt Steigl, they were correct to be suspicious. A search of his rooms uncovered a quantity of pro-Nazi magazines and leaflets.[78]

A week later, politics boiled over in Austria and workers in Linz rose in protest against the deterioration of their working and living conditions.[79] Soon afterwards, Vienna's Socialists came out onto the streets, to be met by a response from the Austrian Army, supported by the *Heimwehr*. The *Heimwehr* added approximately 20,000 men across Austria to a gendarmerie and regular army which, under restrictions imposed by Versailles, totalled 43,000.[80] Fighting was recorded across the city, with the heaviest being reported in the Social Democratic stronghold of Floridsdorf.[81]

From the immediacy of his language, Father Schwarz at Alt-Ottakring seems to have recorded in his *Chronik* the events in his parish as they happened. On Monday 12th February there was 'Revolution! A whole class from the junior school had to stay in the presbytery, because Sandleithen was being shot at and shelled'. The next day, a few women and only one man populated a near deserted church at Alt-Ottakring for the 6 a.m. Shrove Tuesday mass, and all of those were 'intimidated'. Despite being aware of the extent of the violence that had erupted on the streets of Vienna, Schwarz was shocked by the low numbers. Barely two weeks earlier, more than 2,700 had attended Sunday masses in the parish, with six masses held between 6 a.m. and 11 a.m.[82]

The government in Vienna had shown no hesitation in responding to the workers' revolt. Maximum force was turned onto the streets. Ottakring was particularly badly affected, as the Army deployed artillery in order to shell a number of model workers' homes that had been erected by Vienna City Council. Despite their solid appearance, these homes were no match for firepower of this kind and, after a few days, the revolt was crushed.[83] The

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[76] ABPD 1934, 19th January 1934. Karl Koller to the Police at Wieden.

[77] ABPD 1934. 19th January 1934.

[78] ABPD 1934. 19th January 1934.

[79] Carsten, p.189.

[80] Lauridsen, p.269.

[81] Carsten, p.190.

[82] AEDW AOCk, 1934. Attendances are for Sunday 31 January 1934.

[83] Gedye, p.105.

workers' homes had been intended as a permanent statement of how society could be changed away from the old order. Their shattering was intended to show a different direction for society. This was the Christian state against an allegedly Marxist Vienna.

Supporters of the regime saw these events as a necessary re-imposition of order. They also saw them as an essential stage in the work of building the new Austria. For 1934, instead of beginning his *Chronik* with the usual list of staff changes and building works, Father Schubert at St. Laurenz starts his *Chronik* by saying that he must record the events of February, which he does in considerable detail. Then he goes back to recording church building works. This is not to suggest that Schubert, or his fellow priests, thought the struggle for the new Austria had been won. They were acutely aware of the challenges and dangers ahead. In 1934, Schubert's near neighbour, Father Lojka, records street fighting between bands of Nazis on one side and Socialists on the other. This, said Lojka, was despite the presence of the *Heimwehr*, and came after the events of February. In an effort at deterring resistance, in February 1934 the government extended the death penalty, reintroduced in November 1933, to a range of offences including political revolt.[84]

The government began to develop its long-term plans. On 30th April 1934, Christian Social MPs and their allies met at Parliament, just long enough for Parliament to dissolve itself permanently, and to hand over all powers to its successor. On 1st May 1934, Dollfuss declared Austria to be a Corporate State. A new constitution incorporated a Concordat that had recently been agreed between the Vatican and the Austrian Republic, under which the Church gained increased influence over education and marriage.[85] The Church drew benefit in other ways. The authoritarian state forced schoolchildren to mass.[86] In 1935, at the parish of Neulerchenfeld, in Ottakring, 'Red' buildings next to the parish church, confiscated after the 1934 uprising, were handed over for use by the parish.[87] Between 1934 and 1937, fifteen church foundations took place. At a time of severe restrictions on expenditure, these churches were partly funded by the State.[88] Not that this pleased everyone connected with the Church. Father Schwarz objected to plans for a new church at Sandleithen, within his own parish, as this would reduce the number of his parishioners.[89] The State clearly thought

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[84] Tálos and Neugebauer, eds., p.423.

[85] See Herbert Dachs, ''Austrofaschismus' und Schule', in Tálos and Neugebauer, eds., pp.282-297, here p.287.

[86] Ernst Hanisch, *Lange Schatten*, p.312.

[87] *Neulerchenfelder Pfarr-Blatt*, hereafter *NL Pfarrblatt*, Year VI, No. 5.

[88] See Anonymous, *Festschrift: Die Wiener Pfarren*, throughout, for Church reorganisation in the period.

[89] AEDW AOCk, 1936.

the support of the Church was worth having, and in return the Church endorsed the form of the state.

In the parishes, priests joined in with this endorsement. Father Lojka described 1st May 1934 as a 'day of rebirth' and rejoiced that significant parts of the Concordat of 1933 were now part of Austria's constitution.[90] At Währing, Father Schubert was enthusiastic about the Christian elements of the constitution, but he was equally aware of its implicit German values. The importance of this German dimension to Schubert's thinking emerged almost subconsciously in comments he made later in 1934. He announced this Corporate State as a second Gospel, the bringer of good news and wrote that, five months to the day after the celebration of the 250th anniversary of deliverance from the Turks, Vienna and Austria had been freed from an even greater threat, 'Austro-Bolshevism'. The state was now a 'stronghold of Christian-German culture'.[91]

From The Assassination Of Dollfuss To Desertion By Mussolini

As has been seen, despite the quarrels that had taken place on the Right, considerable overlaps still occurred. Dollfuss, for instance, talked with a number of groups, including, in June 1934, the *Sturmabteilung*, the Brownshirts.[92] This may have been political manoeuvring, but it still showed the existence of common ground on the Right. Nevertheless, feuds did boil over. The Nazis were capable of extreme ruthlessness. They had been declared illegal, but they had not been suppressed and, on 25th July 1934, they took their revenge. A group of Nazis seized public buildings across Vienna, kidnapping Dollfuss in the Chancellery in the process.[93] Father Lojka notes this as nothing short of an attempt at 'Revolution', and troop movements in response were reported across much of the country.[94] In Carinthia, an uprising by Nazis from Northern Germany was suppressed by the Austrian army, supported by local *Heimwehr*. Mussolini assembled Italian army units on the border and let it be known he was still prepared to invade Austria, as he had been the year before, if German troops entered the country. The Austrian army surrounded the Chancellery and the Nazis there surrendered, but it was too late. In the confusion that had occurred as the Nazis seized the building, Dollfuss had been shot and mortally wounded. Before loyal troops could reach him, Dollfuss was dead.[95]

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[90] AEDW WeCk, 1934.

[91] *SLG Pfarrblatt*, March 1934.

[92] Edmondson, p.239.

[93] See Edmondson, pp.239-240, for details of the plot.

[94] AEDW WeCk, 1934.

[95] AEDW WeCk, 1934.

This was a blow on many levels to those who followed Dollfuss and who wanted to maintain Austrian independence. Even allowing for the emotion of the moment, the expressions of grief to be found in parish *Chroniken* and correspondence come across as genuine and unexaggerated. Fathers Lojka and Schubert were both deeply shocked that Dollfuss had been shot and left to die without access either to doctor or priest.[96] Lojka described Dollfuss as a martyr. Bells were rung at churches across the country.[97] Lojka was not alone in his estimation of Dollfuss. Double page magazine spreads show the enormous crowds that turned out in central Vienna for his funeral, packing the grounds of the *Hofburg*.[98]

These crowds were a potent demonstration that a mass base still existed in support of Austrian independence. The point was underlined by the heavy presence of the symbol of the *Vaterländische Front*, the *Kruckenkreuz*, across the *Hofburg* and across the city.[99] Yet, while the Nazis had failed, their boldness must have reinforced the impression that they were a growing force in the country. Their *Anschluss* policy might succeed in winning significant support, now that the death of Dollfuss had deprived Austria of someone who had shown he was prepared to stand against them. It also deprived Austria of a figure who had become known internationally, and it was a psychological blow to those who placed their confidence in the leadership shown by Dollfuss. Lojka was convinced he knew the origins of the guilty men and he pointed the finger for the murder firmly at 'former soldiers' who had joined the Nazis.[100] So did the press.[101] Father Lojka seems to have expected that, after Dollfuss, Austria would turn to another supposed strong man to match other Fascist leaders. He was disappointed that lawyer and career politician, Kurt Schuschnigg, had succeeded Dollfuss. He would have preferred Prince Starhemberg.[102]

Over the next few years, the Church supported the Right's position that Austria needed a strongman, but this was only partly in response to conditions of place and period. The Austrian archbishops' pastoral letter of 1919 had set out that they would oppose the state if it tried to carry through fundamental changes in the social or economic order, but the Church in Austria was not alone in adopting this position. In Portugal, the Salazar dictatorship, often described as Fascist, but in reality an authoritarian state with a streak of reactionary

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[96] AEDW WeCk, 1934.

[97] AEDW AOCk, 1934. The note in the margin reads 25th July 1935, but this must have been added later as this is a mistake.

[98] *Österreichische Wochenzeitung*, 16th August 1934, pp.2-3.

[99] *Österreichische Wochenzeitung*, 16th August 1934, p.1.

[100] AEDW WeCk, 1934.

[101] *WZ*, 4th October 1933, p.2.

[102] AEDW WeCk, 1934.

Catholicism, was supported by the Church, as it had been since 1928.[103] In Spain, the Church supported a Right-wing coalition of parties which threatened to bring down democracy, if democracy was not to its liking.[104]

Schuschnigg was expected to be the guarantor of Austria's independence, but in order to hold Germany at bay he needed to keep a base at home and maintain the support of the European powers. Internally, propaganda was being marshalled to promote both the Austrian *Ständestaat* as a state form and the idea of an independent Austria as a separate German state. Pamphlets were prepared which suggested that Catholic Universalism and national culture were not mutually exclusive, and that the idea of *Deutschtum* existed within and as part of European culture. It is unlikely that these somewhat dry pamphlets had a wide readership or impact.[105]

Nevertheless, in April 1935 Schuschnigg might also have had cause for optimism that Austria had allies abroad. At a conference in Stresa in Italy, France, Britain and Italy declared themselves united against any aggression towards Austria. The independence of Austria was their goal.[106] This unity was short lived, however. A few months later, Italian troops invaded Abyssinia. Britain and France criticised Italian actions, and Italy began to grow closer to Germany on the one side, and distant from France and Great Britain on the other. This distancing soon intensified, when Italy and Germany supported a revolt by Spanish army units against the democratically elected government in Madrid in July 1936.[107] The united front formed at Stresa was effectively at an end, little more than a year after it had come into existence.

The Writing On The Wall?

Hitler expressed his intentions towards Austria in an increasingly hostile manner. He had the confidence to do this because Mussolini had now told him he would raise no objections to German intervention of some kind in Austria.[108] In July 1936, Schuschnigg was summoned to meet Hitler at Berchtesgaden and told how to govern Austria. The outcome was the July agreement, a 'treaty of friendship' between Germany and Austria.[109] Under the

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[103] David Birmingham, *A Concise History Of Portugal*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp.162-179.

[104] Preston, p.43 and pp.62-63. See also José María Gil Robles, *No Fue Posible La Paz*, (Barcelona: Planeta, 1978), pp.75-78 and pp.85-90.

[105] For instance, a pamphlet by Prof. Julius Patzelt, on one year of Schuschnigg. ABPD 1935/1.

[106] Tálos and Neugebauer, eds., p.424.

[107] Preston, pp.116-118.

[108] Mazower, p.67.

[109] Karl Stuhlpfarrrer, 'Austrofaschistische Aussenpolitik – ihre Rahmenbedingungen und ihre Auswirkungen' in Tálos and Neugebauer, eds., pp.322-337.

terms of this treaty, Germany promised not to interfere in Austrian internal affairs, and dropped the thousand Mark tourist tax.[110] Austrian Nazis who had been arrested after the assassination of Dollfuss were released under an amnesty. Schuschnigg agreed to bring Nationalist politicians who were sympathetic to the Nazis into his cabinet.[111]

A secret protocol to the agreement also stipulated that Austria was a 'German state', which would follow a 'German Course'.[112] Austria would lend its diplomatic support to German foreign policy aims where it could. This was in turn supplemented by the November Protocol, which established a German-Austrian Cultural Committee, to ensure sufficient 'German' content in cultural areas, such as theatre, film and music.[113] The meaning behind it was that Austria internally would follow a course which discriminated against those who did not comply with radical definitions of being German. This did not mark a change in the stance of the Corporate State towards Jews, nor in its dealings with Nazi Germany. In a 1935 agreement on trade in films, the Corporate State had consented to check that all artists in film would provide proof of their Aryan origins.[114]

The constitution of the Corporate State promised equality before the law, and some of the bodies created by the Corporate State, such as the *Vaterländische Front*, had Jewish representation.[115] This, however, hid underlying attitudes and unspoken policies, evidence of which can easily be found. Chancellor Dollfuss had been a member of the *Antisemitenbund*, and regularly spoke at its meetings when he was member of its student body. Dollfuss was therefore a supporter of an organisation which demanded legal separation of Jews and non-Jews, quotas on employment, and the reversal of Jewish immigration. Jews were racially defined as having one Jewish great-grandparent.[116] Aryanisation had been happening before the 1936 agreement. Proponents claimed this was necessary to limit so-called Jewish domination of selected occupations. This disingenuous position took no account of the custom and practice that excluded Jews from certain walks of life and therefore forced them into others. This also ignored the reality that Jews were prominent and successful in some areas, working class and poor in others.[117]

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[110] Carsten, pp.230-232.

[111] Gehl, pp.145-146.

[112] Gehl, p.132.

[113] See Gehl, p.138, Funder, *Sturm*, p.269 and Gabriele Volsansky, *Pakt auf Zeit: das Deutsch-Österreichische Juli-Abkommen 1936*, (Vienna: Böhlau, 2001).

[114] Angelika Königseder, 'Antisemitismus 1933-1938', in Tálos and Neugebauer, eds., p.55.

[115] Königseder in Tálos and Neugebauer, eds., p.55.

[116] Thorpe, p.156.

[117] Königseder, in Tálos and Neugebauer, eds., pp.54-55.

From its inception, the Corporate State and its officers worked against the interests of Jews.[118] Jews were refused state employment or had their contracts terminated.[119] Non-Socialist Jewish doctors were sacked under the pretext of being Social Democrats.[120] The same happened to Jewish teachers.[121] Such discrimination had a more profound meaning than just immediate exclusions. Discrimination was being used both as a means to construct civic and ethnic barriers and as a long-term means to create a bond between those who belonged, or who were being told they belonged.[122]

At the parish of Weinhaus, Father Lojka created in his *Chronik* a vivid image of the turbulence of this time. Lojka may have contemplated Austria becoming a Fascist state but, as he said in his parish newsletter of June 1936, he would never be a Nazi.[123] When, in July 1936, the Austrian government announced the normalisation of German-Austrian relations, Lojka noted: 'I hear the message clearly, but I do not believe it at all'. He expected further attempts, along the lines of those of the violence of 1933 and 1934, 'to absorb *us (sic)*'. Lojka recognised that as a result of the July agreements, Schuschnigg had no choice but to bring the 'Nationalists', as he described them, into government, but for him a Catholic's first duty was to protect the Church. Lojka believed that the Nazis, hiding behind the Pan-Germans, were a threat to the Church. 'The will of the people for independence, begun by Dollfuss and continued by Schuschnigg, must be strengthened', he wrote. 'May Austria resist Germany's friendship in the way it would oppose its enmity!'[124]

The political troubles and further street fighting of 1936 are reflected in Lojka's notes on a visit by Cardinal Innitzer to the church at Weinhaus. Innitzer paid his respects at Deckert's grave, which was – and still is – at the rear of the church.[125] According to Lojka, this required heavy security to prevent disruption by either Nazis or Socialists. Lojka records that he did not involve himself in party politics, except where this intruded on broader moral issues. He was not blindly loyal to the official *Vaterländische Front*, which he criticised for organising fund-raising dances during Lent. Lojka argued instead that, to help Austria out of its dilemmas, people needed to show more self-responsibility. Lojka was, of course, only

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[118] Königseder, in Tálos and Neugebauer, eds., p.56. Also Pauley, pp.268-273.

[119] Pauley, p.270.

[120] Thorpe, p.165.

[121] Thorpe, p.166.

[122] Thorpe, pp.153-155.

[123] *Weinhauser Pfarrblatt*, hereafter *We Pfarrblatt*, 5th June 1936.

[124] AEDW WeCk, 1936.

[125] AEDW WeCk, 1936.

human and he did complain that, during Innitzer's visit, he had to go with him from school to school, without being able to have breakfast.[126]

Lojka also observed the activities of his fellow priests. He described as 'eccentric' Father Leopold Schmid of St. Rochus, Leopoldstadt, met earlier in this work. Lojka had read in newspapers that Schmid had allegedly been banned from preaching. Lojka thought Schmid was an eccentric because he rejected both the Christian Socials, the men in power, and the Nazis, the coming men. Lojka's circle are said to find Schmid an oddity.[127] According to Lojka, Schmid was something of a loner, not part of a wider group of priests. This may have been true but, in 1936 Schmid, spoke at what he himself later described a 'famous' *Vaterländische Front* rally. It is not known if this rally took place before or after the July agreements of that year, but Schmid seemingly had no trouble reconciling his Pan-German views with this.[128]

Despite efforts by the Corporate State to gain complete control, Vienna remained a battleground for mass politics, and the major political groupings staged move and counter move. In October 1936, a *Vaterländische Front* rally had attracted crowds estimated at 360,000 in Vienna.[129] In February 1937, German Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath had visited Vienna and found the streets lined with Nazi supporters all the way from the station to his residence, yet a counter-demonstration on a large scale was organised for the day of his departure, with crowds chanting '*Heil Schuschnigg!*'[130] Nor had the Social Democrats on the ground given up the fight. Just as the Nazis had done, they too were able to organise resistance to the Corporate State, often on a surprising scale and for what seem simply symbolic occasions. In July 1937, Max Winter, Social Democratic journalist and politician, died in exile in the United States. His body was taken back to Austria in secrecy, and a funeral under a false name was arranged for the *Zentralfriedhof*. Word still made its way round the city. The police were aware of the funeral, but were unable to prevent huge crowds turning out in memory of the man who had led the way in reporting the condition of the Viennese working class. Vienna had not gone over to the Right-wing radicals, and Red Vienna as an idea had not been completely buried by the Corporate State.[131]

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[126] AEDW WeCk, 1936.

[127] AEDW WeCk, 1936.

[128] *SR Pfarrblatt*, March 1938, pp.53-57.

[129] Carsten, p.238.

[130] Carsten, p.233.

[131] Hannes Hass, ed., *Max Winter: Expeditionen ins dunkelste Wien*, (Vienna: Picus, 2006), p.10.

By late 1937, however, the threat from abroad was building. An increasingly aggressive Adolf Hitler was becoming less and less patient towards Austria. It was by now a clear possibility that if Hitler chose the military route, decisions over whether the *Anschluss* might happen would not be the prerogative of Austrians. Father Lojka was well aware of this. It was as if he had given up hope of Austria's continued independence when he recorded in January 1938 that he was expecting the Germans to enter Austria at any moment. Lojka's fears seemed to be confirmed when the Nazis, apparently using people shipped from all parts of Austria, were able to organise large scale rallies in Graz and Linz, with swastikas covering the streets.[132] The Nazis seemed to be on the verge of carrying out what he believed was the '*Anschluss* which has been hotly, if vainly, resisted for so many years'.[133]

Lojka was not alone on the Right in being an ardent opponent of Anschluss. The antisemite Leopold Kunschak had argued, as early as 1934, that all Austrians should be co-opted into the struggle against the Nazis, even the Social Democrats. Kunschak had argued that the Jews should be separated from German Austrians, as foreigners, but he saw nothing German in the National Socialist movement either:

> 'The real enemy of our country and of that individualism which it is the historic mission of Germany to preach, is the distortion of the German spirit by Nazism'.[134]

Kunschak saw in Nazism a totalitarianism that was opposed to Austrian German values.

These men saw a conflict between Nazism and Austrian identity. After 1933, ordinary Austrians may have felt a conflict between principle and their personal needs, as economic depression continued in Austria, while Germany was apparently an economic success. Nazi propaganda regularly played on this comparison.[135] Others, who saw themselves as good Austrians and good Germans, were positively attracted to an Austria that was once again part of Germany. The two Nationalists appointed to Schuschnigg's cabinet in 1936 were Edmund Glaise-Horstenau and Guido Schmidt. Schmidt was a friend of Schuschnigg from their school days, who had already served in Schuschnigg's cabinet.[136] Schuschnigg had therefore already accommodated his views. Glaise-Horstenau went on to occupy positions

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[132] Carsten, pp.268-272.

[133] AEDW WeCk, 26th January 1938: 'der so viele Jahre vergebens heißerwehrte *Anschluss*'.

[134] Gedye, p.110.

[135] See page 213 of this thesis.

[136] Edmondson, p.258.

of importance after *Anschluss*.[137] In February 1938, neither Glaise-Horstenau nor Schmid would have seen Germany as a threat.

Summary

In 1932, the international environment meant that *Anschluss* between Austria and Germany was a long way from becoming a reality. Within Austria, change was coming, as the Nazis registered successes in elections in Vienna. In Germany, they were also still only a party aiming for power. The Nazis then did well in local and regional elections elsewhere in Austria, confirming the decline of the Christian Socials in Vienna since the end of the First World War. More importantly the traditional Pan-German movement collapsed as its supporters deserted to the Nazis. Given the pressure on the Christian Socials, their vote held up relatively well in 1932. The Christian Social ranks in Vienna and beyond did split, but the Party lost less than twenty per cent of its support, not half, as certain newspapers claimed. The eighty per cent of the supporters who remained loyal to the Christian Socials from 1930 were voting for an independent Austria, but not for an inclusive ideal of Austrian identity. The Republic in which they lived was fragile, and forever seemed to be about to be torn down. In this, it was not untypical of Europe in this 'contingent age'.[138]

In Vienna, the traditional radical Right, via its component organisations and networks, continued to deal in stereotypes. At the middle of many of the Christian Social elements within these networks sat priests, reiterating a message that Jews could not belong. This had been a long-term process, the effect of which was to make it seem to many that exclusion of Jews was the natural order. The Corporate State reinforced this thinking. The Dollfuss and Schuschnigg cabinets re-assured foreign governments that the Corporate State was not antisemitic, but its anti-Jewish culture affected the lives of Jews, perpetuating and strengthening the social and economic discrimination against Jews that had been an underlying feature of life in certain circles in Austria.

Under the Empire antisemitism had acted as a bond to bring Christian Socials and all but the most radical nationalists together in Vienna in the Christian Social Party. In the Republic, the radical Right forged alliances against the common 'Marxist' enemy. After 1932, a different realignment within the bourgeois camp took place, as German nationalists did not so much cross to the Nazis as become the major component of the Nazi movement. After a change in international politics in 1936, a real division existed between the pro-Austrian Right and the Nazi Right.

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[137] *ÖBL, Vol.2,* p.1.

[138] Edmondson p.4.

By the opening of 1938, *Anschluss* was something that could occur, if Hitler kept his nerve while others lost theirs. If successful, he would inherit a Vienna where a strand of antisemitism had permeated the city over a long period. Yet followers of this strand held firm to a separate path for Austria. They held views which are now rightly viewed as repugnant, but they did not fall into the trap of seeing *Anschluss* with the other antisemitic German state as the primary means by which their radical German visions could be achieved. They were, as was Father Lojka, tempted by Fascism, but not Nazism. They discriminated against Jews, but the discrimination that Jews, and others, experienced under the Corporate State was just a taste of things to come after March 1938.

CHAPTER 10: *ANSCHLUSS* AND AFTER

In February 1938, Hitler summoned Schuschnigg one last time to his Bavarian stronghold of Berchtesgaden.[1] He berated and shouted, and in effect told Schuschnigg that Austria was now a German satellite state.[2] Schuschnigg bided his time in giving his response, but a month later he attempted to break Hitler's lock on the country. On the 9th March, Schuschnigg announced that a plebiscite would take place in Austria, to settle once and for all the relationship between Austria and the German *Reich*.[3] After nearly twenty years of independence, Austrians would at last be given the chance to decide for themselves if they wanted a free Austria to continue. In effect, Schuschnigg was taking a huge gamble.

Schuschnigg, and other Austro-Fascist politicians, had for some years attempted to cultivate allies abroad, in Italy, Great Britain and elsewhere, to prevent *Anschluss*.[4] These attempts seemed to have failed, so Schuschnigg turned now to the Austrian people. Two years earlier, he might not have made such a move. A 1936 government report was of the opinion that the National Socialists were undermining Austria from within, exploiting 'widespread disdain' for Austria as a nation.[5] The government feared that fifteen years of widespread rejection of the concept of an Austrian state, coupled with pro-*Anschluss* party propaganda, had eased the task of the Nazis in attacking Austrian independence.[6] Schuschnigg must have felt that enough had changed in two years to give him a chance of winning.

Voters were to be asked if they wanted a free, social, German, Christian, independent Austria.[7] The question was carefully chosen. A German Austria complied with the July agreements of 1936. A Christian Austria satisfied the criteria for those who had long pursued a path of German Austrian nationalism, with a Christian element at the centre of this vision. A free Austria was intended to send a signal to any potential allies that Austria might call on that *Anschluss* was not the desire of the Austrian people. If the vote was carried, Hitler could no longer claim that *Anschluss* was simply the setting to rights of the unjust Versailles treaties, especially in their effects on Austria. The ballot was scheduled for 13th March. It did not take place. By then, German troops had invaded and taken control of the country. They met little resistance.

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[1] Gehl, pp.166-175

[2] Gehl, p.174.

[3] Gedye, p.275.

[4] Thorpe, p.2.

[5] Lauridsen, p.375.

[6] Lauridsen, p.375.

[7] Tálos and Neugebauer, eds., p.425.

This chapter brings the long period from 1861 to 1938 to a close. It outlines events in the days leading to *Anschluss* but, just as importantly, it follows beyond the *Anschluss* some of the individuals who have been encountered so far. This is not just to tie up loose ends. The reactions of these people to the *Anschluss*, and in some cases their fates, give as clear an indication as possible of their position towards the unification of Austria and Germany. Since there was no single position that all Austrians took towards the idea of *Anschluss*, it is not possible to extrapolate from individuals the position of all Austrians, but the attitudes of most of those followed here show that the *Anschluss* was not the deep-seated wish of all Austrians, even if many of them did want Austria to be defined as German and Christian. This chapter ends with a brief consideration of how some of the events and individuals covered in this work here have been reflected upon in post-War Austria.

Anschluss

On 3rd March 1938, the cover of the *Österreichische Wochenzeitung* showed Chancellor Schuschnigg addressing the *Bundestag*. The *Kruckenkreuz*, personally chosen as a symbol of Austrian Christianity by Dollfuss, is aloft.[8] In its incarnation under the Corporate State, the assembly is filled with civilians, military and clergy. Austrians were here presented with an image of a country, through its various estates, united around their Chancellor and the values of the Corporate State that he led. When Schuschnigg announced the plebiscite, it was not just the images in the *Österreichische Wochenzeitung* which suggested he had made the right decision. Large crowds gathered across Vienna, and in other cities, waving *Vaterländische Front* banners. Schuschnigg's picture was displayed on walls all over the city. Volunteers rode on the back of trucks, distributing pro-Schuschnigg posters and leaflets.[9] The Chancellor's supporters were numerous and energetic, and they were helped in their work by orders for the police to suppress their bitter opponents, the Nazis. Eye witnesses among the Jewish community at this time reported a sense of optimism that the possibility of a takeover of Austria by Nazi Germany had been delayed, or perhaps even avoided altogether.[10] The photographs in the magazines present an image of the solidity and strength of Austria, but the reality was one of insubstantial foundations. Schuschnigg's supporters were just one of the factions fighting for control of the streets. The crowds that gathered for Schuschnigg, just like those that would later gather for Hitler, were substantial, but they did not represent the whole of Vienna.

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[8] *Österreichische Wochenzeitung*, 3rd March 1938, p.1. *WZ*, 1st September 1933, p.2, for the announcement that Dollfuss had gifted the *Kruckenkreuz* to the Patriotic Front.

[9] Hans Petschar, *Anschluss Ich hole Euch heim*, (Vienna: Christian Brandstätter Verlag, 2008), p.44.

[10] Clare, p.171.

Hitler called Schuschnigg's bluff. In early March, the Germans made clear to both Schuschnigg and Austrian President Wilhelm Miklas that the holding of the planned plebiscite would be considered a hostile act. At the same time, Germany announced that the prospect of the plebiscite was causing Austria to become unstable, with the fall-out affecting German citizens who lived in Austria. Hitler therefore announced plans for a German 'peace-keeping' operation if the plebiscite was not called off and, on the night of 11th March, German troops massed on the border.[11]

In a last act as Chancellor, Schuschnigg ordered Austrian troops to offer no resistance. He could not, he said, bear the thought of 'German blood' being spilled by Germans. Schuschnigg really had little choice. Even if he could rely on the army, which had drawn up plans to resist a German invasion, it would not be strong enough to hold out for long.[12] He had no assurances from either Britain or France that help would come, and even if it did come it would take time, might not be effective, and would only follow on from bloodshed.[13] Schuschnigg resigned, and in his resignation speech, broadcast by radio, he was clear that he was yielding to 'brute force'. He spells out that German rumours of workers' revolts against the Corporate State and the need for a German peace-keeping force are 'fabrications from A to Z'.[14] This was bravery, when Schuschnigg knew that those imposing brute force would soon be in charge in Vienna. Yet Schuschnigg's words are revealing of how he still saw Austria: as a German state, but not part of the Germany that exists to the North. He feared the spilling of German blood, whether this blood came from soldiers of the Third Reich or from those of Austria. It can not be known how he felt about Austrian Jewish blood, and if he feared this too would be spilled.

Crowds began gathering to cheer the new National Socialist Chancellor, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, and waited for the arrival of German troops to enforce the *Anschluss*. Seyss-Inquart was an appropriate symbol for the changing times. He had been an advisor to Catholic Action, but also a go-between for Christian Social, Heimwehr and Nazi groups.[15] Jews in Vienna and other cities, however, did not have to wait for the arrival of these troops for violence to break out against them. Incidents took place across the country on the night of the 11th March, with neighbour turning on neighbour.[16] As British journalist G.E.R. Gedye

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[11] Carsten, p.273.

[12] Hanno Scheuch, 'Austria 1918-1955: From The First To The Second Republic', *Historical Journal*, (1989), Vol.32, No.1, pp.177-199.

[13] Scheuch, pp.191-192.

[14] Gedye, p.10.

[15] ÖBL, Vol.12, pp.213-214.

[16] Pauley, pp.280-281. Gedye, p.296.

recalled shortly afterwards, crowds sweeping across the streets of Vienna formed a 'witches' Sabbath', 'marching side by side with police turncoats'. Cries of 'Heil Hitler!' mixed with 'Down with the Catholics!'[17] The next morning, at 5:30 a.m. on 12th March 1938, German troops began crossing the border into Austria. They began a steady progression towards the capital. In advance of their arrival, the *Luftwaffe* flew over Vienna, dropping leaflets proclaiming friendship among all German people. The intention was to reassure the majority of the population that they had nothing to fear. Jews, Socialists and loyal Christian Socials would have experienced other emotions as they looked at the hundreds of bombers overhead.[18]

Nevertheless, a large number of people were enthused, and crowds did turn out to cheer German troops in towns on the route to Vienna. Crowds, however, are difficult to gauge as indicators of feeling. The absolute numbers of those making them up may be large, but even a large crowd will be only a part of the whole population, often only a small part. People may turn out to witness, not necessarily to cheer, an event. They may be caught up in temporary emotion. In Vienna, the crowds were large, but they were far from being the entire population. They were, however, enthusiastic in their pent-up anti-Jewish rage. After German troops arrived in Vienna in March 1938, round-ups of Jews proceeded at a frantic pace. Large numbers of Jews committed suicide rather than fall into Nazi hands.[19]

This is a world turned on its head, where Stefan Zweig's security has been smashed and replaced, in brutal fashion, by crowds inflicting violence and humiliation on people who, in law at least, until days before had been their equal citizens. George Clare recalled boys he had known at school, who had been antisemitic then and who were now in SS uniform. Gedye confirms this picture, with reports of large numbers of those 'barely out of the schoolroom' in storm trooper uniforms.[20] In these early days after the *Anschluss* Clare finds few opponents of antisemitism, however, apart from other Jews. He highlights that many believed that Austrian and Viennese identity had become narrowly and ethnically defined. The 'Viennese' and the 'Jews' are no longer the same thing. The Viennese marched in columns. Jews stayed at home. Clare talks elsewhere of a friend who had asked him to join militant Zionist organization *Betar Trumpeldor*. He refused, 'probably because by becoming a member of a Zionist organization I would have acknowledged that I was a Jew

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[17] Gedye, p.295.

[18] *The Times*, 14th March 1938, p.1.

[19] See Gedye, pp.305-309.

[20] Gedye, p.295.

and not an Austrian'.[21] It is clear in his mind that by 1938 he could not be both, and he wanted to remain an Austrian.

Clare's observations are passionate, but they are also acute. He does not fall for a simple story that anyone who was not a Jew cheered these events. Even at the height of the frenzy, he recognises that 'many thousands' did not turn out to celebrate. He points to 'Social Democrats, Legitimists, true Catholics, Christian Socials, who put patriotism before opportunism, as well as people who were neither this nor that but just honest human beings'.[22] Gedye found some who might otherwise have been considered to be antisemites, because of unthinking prejudice, so disgusted by the violence that they pleaded with him to report on it outside Austria, to try to find ways to stop it.[23]

At the same time as Jews were being pilloried, other potential opponents of the new regime were being rounded up. Social Democrats who remained in Austria were being interned. The same was happening with Christian Socials. Some of them may have shared aspects of the Nazi view of Jews, but as Austrian patriots they were a threat. As time passed after the *Anschluss*, even Pan-Germans were arrested. Anyone who stood outside the Nazi Party, however much they had in common with it, was perceived as a threat.[24]

The first evenings after *Anschluss* were a litmus test of the thoughts of many Viennese. Giving them the benefit of the doubt, it could be argued that, even though they knew about the Nuremberg Laws, those Viennese who were cheering *Anschluss* were still uncertain of the full meaning of the Laws. After all, in 1938 even *Die Wahrheit*, an Austrian newspaper aimed at a Jewish readership, was somewhat underplaying the significance of the Laws.[25] This might not have become clear until later in the year, when Goebbels unleashed the worst of the German people against Jews on *Kristallnacht*. Nevertheless, it would be fair to argue to the contrary that the first *Kristallnacht* took place in Vienna, and other Austrian cities, in March 1938.

The Viennese who took part in the persecution of Jews had a good idea of what they wanted from *Anschluss.* They understood the implications of the second class status that Jews would now experience in the *Reich*. These crowds expressed their aims clearly, and in doing so they prepared the ground for the first public appearance in the city by Hitler, at the

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[21] Clare, p.187.

[22] Clare, p.196.

[23] See Gedye, p.300-313 for a narrative of events immediately after *Anschluss*.

[24] See, for instance, *The Times*, London, 15th March 1938, p.14.

[25] Pauley, pp.238-241.

Heldenplatz. It was his first visit to the city since he had left for Munich in May 1913.[26] If any doubts lingered in his mind as to how his fellow Austrians might react, Hitler would have been calmed by the reports that would have made it back to him.

Supporting The *Anschluss*

The postponed plebiscite gave way to a new vote, scheduled for 10th April, on union with Germany. The ballot paper now carried a different message. It began: 'Do you agree with the reunification of Austria with Germany that was carried out on 13th March 1938?' The ballot paper carried two circles, one larger, for 'Yes', the other for 'No'. This crude attempt to influence the vote was accompanied by propaganda measures. Viennese newspapers displayed photographs of German troops leading food convoys into workers' quarters.[27] German newspapers were harnesed for their propaganda skills. They showed pictures of the factories and supposed model homes of German workers, with the jobs created by the Nazi state providing money to send children on state subsidised holidays. Austrians, by contrast, were shown living in slums, with the unemployed passing their time on the streets. These newspapers were often free. They may have been published in Germany, with an apparently local circulation, but their intended readership was in Austria. The front cover of the *Stuttgarter Illustrierte* showed in full page a young mother lifting a smiling blond child, above the caption 'Adolf Hitler thinks of your children!'[28]

The Nazis took nothing for granted as they put measures in place to ensure support for *Anschluss*. Troops would be in the voting stations, and the ballot would by no means be secret. The former bastion of *Vaterländische Front* views, the *Österreichische Wochenzeitung* retained its name, even if, on 7th April, where pictures of Dollfuss and Schuschnigg had once been prominent, Hitler was now on the front cover. Under his picture is an exhortation to vote for *Anschluss*. On 9th April, the 'Day of Greater Germany' was proclaimed from the *Rathausplatz* balcony of the Vienna city hall by the new Mayor of Vienna, Dr. Hermann Neubacher. In his speech, Neubacher welcomed Hitler to Vienna, 'as a soldier would his General, on entering a fallen citadel'.[29] He describes the honour he feels at welcoming Hitler to Vienna, now Hitler's city. Hitler, dressed in formal civilian wear, took this as the greeting of Vienna and of the whole of German Austria. He expressed his confidence that the next day's plebiscite would bring an overwhelming and irreversible 'Yes' vote. This confidence was well-founded. Apart from the measures that had been

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[26] Hamann, *Hitler's Vienna*, p.157.

[27] See, for instance, *kB*, 20th March 1938, p.3.

[28] *Stuttgarter Illustrierte Zeitung,* 4th April 1938, p.1, available in ABPD 1934-1938.

[29] ABPD 1938/4, undated. Souvenir transcripts of the speeches.

taken to coerce Austrians into voting for *Anschluss*, two sources that might have been expected to oppose the plebiscite came out in support of *Anschluss* in different ways.

The first of these sources was the Social Democratic Party leadership, by now mostly in exile or in hiding. This should not be interpreted as a positive Social Democratic endorsement of the *Anschluss*, however. Aside from the likes of Karl Renner, who gave only a 'highly qualified' support for *Anschluss*, and then 'under duress', Social Democrats had a rational position regarding the *Anschluss*.[30] First, the Social Democrats recognised that any resistance, whether by not voting, or voting against *Anschluss*, was a futile gesture, likely to lead to loss of life. As they had seen in Nazi Germany, resistance was met by massive retribution from the state.[31] Second, a number of Social Democrats saw union between Austria and Germany, but not this Germany, as desirable, a culturally logical outcome. The key here is that the Social Democrats believed that Nazi Germany would collapse under the weight of its own contradictions, to be replaced by a more 'advanced' regime. Even if the advice is considered in hindsight to have been either wrong or naive, given the events of 1938 to 1945 in Austria, it was not a ringing endorsement of *Anschluss* with Hitler's Germany. It would be more correct to say that the Social Democrats had remained 'steadfast' in their aim of *Anschluss* with a democratic Germany.'[32] The only time they had deviated was when, in the Nazi period, they fell behind Otto Bauer's support for Austria as the second, better Germany: 'a German land of freedom, a German land of spirit and culture'. [33]

The Austrian bishops of the Catholic Church, including Cardinal Archbishop Innitzer of Vienna, formed the second major source of support for a pro-*Anschluss* vote. On the Sunday before the plebiscite, the *Wiener Kirchenblatt* carried the a pastoral letter from the bishops, 'A Solemn Declaration'.[34] The bishops called on the people of Austria to carry out their 'obvious national duty' in voting for the 'fulfilment of a thousand year desire' of the German people to be brought together in one state. The letter went on to talk of the achievements of the Nazi regime, especially in the 'social area'. What the bishops thought of the Nazis' 'achievements' towards Jews in the social area is not stated. Whatever they thought, they advised Catholics, 'out of inner conviction', to vote for the *Anschluss*. In order to reach as

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[30] Robert A. Kann, 'Karl Renner (December 14, 1870-December 31 1950)', *Journal of Modern History*, (1950), Vol. 23, No.3, pp.243-249, here p.248.

[31] Kirk, p.50.

[32] Lauridsen, p.375.

[33] Stourzh, p.35.

[34] A *'feierliche Erklärung'*: *Wiener Kirchenblatt,* 3rd April 1938. Available in ABPD 1938/2. See also *Diözesanblatt*, 22nd March 1938, p.23.

many Catholics as possible, this message was carried in many newspapers and parish newsletters.[35] The message was signed by the Bishops of Austria with the words 'Heil Hitler!', although Archbishop Innitzer appears to have been reluctant to do so.[36] Nevertheless, this was a ringing endorsement of *Anschluss*, made after Innitzer had personally negotiated with Hitler the terms for the relationship between State and Church. The difference between the positions of the bishops on the one hand and on the Social Democratic leaders on the other is profound. The latter were accepting the inevitable; the former were helping to make *Anschluss* with Nazi Germany desirable, acceptable and respectable.

Father Schmid

Many parish priests in Vienna must have struggled to reconcile this 'thousand year dream of the German people' with their own views. Few priests had been enthusiastic about union with Germany, even before the establishment of the Third Reich. One priest who was enthusiastic, however, was Father Leopold Schmid, of the Landstrasse.[37] When *Anschluss* came, Father Schmid was quick to praise Hitler. In his parish newsletter, he presented to his readers a lengthy explanation of his views and the journey he had taken in reaching them. He recalled the early 1920s, when he regularly addressed the Pan-Germans in Vienna, and how they had initially been sceptical of him. Yet, he had always believed that religion should not divide Germans. He explained that, while he had supported the *Vaterländische Front* and the establishment of the Corporate State, this was solely as a necessary measure to fight Bolshevism. He had always retained the hope of German unity. He signs his newsletter '*Heil Hitler!*' Given what is known of him it is unlikely that Schmid shared Innitzer's reluctance in signing in this manner.

The depth of Schmid's feeling can be gauged from his marking of the *Anschluss* in his 1938 *Chronik*. Here, he heads the page with a single word, in large handwriting: '*Wiedervereinigung!*' – 'Reunion!' This sums up how German nationalists had felt about their struggle for Austria to be joined with the German state to the North. They believed that Germans had once been united, and had become divided. Whether they dated this division to the time of the Reformation, or to the end of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, or even to Austria's eviction from what they saw as the rest of Germany, these Pan-Germans thought they were putting Germany back together. They did not see their struggle in Austria as creating something new, but recreating something that had been broken.

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[35] See, for instance, *Katholische Aktion in der Alservorstadt*, hereafter *AV Pfarrblatt*, April 1938.

[36] On Innitzer's reluctance, see Reimann, p.110.

[37] This was the same priest who had been considered an outsider by his colleagues. See page 204 of this thesis.

Subsequent events quickly led Cardinal Innitzer to see that he had been wrong in hoping that union with Germany offered the fulfilment of a dream, and he came to regret his endorsement of *Anschluss* on two fronts. On the first, Innitzer was summoned to the Vatican in April 1938. He was made to publish in the *Osservatore Romano* a qualification to his announcements in support of *Anschluss*. This qualification stated that the bishops were not endorsing anything that came into conflict with Catholicism.[38] On the second, he saw the Nazis go back, one by one, on virtually every agreement they had made with the Church in Austria. The Nazis hit at those areas where the Church had the State had battled for decades. They made civil marriage compulsory, with the state recognising civil marriage without the need for a religious ceremony.[39] Schools were taken into State control.[40]

Then the Nazis moved against the institutions of the Church itself, closing down its many societies. Umbrella organisations such as *Katholische Aktion* were disbanded. This was a potentially fatal blow to the ability of lay members of the Church to come together in groups that were closely tied to the Church, and to the ability of priests to work through these groups to maintain contacts beyond masses. *Katholische Aktion*, individual groups for men, women, boys and girls, Marian congregations for men, the *Katholischer Arbeiterinnenverein*, gymnastics groups named in honour of Karl Lueger, and bearing the words Catholic and German, had proliferated across the city.[41] After the Anschluss, they were banned. Worse still, Catholic youth organisations like the Pathfinders were closed, and members of these youth organisations were then automatically recorded as having become members of the Hitler Youth. In many instances, no notification was sent to members that this had happened. In this way, the Nazis could record the growing membership of their organisations.[42]

The Church came to terms with the deal it had made with the Nazis. In November 1938, Innitzer convened a gathering of young Catholics by St. Stephen's Cathedral. During prayers, he declared that there was only one *Führer*, Jesus Christ. This stirred up local Nazis, who next day raided the Archbishop's offices in central Vienna. One young priest, Father Krawarik, who had served at St. Laurenz in Währing, and who would later serve at Alt-Ottakring, was looking out of a window to see what was happening. Krawarik was shot and wounded in an eye. Despite all of this, Father Schmid at St. Rochus continued to move

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[38] Scholz and Heinisch, p.109.

[39] AEDW WeCk, 1938.

[40] AEDW WeCk, 1938.

[41] For lists of associations at the parish level, and details of how frequently they met see, for instance, *NL Pfarrblatt*, Year IV, No.2 or *Hernalser Pfarrblatt*, 1933, No.4, p.4.

[42] As recorded, for instance, in AEDW AOCk, 1938 as well as AEDW WeCk, 1938.

ever closer to the Nazis, especially after war broke out. He regularly and willingly acted as an agent of their propaganda. In this, Schmid must have become an annoyance for the upper hierarchy, especially as Cardinal Innitzer came into conflict with the Nazis in the year or so after the *Anschluss*.

If the Church made efforts to control him, Schmid defiantly resisted. By 1943 he was sending open letters to congregations at his present and former parishes, in which he insulted senior members of the Viennese clergy.[43] He also broadcast on Radio Vienna, sending a message assumed to have been worded for him by the Nazi Propaganda Ministry. This was counter to specific instructions from the office of the Archbishop. It is not clear whether this was the final straw, but Father Pichler, who succeeded Schmid in 1944, recorded that Schmid had been dismissed from his parish.[44] Schmid was an anomaly in his long-term support for the Nazis, and while some priests did exhibit an initial burst of enthusiasm for *Anschluss* in March 1938, this enthusiasm died down as the reality of the relationship between the Church and the Nazi state became clear.[45]

This was not the case at the parish of Alservorstadt, where parish newsletters in 1938 carried items not found in other parish newsletters surveyed here. The newsletter goes from an admiration of Fascist Italy in 1937 to placing two swastikas on its front page in 1938, describing them as symbols of German unity.[46] It carries articles about how to check that an Austrian's blood is truly German.[47] It appeals for people to join the *NS Volkswohlfahrt*, a Nazi welfare organisation.[48] These articles stand out as anomalies when the newsletter is compared with those from other parishes. Elsewhere, clergy such as Archbishop Alois Hudal had tried to publicise what he saw as the common ground between Nazism and Catholicism.[49] Hudal drew, at best, mixed responses from Austrian Catholics.[50] The evidence, however, strongly favours an interpretation that priests in Vienna who supported the Nazis were rare.[51]

Father Lojka

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[43] AEDW SRCk, 1944.

[44] AEDW SRCk, 1944.

[45] Scholz and Heinisch, 89-98.

[46] *AV Pfarrblatt*, May 1938, pp.111-113.

[47] *AV Pfarrblatt*, 1938, No. 4, pp.102-103.

[48] *AV Pfarrblatt*, 1938/1939, No.1, p.158.

[49] Königseder, in Tálos and Neugebauer, eds., p.59.

[50] Thorpe, p.161.

[51] Scholz and Heinisch, p.69.

Fathers Lojka and Schubert, in the district of Währing, were not of the type of Father Schmid. For all the differences of personality that come out of their writings, they belonged firmly to a large group that existed in the Church in Vienna at the time: anti-*Anschluss*, fiercely loyal to Austrian independence, and vigorously opposed to the Nazis. Yet, as has been seen, they were also routinely and casually antisemitic. Both priests inherited these attitudes from their predecessors, but sometimes they also seemed to relish them, to enjoy displaying them.

After the *Anschluss*, Lojka was never directly critical of the bishops' position, but his writings suggest that he was not surprised at how events turned out. He records that the Nazis offered a hand of reconciliation when *Gauleiter* of Vienna Josef Bürckel declared that there was 'no opposition between Christianity and *Volkstum*'.[52] The bishops put forward their conditions for support in the plebiscite: no change to the Concordat and continuing Church control of the schools. On 28th March 1938, following the instructions of the Austrian bishops, the Church at Weinhaus carried a huge poster in support of a positive outcome for the plebiscite. This was a general instruction for all churches, and Lojka believed that in orders such as this the bishops contributed greatly to the overwhelmingly positive outcome of the plebiscite.[53]

Lojka shows no surprise that the Nazis had gone back on their word, forcing the clergy to speak out against the new regime. Although the bishops had tried hard to work with the 'new authorities', Nazi pledges had been broken one after the other. Religious rites were being refused to Catholics in public hospitals. Cardinal Innitzer had been forced to rebut stories in the *Tageszeitung*, where he had been misquoted, and where it was alleged that he had 'opposed the *Führer*'. In Weinhaus after the *Anschluss*, the number of parishioners attending mass on Sundays was down to 894, as a result of 'personal agitation and even worse means'. Catholics who held true to their faith were losing jobs.[54] The irony must have been lost on Lojka that members of the Church had supported quotas against Jews.

By 1938, Lojka was 66 and should have retired.[55] He carried on into the war years, but his *Chronik* entries become more sparse. He records the death of Pius XI, but not the start of the war, although the war came inside his church when rooms at the presbytery were requisitioned for military service in 1941.[56] Any close attention on Lojka that this created

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[52] AEDW WeCk,1938.

[53] AEDW WeCk, 1938.

[54] AEDW WeCk,1938.

[55] Lojka's date of birth can be found in his *Chronik*, AEDW WeCk, *Chronik* 1921-1922.

[56] AEDW WeCor, 4th March 1941. Correspondence between Lojka and Ordinariat.

did not alter his behaviour. He remained motivated by religion above all, and his 1942 entry records the names of priests, German and Czech alike, who were executed on suspicion of involvement in the assassination of acting *Reichsprotektor* Reinhard Heydrich in Bohemia. Recording this information was an act of defiance.[57] More than a year after being instructed to retire, Lojka finally requested permission to leave his parish, as Autumn turned to Winter in late 1944.[58] Here, the trail on Father Lojka ends.

Father Schubert At St. Laurenz-Gertrud

Father Lojka's near neighbour, Father Schubert, has been subject to more coverage in the history of Vienna, possibly because he was more publicly engaged.[59] It has been noted in this thesis that on more that one occasion Schubert openly stated both his antisemitic beliefs and his opposition to the Nazis. A study of antisemitism among the clergy, based on parish newsletters, claims that, apart from one brief effort in the parish newsletter, Schubert ceased his anti-Nazi activities after the *Anschluss*.[60] Certainly, no evidence exists that Schubert ever recanted his antisemitism, but a different picture emerges with regard to his anti-Nazi activities after the *Anschluss* if sources in addition to the parish newsletters are considered. In his *Chronik* for 1938, he notes that the year has to be handled in two parts, because of the events of March 1938. 'Whoever is interested in the events of 1938 should not rely on this *Chronik* alone'. They should instead refer to the parish newsletters, safe in an iron box, especially to those of 1934, the year of Dollfuss's death and the suppression of a Nazi coup.[61]

A single letter has been kept within the pages of the *Chronik*.[62] It refers to the 'suicide' of Egon Friedl. Friedl was a Jewish intellectual, who lived little more than two hundred metres from Schubert's church, at Gentzgasse in the Währing district. Friedl had thrown himself from the upper floors of his home as SS officers prepared to break in and arrest him. The quotation marks around the word suicide are accurate, as it was at the very least an induced suicide. If Schubert and Friedl did not know each other, they would have known of each other. For a man of such strongly expressed antisemitic views, it is odd that Schubert should keep this letter, and odd that someone should choose to write to let him know of Friedl's

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[57] AEDW WeCk, 3rd October 1942.

[58] AEDW WeCor, 20th May 1943 and 26th September 1944. Correspondence between Lojka and Ordinariat.

[59] Scholz and Heinisch on Schubert, pp.63-64, are frequently cited in other works.

[60] Scholz and Heinisch, p.76.

[61] AEDW WäCk, 1938.

[62] AEDW WäCk, 1938.

death. Whatever the reasons, this *Chronik* entry, and the retention of the letter, could have brought Schubert into considerable trouble with the new regime if either had been read.

Schubert was in trouble regardless. The Nazis remembered his attacks on them. In April 1938, a group of Nazis held a mock burial of the *Vaterländische Front* and of a priest, using children's dolls, outside the church.[63] The message was clear. Schubert was a man under pressure, but it did not stop him finding ways to attack the Nazis. He had not given up his opposition to them, and he found ways to hit at the heart of how the Nazis organised the state. Nazi party officials entered into correspondence with the Archbishop's office in May 1939 to complain that Schubert had been making known his views on compulsory civil marriage, as introduced under Nazi laws.[64] Schubert would address by her maiden name any woman who had not been through a Church service, but who had only been married by the state. In refusing to acknowledge civil marriage, Schubert was refusing to roll over.

His preaching must have been having an effect, for whatever reason. Just a couple of months before the Nazis started their investigation, the parish management committee had requested permission to erect a loud-speaker for mass, as the large crowds were unable to hear Father Schubert preach.[65] Perhaps this is where the missing parishioners from neighbouring Weinhaus were to be found. Schubert was an antisemite, but despite claims to the contrary he did not give up the struggle against the Nazis. Schubert did not live to see the end of the Nazis. He died in April 1942, aged 67.[66]

Father Schwarz

Lojka and Schubert were not exceptional as priests in their antisemitism. Many other parishes have been identified where priests used their newsletters, for instance, to spread antisemitic messages.[67] This does not mean that all parishes held priests in this category. The parish of St. Anton in the Favoriten district, for instance, has been identified as carrying positive comments about Jews in its newsletter in this period.[68] The parish of Alt-Ottakring, however, has been identified as a source of antisemitism, yet this judgement, on Father Karl Schwarz, should be reconsidered for a number of reasons. Father Schwarz is singled out as an antisemite from a comment he made in his parish newsletter. Yet the comment seems to have many possible interpretations. In 1928, he wrote a story under the headline 'Star or

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[63] AEDW WäCk, 14th April 1938

[64] AEDW WäCor, 9th May 1939.

[65] AEDW WäCor, 1st March 1939.

[66] AEDW WäCk, entry for 24th April 1942.

[67] Scholz and Heinisch, pp.21-88.

[68] Scholz and Heinisch, p.21.

Cross?' The story describes how the modern struggle was no longer between Cross and Crescent Moon, but between Cross and Star. 'The five-pointed star, whether we call it the Freemasons' or Jewish or Soviet star, conquers nothing. On the one side is Christ, on the other is the Antichrist, that is the key struggle today more than ever'.[69]

This article has been marked out as the sign of a conspiracy fantasy on the part of Schwarz, a conflation of Jews, freemasons and Socialists. Given the way many priests described their world, this would often be a reasonable interpretation, but other interpretations are possible. Apart from the five-pointed star being problematic as a symbol of Jewishness, as the Star of David has six points, if the rest of the article concerned is read then this could all be taken as a parable for the modern world. The quotation on its own does not give the whole picture. The message of the article as a whole could be re-phrased as 'However we choose to describe the wrong path – as liberal, Jewish, or Socialist – in the modern world we are coming to the greatest struggle. The only true path to salvation is through Jesus Christ'. This interpretation becomes more feasible if a little more is known about the priest in question, his background and the consequences of *Anschluss* for him.

Schwarz was an old-school Catholic Austrian patriot, who had labelled the Nazis' murder of Dollfuss as Austria's blackest day. For Schwarz, Dollfuss was a martyr.[70] On 24th February 1938, in Ottakring, Father Karl Schwarz was celebrating. He seems to have been in the habit of making impromptu entries in his *Chronik* as the year progressed, rather than waiting until the end of the year, and this entry appears to have been made on this day. His Alt-Ottakring parish church was in need of urgent repairs, but the budget allocated to the church covered little more than its running costs. Then came the direct involvement of the Minister for Education, who granted the necessary subsidies. He entered this in the *Chronik* and called it a 'miracle'.[71] This was the sort of intervention that Schwarz would have hoped the Corporate State would make.

Schwarz's next entry is almost three months later, for 16th May 1938, after what he described as an 'illness' had forced him to stay away from Vienna, at the small town of Gablitz, from the day of the *Anschluss* to 12th April 1938. When he returned, he found that a swastika flag had been unfurled at the church and other parish buildings. He notes a large fall in attendance at mass, including the attendance of only ten children for the service for the local Gymnasium school. In other years, children's masses and processions had merited special mention in the *Chronik* because of their large turn-outs, and because the children

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[69] *Alt-Ottakringer Pfarrblatt*, hereafter *AO Pfarrblatt*, November 1928, p.2.

[70] AEDW AOCk 1934.

[71] AEDW AOCk, 24th February 1938.

were the future of the Church.[72] In the course of 1938, he notes the dissolution of all Church associations, including children's groups and the Pathfinders, but also Catholic Action, with which he had close links. The old Habsburg high celebration, *Corpus Christi*, was held for the first time without any participation by state officials. No public gathering took place, as it was too cold, and only one school turned up for 7:30 a.m. mass. At a personal level, a planned trip to Lisbon with the Redemptorist Order had to be called off. Schwarz does not record the reason.[73]

However, this lost opportunity to leave the country must have struck hard against Schwarz, a man who does not seem to have travelled abroad. The timing of this planned trip and his 'illness' and temporary departure from Vienna at the time of the *Anschluss* are significant. They point to plans by Schwarz and his personal circle to keep him away from the capital, because when the Nazis took control of Austria, Schwarz knew he would be among the persecuted. The new authorities launched an investigation after Schwarz, complying with the law, registered his 'racial origins'. Minister Wallentin ordered investigations into the accuracy of statements by Schwarz and one of his curates, Fried, who had registered themselves as Jewish.[74] Nothing more is known about Fried, but Schwarz had, it seems, converted to Catholicism as a youth.[75] Forced to withdraw from his parish, initially to a monastic order, he then went on the run, adopting a disguise and a false name. In this he was courageously assisted by his housekeeper and her husband. They hid Schwarz's departure by buying the necessary rail tickets for him. They also continued to draw his food ration, until the deception was discovered. Eventually, they stood trial and could have been executed, but they escaped this fate and survived the war. Somehow, Schwarz ended up in the last place the Nazis would think to look for him: working as a chaplain at an SS hospital in Germany. Late in the war, he was recognised by a wounded soldier who had been one of his parishioners in Ottakring. From his hospital bed, the soldier told Schwarz that he would say nothing, and Schwarz survived.[76]

In the fight to take Vienna, Ottakring was the scene of close quarters fighting, as resistance against the Nazis spilled onto the streets and workers took up arms. The priest at the Catholic church of the Holy Spirit, on the Southern side of the district, sheltered 52 Ukrainian slave workers from the Nazis. Others were not so lucky, and the district was the

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[72] See, for instance, detailed records of church attendance and school registrations at AEDW AOCk, 1875, 1942 and AEDW WeCk, 1861.

[73] AEDW AOCk, 1938.

[74] AEDW AOCor, 19th October 1939. Memorandum from Minister Wallentin. See also correspondence of 20th October 1939.

[75] Kluger and Loidl for Schwarz and the story of the housekeeper, pages unnumbered.

[76] Kluger and Loidl, pages unnumbered.

site of mass executions of slave workers by German troops as the Red Army closed in. Aerial bombing left many buildings burnt out. These included the parish church of Neulerchenfeld, which was reduced to a shell.[77] These scenes could not have been far from his mind when, in the months after the end of the war, one Karl Walcher, who had been appointed as the parish administrator when Schwarz was forced to step down from day-to-day running of the parish, kept the *Chronik* of Alt-Ottakring up to date.[78] On 1st May 1945, Walcher recorded that the swastika had gone from the parish buildings, and 'the red-white-red flag, the flag of Austria is flying. God protect our country and our people'.[79] The Austrian flag was also to be seen flying from other public buildings. In October 1945, the entry reads that there was no sign of Schwarz, even though the parish had been 'freed' for five months.[80]

Then, late in 1945, news reached one Anna Kohl in Ottakring that Schwarz had been seen living and working in a monastery in Bavaria. He was on his way back and 'he is fine'.[81] The writer of the *Chronik* then talks of everything going back to normal and makes no reference to any consequences that might come out of the war. There were, however, consequences for Schwarz. He did go back to Ottakring, but only briefly. Schwarz retired on the grounds of what he described as an illness he had picked up 'in the field'.[82] Schwarz's biographer believed this had more to do with the rejection Schwarz experienced from his parishioners after his return in 1946, where he was still referred to as the 'Jewish Priest'.[83]

At this point, a discrepancy emerges between Schwarz's biography and the correspondence in the archives. According to the biography, Schwarz now took rooms in another parish in a different district of Vienna, where his role was restricted to the occasional hearing of confession, until his death in the late 1950s. Correspondence between Schwarz and the Ordinariat reveals a different story. Schwarz did retire, but he stayed only briefly in the role of father confessor in Vienna. He subsequently wrote to Diocesan officials that his experience of not having a parish had come too soon. Quoting from Genesis, he said he was

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[77] Schiemer, pp.163-167 for the end of the war in Ottakring.

[78] 1 October1939 Karl M. Walcher takes over parish administration. AEDW AOCor. These notes are by Walcher, who says his five years as administrator have taken their toll

[79] AEDW AOCk, 1945.

[80] AEDW AOCk, 1945, dated 24th October.

[81] AEDW AOCk, 1945. This comes after the October entry.

[82] AEDW AOCor, 30th April 1946.

[83] Kluger and Loidl, pages unnumbered. This is Kluger's comment, based on his experience of Schwarz.

now like Rachel: 'Give me children, or I will die'.[84] He still needed to have parishioners. So this request to come out of retirement was granted, and he was given a parish in Bavaria. It was in Bavaria, it appears, that he had spent some considerable time on the run during the war. Finally retiring after several more years' service, Schwarz lived to the late 1950s.[85]

The story of Schwarz is instructive when looking at antisemitism in the past. It cautions against making judgements that are influenced by the group with which an individual is associated. It also cautions that statements that appear to imply an antisemitic stance require analysis within a wider context. It is understandable that a reading of the parish newsletter could lead to an interpretation that Schwarz was an antisemite. Even without the knowledge of Schwarz's own background, however, other interpretations of his writing would be possible. The priests examined here were highly motivated by religion, and dedicated their lives to the service of the Church. The evidence does suggest that a large number of them were unpleasant, antisemitic and could be described in modern terms as racist. That does not mean that modern interpreters should read antisemitism into everything that appears, on the surface, to be antisemitic. This was a complex world. Comments about 'following stars' need to be taken in the religious context in which they were meant, rather than being read as signs of antisemitism. It may be just as likely that the curate who questioned Schwarz's credibility as a priest, in the dispute over stolen cheques mentioned earlier, was antisemitic and thinking of Schwarz's Jewish origins. Without knowing more about the curate who made the comment, however, it is impossible to know for certain.

The View From Post-War Austria

Schwarz's biography had joint authors, one of whom, Wolfgang Kluger, was the son of a lay helper at masses at Alt-Ottakring from the 1920s onwards. Kluger had been baptised by Schwarz at Alt-Ottakring and knew him well. The second author was Monsignor Franz Loidl, who wrote or co-authored a number of biographies of priests for the Church after the War. These biographies are revealing for what they show about post-War attitudes. No biography of Father Dittrich or Father Deckert has been published in this series, nor of Fathers Lojka or Schubert, yet Schubert had been well-connected in his lifetime. He had received papal honours, and the church at St. Laurenz had been chosen as the Dollfuss memorial church. Plans for the demolition of the old church and the raising of a modern church to cope with larger congregations were well advanced when *Anschluss* came and

[84] AEDW AOCor, 1st December 1946.

[85] Kluger and Loidl, pages unnumbered.

brought a halt to them. The plans had the explicit approval of Dollfuss's widow and of Cardinal Innitzer.[86]

The many priests who merit an entry in the series includes those who served in Ottakring and Währing, such as Leopold Engelhart, who was at Neu-Ottakring from 1938.[87] The series also includes a number of priests elsewhere who suffered persecution or died at the hands of the Nazis, such as Father Otto Neururer, a priest in the Tyrol who resisted the Nazis.[88] Over the years several works, including one in this series, have been written about Father Latschka. None of those that have been investigated for this study were critical of him or of his attitudes. Latschka has instead been allowed to speak freely through these works, stating his views without any critical appraisal. One biography, written in 1962, quotes extensively from Latschka's entries from the *Chronik* at Neu-Ottakring from 1899. Passages about the dreadful conditions of the working classes in late nineteenth century Vienna are accompanied *verbatim* by Latschka's explanations for this state of affairs: that the Jew *(sic)* was exploiting these people.[89]

At several levels, this biography seeks to validate Latschka's opinions. The statement is made that Latschka's views are being repeated without comment, for their 'interesting insights' on Vienna at the turn of the twentieth century.[90] This attribution of 'interesting insights' suggests that the author thought they were worth bringing to the attention of a new public. The choice of the 1899 *Chronik* entry, rather than the 1897 Alt-Ottakring *Chronik* on which Latschka based this entry, is also significant for the views of the biographer towards Latschka. This, after all, is Latschka's Vienna, which he conceptualised as a city where Christians were being held in *robot* to the Jews. The very title of the biography indicates how Latschka was viewed when this work was written. He is described as a *Seelsorger*, a German term often translated as 'Pastor', but one with a literal meaning of carer of souls. Less than twenty years after the end of the Second World War and the discovery of the Holocaust, it was acceptable to repeat without condemnation the words of a Catholic priest who had preached some of the worst vitriol against Jews in Vienna and the Habsburg Empire. It was acceptable for this priest to be described as a 'carer of souls'.[91]

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[86] *SLG Pfarrblatt*, September-October 1934.

[87] Franz Loidl, *Kanonikus Leop. Engelhart*, (Vienna: Publisher Name Not Printed, 1971).

[88] Franz Loidl, *Pfarrer Otto Neururer NS Opfer*, (Vienna: Wiener Katholische Akademie, 1983).

[89] Loidl, *Latschka*, pp.6-12.

[90] Loidl, *Latschka*, p.6.

[91] Loidl, *Latschka*, Title Page.

This lack of direct engagement with the attitudes of Latschka and his associates and successors still occurs. A recent biography of political theorist Alfred Missong states that Missong developed a Catholic social politics that was free of antisemitism.[92] It is well known that Missong polemicised against the book by Bishop Hudal that attempted to build bridges between the Church and the Nazis.[93] Missong belonged to a circle that opposed racial antisemitism, and no suggestion is made here that Missong was racist.[94] Missong did not, however, reject a debate that was based upon the alleged attributed characteristics of Jews. Writing in the 1930s, Missong described Father Joseph Deckert as having an honoured place in Church history, as the man who laid the spiritual seed from which Lueger's 'people's movement' had grown.[95] Missong also claimed that, in opposition to the racial antisemites, Deckert had succeeded in reducing the 'Jewish question' to one of religion and morality.[96] Leaving aside whether there was a 'Jewish question', rather than an antisemitic question, Missong is describing the same Deckert who wrote that he was a confirmed racial antisemite.[97] This is to say nothing of where or how, according to Deckert's world view, Missong would have placed Jews who rejected Judaism, whether for some other religion or for none.

Attempts have been made to come to terms with the past, some more profound than others. The Christian Social Party became, in effect, the Austrian People's Party.[98] The Church reflected on its time under the Corporate State and the *Anschluss* in a book on Church organisation in Vienna under Innitzer's leadership from 1932 to 1945. The book contains much reflection on practical matters, such as the redrawing of parish boundaries, and the relatively significant number of church foundations in Vienna between 1934 and 1937. No comment is made on why these years would have seen these foundations, as the Corporate State paid off its debts to the Church. The years of *Anschluss* are described as difficult years for the Church in Vienna. The index makes no reference to Jews or to antisemitism.

Numerous Viennese, of all political persuasions and none, of various religious beliefs and none, were persecuted during the *Anschluss* and spent time in prison and camps. Priests and others were executed for aiding resistance, sometimes of the most minor kind, but resistance

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[92] Alfred Missong jun, ed., *Alfred Missong: Christentum und Politik in Österreich: ausgewählte Schriften 1924-1950*, (Vienna: Böhlau, 2006), Introduction.

[93] Stourzh, p.39.

[94] John Connelly, 'Catholic Racism And Its Opponents', *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 79, No. 4 (December 2007), pp.813-847, here p.814.

[95] Alfred Missong, *Heiliges Wien: ein Führer durch Wiens Kirchen*, (Vienna: Dom-Verlag, 1930, 1970 edition), p.239.

[96] Missong, *Heiliges Wien*, p.239.

[97] Deckert, *Rassenantisemitismus?*, p.43.

[98] Lauridsen, p.22.

of any kind required enormous courage. Some Viennese were fortunate enough to be able to move on after the war. Kurt Schuschnigg, last pre-war Chancellor of Austria, was arrested by the Nazi regime in 1938 and was imprisoned until 1945. In 1946, still only in his late forties, he moved to the United States, where he became a professor of law at the University of St. Louis. He retired to rural Austria some twenty years later. It had been Schuschnigg who had pushed Dollfuss to execute leaders of the 1934 Socialist uprising. Schuschnigg, questioned about this many years later, described his action as a '*faux pas'*.[99]

Other ways in which some of the characters encountered in this work are still remembered in Vienna may surprise modern readers, especially when contrasted with those who are not commemorated. Yet it is difficult to ascribe a single meaning to the ways in which they are remembered. These are complex matters. The British and the French still have monuments and signs of remembrance for the builders of Empire. Cecil Rhodes, the spiritual godfather of the British Empire as it reached its greatest extent, is remembered today in an arts centre that bears his name on the site of his birthplace in the small English town of Bishop's Stortford.[100] The street leading to it is Kimberley Close, named after the mining centre in South Africa from which Rhodes established a commercial, political and military presence. Perhaps only those who are well versed in the history would draw the connection between this and a man whose views would nowadays be classed as racist.

This is not too dissimilar from the situation in Vienna today. Vienna is still the home of the Karl von Vogelsang Institute, with its Leopold Kunschak rooms. Those with a limited knowledge of history might be unaware that Vogelsang was an antisemite, who seems to have based his antisemitism on religious and allegedly economic grounds.[101] During a long career, Kunschak proposed the separation of the 'Jewish nation' from the 'German majority' of Austria. He also believed that no Jew could ever cease to be a Jew, even after conversion to Christianity.[102] Kunschak was able to resume a career as a politician after the Second World War, and is even now remembered officially by the Vienna City Council for his election to the freedom of the city in 1946.[103] Vienna is also the home of Dr.-Karl-Lueger-Platz as well as Dr.-Karl-Lueger-Ring. There is no clamour to rename these places as they

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[99] Neugebauer, in Tálos and Neugebauer, eds., pp.298-321, here p.303.

[100] http://www.rhodesbishopsstortford.org.uk/museum.php

[101] Pulzer, *Political Antisemitism,* pp.126-128.

[102] See Königseder, in Tálos and Neugebauer, eds., pp.60-61.

[103] http://www.wien.gv.at/rk/historisch/1946/november.html

sit in truce with Dr.-Karl-Renner-Ring or the numerous other places named after Marxist heroes and heroines, such as Friedrich Engels and Rosa Luxemburg.[104]

Perhaps, however, this does no more than to point to Renan's formulation that societies and nations survive not through their power to remember what binds them together but through their power to forget what divides them. Joseph Deckert's grave is in a well tended garden at the rear of his old church in Weinhaus. In the leaflets on sale there, his name is given as a founder of the church that stands there now. He is credited as the driving force in raising the funds for the building. There is no mention of his antisemitism. At the church of St. Laurenz in Währing, a stained glass window commemorates the work of Father Schubert. Again, there is no mention of his antisemitism. Adam Latschka remains honoured for his social work among Christians, and a Viennese street, Latschkagasse, is still named after him. Once again, there is no mention of his antisemitism. Father Johannes Krawarik, the priest wounded as Nazis stormed the Diocesan office, and against whom no accusations of antisemitism are laid, served to 1968 as parish priest at Alt-Ottakring, immediate successor to the 'Jewish priest', Father Schwarz. The square next to the church at Ottakring is named after Krawarik. But in Vienna, one priest is unremembered, at least publicly, and there is no immediately visible memorial, no street named after Father Karl Schwarz.

[104] Peter Autengruber, *Lexikon der Wiener Straßennamen*, (Vienna: Styria Pichler, 2010) for a comprehensive guide to the history of the names of Vienna's streets.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter presents the principal conclusions that have been reached in response to the questions posed in this work, concerning the nature, aims, depth and extent of radical visions of German identity in Vienna, between 1861 to 1938. Summaries are given of the themes that are central to the work, such as the nature of debates over identity and belonging, and include discussion of whether antisemitism was widespread, even in Red Vienna. The conclusions emphasize the importance of looking not just at comments in historical isolation, but examining individual and shared world views, for a clearer understanding of people's underlying attitudes and deeply held beliefs. This chapter then addresses the lessons to be drawn from Vienna in terms of understanding and applying models of nationalism. Finally, it returns to considering events shortly before and just after the *Anschluss*, to understand how some were attempting to shape and define identity and belonging, and what this meant in terms of radical German nationalism in Vienna.

A chronology of the period studied here reveals the complexity of life in a major European city from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century. Within this complexity, however, themes constantly re-emerge that are important for this study. Time and again, for instance, the state addressed questions of how it derived its legitimacy while, at the same time, questions were raised as to who could legitimate the state, who could belong to this state, and the forms that belonging and participation should take. The questions were often put in simpler terms. Who was a German? Who was an Austrian? What should happen to those who were considered to be different?

Nation And Identity: Dialogues On The Radical Right

At the start of the period under examination, large tracts of the Habsburg lands were part of the German Confederation, but the German speakers who occupied these lands had more than one identity that they could share: German, Habsburg, Christian, Catholic being among them. Those on the German radical Right came to argue about subsets of these groupings, of whether a Catholic or a Protestant identity was the essence of being Austrian or German, or whether an Austrian should be seen as Austrian first, then German, or vice-versa. At various times, these aspects of identity took on different levels of significance, and aspects were stressed in different measure as a response to perceived threats or opportunities. The one thing that the radical Right seems to have agreed upon was that a true German was an antisemite.

The radical camp split into those who favoured union with Germany and those who remained loyal to an Austrian vision, in one form or other. As the period progressed, the latter were generally members of the Christian Social movement, although some Christian

Socials wanted *Anschluss*. Whether Pan-German or Christian Social, antisemites defined Germans as a distinctive group of people, different from others. They emphasized ideas of belonging to a distinct territory, even if they varied the territory or territories that they emphasized, and suggested powerful links between nation and territory. They used a common language, common traditions and a shared history in order to promote unity. They argued about the nature and political objectives of the nation.

These groups had different objectives when it came to the state in which they felt they should be based, but many models of nationalism presuppose that nationalists would wish to bring together all co-nationals in one state. Pan-Germans would ultimately have expected Germans to come together in one state. Christian Socials generally regarded the German nation as a collection of tribes, each of which had the right to its own religion. This does not, however, make the Christian Socials less nationalist than the Pan-Germans, in the sense that they would respond forcefully to any perceived threat to German culture. At these points, they were nationalists foremost, with the nation their primary concern.

All radical Germans emphasized kinship and the ethnic nature of nationalism, and they believed that the German nation was rooted in the past. Pan-Germans also appealed to the strength they felt would come from what, in their eyes, was a modernising of society through the nation-state. Pan-Germans were ultimately ethnic, political nationalists. Christian Socials adopted a more culturally nationalist tone when this suited their objectives. Under the Empire, they proposed hierarchies of nations, but all nations, Jews excluded, were to be allowed their own culture, to some extent.

The radical Right struggled to find common ground over religion. While religion was not the only area that drove a wedge between Pan-German and Christian Social antisemites, it was key, especially after the fall of the Empire. Under the Empire, dynastic attachment kept many German Austrian antisemites loyal to the Habsburgs. Under the Republic, though, religion dictated for many whether union with Germany or a separate development for Austria was to be promoted. Occasionally, even the Catholic clergy, like Father Schmid or Cardinal Innitzer, could say that religious differences should be set aside in order to bring all Germans together. On the whole, however, this did not apply.

The shifting alliances and the sometimes apparently contradictory positions adopted by people on the radical Right demonstrate that no single model of the nation and nationalism has universal validity, but models of the nation and nationalism are useful tools, if they are applied as complements to each other, and if it is recognised that they do not tell the whole story. Nationalism may be a political programme used to benefit those who would form an elite in a new, nationalised state, but this does not mean that nationalist politicians do not

also believe that a nationalised state would be good for the people they define as their nation. Even if nationalists move from one position to another, this does not necessarily invalidate the models described here. People form coalitions of interest with similar groups which may at other times be rivals. People also emphasize different aspects of their identity at different times, so someone can be a cultural nationalist at one time, then be radicalised into political action later.

It would also be far from correct to say that the nation had or has a monopoly over definitions of identity or belonging. In the period under consideration, religion, or a lack of one, was clearly a significant factor in identity. This can be seen from conversions and reconversions, to and from Catholicism. In the 1890s, the taking of power in the city by the Christian Socials was followed by a spate of conversions to Catholicism in Vienna. Then, Pan-German successes initiated a brief swelling of Protestant numbers. In the 1920s, in Red Vienna, approximately 20,000 people a year were leaving the Catholic Church. After 1933, with Dollfuss in power, a wave of re-conversions followed.

Individual causes of these conversions to, and departures from, various churches are difficult to establish, and while conversion or departure was a one-off act, involvement in church ritual was part of a banal process that reinforced identity, a form of daily plebiscite that Renan would have recognised. Further daily plebiscites were made possible by formal and informal networks, and by places which at first sight may not seem to have any political purpose: the singing societies, voluntary associations, church groups and even masses and pilgrimages. These groups on their own may seem to lack a greater significance, but they were important collectively. Individual churches, for instance, may have been relatively small, but the twenty-one districts in Vienna each held several parishes. Each church held several masses a day, and on Sundays and feast days these churches were full, and the priest was often a key player in wider antisemitic networks, which overlapped each other many times. These networks, as has been seen, had a considerable extent at any one time and a considerable durability over time.

These networks also, in ways that echo Rogers Brubaker's hypothesis, provided places where identity could be formed as a process, not just as a fixed set of attributes. Social interaction among a group of people who shared views on the world would have helped to create or confirm radical opinions. On the Christian Social side, they would have set these opinions first in a bourgeois world of Habsburg loyalty, then in a bourgeois world of opposition to the Republic. They would have confirmed these people in their view that a 'true' German way was a Catholic German way.

German nationalists were less fortunate. Fewer in number than the Christian Socials, they did not possess their own networks as counterparts to those that formed around the Church or Christian Social groups. They did, however, have access to those shared areas of social life and charitable activities which were open to Christian bourgeois. The Three Camps model did not apply here, and German nationalists and Christian Socials could rub shoulders together in, for instance, the bourgeois singing groups that gathered under the umbrella of the *Österreichischer Sängerbund*. These groups allowed a common bourgeois front, right into the First Republic, and sometimes provided Christian Socials and Pan-Germans with common ground.

By 1930, the Christian Social vision of identity was under challenge as the dominant vision on the Right. In the elections of that year in Vienna, record numbers of people on the Right voted for a political movement which aimed at bringing together the entire German nation in one state. It is difficult to say whether they were voting for this option out of conviction, rather than, say, despair at the economic circumstances. It can be said that by 1930 the overlapping networks on the radical Right made acceptance of the idea of union with Germany something to be considered by some former Christian Social voters. It can be said, too, that the 1932 elections showed that the most radical version of nationalist exclusion, in the ideas of the Nazi Party – if not the ways in which they would be implemented – had found acceptance by many on the radical Right.

Julie Thorpe rightly rejects interpretations of this breakthrough in 1932, and the subsequent Nazi takeover in 1938, as the outcome of a linear tradition that links Pan-Germanism from Schönerer in the 1880s through to the Nazis.[1] Thorpe draws attention to a widespread Austro-centric interpretation of Pan-Germanism, a view which pointed to 'Austria's unique identity as a German state and to the shared national identity of Austrian Germans and other Germans in Central Europe'. Thorpe also points to how Pan-Germanism could be defined in many different ways. This could be beneficial in helping competing radical groups, who might be different from each other in many ways, to reach agreements of convenience. As Thorpe says, over the years, Nazis and Austro-Fascists clashed, but often converged in the idea of building 'a new state of German citizens'.[2]

Nevertheless, the extent of agreement should not be exaggerated. The Austro-fascist vision of Austria as a German state was very different from that of the Nazis. Nor should the widespread acceptance of a common German heritage that transcended state boundaries lead

[1] Thorpe, p.6.

[2] Thorpe, pp.6-7.

to a conclusion that Pan-Germanism was the 'unifying creed of all Austrians before 1938'.[3] Otto Bauer did not talk of Austria as 'the better Germany' because he accepted Pan-German themes of 'blood and soil'.[4] Bauer's vision of 'Germany', however much it would have privileged German culture over others, was ultimately based on a Socialist internationalism, which separated it from the vision of the radical Right. Despite the Social Democrats being perhaps the last allies he could call on in his struggle with the Nazis, Schuschnigg would therefore have no dealings with 'Marxists'.[5]

Vienna As An Antisemitic Hotbed?

Christian Socials and German nationalists tried hard to recruit people to their viewpoint and between them gathered sizeable support in Vienna, even if this support remained a minority overall. However, the impact on the city of their visions of exclusion can not be understood by studying them in isolation, and the context of the city has to be taken into account. This was a predominantly working class city, where the Social Democratic Party influenced life at many levels, even before it took control of Vienna after 1918. Neither the Party, nor the movement as a whole, was the same as the working class, but the reach of the Social Democrats was such that an analysis of their position with regard to antisemitism is required, especially as there has been criticism of their actions, policies and attitudes. If an examination of the context leads to a conclusion that the radical Right was not alone in making antisemitism widespread, then its share of the responsibility for the scenes of 1938 and afterwards is limited.

In order to reach a conclusion, it must be remembered that few would have imagined, even as late as the 1930s, that exclusionary prejudice could lead to the genocide of the Holocaust. Social Democrats therefore prioritised the class struggle over the struggle against prejudice. Social Democrats considered Christian Social attacks on 'Jewish Capitalism' to be a political lie of convenience. Christian Socials made life difficult and deeply unpleasant for Jews without influence or power, yet they formed opportunist coalitions with the rich, regardless of their confessional status, when both stood to gain from such coalitions. The Social Democrats were asking why the Christian Socials would form alliances with Jewish capitalists if antisemitism was the main thrust of the Christian Social programme. As for Social Democratic use of stereotypes, these, however distasteful, should not be equated with antisemitism. Vienna from the 1860s to 1938 was a world where stereotype and caricature were used extensively. This world of stereotypes may seem crude and harsh under modern

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[3] Thorpe, p.17.

[4] Thorpe, p.31.

[5] Stourzh p.38.

analysis, but the use of stereotypes does not necessarily indicate antisemitism. Stereotypes were short-cuts that formed part of a very specific assault on Christian Social propaganda.

This work has shown that much criticism of the Social Democrats is unjustified. It accepts that, just as it would be mistaken to suggest that all supporters of the Christian Social Party were antisemites, it would be mistaken to suggest that all Social Democratic supporters were immune from antisemitism. However, in short, and while accepting that tactical considerations came into play, and mistakes were made, Social Democratic analysis of antisemitism derived from a Marxist viewpoint which differentiated neither capitalists nor proletarians by race, religion or nationality. Class was all that mattered.

Anschluss And After

In 1932, whatever the desires of the Austrian people, the international situation would not have allowed *Anschluss* to happen. The *Anschluss* of 1938 was the result of changes over the previous handful of years to the political, diplomatic and military environments in Europe. However, when the *Anschluss* did come, huge crowds gathered to celebrate in Vienna. The people making up these crowds would have come for a variety of reasons, from deeply-felt conviction about the events that were taking place through to simple curiosity. Some celebrated a new start, in a state that apparently offered a way out of the Depression. Others, like Father Schmid, rejoiced at the re-union of German peoples who had been separated in the nineteenth century. Alongside these crowds, though, other events demonstrated the depth and nature of the sentiment that some shared for this particular *Anschluss*. The mobs that attacked and demeaned Jews effectively executed the first *Kristallnacht* in the newly unified *Reich*.

These mobs help to answer the first key question posed at the beginning of this work, of whether, by 1938, support for radical German nationalism had become deeply embedded in the political and social life of Vienna. The answer is that radical German nationalism was deeply embedded among certain sectors within Vienna. The mobs were the product of an explosion of feeling that had been built up by groups and networks of many kinds, political, social and charitable among them, with their long history of promoting an exclusionary vision of belonging, especially towards Jews. The nature of the radical vision that had been propagated was extreme. Metaphors and imagery that portrayed Jews as alien intruders, exploiters, and even vermin, had for long been common on the radical Right. Those who would nowadays be expected to give a moral lead against these positions, such as the clergy, were often to be found using such language. By 1938, the everyday, unthinking repetition of viciously expressed views of racial hierarchy were ingrained among certain sectors of the

Viennese population. The result was that these views were deeply held by those who believed them. They were not opinions that could be easily changed.

The second key question addressed by this work is whether *Anschluss* was the fulfilment of the visions that those with radical definitions of being German had been supporting in the lead-up to 1938. The clear answer to this is that it was not the fulfilment of the dreams of all of them. In the long period before 1938, significant numbers opposed union with Germany, often for many different reasons. After 1938, they often paid for this opposition. Despite the common ground of antisemitism between the post-*Anschluss* régime and many on the radical Right, supporters of an Austrian particularist path were frequently harassed, oppressed and jailed. Even those who had been prepared to resort to strong-arm tactics against the Social Democrats were not necessarily supporters of Nazi aims. Some on the Right, like Fathers Lojka and Schubert, even opposed the Nazis, in their own ways.

The final key question concerns the extent of support in Vienna for Anschluss. This requires some quantification of the extent of support for union with a Nazi-led Germany which, it was already clear by 1938, promoted exclusion through state sponsored, and often state led, violence. Any attempt to put a figure on how many in Vienna supported union with a Nazi-led Germany necessarily involves a degree of speculation. This speculation as to their numbers is worthwhile, however, as it provides a means of assessing their strength as a group compared with others, and an estimate is possible by using the evidence at hand.

The most tangible evidence to be found is in the election results of 1930 and 1932 in Vienna. In the 1930 national elections, the Pan-Germans won 150,000 votes in Vienna and the Nazis won almost 30,000, giving a total of nearly 180,000 Viennese who voted for parties which had *Anschluss* as the overriding objective of their programmes. In 1932, the combined total was just short of 240,000, although this time the vast bulk of support was for the Nazis. Again, caution must be exercised about the motivations behind voting Nazi, but the voting figures strongly suggest an interpretation that about 240,000 adults, approximately nineteen per cent of the city's mature population, supported the version of *Anschluss* that Hitler represented in March 1938.[6]

Final Remarks

Extreme response to change was a major theme to emerge from this work. Many reacted angrily to the rapidly expanding Jewish population of the city in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to the wartime refugee crises, to the fall of the Empire, and to the newly

[6] Estimated from Seliger and Ucakar, Vol. 2, p.1081, as just under seventy per cent of a total population of 1,874,130 in 1934, to reach a figure for adults of 1,295,596.

Social Democratic Vienna of the 1920s. Radicals, angered by changing economic and social conditions, used images of an idealised pre-industrial and 'pre-liberal' social order to promote an exclusionary vision. They talked of the recreation of something that had not existed, and put forward scapegoats who were said to be responsible for change, rather than confronting the realities of social and economic trends that were taking place over a long period.

It has been recognised that the explosion of violence that took place in 1938 in Vienna was the result of both long-term and immediate causes, but much debate has taken place over the years as to where and how an exclusionary vision of identity and belonging took root. This work has contributed to the debate by examining events over a relatively long period. It has gone into the daily lives of some of the key players in events, the priests of Vienna, to explore their involvement in politics, but set against the context of their other activities and those of others who were involved with the movement. It has shown that priests were not just low level agitators in the Christian Social movement. This would be true if only power was taken into account, but these priests had access to another important commodity: influence. The priests were not just confined to their parish churches. They were present in the daily lives of many people. They called on the support of numerous curates. They used their influence within networks of antisemitic sympathisers and activists.

The priests encountered earlier in the period influenced not just those around them, but those who came after them. Father Lojka explicitly identifies the preaching of Father Deckert as one influence on his decision to become a priest. Other priests, from around the turn of the century, show the influence of their predecessors in the language they use, and the ways in which they use it: they are confident that the antisemitism they express is, for many, an orthodoxy. Yet a tension in their language sometimes betrays a frustration that they have not won their battle everywhere.

In examining the stance of associations in spreading an exclusionary message, it is appropriate to divide them into three groupings: those where evidence clearly shows that they adopted a stance towards exclusion; those that appear not to have adopted an exclusionary stance; and those where the findings strongly suggest that exclusionary visions were prominent, but where further research would be of benefit in reaching more definitive conclusions.

In the same way as liberal political groups moved towards a nationalist or antisemitic standpoint, it has been well documented by others, such as Pulzer and Boyer, that many associations and societies followed the same path. The research for this work has uncovered further evidence of this process. Some associations, such as the Academic Association of

German Historians, were formed to promote a nationally exclusive vision, and the evidence suggests that this incorporated antisemitism. Other associations, such as *Jung-Währing*, expressed an explicitly antisemitic purpose. Others had an indirectly, but strongly, antisemitic intent. Father Abel turned to the *Marianische Kaufmannskongregation* to recruit members for pilgrimages, but his weapon, and his aim, was the antisemitism of the crowd. Abel, and others like him, perceived associations as a tried and tested means to spread their message.

The issue of exclusion penetrated many associations, although the members of some, such as the seminar of the geographers, or the *Deutsch-österreichische Schriftsteller-Genossenschaft*, seem to have held out against exclusionary visions. With others, the findings are less clear, but point strongly to their pursuing an exclusionary agenda. The singing groups examined here, one of the most highly active sets of associations, need to be considered carefully. Explicitly exclusionary statements do not come through, but other evidence points to the prevailing attitudes among these societies. They belonged to umbrella groups that were organised along political lines, aligning with political movements which had an antisemitic agenda. They were in attendance at events, such as wedding anniversaries, which were patronised by important members of the antisemitic Christian Social movement. Tellingly, some of their publications shared the language of radical Germans from this time. The *Währinger Liedertafel* talked of the need to 'protect' a 'true' German identity, without explaining why this protection was necessary, nor against whom. In the 1900s, they talked of how they had been unappreciated in this role in their early days, but that this had changed. This corresponds to the period in which exclusionary developments took place among other associations, and reflects the exclusionary language of Vienna of the time. Overall, the findings gathered here, coupled with those from other works, demonstrate the involvement of a considerable number of associations, made up of people with status and therefore with influence, in the creation of an exclusionary vision. However, further research, on these and other associations would yield a more comprehensive picture.

Groups and individuals on the radical Right, the priests, journalists, teachers, society members, politicians and others, whatever their motivation, were the causes of the long-term growth and persistence of antisemitism and a brand of German nationalism based on exclusion. They helped to make acceptable antisemitism and extreme nationalism as a natural basis for the understanding and foundations of society. Responsibility for the exclusionary vision ultimately lies with those attempting to create it, not with those who miscalculated its importance or who were unable to stop it. The irony is that when the Nazis arrived, they did not just target Jews, Social Democrats, Communists and others who did not

fit their world view. They rounded up many who had laid the foundations for extreme views to be accepted by a large part of the population of the city. Those spreading these messages had played with fire in exploiting vicious forms of exclusionary nationalism and antisemitism, and now they too were paying the cost.

APPENDIX A: NATIONALISM – A TYPOLOGY



Developed and extended from categories suggested in John Hutchinson, *Modern Nationalism* (Fontana, London, 1994).

APPENDIX B: SOME CATEGORIES AND ASPECTS OF ANTISEMITISM[1]

Antisemitism is defined here as a range of attitudes characterised by prejudice against Jews simply for being Jews. These attitudes are directed against people who are of Jewish origin, or who are considered to be Jewish by the person who is antisemitic. Antisemitism may be expressed against individuals, but it is based on views of Jews as a group. Antisemites often justify these views by claiming that Jews possess certain attributes which make them different from others, and that Jews are harmful to the community in general. The categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and some overlap each other.

VARIETIES OF ANTISEMITISM	
CATEGORY	**CHARACTERISTICS**
Religious (Christian)	Jews are considered an intruder into Christian culture. In its least aggressive form, religious antisemitism against an individual would cease when a Jew converted to Christianity.
Economic	Jews are defined as a group which looks after its own interests, to the detriment of others. Jews are said to work in sectors which they 'dominate'. This overlooks historical circumstances that led to some Jews becoming heavily involved in some sectors because of their exclusion from others.
Social	Jews are considered to be unsuited to the company of non-Jews. Students who refused to duel with Jews on the grounds that they were unworthy of 'demanding satisfaction' formed a notable manifestation in Vienna between 1860 and 1938
Political	This is the organised expression of antisemitism through political means. It is intended to be the means to implement discriminatory measures against Jews.
Racial	Jews are considered to be at the bottom of hierarchies of 'races'.
Biological	Jews are not even considered to be part of the human race, but another species altogether, 'vermin' infesting society.

[1] This appendix has drawn from several sources, but especially Pulzer, *Political Antisemitism*, *passim*, and Scholz and Heinisch, p.18.

MOTIVATIONS FOR ANTISEMITISM	
Defensive Versus Attacking	Antisemites may perceive a need to defend their societies against Jews, or to attack alleged 'Jewish interests'. The antisemitism of clerical circles in the 1860s was characterised by defensive language, but later became increasingly attacking.
Genuine Versus Opportunistic	Antisemites may genuinely believe in their case, or they may display antisemitic attitudes solely for their own gain. Karl Lueger's antisemitism has been described as both genuine and opportunistic.

Relationship Of Antisemitism With Radical Nationalism	
Subset Of Nationalism Or Distinct?	In the context of this work, antisemitism and radical nationalism overlap. Antisemites of all varieties agreed on their hostility to Jews, and could promoted an exclusionary vision of identity. Pan-German antisemites and particularist Austrian antisemites, however, frequently came into conflict over how to define who belonged in society. Divisions were strong where religion was concerned, or as to whether Germans were one indivisible nation or a nation of several 'tribes'.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS	
'Moderate' / 'Mild' Antisemitism	Some antisemitism has inaccurately been described as mild or moderate. Any form of antisemitism discriminates on the basis of irrationally attributed alleged attributes.
Apparent Antisemitism	Comments or attitudes which are not based on antisemitism may be described as antisemitic when their context is not taken into consideration. Misunderstandings of this kind derive from anachronistic interpretations of comments from the past, especially when the interpretations are made by people living in a post-Holocaust world.

APPENDIX C: VIENNA'S DISTRICTS



Number And Name		Number And Name		Number And Name		Number And Name	
I	Innere Stadt	VII	Neubau	XIII	Hietzing	XIX	Döbling
II	Leopoldstadt	VIII	Josefstadt	XIV	Penzing	XX	Brigittenau
III	Landstrasse	IX	Alsergrund	XV	Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus	XXI	Floridsdorf
IV	Wieden	X	Favoriten	XVI	Ottakring	XXII	Donaustadt
V	Margareten	XI	Simmering	XVII	Hernals	XXIII	Liesing
VI	Mariahilf	XII	Meidling	XVIII	Währing		

This map shows modern day Vienna, and the boundaries of each of its districts. Districts I to IX, plus XX, which was part of the Leopoldstadt until 1900, comprise the extent of Vienna City Council until expansion in the 1890s. Most suburbs beyond this line were then brought into the city. District XXIII, Liesing, was integrated into the city in 1938.

APPENDIX D: THE PRIESTS OF THE FOUR PARISHES

Alt-Ottakring (Ottakring until 1897)	
Years	**Priest**
1848-1874	Emmanuel Paletz
1874-1889	Carl Dittrich
1889-1897	Wilhelm Pokorny
1897-1899	Adam Latschka
1899-1928	Johannes Pax
1928-1946	Karl Schwarz

Neu-Ottakring	
Years	**Priest**
1899-1905	Adam Latschka
1905-1911	Franz Edelbauer
1912-1938	Leopold Rössler

St. Josef, Weinhaus	
Years	**Priest**
1858-1874	Adam Schwandner
1874-1901	Joseph Deckert
1901-1910	Joseph Pachmann
1910-1921	Ludwig Heppenheim
1921-1944	Leopold Lojka

St. Laurenz-Gertrud, Währing	
Years	**Priest**
1850-1872	Joseph Magnollo
1872-1884	Adolf Khu
1884-1897	Ignaz Aumann
1897-1907	Johannes Panholzer
1907-1923	Johann Treml
1923-1942	Albert Schubert

APPENDIX E: ELECTIONS IN VIENNA, 1932[1]

Table 1: 1932 Absolute Figures

District	Turnout	Change In Turnout From 1930	Christian Socials	Pan-Germans	Social Democrats		National Socialists
I	20367	-3349	7522	176	8919		3574
II	84536	-1362	13409	312	55153		14153
III	86048	150	19278	1252	43980		20007
IV	31633	-2361	9507	6472	11367		9840
V	58420	-2700	11474	7197	33474		11415
VI	30829	-2936	8216	4621	14567		7351
VII	36365	-2997	10068	5595	16277		9043
VIII	26992	-2142	7494	4832	11106		7533
IX	50846	-3625	11525	537	27270		10755
X	95831	3064	13530	319	69366		9398
XI	31857	-417	7239	134	21619		2320
XII	71871	-70	13280	361	46081		10128
XIII	85716	-262	17649	783	49441		15542
XIV	46633	-1963	8904	190	29843		6072
XV	35600	-1775	7646	254	20246		6540
XVI	98354	-3161	15251	400	65390		11700
XVII	55504	-1760	12023	216	31778		9416
XVIII	53535	-3729	12737	933	23903		15065
XIX	35800	-1220	7720	333	19439		7705
XX	55793	-293	8811	143	41970		6200
XXI	63537	3243	10178	216	43751		7705
Totals			233461	35276	684940		202875

This table compares the results for the Christian Socials, Pan-Germans and Nazis in the 1932 Vienna elections. Districts where the Nazi vote alone exceeded that of the Christian Socials in 1932 are highlighted thus: 15065. Districts where the combined total of Nazi and Pan-German votes outnumbered those of the Christian Socials are marked: 7703.

[1] The sources for this appendix are Seliger and Ucakar, Vol. 2, pp.1158-1178; *RP* 25th April 1932; and *NZ*, 25th April 1932.

Table 2: Christian Social And Pan-German Losses To The Nazis, 1932

District	Individual Party Losses Between 1930 And 1932		Change In Turnout	Combined Christian Social And Pan-German Losses	National Socialist Gains From 1930	National Socialist Gains Minus Christian Social / Pan-German Losses	National Socialist Gains as % Christian Social/Pan-German Losses
	Christian Socials	Pan-Germans					
I	496	4091	-3349	4587	2429	-2158	52.95
II	4661	7341	-1362	12002	11060	-942	92.15
III	6014	11201	150	17215	14762	-2453	85.75
IV	2440	5979	-2361	8419	7019	-1400	83.37
V	3077	6681	-2700	9758	8402	-1356	86.10
VI	2305	4280	-2936	6585	5238	-1347	79.54
VII	2473	5131	-2997	7604	6442	-1162	84.72
VIII	1978	4432	-2142	6410	5157	-1253	80.45
IX	2942	6704	-3625	9646	7852	-1794	81.40
X	1914	5631	3064	7545	7288	-257	96.59
XI	-360	1707	-417	1347	1166	-181	86.56
XII	2316	5477	-70	7793	7855	62	100.80
XIII	3409	9413	-262	12822	11941	-881	93.13
XIV	1358	3498	-1963	4856	4567	-289	94.05
XV	1403	3681	-1775	5084	4805	-279	94.51
XVI	2939	6624	-3161	9563	8849	-714	92.53
XVII	2285	4806	-1760	7091	6869	-222	96.87
XVIII	3783	7666	-3729	11449	10800	-649	94.33
XIX	1335	4386	-1220	5721	5234	-487	91.49
XX	1629	3192	-293	4821	4727	-94	98.05
XXI	1101	3715	3243	4816	5195	379	107.87
Total			-29665	165134	147657	-17477	
Average Per District			-1413	7864	7031		

This table compares the 1930 national elections in Vienna with the 1932 Vienna municipal elections. It compares the losses suffered by the Christian Social Party and the Pan-Germans on the one hand, with the gains experienced by the National Socialists on the other. In only two districts, XII (Meidling) and XXI (Floridsdorf), were National Socialist gains greater than the losses of the other two parties, and then only by 62 votes in Meidling. The Nazis gained heavily in Floridsdorf, but the Social Democrats also gained 416 votes compared with 1930. This suggests a broad correlation between voters who left the traditional main Right-wing parties and voters picked up by the Nazis but, as can be seen, not all voters who left the Christian Socials and Pan-Germans voted Nazi.

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This bibliography is comprised of items which have influenced the development of this work. Not all of the books, articles or archive items that have been consulted have been included here, nor even all media. Items which have not been referenced in the text, but which have been of importance to the thinking behind this work, are included here.

ARCHIVES AND LIBRARIES CONSULTED

ARCHIVE / LIBRARY	SPECIFIC MATERIAL REFERENCED IN TEXT, WHERE APPROPRIATE	ABBREVIATION USED IN TEXT
Diözesanarchiv, Wien	Alt-Ottakring *Chronik*	AEDW AOCk
	Alt-Ottakring Correspondence	AEDW AOCor
	Neu-Ottakring *Chronik*	AEDW NOCk
	Neu-Ottakring Correspondence	AEDW NOCor
	Währing *Chronik*	AEDW WäCk
	Währing Correspondence	AEDW WäCor
	Weinhaus *Chronik*	AEDW WeCk
	Weinhaus Correspondence	AEDW WeCor (See note below)
	St. Rochus *Chronik*	AEDW SRCk
	St. Rochus Correspondence	AEDW SRCor
	Grinzing *Chronik*	AEDW GrCk
Archiv der Bundespolizeidirektion Unless otherwise stated, all material from here is a police report, as dated.	Verwaltungspolizeiliche Agenden	ABPD V
	Strafpolizeiliche Agenden	ABPD St
	No distinction made in certain years	ABPD
Wiener Volksliedwerkstatt		WVLW
Wienbibliothek Im Rathaus		WbiR
Wienbibliothek Im Rathaus Handschriftsammlung		WBiR Handschrift
Wienbibliothek Im Rathaus Musiksammlung		WbiR MkS

ARCHIVE / LIBRARY	SPECIFIC MATERIAL REFERENCED IN TEXT, WHERE APPROPRIATE	ABBREVIATION USED IN TEXT
Österreichische Nationalbibliothek		ÖNB
Österreichische Nationalbibliothek Musiksammlung		ÖNB Musik
Österreichische Nationalbibliothek Zeitungssammlung		ÖNB Zeitung

A Note On Materials From The Police Archive In Vienna

The Police Archive – Archiv der Bundespolizeidirektion – provided material that was split between administrative work and work involving investigation and prosecution. In the later years covered, many files covered both aspects. All documents are referenced here by date, where a date was given, as the files are ordered chronologically.

The *Chronik* Or *Gedenkbuch* Of A Parish

Thanks to information from Dr. Johann Weißensteiner of the Archives of the Archdiocese of Vienna, it is understood that, in the period under consideration, priests were understood to be under strict instructions not to keep personal diaries. The *Chronik*, or *Gedenkbuch*, was therefore their primary record of activities in their parish. The instruction did not stop many of them recording personal observations.

Parish Correspondence

Correspondence in the Archdiocesan Archives often carries an alphanumeric reference. This is not referenced here, as it is not universally used. As the files in each box of correspondence are generally held in date order in files, the date of the item is the primary indicator used here.

A Note On The Correspondence From The Parish Of Weinhaus

The box for the correspondence from Weinhaus was divided into folders for the years 1754-1852; 1853-1899; 1900-1910; and 1911-1950. The folder for the years 1853 to 1899, which covered the bulk of the Deckert years at the parish, was missing. Despite the efforts of the staff in the Archive, this could not be found. Fortunately, some correspondence from the period, and copies of Deckert's will, were found in the folder from 1900-1910, since some disputes in which Deckert was involved continued after his death. The Weinhaus *Chronik* was also complete for the whole period, and other items such as Father Deckert's publications were also available.

PARISH NEWSLETTERS

Parish newsletters varied considerably. Some ran to many pages, others to a handful. They generally reflected the wealth and status of the parish. So, the newsletter of the Piaristengemeinde in the Josefstadt was filled with advertisements in the 1930s, but the newsletter for Neulerchenfeld began with four sides, of which one and a half were advertisements. They were meant to raise funds, as well as to spread the word of the Church. Publication could be erratic, and issue numbers did not always correspond to the month of the year. In the text of this work, the year and either the number of the issue or the month is given, for identification of a particular newsletter.

DISTRICT – NUMBER AND NAME	PARISH	NEWSLETTER NAME	ABBREVIATION IN FOOTNOTES
III – Landstrasse	St. Rochus	St. Rochus Pfarrblatt	SR Pfarrblatt
VIII – Josefstadt	Alservorstadt	Katholische Aktion in der Alservorstadt, changed to Pfarrblatt der Alservorstadt in October 1938, after Catholic Action was suppressed.	AV Pfarrblatt
	Maria-Treu, Piaristenkirche	Monatsblatt	MT Pfarrblatt
XVI – Ottakring	Alt-Ottakring	Alt-Ottakringer Pfarrblatt	AO Pfarrblatt
	Neu-Ottakring	Mitteilungen der Pfarre Neu-Ottakring	NO Pfarrblatt
	Neulerchenfeld	Neulerchenfelder Pfarr-Blatt	NL Pfarrblatt
	Zum Heiligen-Geist	Heiliger Geistbote	HG Pfarrblatt
XV – Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus	Breitenfeld	Breitenfelder Pfarrblatt	Br Pfarrblatt
XVII – Hernals	Hernals	Hernalser Pfarrblatt	Hs Pfarrblatt
XVIII – Währing	St. Laurenz-Gertrud, Währing	St. Laurenz-Gertrudsblatt	SLG Pfarrblatt

DISTRICT – NUMBER AND NAME	PARISH	NEWSLETTER NAME	ABBREVIATION IN FOOTNOTES
	St. Joseph, Weinhaus	Weinhauser Pfarrblatt	We Pfarrblatt
XIX – Döbling	Grinzing	Grinzinger Pfarrnachrichten	Gr Pfarrblatt

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Arbeiter-Zeitung

Christlich-Soziale Arbeiter-Zeitung

Christlich-Deutsche Volksbühne

Das Kleine Blatt

Das Vaterland

Der Floh

Deutsche Zeitung

Die Bombe

Die Debatte

Freies Blatt

Österreichische Wochenzeitung

Konstitutionelle-Vorstadt-Zeitung

Montags-Zeitung

Neue Freie Presse

NS Nachrichten für den XVIII Bezirk

Österreichischer Arbeiter-Zeitung

Österreichischer Reformer

Ottakringer Rundschau

Reichspost

Sportblatt am Mittag

Unentgeltliche Nachrichten der organisierten Ottakringer Hausbesitzer

Volksblatt

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Austrian National Newspapers Online – Anno	http://anno.onb.ac.at/	
AEIOU	www.aeiou.at Austrian Federal Ministry for Education, Science and Culture (BMBWK)	
Neue deutsche Biographie	http://www.deutsche-biographie.de Historischen Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften Berlin	
Österreichisches Biographisches Lexikon 1815–1950	http://www.biographien.ac.at/oebl?frames=yes Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaft	This site lists people alphabetically. It uses facsimile pages of its print edition. This is the page in the reference.
Oxford Reference On-Line	www.oxfordreference.com Oxford University Press	